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ABSTRACT 
One of the major economic themes which characterised the development of modern 
company law was the well-documented separation of ownership from control and the 
increase in management control brought about by the wide dispersion of share ownership 
in large public companies. The growth and complexity of the modern corporation with 
diversified ownership created the need for governance mechanisms to facilitate the 
monitoring of managers and to restrain them from acting inappropriately, while not 
unduly restricting their ability to make decisions. 
The issue of corporate governance has been fiercely debated in both the US and the UK 
for several decades. The impact of globalisation and the recent financial crises in East 
Asia and elsewhere have spurred on corporate governance reform, which is now being 
implemented in many jurisdictions around the world. In recent years, China appears to 
have adopted some of the basic corporate governance structures of the Anglo-American 
system. However, little comparative empirical work has so far been undertaken to 
document systemic differences in ownership structures, institutional arrangement and 
legal rules between the current Chinese corporate governance system and the systems in 
the UK and the US, or to determine how a corporate governance regime can best be 
designed to overcome the agency problems created by the separation of ownership from 
control in the Chinese context. 
In this thesis, we investigate the characteristics of China's corporate ownership structure 
and assess how effective shareholders are in monitoring directors' activities; we examine 
II 
how boards are structured and function to ensure the efficient running of the company; 
and we consider the legal duties imposed on directors and how these duties are enforced 
in China, drawing comparisons and contrasts with the UK. Also, given the distinctive 
features of the Chinese corporate governance system, we estimate a regression model to 
investigate the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance in 
China. 
Our results indicate that the weakness of the Chinese corporate governance system is not 
only a consequence of the concentrated state-ownership structure. This weakness is also 
in part due to the ineffectiveness of internal monitoring rules, inadequate/incomplete law 
and poor law enforcement. Finally, we provide some suggestions for the Chinese 
government to improve the Chinese corporate governance system. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance is essentially concerned with the `separation of ownership from 
management', a concept which was first recognised by Berle and Means in 1932.1 
Berle and Means' theory contends that managers do not have the same interest and 
motivation as the owners of a firm to make full and efficient use of corporate assets. 
This is fundamental to the question of corporate governance because it means that 
without performing sufficient monitoring or control, the managers, who are 
potentially left in a position of unchecked power, may cause serious negative effects 
on corporate value and the proper functions of capital markets. Berle and Means' 
theory drew attention to this vitally important corporate governance problem that has 
succeeded in attracting a great deal of public concern and exponential growth in 
academic research because it has wider implications and is critical to economic and 
social well-being? 
The recent spate of various corporate scandals, financial market failures and massive 
financial losses to shareholders in the UK, the US and elsewhere 3 has demonstrated 
1 Berle, A. A. and G C. Means, 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Macmillan. 
2 Clarke, T., 2004. Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of Corporate Governance, 
ed. London; New York: Routledge, pl. 
3 In the UK, a number of companies collapsed unexpectedly in the 1980s and 1990s. These included Polly Peck 
International, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International. British and Commonwealth, the Mirror Group 
News International and the Barings Banks. In each case, they appeared to be caused by corporate internal control 
failure and financial reporting and auditing irregularities. In 2001 to 2003, the collapses of several major US 
companies, including Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia, attracted attention and criticism for their corporate 
governance failures. In 1997, the Asian currency crisis which led to widespread stock market crashes was 
i 
repeatedly the severity of the corporate governance problem that may not only arise 
between managers and shareholders, but also between the controlling and minority 
shareholders or other stakeholders. Following these scandals, there is a growing 
consensus around the world that it is important to strengthen corporate governance to 
protect shareholders from expropriation by the dominant majority/controlling 
shareholders or managers. In addition, there is a wealth of literature on comparative 
corporate governance systems (with the bulk of it focussing on the major economies, 
mostly the UK, the US, Germany, and Japan), which distinguishes between one legal 
system (e. g. the outsider-based system in the UK and US) and others (e. g. the insider- 
based system in Germany and Japan) Most of these works have been carried out by a 4 
comparative analysis of the systems of corporate governance from legal and historical 
perspectives .5 Unfortunately, the outcomes 
'of these works are limited to establishing 
the differences among two or more nations with respect to particular dimensions and 
fail to identify why these differences exist or how they emerged. 
Recently, some empirical studies have broadened the scope of corporate legal 
research, suggesting that the `quality' of corporate law, as measured by a number of 
indicators of anti-directors' rights and law enforcement, is an important determinant 
attributed by many observers to the lack of accountability of major corporate groups in the crisis countries. 
'For example, Mayer distinguishes 'insider' and 'outsider' systems on the basis that the outsider-based system of 
corporate governance relies on active external markets for corporate control through mergers and takeovers of 
listed companies, whereas the insider-based system does not have an active market for corporate control, which is 
usually vested with large shareholders including banks. Mayer, C. 1994. Stock-markets, Financial Institutions and 
Corporate Performance, in N. Dimsdale and M. Prevezer (eds. ), Capital Markets and Corporate Governance, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp179-94. 
5 Franks, J and C, Mayer, 1995. Ownership and Control, in H. Siebert ed., Trends in Business Organisation: Do 
Participation and Cooperation Increase Competitiveness? Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck). 
2 
of corporate value and a country's economic growth. 
6 The benefits of these 
comparative law and empirical studies are substantial and obvious, but there is not 
much research on corporate governance in the Chinese context, especially 
in-depth 
research of the operation and evolution of actual systems of corporate governance 
in 
China and the way in which corporate governance may be improved in the light of the 
theories and practices of the West. 
1.2 The Evolution of China's Corporate Law and Corporate 
Governance 
The legal concept of the corporation emerged in China in the late 19th century. In 
1904, the Qing government enacted the first Chinese company law which gave 
recognition to company incorporation (gongst) and limited liability. The law, which 
was based on the UK Limited Liability Act 1855 and Companies Act 1862,7 and the 
Japanese Commercial Code 1899, contained 13 articles in 11 sections and stipulated 
issues such as company organisational forms, ways to report a company's funding, 
methods of business management and shareholder rights etc, but in much abbreviated 
form .8 The law also provided 
heavy penalties for embezzlement of company funds 
and prohibited organisers of a company from `clandestinely obtaining profits'. 9 
6 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 1998. Law and Finance, 
Journal of Political Economy 106,1113-1154. 
7, The Limited Liability Act 1855 was an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom that first allowed limited 
liability for corporations in the UK. In Salomon vA. Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 the I louse of Lord applied 
the Companies Act 1862 and affirmed that the members of a company had limited liability. See Mayson, S., D. 
French and C. Ryan, 2005, Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law. London: Oxford University Express. pp55- 
60. 
Kirby, W. C., 1995. China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century China, 
Journal ofAsian Studies. 54: 43-63. Zhu Ytng, 1993, Lun Qing Mo De Jingji Fagui, Historical Research, 1993: 5, 
92-109. 
9 Ruskola, T., 2000. Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory in a 
Chinese Perspective. Stanford Law Review 52: 1599. 
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However, Chinese corporate practice during the initial stage lacked the experience 
that Western governments and legal systems had accumulated in relation to the 
operation of joint-stock companies. Stock trading capital was very limited. 
10 
Consequently, the law did not function in the way the government expected in terms 
of promoting industrialisation in China. 
In addition, although the Qing government transplanted the corporate system from the 
West, the 1004 Company Law failed to adopt the fundamental principle of the 
equitable treatment of all shareholders. For example, under the 1904 Company Law, 
the Qing government attempted to control and interfere in corporate practice by 
establishing a number of government-controlled companies in which the government 
as a shareholder had the right to dispose of corporate assets and to appoint directors 
and managers, while other shareholders only had the right to receive dividends. " As a 
result, the companies or enterprises which were formed in the name of shareholders 
but managed by the government, eventually encountered many governance problems, 
such as mismanagement, misuse of funds, bribes, and corruption. 12 
'° Lin, Cyril. 2001. Private Vices in Public Places: Challenges in Corporate Governance Development in China, 
Discussed at the Policy Dialogue Meeting on Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Emerging 
Economics organised by the OECD Development Centre and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, held at OECD headquarters on 23-24 April 2001. Available from 
https: //www. oecd. org/dataoecd/9/60/2443639. pdf [Accessed 25 March 2005]. 
11 Faure, D., 1996. Company Law and the Emergence of the Modem Firm, in: R. A. Brown, Chinese Business 
Enterprise, Routledge, London, Vol. IV, Chapter II; Wei, Y., 2003. Comparative Corporate Governance: A Chinese 
Perspective. Kluwer Law International. 
'2 Dou, J., 1999. Research on the history of Corporate Ideology in China, pp2l-22, citing in Wei, Y. 2002, The 
History of the Corporation in China, 6 University of Western Sydney Law Review, 95-122, at 100. William 
Goetzmann and Elisabeth K811,2003, The History of Corporate Ownership in China: State Patronage, Company 
Legislation, and the Issue of Control, Yale ICF Working Paper No. 04-29. June 2004. 
4 
In 1911, the Qing government was overturned by the republican government. Three 
years later, the republican government enacted the Company Regulation (gongsi 
tiaoli) which was based on the German model of corporate legislation. The 
Regulation was more detailed compared with the 1904 Company Law. 13 It had a 
considerable effect on the promotion of corporate activities. However, the republican 
government attempted to promote state capitalism and in 1929 a new Company Law 
was promulgated. The Company Law 1929 showed a strong desire to protect small 
shareholders and limit the rights of large shareholders. The law stipulated that in a 
company limited by shares, a shareholder's voting rights could not exceed one-fifth of 
the votes over total company issued shares, regardless of their actual shareholding, '4 
but the law provided an exemption for the shares owned by the government. To give 
government-owned shares the privilege in exercising voting rights restricted private 
enterprises from monopolising important economic sectors, such as the banking, 
railway, electricity and water supply industries. 's Nevertheless, the law was not well 
implemented as a result of the instability of the legal and political environment. 16 The 
Company Law 1929 was revised in 1946, then abolished in 1949 by the Chinese 
communist government. 
13 For example, under the gongst tiaoli, corporations were required to produce a detailed company report at least 
once a year. The annual report had to contain a profit and loss statement, a written statement on the company's 
commercial situations, the exact loss and profit figure, the amount of money pair out as dividends and set aside for 
reserves as well as a balance of the company's assets and liabilities. See, ibid, Goetzmann and Köll. 
14 Art. 129, Company Law 1929 
is Shun, Z., 1982. The Speech at Farewell Party for the members of Tongmeng Society, in Complete works of Shun 
Zhongshen, Vol. 2,322; Wei, Y., 2003. An Overview of Corporate Governance in China. Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce, Vol. 30 23-48. 
16 Wei, Y. 1998. A Chinese Perspective on Corporate Governance. 10 Bond Law Review. 363-76. 
5 
After the establishment of the communist government, China adopted a socialist 
economic system with centrally planned management. Property was only owned by 
the State or by Collectives, and there were no private corporations until 1979.17 
China's economic system did not allow any of the normal market mechanisms found 
in Western countries to function. 18 Both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
collective-owned enterprises (COEs)19 were operated by an administrative body with 
directors appointed by the government, and were not independent legal entities 
2° The 
governance structure in both types of enterprises created problems of low efficiency, 
slow technological progress, sectoral disproportions and sharp fluctuation in growth 
rates. 21 Unified public ownership did not provide any advantage to overcome the 
principal-agent problem because of information asymmetries, the lack of incentives 
for improving performance and liabilities for business failure 22 The legal system was 
devoid of corporate governance. 
Economic reform in China started in 1978. The initial purpose of the reform was to 
transform the planned economy into a market economy. The most significant event 
for China's economic reform was the inception and growth of China's stock markets 
'7 Torbert states, "[I]n one sense, China has had a company law since 1979, but only one that applied to joint 
ventures between foreign and Chinese entities. " See Preston M. Torbert, P. M., 1993. China's Evolving Company 
Legislation: A Status Report, 14 Northwesten Journal of International Law & Business. 1, at 2. 
18 Han, A. M. 1996. China's Company Law: Practicing Capitalism in Transitional Economy, 5 Pacific Rim Law & 
Policy Journal, 457. On Kit Tam, 1999. The Development of Corporate Governance in China, Edward Elgar, p90. 
19 The main distinction between SOEs and COEs did not lay in the extent of control of the enterprises, but rather 
the ownership of the enterprises. The SOEs were owned by the central government but controlled by the local 
government, but COEs were owned and control by the local government. 
° Gan, Z. P. 1998, The Law of Enterprise and Companies. Beijing University Publishing House. 
21 Lin, C., op cit. fn. 10. 
22 Under the planned economic system, the state or local government could never obtain complete and accurate 
information of the enterprise to adjust its `perfect' plan. There was no effective monitoring and control from the 
owner of the property and market competition. Managers did not have incentive to improve the performance of 
enterprise without sharing the allocation of profits and resources. There was no any legal duty to impose on 
directors even if business failure. 
6 
which marked the new stage of China's market economy in the 1990s. Two domestic 
stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
were established in 1990 and 1991 respectively, and have experienced remarkable 
growth since then 23 However, all trading companies in the stock market were initially 
regulated by the Provisional Regulations on the Administration of Issuing and 
Trading of Shares, enacted by the State Council in 1993. 
The first Company Law of the People's Republic of China (hereafter, the CCL1994) 
was passed by the People's Congress on 29 November 1993 and came into force in 
July 1994. The CCL 1994 was influenced by the German model, 24 but it is also 
indicative of China's own distinctive features such as the dominance of state-owned 
shareholdings, the superior power of the shareholder meeting and weak minority 
shareholder protection, and a poor legal enforcement system, etc. 25 The role of the 
CCL 1994 in supporting the stock markets and the growth of China's economy has 
been limited and ineffective. Indeed, during the past 12 years, China's corporate legal 
framework and institutions have been challenged by several high profile scandals, 
such as Yinguangxia Industry26 and D'Long Group27, dubbed as "China's Enron", 
23 There were 1,391 Chinese companies were listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges by the end of 
July 2005, compared to only 183 listed companies by the end of 1993. See Yang, X., 2005. The Proposed 
Amendments to Company Law and the Development of China's Capital Market. KING&WOOD PRC LAWYERS. 
24 For example, the two-tier board structure which requires employees' representative seating in the supervisory 
board was followed German system. 
25 See Wei, Y., op cit, n. 16. pp366-67. 
26 According to CSRC report, Yinguangxia fabricated a huge sum of 754 million yuan of profit by way of 
counterfeiting purchasing and selling contracts, exportation declaration statements, value-added tax invoice, duty- 
free documents, financial notes and business revenue fabrication from 1998 to 2001. See Yan Li, 2001, CSRC: 
Yinguanxia Fabricated 745m Yuan Profits, People's Daily, 06 September 2001, available at 
httn: //bloa. issprosy. com/2006/02/china enacts new _governance ru l. html. [Accessed 25 April 2005] 
27 D'Long Group acquired stakes from three listed companies - Shenyang Ilejin, Torch Automobile, and Xinjiang 
Tunhe in 1996 and manipulated their share price to unprecedented highs (between 1997 to 2004, each increasing in 
value by 600% to 1900%) and used them to raise cash from investors and obtain bank loans. In May 2004, the 
D'Long collapse resulted in RMB 57 billion debts and several billion RMB in losses for stock market investors. 
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which had a considerable effect on China's stock markets. Although the Chinese 
government has emphasised that the reform of corporate governance structures is the 
core of the bid to establish a modern corporate system in Chinese enterprises, these 
corporate scandals indicate that the existing legal and financial system may not be 
efficient and effective for China's economic development. Indeed, there are many 
governance issues, such as shareholder rights, directors' duties, concentrated 
ownership structure, and enforcement of the laws, which have not been properly 
constructed to solve agency problems in China's corporate practice. 
In 2000, China's government aimed to counter such weaknesses by providing various 
comprehensive corporate governance rules and mechanisms. 28 These rules and 
mechanisms, which were heavily imported from the OECD Principles on Corporate 
Governance and the UK Combined Code for the listed companies, sought to marry the 
best international, standards with China's corporate practice. 29 However, they are 
apparently inconsistent with the CCL 1994 in various aspects, and in practice appear 
to have had limited impact in mitigating agency costs and improving economy 
efficiency. The CCL 1994 was amended at the 18th Meeting of the Standing 
D'Long's scandal was dubbed by the People's Daily Online as the "biggest financial securities scandal" in Chinese 
history, involving alleged stock manipulation by management. See I lui Li, China - Measurement Problems, CG 
Watch 2004. p39. Available at http: //wwsv. empea. net/does/research/thirdpart //CLSA ACGA CGWatch2004pdf. 
Xinhua, 2006. Delong Mansion in Shanghai Put for auctions in Late January, People's Daily Online, available at 
httr): //cnp-lish. Deople. com. cn/200601/07/enp, 20060107 233521. html. [Accessed 26 May 2006]. 
25 For examples, "Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed 
Companies", Zhengquanfa [2001] No. 102. (hereafter, the Guidelines) Available from 
bttp: //www csrc eov cn/en/jsp/dctail isp? infoid=1061947864100&tvpe=CMS STD [Accessed 25 April 2006], and 
"Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China" . Zhengjianfa 
No. 1, [2002], (hereafter the CCGC) 
available from http: //www. csrc. gov. cn/en/isp/detail. jsp? infoid=1061968722100&type=CMS. STD. [Accessed 25 
April 2006] 
29 See Allen, J. and F. Roy, 2001. Corporate Governance in Greater China: A Comparison between China, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. Asian Corporate Governance Association. 
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Committee of the Tenth People's Congress on 27 October 2005 and came into force 
on 1 January 2006. As expected, the amended Company Law (hereafter, the CCL 
2006) has introduced comprehensive Western corporate governance rules and 
mechanisms, including the cumulative voting system, the role and responsibilities of 
directors and supervisors, and shareholder derivative action, etc. However, whether 
they can function in the same way as they do in western countries remains largely 
untested. 
1.3 Objectives of the Research 
Corporate governance refers to a system consisting of a set of laws, regulations, 
listing rules and voluntary best practices that enable corporations to achieve their 
objectives, to attract investments, to improve corporate performance, to meet both 
legal obligations and general social expectations. 0 In this thesis, the main research 
aim is to explore how the corporate governance system was formed and evolved in 
China compared with the UK and to identify the key factors that have significantly 
influenced the health of corporations and the institutional environment for better 
corporate governance in China. This constitutes the theoretical contribution of the 
study and will entail an extensive comparative study of the countries' corporate 
legislation, securities laws and bylaws dealing with some specific issues of corporate 
governance. This will reveal the fact that the transplanting of legal rules and 
regulations from one country to another does not necessarily result in a good 
30 This definition of corporate governance is due to I laly J. Gregory, in The Globalisation of Corporate 
Governance, Weil, Gotshal & Manges: New York 2003, Law Firm Publication, p. 5. The term 'corporate 
governance' has many definitions and some others will be discussed in Chaper 2. 
9 
corporate governance system being established. Such legal rules and regulations are 
only effective in a country if they are properly enforced, which in turn fosters 
economic growth. The detailed objectives that guide the research process are: 
9 to review and analyse corporate governance theories and set out the major 
theme of the research 
" to examine the key issues which may have significantly influenced the 
effectiveness of corporate governance in China compared with the UK 
9 to identify and explore the relationship between the current Chinese corporate 
governance system and corporate performance 
0 to suggest some solutions to the problems of creating a strong corporate 
governance environment for the success of China's economic reform. 
1.4 Scope and Contribution of the Research 
Following the nature of the research objectives, the scope of the research mainly 
focuses on the internal mechanisms of corporate governance because they form an 
important part of basic company law, corporate governance regulations and best 
practices in both China and the UK. 31 In each chapter, we examine the various 
theoretical aspects including the economic, financial and legal environments within 
which corporate governance has developed in China and the UK. We compare the 
various aspects of the internal control mechanisms including the ownership structure, 
the shareholder general meeting, boards of directors, directors' legal duties and 
31 For an explanation of what is meant by `internal mechanisms' of corporate governance see section 2.2 of 
Chapter 2. 
10 
enforcement between China and the UK and discuss basic corporate governance 
principles in the context of their efficacy as governance mechanisms. Where 
applicable, empirical data are examined and analysed to demonstrate how corporate 
governance operates in China and the UK, and this allows us to penetrate many 
puzzling features of the Chinese corporate governance system by comparisons and 
contrasts with the UK. Finally, we draw together the 'many different facets of 
corporate governance that may have significantly influenced the effectiveness of 
corporate governance in China to examine empirically the relationship between 
corporate governance structures and corporate performance. To this end, this thesis 
will provide a wide range of recommendations to the Chinese government to improve 
the Chinese corporate governance system. 
1.5 Structure of the Research 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the definition of corporate 
governance and the relevant theories of corporate governance to establish the key 
themes of the thesis to be investigated. Chapter 3 explains the methodology used in 
the thesis and describes the survey procedure and data collection process. Chapter 4 
examines the distinctive features of the ownership structure of Chinese publicly listed 
companies compared with the UK and explores the specific ownership structure issues 
that can be linked to the development of good corporate governance in China. Chapter 
5 provides a detailed comparative discussion of the legal and technical rules of 
shareholder meetings between China and the UK and assesses whether the actual 
11 
functioning of the shareholder meeting provides shareholders with sufficient powers 
to participate and engage in the corporate decision making process in China. Chapter 
6 investigates the board systems and presents both legal and empirical findings on 
how boards are structured and function to ensure the efficient running of companies in 
China compared with the UK. Chapter 7 critically examines and analyses the quality 
of company law and securities regulations and assesses whether the legal duties can 
be effectively allocated on the directors and to what extent shareholders can be 
efficiently protected in China compared with the UK. Chapter 8 examines the role of 
shareholders in enforcing directors' duties and the current development of company 
law in respect of shareholder legal actions and assesses the uncertainty and ambiguity 
surrounding the civil proceeding regimes in China compared with the UK. Chapter 9 
supplements our comparative analysis with an empirical investigation into the 
relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance in China. 
Naturally, this is the section that identifies the key factors that determine an effective 
corporate governance system. Chapter 10 summarises the main findings of the thesis 
and provides some suggestions for the Chinese government to improve the Chinese 
corporate governance system. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with an overview of the definition of corporate governance and 
the mechanisms of corporate governance. Section 2.3 then proceeds to a discussion of 
particular corporate governance problems from a variety of theoretical backgrounds, 
including property rights theory, incomplete contracts theory, agency versus 
organisational theories, the legal theory of director's duties and enforcement, and 
shareholder versus stakeholder theories. Then, section 2.4 provides a broad view of 
the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance, and 
examines the contribution of some important internal governance mechanisms in 
dealing with corporate governance problems. 32 Section 2.5 analyses the corporate 
governance in developing countries/transition economies. Finally, this chapter 
concludes by introducing the key themes of the thesis derived from the theoretical and 
empirical framework reviewed in this chapter. 
32 Chapter 9 gives a detailed literature review on the relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
performance. 
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2.2 Corporate Governance and Corporate Control Mechanisms 
2.2.1 Definition of Corporate Governance 
Crucial to an understanding of the inherently distinctive conceptualizations of 
`corporate governance' is the recognition that there is no single definition which has 
been universally accepted because there are substantial differences among countries 
and many factors have driven different institutions, interest groups and individuals 
with different perspectives to formulate `a' definition of corporate governance 33 The 
following definitions which are selected from the contemporary corporate governance 
debates are the most influential with regard to the development of corporate 
governance systems in different jurisdictions. 
A basic definition of corporate governance, which has been frequently quoted or 
paraphrased, is provided by the Cadbury Report (1992), and states that 
"[C]orporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their 
companies. The shareholders' role in governance is to appoint the directors 
and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance 
structure is in place °'34 
33 See Solomon J. and A. Solomon, 2004. Corporate Governance and Accountability. John Wiley & Sons Ltd. p12, 
also see The Encyclopaedia about Corporate Governance. Available from: http: //www. encycogov. com [Accessed 
5 January 2006]. 
34 See Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance and the Code of Best Practice 
(hereafter `the Cadbury Report'). London: Gee Publishing, December, 1992, at paragraph 2.5. 
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This definition provides a view of corporate governance as a set of internal 
arrangements to govern the relationship between the shareholders, board of directors 
and management of the corporation. However, this definition has been criticised as 
being too narrow. Many commentators argue that the concept of corporate governance 
should also encompass the relationship of the corporation to stakeholders and 
society. 35 
A broader definition of corporate governance, provided by the OECD, states that: 
"[C]orporate governance is one key element in improving economic efficiency 
and growth as well as enhancing investor confidence. Corporate governance 
involves a set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means 
of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. 
Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and 
management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and 
its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring. °'36 
 See Freeman, R. E. 1984, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, Ballinger, Boston, MA; Shleifer, A. 
and R. W. Vishny 1997. A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance, 52,737-783; Deakin, S. and A. 
Hughes, 1997. Comparative Corporate Governance: An Interdisciplinary Agenda, in Deakin, S. and A. Hughes, ed. 
Enterprise and Community: New Directions in Corporate Governance. Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, p2.; and 
Rose, C., 2004. Stakeholder Orientation vs. Shareholder Value -A Matter of Contractual Failures, European 
Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 77-97. 
36 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004), pl1. Available from: 
b n: //www oecd org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724 ndf. [Accessed 22 February 2006] 
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This definition serves to illustrate that an effective corporate governance system 
should improve economic efficiency. The purpose of this definition is intended to 
assist the government in its efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, institutional and 
regulatory framework for corporate governance, and to provide suggestions for the 
stock exchange, investors, corporations, and other parties that have an interest in the 
process of developing good corporate governance. 
By examining various definitions of corporate governance, Solomon and Solomon 
suggest that "corporate governance is the system of checks and balances, both internal 
and external to companies, which ensure that companies discharge their accountability 
to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their 
business activity". 7 This definition advocates that a corporate governance framework 
should be designed from both the internal and external aspects of a company to 
demonstrate a wide range of corporate accountability to all stakeholders and society at 
large. 
2.2.2 Corporate Control Mechanisms 
Despite the increasing amount of contemporary literature on corporate governance, 
there is considerable variation in its definition. Corporate governance embraces the 
combination of laws, regulations, listing rules, voluntary private sector practices, 
along with typical capital market and ownership features. Differences in the liquidity 
37 see Solomon J. and A. Solomon, op cit. fn33. p14. 
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of the capital market and ownership structure will shape different patterns of 
participation in corporate governance. For example, various studies indicate that the 
effectiveness of internal monitoring mechanisms and the market for corporate control 
38 is largely determined by the ownership structure of the corporation. Different 
ownership structures are associated with different incentives for shareholders to 
monitor and scrutinize management decision making. In countries with a dispersed 
ownership structure, shareholders will often have little incentive to monitor 
management because the tiny stake owned by each individual gives them limited 
power to do so. 9 By contrast, in countries with more concentration of ownership and 
voting power the major shareholders have incentives and power to monitor managers, 
since cash flow and control interests equip shareholders with the necessary power to 
influence the decision-making process and to assure profit maximisation. However, 
the exploitation of the interests of minority shareholders by the large blockholders or 
majority shareholders is extensive 40 In addition, given the public good characteristic 
associated with costly monitoring of managerial actions, free-rider problems and 
information asymmetries have also indubitably limited the incentives of individual 
shareholders to actually monitor and discipline the management 41 Furthermore, as 
regards the legal aspects of corporate governance, Shleifer and Vishny argue that the 
39 Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1988. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical 
Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20,293-316; Shleifer, A, and R. Vishny, 1986. Large Shareholders and 
Corporate Control. Journal of Political Economy 95,461-488. McConnel, J. J. and H. Servaes, 1990, Additional 
Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value, Journal of Financial Economic 27,595-612. 
39 Berle and Means, op cit, fn. l. Also see, Shleifer, Adrei and Robert W. Vishny 1997. op cit. fn. 35. Pettet, B. 2005. 
Company Law, 2ed. Harlow: Pearson Longman, p55. 
40 Klaus Gugler, 2001, Corporate Governance and Economic Performance, Oxford University Press. p6. 
41 Ezzamel, M. and R. Watson, 2005. Boards of Directors and the Role of Non-executive Directors in the 
Governance of Corporations, in K. Keasey, S. Thompson and M. Wright ed. Corporate Governance: Accountability, 
Enterprise and International Comparisons. John Wiley & Son Ltd. p97. 
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ownership structure and the level of stock market development may be determined by 
the quality of the protection of shareholders and creditors 
42 La Porta et al confirm this 
proposition empirically, showing that companies domiciled in countries with weak 
investor protection may have concentrated ownership as a substitute for legal 
protection. 43 
It is clear that corporate governance mechanisms have developed over time in a 
specific economic, legal and political environment within a country, and there is no 
single mechanism that can provide a solution for the entire set of corporate 
governance problems, but rather certain mechanisms are interdependent and 
sometimes substitutes or complements. 44 This inevitably means that when we 
compare one country's corporate governance system with another's, it is necessary to 
consider not only the mechanisms or the best practices reflected in guidelines and the 
corporate governance code, but also the underlying ownership structure, voting 
powers and incentives, and related laws and judicial enforcement. 
2.2.3 Summary 
Although corporate governance can be defined in a variety of ways, generally it 
involves a set of internal and external mechanisms acting as a check on managerial 
self-serving behaviour and as a means of promoting the efficient operation of the 
42 Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, op cit. fn. 35. 
03 see La Porta et al, 1998. op cit. M. 
44 Kevin Keasey, Steve Thompson and Mike Wright, 2005. Introduction, in K. Keasey, S. Thompson and M. Wright. 
Corporate Governance: Accountability, Enterprise and International Comparison, eds. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
pl. 
is 
company for the benefit of its shareholders and other stakeholders, and the company's 
contribution to society at large. Pettet explains that the internal mechanisms will 
involve "the extent to which the law puts in the hands of shareholders the ability to 
control or influence the board of directors, through voting in the meetings, or perhaps 
by the use of litigation to enforce the legal duties owed by directors" and the external 
mechanisms include the existence of the regulatory and institutional environments, as 
well as market mechanisms such as the disciplining effect of the possibility of a 
hostile takeover. 5 However, in China, as the market for corporate control is at its 
most primitive stage, and most mergers and acquisitions are policy-driven and 
controlled by the government, hostile takeovers are largely non-existent in publicly 
listed companies 46 In addition, the managerial labour market does not function due to 
governmental administrative interference in the nomination process. Zhang criticises 
the problem of selecting and appointing management, stating that since the 
bureaucrats have no incentive to search for good directors or managers, the selection 
is often based on personal connections (guanxi) rather than merit. 47 Furthermore, 
since banks, securities and investment funds management firms are mainly 
established by the state, or government agencies, or state-controlled companies, the 
capital markets is far from being mature. 48 Thus, the role of external governance 
mechanisms in China is negligible. 
45 See Pettet, op cit, fn. 39, p54. 
46 In October 2002, the CSRC released a M&A code for listed companies which clarified rules regarding tender 
offers and the nature of administrative approval needed for deals. See Stephen Green, 2003. Better Than A Casino: 
Some Good News from the Frontline of China's Capital Market Reforms. Asia Programme Working Paper, No. 6. 
47 Zhang, W., 1999. Development in Chinese Corporate Finance and its Implication for Ownership Reform, Asia 
Pacific Financial Development, pp183-205, Routledge, London. 
48 Stephen Green, op cit. fn. 46. 
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2.3 Theories of Corporate Governance 
2.3.1 Property Rights Theory 
Economic property rights have been broadly discussed for many decades. The 
pioneering paper on property rights was written by Coase, who assumed that property 
rights arose from mere use. 9 The Coase theorem gave rise to a fierce debate relating 
to the definition, allocation and protection of property rights among economic 
theorists. Alchian argues that Coase's theorem leaves unsolved the role played by 
other types of economic rights than use rights, such as income rights, rights to exclude 
or rights to alienate assets. 50 Alchian and Demsetz argue that the position of 
shareholders in a company is not based on an idea that they "own" the company, but 
stems from the supposition that they are its residual claimants. 1 
Demsetz also argues that property rights cannot simply be thought of as the 
possession of some vector of use rights over an asset, but also the right of sale or 
disposal of assets. 2 Hart's property rights approach takes a step towards emphasising 
the importance of residual control rights over assets and argues that the essence of 
ownership is not the right to residual income or responsibility for monitoring, but 
49 For example, Coase takes the market mechanism as the benchmark and then examines whether an entrepreneur 
should form a firm or rely on the market mechanism in utilizing resources. See Coase, Ronald H. 1937. The Nature 
of the Firm, 4 Economica pp386-405. Coase also uses the condition of zero transaction costs as the benchmark and 
then explores how resources would be utilised both in this world of zero transaction costs and in the real world. 
See Coase, R. H., 1960. The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 3, ppl-44. 
50 Alchian, A. A., 1965. Some Economics of Property Rights, Il Politico, 30: 816-829. 
5'Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz -1972. Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, The American 
Economic Review, 62(5), 777-95 
52 Demsetz, H. 1988. Profit as a Functional Return: Reconsidering Knight's Views, in Harold Demsetz, Ownership, 
Control and the Firm: The Organisation of Economic Activity, vol. 1, Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 
pp236-247. 
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rather the right to make decisions S3 Indeed, the rights of sale or disposal of assets and 
the residual right of control over an asset are always the ultimate expression of an 
investor's ability to exercise control representing an essential part of what it means to 
own something. 
According to the property rights theory as propounded by Furubotn and Pejovich, 
property ownership rights in a firm may be categorised as: "the right to use an asset, 
the right to enjoy an income flow generated by the asset, and the right to change an 
asset's form and substance. "54 Blair concludes that ownership normally entails "the 
right to possess or dispose of the asset, the right to use the asset, the right to claim the 
proceeds from the sale of the asset or the returns generated by the asset, and the 
responsibility for bearing certain risks associated with possession and control of the 
asset". 55 Rehman and Perry suggest that the shareholder rights in a modern 
corporation can be divided into two main bundles or categories. 
6 The first bundle of 
rights derives from the legal aspects of ownership that includes "the right to 
information on the performance of the company, the right to an equitable distribution 
of profits in the form of the dividends, the right equitably and proportionately to 
participate in decision making, and the right to sell one's shares' . 
57 The second bundle 
, of rights 
is concerned with the separation of ownership and management. 58 Because 
53 Hart, Oliver. 1989. An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, Columbia Law Review, 89: 1757-74. 
S4 Furubotn, E. and S. Pejovich, 1974. The Economic of Property Rights, Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing. 
55 Blair, M. 1995. Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-first Century, the 
Book Institution Washington D. C. 
56 Rehman, S. S. and F. V. Perry, 2005. Global Convergence of Corporate Governance Systems and 
Competitiveness, Occasional Paper Series, the GW Centre for the Study of Globalization. Available from: 
httn //gstudynet. coni/gwcsSZpublications/OPS-Ipapers/CSGOP-05-35. ndf. [Accessed 26 January 2006]. 
57Ibid 
59 Ibid. 
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of the separation of ownership from control in a large company, it is impossible to 
allow all shareholders rationally to participate in the day-to-day management decision 
making process. The shareholders, especially minority shareholders of a company 
who wish to ensure the company's directors are sufficiently accountable to them need 
to have effective monitoring and incentive systems in place that provide a set of 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as "shareholder meeting procedures, election 
of directors; and approval of basic corporate actions", to solve the agency problem 59 
It is clear that the important empirical investigation by Berle and Means into 
ownership structures in public companies in the United States subjected the second 
bundle of rights to closer examination. 
An understanding of property rights is a prerequisite for shareholders to exercise their 
rights as owners in a firm. Demsetz suggests that property rights derive their 
significance from the fact that they help people to form those expectations which they 
can reasonably hold in dealing with others. 60 Property rights confer a right on 
individual property owners to pursue their own self-interests in a competitive market. 
Analysing property rights within a firm helps to ensure that the management is 
generating shareholder value and aligning the interests of shareholder "owners", who 
provide the capital, and corporate managers who run the company. 
Property rights define governance structures so that the shareholders' role in the 
59 ibicl 
60 Demsetz, H., 1976. Toward a Theory of Property Rights, The American Economic Review, Vol. 57.347-359, at 348. 
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governance structure of a company appears to be viewed as ancillary to their claim on 
its resources. They have certain powers over the affairs of the company, exercisable 
by them collectively through their right to vote on resolutions at shareholder meetings, 
for example. The most important is their ability to appoint and remove the members 
of the board of directors. 61 Property rights tend to influence incentives and the 
behaviour of shareholders in a modem corporation. 
62 Shareholders' voting rights 
provide them with some economic incentive against mismanagement. If management 
fails to maximise the shareholders' residual claim, the aggregated votes might restrict 
managerial discretion or even vote out the incumbent board of directors. 
63 
Nevertheless, clearly defined ownership rights do not mean that those rights are 
distributed efficiently and consistently enforced because of the separation of 
ownership and control in the large modern corporation. 
4 For example, the exercise of 
a particular right may depend on a decision process which many individuals share, 
such as the use of majority voting and proxy voting. Alchian and Demsetz observed 
that "the right to vote may be exercised individually, but it is the pattern of votes by 
many individuals that determines the way in which a right to use a resource will be 
exercised" 65 In addition, directors can bundle shareholders' decisions on particular 
corporate actions, such as removing or retaining incumbent directors, where a proxy 
61 Their right to appoint or remove directors is a common rule adopted by many jurisdictions, e. g. Table A, arts 73 
to 80, s. 303 of Companies Act 1985 in the UK. 
62 Coleman, J. 1966. Reward Structures and the Allocation of Effort in P. F. Lazarsfeld and N. W. Henry, eds. 
Reading in Mathematical Social Science. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 159-73. 
63 Easterbrook, F. 11. and D. R. Fischel, 1989. The Corporate Contract, 89 Columbia Law Review, pp1416-48. 
64 See Berle and Means, op cit. fn 1, p8. 
65 Alchian, A. A. and H. Demsetz, 1973. The Property Rights Paradigm, The Journal of Economic History, pp 173- 
83. 
23 
reason for this is that when the state is the owner of the firm, bureaucrats are 
delegated with ownership rights to control the firm but bear no financial risk for their 
intervention. 7 Such pursuit of self-interest, or "shirking", becomes a dominant theme 
as a typical cost associated with the agent-principal relation, and indicates that the 
central problem of corporate governance in China nonetheless arises out of the 
separation of ownership and control, but cannot be simply explained by the Berle and 
Means' theory - the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders in the 
Anglo-American phenomenon. 
Therefore, to understand the aspects of corporate governance in China it is vital to 
investigate how the Chinese publicly listed companies are structured; who controls 
the Chinese publicly listed companies, how they are different from other jurisdictions 
and whether the conflicts of interest between the controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders which is created by the existing ownership structure appears to 
be an important problem in the Chinese corporate governance system. These issues 
are the subject of investigation in Chapter 4. 
2.3.2 Incomplete Contracts Theory 
The theory of incomplete contracts, originally based on transaction cost arguments, 
contends that contracting parties often fail to write a `comprehensive' contract in the 
sense that it will specify all parties' obligations in all future states of the world, to the 
67 Zhang, W., op cit. fn. 47. 
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fullest extent possible 68 Based on the observation that it is either impossible or too 
expensive to foresee, define, enumerate and. contract upon all circumstances and 
contingencies which may occur in the future, 
69 Grossman and Hart and Hart and 
Moore proposed the theoryof incomplete contracts, which underscores the 
importance of the residual rights of control: the rights to decide the disposition of the 
assets under the contingencies that are not specified in a contract 
7° Hart argues that 
"contractual incompleteness" appears to be important to understanding why the 
structure of governance matters. 1 Similarly, Maskin and Tirole note that contractual 
incompleteness is crucial to explaining the boundaries of the firm, corporate control 
and the governance system. 2 
According to the theory of incomplete contracts, shareholders may utilise ex post 
bargaining power to judge for themselves whether the directors are using their 
managerial powers for their own benefit at the expense of the company. However, the 
allocation of bargaining power can be affected by the choice of an appropriate 
governance structure (e. g. the allocation of ownership rights or voting rights). For 
68 Hart, Oliver, 1995, Firms Contracts and Financial Structure, Clarendon Press, Oxford. p22. 
69 According to Tirole, the contracts may be incomplete for the following three reasons: Unforeseen contingencies: 
"parties cannot define ex ante the contingencies that may occur (or actions that may be feasible) later on. So they 
must content themselves with signing a contract such as an authority or ownership relationship that does not 
explicitly mention those contingencies, or with signing no contract at all". Cost of writing contract-. "even if one 
could foresee all contingencies, they might be so numerous that it would be too costly to describe them in a 
contract". Cost of enforcing contracts: "court must understand the terms of contract and verify the contracted upon 
contingencies and actions in order to enforce the contract. " See Jean Tirole, 1999, Incomplete Contracts: Where Do 
We Stand? 67 Econometrica, pp741-81, at 743-44. 
70 Grossman, S. J. and Hart, 0.1986. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral 
Integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), pp691-719. Hart, 0 and Moore, J. 1999. Property Rights and the 
Nature of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), pp1119-1158. 
71 Hart states that "governance structure matters when some actions have to be decided in the future that have not 
been specified in an initial contract: governance structure provides a way for these actions. " See Oliver Hart, 1995. 
Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications. The Economic Journal, Vol. 105, pp678-89, at 679. 
1 Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole, 1999. Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, Review of Economic 
Studies, 66, pp89-114. 
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example, the de facto separation of equity ownership from control changed the whole 
legal concept of property in a modern corporation and affected the investment 
incentives of the involved parties. When ownership rights are broken up, many 
shareholders are totally passive since the residual rights of control for those 
shareholders are attached only to their certificates and ownership is so widely 
dispersed that the typical shareholder may not exercise real power to oversee 
managerial performance. This issue has been labelled as the `collective-action 
problem' or the `free-rider problem'. 3 
Forbes and Watson study the role of shareholders in a modern corporation and argue 
that the real problem is not the lack of formal powers, but rather of incentives to act 
and the difficulties in using what powers they have. 
74 The incentive problem arises 
because of the `public good' characteristic of monitoring and control activities. 
Typically, each shareholder has only a tiny proportion of the firm's equity. In the 
absence of an easily enforceable collective arrangement, it is impossible to exclude 
`free riders' from the benefits arising from improved monitoring by an individual 
shareholder. Benefit, but not costs, will be shared with other `free-riding' shareholders 
and, in consequence, the expected benefits accruing to the individual who incurred the 
full monitoring costs will only be in proportion to his or her equity holding.. Similarly, 
73 The collective-action problem or the free-rider problem will inevitably arise because appropriate shareholder 
initiatives may benefit all shareholders, but only one or a small group has to pay all the costs. See R. Monks and N. 
Minow, 2004. To Sell or Not to Sell: the Prisoner's Dilemma, in R. Monks and N. Minow, Corporate Governance, 
Blackwell Publishing. p129. Fisch, J. E., 1994, Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, Ohio State 
Law Journal, Vol. 55, No5,1009. 
" Forbes, W and Watson, R. 1993. Managerial Remuneration and Corporate Governance: A Review of the Issues, 
Evidence and Cadbury Committee Proposals. 23 Accounting and Business Research, pp331.338. 
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Stiglitz argues, as with all public goods, that with the absence of a collective provision 
there may be too little recourse devoted to ensuring that sufficient monitoring takes 
. place. 
75 Griffiths emphasises that in a public company, the votes of any one 
shareholder are unlikely to carry much weight and shareholders face serious practical 
difficulties in acting collectively. He points out that a body as large and diverse as the 
shareholders of the typical public company cannot readily initiate activity and 
function as a decision-making organ, and this problem is compounded by each 
shareholder's lack of incentives to take the initiative. 6 As a result, if the shareholders 
are dissatisfied, their most likely course of action is to sell their shares and invest the 
proceeds elsewhere. 
As observed, since complete contracts cannot be written, there has to be a mechanism 
to adapt the initial investment contract (e. g. company's memorandum, articles of 
association and by-laws) to changing circumstances or future contingencies of the 
corporation through a renegotiation process. Hart argues that contractual 
incompleteness matters because the renegotiation process imposes several transaction 
costs: some of these are ex post costs, incurred at the renegotiation stage itself, and 
other are ex ante costs, incurred in anticipation of renegotiation. 77 Although any 
fundamental issues and developments affecting the strategic direction or structure of 
the company will usually require shareholders' consent in annual shareholders' 
75 Stigliz, J. E. 1985. Credit Markets and the Control of Capital, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 17(2): 133- 
152. 
76 Giffiths, A., 1995. Shareholding and the Governance of Public Companies, in Saleem Sheikh & William Rees, 
ed. Corporate Governance & Corporate Control. Cavendish Publishing. p61. 
n Oliver Hart, 1995. op cit. fn. 68. p25. 
28 
meetings, voting as a safeguard for the residual risk-bearers of a corporation against 
ex post expropriation by the management is costly and often ineffective. 
78 For 
example, on the general voting principle, "one share-one vote" and various 
forms of 
majority voting rules as the decision mechanisms must be followed 
in the voting 
process. On the one hand, because the equity shareholding is widely dispersed, 
it is 
impossible to expect all shareholders to participate in the renegotiations. 
79 On the 
other hand, shareholders with small stakes are likely to be "rationally apathetic" when 
it comes to acquiring the information necessary for taking informed conclusions 
80 In 
practice, voting rights are normally exercised by the boards on shareholders' behalf 
through a proxy voting process. However, in such cases, representations are more 
likely to be symbolic because most of resolutions are put forward by boards 
themselves 81 
Despite the extensive evidence showing the importance of voting rights guided by 
incomplete contracts theory, the economic literature has rarely been able to analyse 
the legal rules that govern shareholder voting and to identify how the voting rights are 
exercised in the various legal systems. Easterbrook and Fischel argue that "the states' 
legal rules generally provide investors with the sort of voting arrangement they could 
find desirable if contracts could be arranged and enforced at low cost. "82 It is worth 
78 Ibid 
79 Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 1989. Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on 
Charter Amendments, 102 Harvard Law Review, pp 1820-1860. 
80 Theodor Baums, Osnabruck. Shareholder Representation and Proxy Voting in European Union: A Comparative 
Study, in Ilopt et al, 1998, Comparative Corporate Governance, Clarendon, p547. 
81 On Kit Tam, op cit, fn. 18, p27. 
82 Frank 11. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, 19 83. Voting in Company Law. Journal of Law and Economic, Vol. 
26, pp395-427, at 398. 
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noting at this point that 'the legal rules and contractual arrangement that determine 
who votes, on what issues, and using what procedures would be significant and 
examining the practices of the legal rules might provide helpful insights in relation to 
countries' corporate governance issues. Chapter 5 of the thesis provides a detailed 
comparative discussion of the legal and technical rules of shareholder meetings 
between China and the UK and assesses whether the actual functioning of the 
shareholder meeting provides shareholders with a platform which allows them to 
participate and engage in the corporate decision making process in China. 
2.3.3 Agency Theory Versus Organisational Theory 
According to the property rights theory of the firm, the reasons why shareholders 
should be involved in corporate control are straightforward. Putterman and Keoszner 
argue that the works on property rights and ownership by many theorists assume that 
the manager of the firm is the owner and residual claimant. However, in modem 
corporations, the agency problem has existed as long as shareholders have allowed 
others to act on their behalf. As Adam Smith observed, 
"[D]irectors... being the managers rather of other people's money than of their 
own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private co-partnery frequently 
watch over their own ... Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always 
prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company". 3 
11 Quoting from Adam Smith, 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, p700. 
30 
Jensen and Meckling draw attention to the principal-agent problem in the public 
corporation and explore `agency theory'84. They postulate that shareholders are the 
principals, managers are their agents in a firm, and management is the "continuous 
process of negotiating contracts". 85 Shareholders enter into contracts with 
management, which create an agency relationship between shareholders and directors. 
They define the problem of agency as: 
"... a contract under which one or more persons (the principals) engage 
another (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the 
relationship are utility maximisers there is good reason to believe that the 
agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal... "86 
This statement emphasises that a firm is simply a nexus for contracting relationships, 
creating agency costs because of the divergence of interest between management and 
shareholders. In such cases, as Jensen and Meckling observed, the interests of the 
agent are likely to deviate from those of the principal. This deviation of interests 
requires the principal to employ various mechanisms to align the conflicts of interest 
and to monitor the behaviour of agents. Dealing with the agency problem between 
shareholders and directors, Jensen and Meckling suggest that shareholders have to 
prevent the directors from diverging from the shareholders' interests by incurring 
84 Jensen, M. and W. Meckling, 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, The Journal of Financial Economics, 3: pp305-360. 
as Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz, 1972, op 'cit. fn. 5 1. 
°6 See Jensen and Meckling, op cit. fn. 84. 
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monitoring costs to mitigate the directors' aberrant behaviours and by devising 
appropriate incentives for directors 87 Jensen and Meckling argue that agency costs - 
the monitoring costs by the principal, the economic bonding expenditures by the agent 
and the residual loss, are an unavoidable result of the agency relationship. 
8 
The key corporate governance mechanism developed under agency theory, suggesting 
that the board of directots may resolve agency problems through conflict monitoring, 
has been challenged by organisation theory (e. g. managerial hegemony theory and 
resource dependency theory). For example, from a resource dependence perspective, 
Smith notes that non-executive directors who have business relationships with a 
company or directors in related industries can serve as resources, contributing 
valuable expertise to the management of a company 89 Hillman and Dalziel suggest 
that the non-executive directors provide much more than a monitoring function, but 
also a wide range of resources or capital to the corporation beneficial to business and 
strategic decision making 90 However, Dallas points out that non-executive directors 
may not always be in a position to provide all of these resources and functions of 
boards and where. non-executive directors are close associates of the managers they 
el ibid. According to Jenson and Meckling's theory, bonding cost takes place when the managers' income is 
determined by the company's performance and thus discourages them from pursuing their own interests. In this 
case providing incentives through the contractual agreement will result in bonding costs. These could include 
determining a reward structure so that managerial incentives are aligned with the interests of owners. Such rewards 
are usually pecuniary and take the form of performance-related pay or share options. Realignment of interests can 
also be achieved through monitoring the activities of managers. This monitoring can consist of internal and 
external auditing, budget restrictions, the production of financial reporting information, etc. Bonding, monitoring 
and the residual loss are all characterised as agency costs. 
ßa ibid. 
89 D. G. Smith, 1996. Corporate Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons from Kmart, 74 North 
Carolina Law Review, ppl037-1139, at 1138. 
90 Amy J. Hillman and Thomas Dalziel, 2003. Board of Directors and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and 
Resource Dependence Perspectives. Academy of Management Review, 28: pp383-396, at 383-84. 
32 
may be unable to monitor management in shareholders' interests 
91 From a managerial 
hegemony perspective, it has been argued that a board's ability and willingness to 
exercise its governance role effectively is dependent on its `independence' and powers 
over the corporate management. 
2 Dallas argues that agency theorists have only paid 
attention to the occurrence and resolution of the conflicts of interest between the 
management and shareholders without considering the board's ability to monitor. 
Dallas advocates an extreme view which admits that the board of directors' control 
role is conceptually and normatively important, but argues that, in spite of their 
responsibilities to safeguard shareholder interests, many boards are effectively 
controlled by the full-time, better informed, and more experienced corporate 
management, while the independent directors acquiesce into a rather passive, rubber- 
stamping role. 93 In other words, the managerial hegemony theorists suggest that 
boards are dominated by executive directors and are, therefore, ineffective in 
performing conflict monitoring. Accordingly, solutions to agency problems include 
organisational arrangements which encourage independent overseeing and monitoring 
devices which reduce the costs of managerial opportunism or shirking. 
It is clear that both agency and organisational theorists advocate that a fundamental 
function of boards of directors is to provide an important internal monitoring device 
to prevent management from opportunistic and self-serving behaviour. For agency 
91 Dallas, L. L. 1996. The Relational Boards: Three Theories of Corporate Board of Directors, The Journal of 
Corporation Law, Vol. 22, pp1-25 
92 Pettigrew, A. and T. McNulty, 1998. Sources and Uses of Power in the Boardroom, European Journal of Kork 
and Organisational Psychology, 7(2), 197-214. 
93 ibicl 
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theorists, the central argument with agency theory is that a boardroom should contain 
more independent outside directors who are non-employees with no significant 
business relationship with corporations in order to improve the conflict monitoring 
function 94 For managerial hegemony theorists, there has been great emphasis on the 
view that the non-executive/independent directors are ineffective in monitoring the 
performance of executive management if the CEOs play the main role in the 
nomination of board members. In contrast, resource dependence theorists focus on the 
role of the board as resource providers or boundary spanners between firms and their 
environments and emphasise the independence of board members as being critical to 
their ability to carry out the monitoring functions 95 It is reasonable to assume that if a 
director has business ties to corporate management, he or she might too easily be 
influenced into rubber-stamping management decisions. Indeed, recent corporate 
governance developments seem to have focused more on the structure and the role of 
boards of directors to strengthen their accountability to shareholders. Chapter 6 of this 
thesis investigates the development of board systems and presents both legal and 
empirical findings on how boards are structured and function to ensure the efficient 
running of the company in China compared with the UK. 
'4 Baysinger, B. D. and IL N. Bulter, 1985, Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects 
of Changes in Board Composition, Journal of Lax, Economics & Organisation, 1.101-124, Lorsch, J. W. and E. 
MacIver, 1989. Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America k Corporate Boards. Harvard Business School Press, 
Boston, MA. 
9s Pfeffer, J. and ('i Salancik, 1978, The External Control of Organisations: A Resource-dependence Perspective, 
New York: Harper & Row. 
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2.3.4 Legal Theory of Directors' Duties and Enforcement 
In economic theory, a public corporation is an expression of the relationship between 
the principal who has entrusted property and the agents who manage the entrusted 
property. From a legal perspective, the company is an artificial legal entity, created 
and recognised by law, 96 and the directors who acts as agents of the company, 
therefore, have a duty of care to inform themselves reasonably before making a 
decision on the behalf of the principal and fiduciary duties to place the interests of the 
corporation and the principal above any self-serving motive. 7 Black concludes that 
the fiduciary construct enacts "a web of legal rules" that defines and governs in 
important ways what a fiduciary can and cannot do 98 Macey and Miller explain that 
"fiduciary duties are the mechanism invented by the legal system of filling in the 
unspecified terms of shareholders' contingent [contracts). "99 
Indeed, directors' fiduciary duties and duty of care have been well recognised as the 
last resort, when the internal monitoring devices and the external market for corporate 
control mechanisms fail against directors who have not acted in the company's and its 
shareholders' interests. From this perspective, in most countries the tendency in recent 
years has been to draw up a statutory company law to define the duties of directors, 
but using different forms of expression and different phrasing. Most corporate statutes 
96 See Saloman v Saloman & Co. Ltd. [1897] A. C. 22. 
97 See Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, 1999, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law. 85 Eirginia Law 
Review, pp247-328. 
98 Black, Bernard, 1994. Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: The Case of Institutional Voice, 6 
Journal ofApplied Corporate Finance, pp 19-32, at 23. 
"Macey, Jonathan R., and Geoffrey P. Miller. 1993. Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective. 43 
University of Toronto Law Journal, 401 at 407. 
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provide that a director or officer must act with the care an ordinarily prudent person 
in 
a like position would exercise under similar circumstances and in a manner 
he or she 
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. This 
is termed `duty 
of care'. In addition, fiduciary principles constrain managerial discretion 
by governing 
the web of agency relationships constituting the corporate structure. Directors of the 
corporation must act in good faith, and in the honest belief that an action is in the best 
interests of the corporation, not allow their private interests to conflict with those of 
the company, and exercise the powers of the company for a proper purpose. 
Accordingly, if the duty of care and the fiduciary duties are breached, directors may 
be held personally liable for any damages caused by the breach, subject to the rules of 
enforcement. 
Beyond the legal duties of directors, there is also a renewed emphasis on the 
enforcement of directors' duties. Minow suggests that the law should encourage 
shareholders with a meaningful stake to file lawsuits to enforce limits on corporate 
directors and managers who have neglected or abused their obligation to be candid 
about the company's current status and prospects. 100 By examining insider 
expropriation via `tunnelling', Johnson et at advocate that the establishment of a 
stronger and more effective judiciary to enforce the general principles, such as duty of 
care and the duty of loyalty, by courts may influence how firms in different countries 
organise and finance themselves. 10' 
10° Nell Minow, 1995. Putting Shareholders Back into Shareholder Litigation. Available from: http: //www. lens- 
library. com/info/cgadvis. htrnl. [Accessed 11 December 2005] 
101 Johnson et al. 2000. "Tunneling", The American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 90: 22-27. 
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Comparative law and economics has recently taken a step forward with regard to the 
effectiveness of different systems of corporate governance by classification of the 
origin of legal systems. An outstanding contribution on how a country's legal and 
regulatory regime influences its corporate governance system is made by La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny. 1°2 They argue that legal rules governing 
investor protection and the quality of enforcement of the law vary systematically 
across countries depending on the national legal system. Common law countries have 
the strongest, and French civil law has the weakest, and the German and Scandinavian 
civil laws are located in the middle in the protection of the investors. However, this 
study does not explain how a "good" law could actually be developed by a country 
and what sorts of accompanying institutions and norms have to be established to 
support this law? 03 This study has been criticized with regard to the reasonableness 
and credibility of classification of the legal families as it looks at the origin of the 
initial laws instead of any revisions of the law. 104 In addition to that, Coffee argues 
that common law countries, for example, the UK and the US, are quite different in the 
enforcement mechanisms employed to protect investors and the level of judicial 
activism. 105 This suggests that there will be uncertainty in measuring the law and 
institutional environment's influence on corporate governance without a sufficiently 
comprehensive observation across different regulatory regimes. To achieve an 
102 La Porta et al., 1998. op cit fn. 6; and La Porta et al., 1997. Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 Journal 
ofFinance. pp1131-1150. 
1 Pistor, Katharina Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Mark D. West, 2002. The Evolution of Corporate Law. 
A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, pp791-871. 
104 John C. Coffee, Jr., 1999. Privatisation and Corporate Governance: The Lesson from Securities Market Failure, 
25 Journal of Corporate Law, ppl-39. 
"I ibid at pp6-8 
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understanding of corporate governance and seek the merits and effectiveness of 
different systems, a country by country comparative approach may be more desirable. 
According to the legal theory of directors' duties and enforcement, in Chapter 7 and 8, 
we critically examine the legal duties imposed on directors, and analyse the role of 
shareholders in enforcing directors' duties and the current development of the 
company law in respect of shareholder legal actions, and assess the uncertainty and 
ambiguity surrounding the civil proceeding regimes in China compared with the UK. 
2.3.5 Shareholder Versus Stakeholder Theories 
The focus of both shareholder and stakeholder theories has been articulated into some 
core questions in corporate governance. As Kirk-bride et al have summarised: "what is 
the purpose of the corporation, for whose interests is the corporation run, and who 
should control the corporation and how they should control it? "106 These questions 
have no universally accepted answers. In the Anglo-American corporate system, 
corporate governance identifies rights and responsibilities, legitimises actions and 
determines accountability where corporate entities are governed. The corporate 
objective has been traditionally defined as maximising the profits of shareholders. 
Therefore, shareholder value is assumed to be the ruling conception of corporate 
governance. The directors of the corporation are legally responsible to the 
shareholders and conduct the affairs of the corporation in the interests of the 
106 J. Kirkbride, S. Letza and X. Xun, 2005. Corporate Governance: Towards a Theory of Regulatory Shift. European Journal of Law and Economics. 20: 57-70. 
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shareholders. However, some have argued that it is too narrow a perspective to treat 
shareholders as the sole owners of a corporation, since there are others who have 
interests in the corporation, such as employees, creditors, customers and so on, 
therefore the management must take a long-term view of the corporate commercial 
needs rather than. pursue a short-term strategy to maximise shareholder value. 
'07 
German and Japanese governance systems have received praise for their sustainability 
and superior capacity for long-term planning, as well as their practiced ability to 
include a stakeholder approach within the decision-making framework through 
structured interaction between the CEO and other stakeholders. 
108 
China's current corporate governance system was built upon stakeholder theory with a 
two-tier board system, but recently has reformed its law to provide for a system that 
approaches the Anglo-American model in a variety ways. For example, increasing the 
number of outside independent directors on the board, strengthening the independent 
board system by the establishment of board sub-committees and the separation of the 
role of the chairman of the board from the CEO, and improving minority shareholder 
protection etc. 109 However, whether the current hybrid approach to the systematic 
development of corporate governance in China is likely to succeed in producing the 
107 Freeman defined a stakeholder as "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
an organisation's objectives". See Freeman, op cit, fn. 35, p46. According to stakeholder theory, Donaldson and 
Preston argue that "all persons or groups with legitimate interests participating in an enterprise do so to obtain 
benefits, and there is no prima facie priority of one set of interest and benefits one another". See Donaldson, T. and 
Lee E. Preston. The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation, Evidence and Implications. The Academy of 
Management Review, Vo1.20,65-9 1, at 68. 
108 Detomasi, D., 2002, International Institutions and the Case for Corporate Governance: Toward a Distributive 
Governance Framework? Global Governance, 8(4), 421-442, at 431. 
109 The most notable response to these developments has been the Guidelines for Introducing Independent 
Directors to the Board of Direciors of Listed Companies and the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies in China. 
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expected effects is a question of great interest and the main subject matter of the 
corporate governance research in the thesis. 
2.4 Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance 
An empirical investigation of the relationship between corporate governance and 
corporate performance essentially attempts to test whether `better' corporate 
governance results in better corporate performance by preventing the management 
from pursuing their own objectives or the expropriation of minority shareholders in 
cases where there is a controlling shareholder. For example, a number of empirical 
studies examine the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance 
assuming that the differing ownership and control structures will have significant 
implications for the operation and performance of the firm. ' 10 In addition, much of the 
empirical literature argues that if certain shareholders act as monitors of management 
behaviour, ' corporate performance will be better than in firms where monitoring does 
not occur. "" Furthermore, the disciplining of the board of directors has also received 
considerable empirical attention, arguing that greater board independence, the 
establishment of board committees, and innovation of the executive remuneration 
110 Demsetz, H. and Lehn K. 1985. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, Journal of 
Political Economy 93,1155-1177; Holderness, C. G. and Sheehan, D. P. 1988. The Role of Majority Shareholders 
in Publicly Held Corporations: an Exploratory Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 20,317-346; Levin, S. 
G1 and Levin, S. L. 1982. Ownership and Control of Large Industrial Firms: Some New Evidence, Review of 
Business and Economic Research, Spring, 37-49; McConnell, J. J. and Servacs, li. 1990. Additional Evidence on 
Equity Ownership and Corporate Value, Journal of Financial Economics, 27,595-612; Morck, It., A. Shleifer and 
R. W. Vishny, op cit. fn. 38 
UI Gillian, S. and L. Starks, 1998. A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and Empirical Evidence, 
Contemporary Finance Digest 2(3), 10-34. Karpoff, J., 1998. The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Target 
Companies: Survey of Empirical Findings, University of Washington, School of Business, Seattle, Washington; 
Carleton, W. T., J. M. Nelson, and M. S. Weisbach, 1998. The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance 
Through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF, The Journal of Finance, Vol. LIII, No. 4,1335-1362, at 
1356-1657. 
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regime will enhance corporate performance and valuation of shareholders. 
112 Various 
arguments have been put forward, however, and there is little consensus because there 
are significant differences in corporate governance characteristics and too many other 
factors that impact on performance at the individual company level. 
' 13 Coles et at 
suggest that in order to understand the relationship between the typical agency theory 
constructs of monitoring, incentives and ownership structure and a firm's financial 
performance, it is necessary to examine a number of different governance 
mechanisms both individually and their interactions with firm performance because 
firms may use governance packages to deal with agency issues and enhance 
shareholder value. 114 By reviewing the literature on the relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate performance, Chapter 9 of the thesis attempts to overcome 
the shortcomings identified in empirical studies which focus on only a single 
corporate governance characteristic to explain corporate performance, instead 
adopting and developing a broad view of corporate governance characteristics, 
including ownership structures, shareholder activism and board of director 
112 There is a considerable amount of literature examines the relationship between board size, board composition, 
board committee and director remuneration and corporate performance. See, Bhagat, S. and B. Black 1999. The 
Uncertain Relationship between Board Composition and Firm Performance, Business Lawyer 54.921-963; 
Baysinger, B. D. and H. N. Butler 1985. op cit. fn. 94. Ilermalin, B. E. and M. S. Weisbach, 1991. The Effects of 
Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance, Financial Management 20(4)101-112; Core, J., 
Holthausen R. and Larcker, D. 1999. Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer compensation and Firm 
Performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51, pp. 371-406. Mehran, H., 1995. Executive Compensation 
Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance, Journal of Financial Economics, 38, pp163-184. Klein, A. 1998. 
Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure, 41 Journal of Law and Economics, 275-303. 
113 Leech and Leahy note that the performance of a firm reflects both internal influence, such as its internal 
organisation and factors which may modify incentives, and external constraints in the form of influences from, for 
example, the product market, the capital market and also the influence of life-cycle effects. See Leech, D. and J. 
Leahy, 1991. Ownership Structure, Control Type Classifications and the Performance of Large British Companies, 
Economic Journal, 101,1418-1437. 
114 Coles, J. W., V. B. McWilliams and N. Sen. 2001. An Examination of the Relationship of Governance 
Mechanisms to Performance. Journal of Management 27,23-50. 
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characteristics, to identify the complex relationship between the corporate governance 
structure and the economic performance of corporations in China. 
2.5 Corporate Governance in Developing Countries 
Recent research on corporate governance has found systematic differences among 
nations in terms of ownership structure, the value of voting rights, ' the role and 
structure of the board of directors, law and legal enforcement, and the development of 
capital markets. More importantly, recent comparative corporate governance research 
suggests that the systems operating in developed western economies may not 
necessarily be transferable to developing countries (or emerging or transition 
economies), where the actual practices, institutional environment and behaviour of 
key participants in the corporate governance process, are not always consistent with 
the principles operated in the UK or the US. 
' 15 For example, a survey of corporate 
governance in Asia (including China) conducted by Claessens and Fan shows that 
conventional corporate governance mechanisms (takeovers and the board of directors) 
are not strong enough to relieve the agency problems in Asia. Also, alternative 
corporate governance mechanisms (e. g. employing reputable auditors, foreign 
institutional investors) can only have limited effectiveness in systems with weak 
institutions and poor property rights. 116 By observing specific corporate governance 
"s See Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard, 2002, Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 
European Economic Review 47(1): pp165-195; Ravi Dhareadkar, Gerard George and Pamela Brandes, 2000, 
Privatization in Emerging Economies: An Agency Theory Perspective, The Academy of Management Review, 
Vol. 25, pp650-669. Pistor, K.. and C. Xu, 2002, Fiduciary Duties in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions: Lessons 
from the Incomplete Law Theory, ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, working paper No. 01/2002. Tam, O. K. 
1997, The Development of Corporate Governance in China, Edward Elgar,, p77. 
116 Claessens, Stijn and Joseph P. H. Fan, 2003. Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey, International Review of 
Finance 3(2), pp71-103., 
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issues in Asian firms, Claessens and Fan argue that "there are many corporate 
governance issues in Asia generic to other countries, most importantly the role of 
family ownership concentration and the degree of minority rights protection. "' 17 
Indeed, there are two main features of corporate governance in developing countries: 
(i) The state or family (or family holding company). dominated ownership structure. 
The majority of the firms in developing countries are controlled and managed by 
either the state or families (or family holding company). For example, by examining 
corporate governance in India, Goswami finds that SOEs account for 20% of the 
market capitalisation of listed companies, and this has inevitably influenced their 
governance structures. 118 Claessens et al examine the deviation of ownership and 
control rights in nine East Asian countries and report that a single shareholder 
controls more than two-thirds of publicly listed East Asian companies and most of 
them are families or family holding companies. ' 19 Based on a recently published 
survey of the 100 largest non-financial companies in Brazil, the IIF Task Force Report 
notes that in about 52 per cent of firms, families or family foundations controlled over 
50 per cent of the voting stock, while in another 40 per cent a family or other 
company owned often between 20 per cent and 50 per cent of voting shares and only 
8 per cent of companies had a dispersed ownership structure. 120 In typical analysis of 
ownership structure in developing countries, research suggests that the nature of the 
1 17 Ibid. 
18 Omkar Goswami, The Tides Rises, Gradually: Corporate Governance in India, (CWOECD), Informal 
Workshop on Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Emerging Economies, April 2000. 119 Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov and Larry H. P. Lang, 2000. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 58: 81-112. '201IF Task Force Report, Corporate Governance in Brazil: An Investor Perspective, June, 2004. 
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agency problem is no longer the traditional agency problem of shareholder-manager 
conflicts, but rather the risk of expropriation of the minority shareholders by the 
controlling shareholder. 
(ii) Weakness in minority shareholder protection. The absence of the rule of law and 
poor enforcement of the law are the central functional differences between developed 
market economies and developing economies. 121 For example, Jesover argues that the 
importation of the Anglo-American form of governance using the rule of law and 
boards of directors was largely a failure for Russia, due to the lack of effective 
methods for adjudicating claimed violations of corporate law and the enforcement of 
the resulting judgement. 122 The 1117 Task Force Report claims that weak enforcement 
of rules and regulations has been a perennial concern for investors in emerging 
markets. 123 The experiences of the developing countries show that a weak legal 
enforcement system creates a unique set of governance concerns relating to the 
expropriation of minority shareholders. Clearly, this problem is rooted in the form of 
concentrated ownership, but evidence also suggests that such a problem cannot be 
resolved without the strengthening of the respective countries' legal infrastructures. 
The research literature reviewed above has highlighted the weak governance and 
underdeveloped institutional context in developing countries and emerging or 
121 La Porta et al, 1998, op cit fn. 6 ; Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2002, op cit. fn. 119 Berkowitz, Pistor and 
Richard, 2002, Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, European Economic Review 47(1): 
ppl65-195 
Jesover, F. 2001, Corporate Governance in the Russian Federation: The Relevance of the OECD Principles on 
Shareholder Rights and Equitable Treatment, Corporate Governance: 9, pp79-88. 123 IIF Task Force Report, 2004, op cit. fn. 120. 
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transition economies. The nature of the ownership structure is a key determinant of 
the nature of agency problems. In addition, highly concentrated ownership also affects 
the development of corporate governance rules. For example, due to concentrated 
ownership, independent directors are often nominated by executive directors who 
represent controlling shareholders or who are controlling shareholders themselves, so 
that the independent directors have limited direct effect as the controlling shareholders 
will not allow them to have any real influence on the firm's board. 124 Hanazaki and 
Liu claim that ownership concentration and the divergence between the voting rights 
and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders in firms which allowed insiders to 
exercise effective control, were associated with significantly worse corporate 
performance during the Asian crisis. 125 
Recent literature on corporate governance also draws much attention to the issue of 
shareholder identity. It stresses that the objective functions and the costs of exercising 
control over corporate management vary substantially for different types of owners. 
For example, Goswami argues that as shareholders of private sector companies are 
direct beneficiaries of profitable activities, they have an incentive to monitor 
management and to maximise corporate value. In contrast, the directors of most 
government-controlled companies, because they do not have a substantial body of 
informed private shareholders whose income. depends upon the performance of the 
124 Berglot; E and S. Claessens, 2006, Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance: Governance in Developing 
Countries and Transition Economies. The World Bank Research Observer, 21: 123-150. 
'25 Masaharu Ilanazaki and Qun Liu, 2003. The Asian Crisis and Corporate Governance: Ownership Structure, 
Debt Financing, and Corporate Diversification, CEI Working Paper Series, No. 2003.18. 
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companies, are typically described as "agents without principals". 126 Using data for 
more than 700 Czech firms listed on the Prague Stock Exchange over the period 
1992-95, Claessens et al find that concentrated ownership by bank-sponsored 
investment funds is beneficial in improving firm management. 127 By investigating 
ownership concentration and corporate performance, Cleassens and Djankov find that 
the presence of a significant foreign investor is associated with higher profitability in 
newly privatised Czech firms. 128 Similarly, Boubakri and Cosset's research on 189 
privatised firms in 32 developing countries, also finds that firm profitability and 
efficiency are associated with the presence of foreign investors. 129 
The protection of investors is a fundamental objective of corporate governance. To 
achieve this objective requires both governance rules and enforcement mechanisms to 
be present within a country's legal system. In fact, investor protection in developing 
" countries has been gradually improving following the development of the Corporate 
Governance Code and the introduction of new corporate legislation. However, 
unfortunately, certain well-designed rules and corporate governance practices 
transplanted from Anglo-American system seems work poorly in developing 
countries. 130 One likely answer to this puzzle is that the effectiveness of law is not 
Omkar Goswami, op cit. fn. 118. 
Stijin Claessens, Simeon Djankov and Gerbard Pobl, 1997, Ownership and Corporate Governance - Evidence from the Czech Republic, Notes No. 111, Public Policy Journal, World Bank Group. Available at 
httn: //rru. worldbank. ory[Documents/PublicPoligyJoumal/i l lnohl pd last visited 10 September 2006. " Claessens, S. and Djankov, S. 1999, Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech 
Republic, Journal of Comparative Economic, 27: 498-513. 
129 Boubakri, N and Cosset, J. C. 1998. The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: 
Evidence from Developing Countries, Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, ppl081-1110. 130 See Justin Lu and Jonathan Batten, 2001, The Implementation of OECD Corporate Governance Principles in 
Post-Crisis Asia, Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 4: 47-62. 
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dependent on the content of the substantive law, but rather the adequacy of the 
enforcement mechanisms that underlie it. 
131 Thus, Beiglöf and Claessens stress that 
the enforcement of the rule of law, rather than regulations, laws on the books, or the 
voluntary code, is the most important determinant of the effectiveness of corporate 
governance in developing countries and transition economies. 
132 Marinov and Heiman 
argue that the objective of corporate law and corporate governance in transition 
economies should reflect the need for "relatively simple, highly credible rules that 
allow shareholders to protect themselves by their own voting decisions and by 
exercising transactional property rights". '33 
The discussion of corporate governance in developing countries is useful because 
China is facing corporate governance issues quite similar to most developing 
countries. Given the fact that the predominant governance problems in developing 
counties are related to ownership concentration and weak law enforcement, the thesis 
attempts to investigate if the ownership structure has an adverse effect on China's 
corporate governance system, and what China needs to do with its current corporate 
structure in order to improve the effectiveness of the corporate control mechanisms. 
And, if the legal enforcement is rather weak compared with that in the UK, what 
further legal reforms are required in China. 
131 John, c. Coffee, 1999, Privatization and Corporate Governance: the Lesson from Securities Market Failure, 
Journal of Corporate Law, Fall, pp1-37. 
"Z Erik Beiglöf and Stijn Claessens, 2006, Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing Countries 
and Transition Economies, The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 2006. 
133 Boeis Z. Marinov and Bruce A. Heiman, 1998, Company Law and Corporate Governance Renewal in 
Transition Economies: The Bulgarian Dilemma. European Journal of Law and Economics, 6: 231-261. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
Given the theoretical and empirical framework of corporate governance, the focus of 
the thesis can be classified into three major themes: (i) ownership structure and the 
role of shareholders in corporate governance; (ii) board structure and accountability; 
(iii) corporate governance and corporate performance. The first theme initially sets 
out the nature of the problem of the ownership structure, indicating that the ownership 
structure (i. e. the identities of the shareholders and the sizes of their positions) is 
potentially an important element of corporate governance, and then addresses the 
issues of the role of shareholders in exercising control over or in ensuring the 
accountability of the board of directors, in particular via shareholder general meetings. 
The second theme deals with the role and structure of the board of directors, directors' 
duties and the role of shareholders in enforcing directors duties, and emphasises that 
the institutional and legal regulatory framework are important in improving corporate 
governance. The last theme discusses the relationship between corporate governance 
and corporate performance. The underlying purposes of this theme are essentially to 
test the propositions of various corporate governance theories that, irrespective of the 
country and system of corporate governance concerned, better corporate governance 
results in better corporate performance. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we briefly review the literature on the comparative law method, the 
economic analysis of law and a combined comparative law and economic analytical 
approach recently employed in the corporate law and corporate governance research 
fields. While recognising that the ideas of economics have provided numerous 
insights into the operation of the firm, and have enriched our understanding of the 
phenomenon of the contemporary corporate governance debates and development, we 
have emphasised that many studies have not provided a close examination of the 
adequacy of the existing law of corporations and related legal enforcement of 
legislative controls over corporate practice which significantly impact on the efficient 
operation of corporations. 
The research methods employed in this thesis attempt to make a substantive 
contribution to the literature, suggesting that corporate governance is an institutional 
framework defined' in large part by law. The development of legal rights and the 
procedural mechanisms for their enforcement aim to -promote the allocation of scarce 
resources in a way which maximises their value to society or minimises the costs 
which are involved in the use of resources. 134 Therefore, it is necessary to apply the 
130 See Law Commission, Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a Statement of 
Duties (1998, Law Com No 153, Scot Law Com No 105). Part 3. 
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comparative law method to examine substantive legal doctrines, the legal and 
institutional framework, and its court system in particular in enforcing the law, and 
employ the economic analysis of law to assess the governance mechanisms affecting 
the efficient operation of corporations. Pure empirical research and explanations of 
the governance function of ownership structure, the role of boards of directors, 
shareholder activism, without paying any attention to cross-country differences in law 
and its enforcement are far less conclusive. 
The comparative law and economic analysis approach applied in this thesis, which is 
novel in studies of the Chinese corporate governance system, is intended to qualify or 
quantify each of the examined characteristics more comprehensively and compare 
them from the same perspectives, with similar details and depth, to explore how the 
corporate governance systems are formed, interact, and evolve in China and the UK. 
This approach shows that the development of a theoretical framework combining 
insights from economic, legal, political and historical backgrounds can be expected to 
improve methodical comparisons of governance systems. In addition, there are two 
distinctive features in our empirical approach to functional relations between 
corporate governance and corporate performance. First, we collect empirical data 
based on the ongoing debates in law and economics scholarship regarding the 
development of corporate governance and the relevant variables to the research issues 
identified by our functional comparative law analysis. Second, perhaps most 
importantly, the research approach of the study is distinguished from other studies in 
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that it not only examines an array of governance mechanisms used within 
corporations and their effects on corporate performance, but also takes 
into account 
the interdependence among these mechanisms. The following two sections explain the 
methodology used in the thesis, based on the contribution of both comparative 
law 
and the economic analysis of law literature. 
3.2 Comparative Law Research Method 
The main objective of a comparative law study incorporates the discovery, 
comparison, and analysis of the evolution of a particular legal issue in different legal 
systems. In this way, a comparative law study can give us fresh, exciting insights and 
a deeper understanding of issues that are of central concern in different countries. 
They can lead to the identification of gaps in knowledge and may point to possible 
directions that could be followed, directions that previously may have been unknown 
to observers or legal reformers, and they provide a source of information for 
improvement of legal systems. 135 As Riles observed, "the attraction of comparative 
law is not just the study of foreign law as such. It would also be the allure of a 
glimpse into the origins of legal norms; the prospect of a better understanding of the 
efficacy and limits of law; and the hope of insight into the connections among law, 
behaviour, ideas, and power. " 136 Drury and Xuereb suggest that a comparative 
analytical approach which goes beyond mere descriptive analysis is required if we are 
135 Zweigert K., and 11. Kotz, 1998, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3`d ed. Oxford University Press, p31-39; 
Reitz, J. C., 1998. How to Do Comparative Law, 46 American Journal of Comparative Law pp617-636. 
136 Riles, A. 1999. Wigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 Harvard International 
Law Journal. 221-283 at 239. 
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to discover how different systems solve particular problems and why certain solutions 
are appropriate for one system but not for another. They argue that the underlying 
concepts, policy considerations and assumptions of each system need to be addressed 
before the real nature and relative importance of key matters which each system can 
be properly understood. 137 Indeed, comparative law has never been just describing the 
facts of foreign law. It is, in fact, a primary method of study of law providing a better 
understanding of the existing legal rules and institutions of a country, as well as 
giving us an understanding of the differences across jurisdictions. It may also help to 
sharpen the focus of analysis of the subject under study by suggesting new 
perspectives. 
Reitz describes nine essentials of the comparative law method. 138 He insists that the 
field of comparative law depends on the study of foreign law and legal systems. He 
maintains that the comparative method will be much more effective if the study 
137 Drury, R. and P. Xuere, 1991. European Company Law: A Comparative Approach. Dartmouth. 
1e The nine methods are: 1). Comparative law involves drawing explicit comparisons, and most non- comparative 
foreign law writing could be strengthened by being made explicitly comparative; 2) The comparative method 
consists in focusing careful attention on the similarities and differences among the legal systems being compared, 
but in assessing the significance of differences the comparatist needs to take account of the possibility of functional 
equivalence; 3) The process of comparison is particularly suited to lead to conclusions about (a) distinctive 
characteristics of each individual legal system and/or (b) commonalities concerning how law deals with the 
particular subject under study; 4) One of the benefits of comparative analysis is its tendency to push the analysis to 
broader levels of abstraction through its investigation into functional equivalence. 5) The comparative method has 
the potential to lead to even more interesting analysis by inviting the comparatist to give reasons for the similarities 
and differences among legal systems or to analyze their significance for the cultures under study; 6) In establishing 
-what the law is in each jurisdiction under study, comparative Law (and, for that matter, studies of foreign law, as 
well) should (a) be concerned to describe the normal conceptual world of the lawyers, (b) take into consideration 
all the sources upon which a lawyer in that legal system might base her opinion as to what the law is, and (c) take 
into consideration the gap between the law on the books and law in action, as well as (d) important gaps in 
available knowledge about either the law on the books or the law in action; 7) Comparative and foreign law 
scholarship both require strong linguistic skills and maybe even the skills of anthropological field study in order to 
collect information about foreign legal systems at first hand, but it is also reasonable for the comparative scholar 
without the necessary linguistic skill or in-country experience to rely on secondary literature in languages the 
comparatist can read, subject to the usual caution about using secondary literature; 8) Comparative law scholarship 
should be organized in a way that emphasizes explicit comparison. 9) Comparative studies should be undertaken in 
a spirit of respect for the other. See Reitz, J. C. op cit. fn. 135. pp617-636. 
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makes comparisons by summarising the most important similarities and 
differences. 139 He argues that comparison starts by identifying the similarities and 
differences between legal systems or parts of the legal systems under comparison. 
However, Reitz emphasises that in performing the basic comparative job of 
identifying similarities and differences, one has to consider the scope of comparison - 
what is going to be compared with what? or how should comparisons be made? 
'4° 
Seeking to answer these questions, Reitz suggests that "a good comparative law study 
should normally devote substantial effort to exploring the degree to which there are or 
are not functional equivalents of the aspect under study in one legal system, in the 
other systems or systems under comparison". 
'at 
Reitz also notes that because comparison focuses on both differences and similarities, 
comparative law studies need to cast light on (1) the special or unique natures of the 
legal systems being compared; and (2) their commonalities with respect to the issue in 
question. The first direction is a normative description which leads toward defining 
the distinctive features of each legal system. The second direction is positive 
(prescriptive) comparison which leads toward appreciation of commonalities, maybe 
even universal aspects, of legal systems and insight into fundamental aspects of the 
particular legal issue in question. 142 Reitz suggests that comparative study could end 
with a delineation of relevant similarities and differences, but the goal of good 
139 Ibid, p619. 
140 lbid, p620 
141 Ibid, p622 
142Ibid, p623 
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comparative study requires significant legal analysis to investigate the reasons for the 
similarities and differences among legal systems or to assess the significance of such 
similarities or differences, such as whether one country's law functions well or which 
country's rules govern the legal issues better? 143 Zweigert and Kötz also contend that 
"the basic methodological principle of all comparative law is that of functionality. "1 
They argue that different legal systems can be compared only if they solve the same 
factual problem, satisfying the requirement in adequate legal regulations. 145 
3.3 Economic Analysis of Law 
Comparative law is concerned with the way the law is and how it evolves, rather than 
how it ought to be. The problem with this approach is, however, that can be 
considered as being limited to essentially descriptive analysis which can only provide 
a legal analysis of similarities or differences and assess the reasons for the similarities 
and differences among legal systems, but does not call for any deeper argumentation 
to explain whether one country's law functions well or whether another rule governs 
the same or similar legal issues more effectively. Therefore, it is necessary for 
comparative law study to draw upon extra-legal methodologies (such as economics) to 
understand how the law evolves and adapts to change, how people react to legal rules 
and institutions, and how to evaluate the soundness of a legal proposition. 146 
1431bid, p627 
144 see K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, op cit. fn. 135, p34. 
145 ibid p5 
106 Mattei describes that Law and Economics' scholars may be able to see a legal rule of one legal system is more 
or less efficient than another as they are concerned with "describing, explaining, and - why not? - predicting and leading legal changes and transplants", see Mattei, U. 1997. Comparative Law and Economics, the University of 
Michigan Press, p145. Also Posner argues that the basis of an economic approach to law is concerned with the 
efficiency of legal system and individual's reaction induced by the particular legal rules. See Posner, R. A. 1973. 
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The economic analysis of law applies the tools of microeconomic theory to the 
analysis of legal rules and institutions. 147 Posner argues that the basis of an economic 
approach to law is concerned with the efficiency of legal systems and individual's 
reaction induced by particular legal rules. 149 Mattei contends that comparative law and 
economics is an approach to build a model of an efficient institution and then compare 
it with alternative legal systems in the real world . 
149 Typically, Mattei explains this 
approach departing from the standpoint of efficiency which explains why this 
inefficiency occurs, and attempts to establish whether the legal system under analysis 
possesses institutions that can work as efficiency-restoring substitutes. 150 
The contribution of economic analysis has been summarised by the Law Commission 
in "Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a Statement 
of Duties". 151 This states that "[T]he economic analysis of law can fulfil two purposes: 
Firstly, it can be used to evaluate particular legal provisions in terms of how far they 
enhance efficiency, or, in other words, how far they contribute to the wealth or well 
being of society as a whole. Secondly, it can be employed to predict the effects of 
changes in the law". 152 In recognising the importance of the economic analysis of law 
for achieving a better understanding of the consequences of legal rules, the Law 
The Economic Approach to Law, 53 Texas Law Review, pp757- 761. 
147 Kornhauser, L., 2006, Legal Philosophy: The Economic Analysis of Law, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed. ), available from: 
http: //Plato. stanford. edu/archives/sor2006/entries/legal-econanalysis/ [Accessed 20 April 20061. 
148 see R. A. Posner, op cit, fn. 146. 
149 see U. Mattei, op cit. fn. 146, p94 150 Mattei, U., 1995. The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts, 43 American Journal 
of Comparative Law. 427-45, at 430. 
... Seee, Law Commission, (Law Com No 153). op cit. f 1.134. 152 Ibid part 3.3, p33. 
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Commission emphasises that the economic analysis of law "may not provide a 
conclusive answer in most cases, it can, nevertheless, inform policy makers of some 
of the possibly unintended consequences of changes to the law"153. 
3.4 Comparative Law and Economic Analysis 
The comparative law and economic analysis combined approach is a rather new 
discipline located at the frontiers of contemporary legal research. However, it is easy 
to agree with the proposition that the reliance on combining the analytical tools of 
adjoining complementary social sciences, and in particular on economics, to conduct a 
critical approach to legal rules and institutions has been one of the major contributions 
of methodology for comparative law. This approach has been applied in a number of 
recent corporate law and corporate governance studies. '54 
The comparative law and economics approach to corporate governance has recently 
emerged as a fruitful way to think about a number of questions on legal families, 
shareholder rights, minority shareholder protection and the quality of the enforcement 
of laws and the link with the economic performance of corporations. For example, La 
Ports et al conducted an empirical study on how laws protecting investors differ 
153 Ibid part 3.8, p34. 
154 See Easterbrook F. H. and D. R. Fischel, 1996. The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard University 
Press; W. Carlin and C. Mayer, 1999. How do Financial Systems Affect Economic Performance? Available from: 
http: //www. finance. ox. ac. uk/file links/fineconpapers/1999fe08. pdf [Accessed 12 September 2005]. ShleiferA. 
and R. W. Vishny, 1997, op cit. n. 35; La Porta et al. 2000. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 
Journal of Financial Economics, 2-27. Claessens, S., S. Djankov and L. H. P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership 
and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 Journal of Financial Economics 81; La Porta et al. 1999. Corporate 
Ownership around the World, 54 Journal of Finance 47; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark Roe, 1999. A Theory of Path 
Dependence in Corporate Governance and Ownership, 52 Stanford Law Review 127; La Porta et al., 1997. op cit 
fn. 102; Roe, M. 1996. Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 Harvard Law Revie, pp641-68. 
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across 49 countries, how the quality of enforcement of these laws varies, and whether 
these variations matter for corporate ownership patterns around the world. 
lss The 
methodology employed by this study was, typically, a comparative law and 
economics approach, in that it adjoined rigorous statistical tools for analysing the 
rules governing investor protection and the quality of law enforcement in a sample of 
countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America. 
'56 
In addition, in 2002 La Porta et al extended their study to testing the agency problems 
and dividend policies around the world by using data collected across 33 countries, 
for more than 4,000 firms. 157 They distilled information from the available literature 
on the basic mechanisms of how dividends could be used to deal with agency 
problems and predicted that dividends are an outcome of an effective system of the 
legal protection of shareholders. 158 The construction of the variables included a 
dummy variable of the 'country's legal origin and a dummy of the index of anti- 
director rights derived from La Porta et al's 1998 study on a proxy for the quality of 
Iss See La Porta et al. 1998. op cit. fn. 6. 
156 ibid. La Porta et al. classified the origin of laws into four legal families: English, or Common law; French civil 
Law; German civil law and Scandinavian law. This index reflects such aspects of minority rights as (1) the ease of 
voting for directors; (2) freedom of trading shares during a shareholder meeting; (3) the possibility of electing 
directors through a cumulative voting mechanism or proportion representation of minorities on the board; (4) the 
existence of a grievance mechanism for oppressed minority shareholders, such as class-action lawsuit or appraisal 
rights for major corporate decisions; (5) the existence of a pre-emptive rights to new security issues by the firm, (6) 
the percentage of votes needed to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting. The range for the index is from zero 
to six. To assess enforcement, the analysis uses five measures: efficiency of the judicial system; rule of law, 
corruption; risk of expropriation (outright confiscation or forced nationalisation) by government, and the likelihood 
of contract reputation by the government. In addition to these rule of law variables, the study uses an estimate of 
the quality of accounting standard. 
157 La Porta et al., 2000, Agency Problems and Dividend Polices around the World, The Journal of Finance, 55,1- 
33. 
158 ]bid and La Porta at al. 1998, op cit. fn. 6. 
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the legal protection of investors. 159 They found that stronger minority shareholder 
rights were associated with higher dividend payouts. 
' 60 
Furthermore, in 2002 La Porta et al also published an empirical analysis of investor 
protection and corporate valuation using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy 
economies. 161 This study evaluated the influence on corporate valuation of investor 
protection and ownership by the controlling shareholders on corporate valuation. 
162 
They employed Tobin's Q to measure corporate valuation, and the origin of the 
country's law and an index of specific rules as an indicator of shareholder 
protection. 163 The corporate valuation and ownership data collected from the 
WorldScope database, companies' annual reports, proxy statements, and cöuntry- 
specific books on the ownership structure of their companies, Web-sites and other 
relevant company documents. IM However, the origin of a country's law was limited 
on common law and civil law classification, and the legal variables of investor 
protection were still derived from La Porta et al's index of anti-director rights. 165 The 
159 ibicL 
160 The civil law dummy enters with a negative and significant co-efficient at the 1 percent level in regressions 
using all three measures of dividend payout -dividend - to - cash - flow; dividend - to earnings and dividend -to 
-sales. See ibid. La Porta et al., 2000. p19 16' The sample includes the larges 20 firms by market capitalisation in each of the 27 countries covered by La Porta 
et al. 's survey. See La Porta et al., 2002. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, The Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 5 7, No. 3, pp 1147-1170. 
162 The sample of controlling shareholders consists of a shareholder who controls over 10 percent of vote of the 
firm. See Ibid. p1154. 
163 The Tobin's Q defined as the ratios of the market value of assets to their replacement value at the most recent 
financial year, typically 1995. ibid, p1156. 
164 The ownership data did not all come from the same year because of the limitation of disclosure in several 
countries. See La Porta et at. 2002, op cit, fn. 161. p 1154. 
165 La Porta et al. use a dummy variable (0,1) to weight a firm comes from a country with a common law origin or 
civil law origin, and index of anti-directors remaining the same scores. See La Porta et al. 1998. op cit fn. 6. and La 
Ports et al. 2002. op cit. fn. 161. 
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result was consistent with their main prediction that better investor protection was 
associated with higher corporate valuation. 166 
Although La Porta et al's economic approaches have made an influential contribution 
to comparative corporate governance research, the methodology they employed in 
their study is not free from criticism. Coffee criticises the reasonableness and 
credibility of the classification of legal origins and questions the causal relationship 
between legal origin and economic performance. 167 In addition to that, Coffee argues 
that even common law systems may not be that much alike - for example, the UK and 
the US, are quite different in the enforcement mechanisms employed on the protection 
of investors and the level of judicial activism. 16' This suggests that there will be 
uncertainty if we measure how the law and institutional environment influence 
corporate governance without a sufficient comprehensive observation across different 
regulatory regimes. To achieve a greater understanding of corporate governance by 
investigating the merits and effectiveness of different systems, a country to country 
comparative approach may be more desirable. 
Pistor et al argues that La Porta et al's studies use the index legal rights variables to 
show how the effectiveness of legal institutions varies among legal families, but they 
Ibid La Porta et al. 2002. 
167 See, Coffee, J. C., 1999, op cit, fn. 104, Also see Coffee, J. C., 2001. The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The 
Role of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale Law Journal, p1-82. '' For example, Coffee argues that "in the United states a highly entrepreneurial system of private enforcement 
which has evolved that largely overcomes the collective action problems that dissuade individual investors from 
suing nothing comparable exists in the United Kingdom. " Ibid. John C. Coffee 1999, p7. 
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do not compare the variance between law on the book and law in action. 
169 They 
claim that the differences in substantive law could be far less important than 
differences in enforcement practise . 
170 A similar point to that of Coffee and Pistor is 
made by Licht et al who object to La Porta et al's choice of index components and the 
assignment of equal weight to different nations. 
171 Hoang also points out that it may 
not be possible to adequately reflect the actual performance of institutions by merely 
using perception data collected from private rating agencies. 
172 Hoang claims, for 
example, with regard to the efficiency of the judicial system, that respondents may 
rely on their experience with other parts of government, but not on any direct 
experience with the courts so that the available measures used to measure the 
effectiveness of law enforcement are general and indirect. 
173 These limitations 
obviously have adverse effects on La Porta et al's conclusion regarding the legal 
system comparison. 
" See Pistor, K., M. Raiser and S. Geifer, 2000. Law and Finance in Transition Economic, CID Working Paper 
No. 49, Center for International Development at Harvard University, and Berkowitz, D, K. Pistor and J. Richard, 
2000. Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, CID working paper No. 39, Center for 
International Development at Harvard University. 
10 See Pistor, K., 2000. Patterns ofLegal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies, 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, working paper No. 49. 
171 See Licht, A. N., C. Goldschmidt, and S. H. Schwartz, 2001. Culture, Law, and Finance: Culture Dimensions of 
Corporate Governance Laws. Available from: htpt : //naners. ssrn. com/sol3/paners. cfm? abstract id=267190 
[Accessed 12 September 2005]. 
n It is important to note that all the data in measuring investor's rights, the quality of enforcement laws and the 
quality of accounting standard in La Porta et al. s' studies are collected from independent agencies - the Business 
International Corp. and International Country Risks. See Hoang, H. L., 2003. The Effects of Judicial Efficiency on 
Credit Market Development, IEE Working Paper, Volume 174, Institute of Development Research and 
Development Policy, RUHR University Bochum. 
173 Ibid. 
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3.5 Research Method Design 
The comparative law method discussed above gives clear guidance for carrying out 
legal comparisons. Based on this guidance, the comparative law as a method utilised 
in this study will reveal both the legal and institutional framework to identify the 
allocation of key decision-making rights between shareholders and board of directors 
of the firm, including rights relating to the existence of the shareholding structure, its 
governance structure, voting rules, the issues of directors' accountability and 
protection of minority shareholders. Accordingly, the scope of this research focuses 
, on the central issue 
for corporate governance in every jurisdiction, which is how to 
mediate the conflicts between shareholders and directors, and protect minority 
shareholders. 
To understand how different countries address these competing claims, this research 
begins with, in the first instance, the investigation of the Chinese and the UK 
corporate legal and institutional systems in order to discover how corporate control 
power is distributed and whether the shareholders hold effective corporate control 
rights over management by a normative comparative approach. We then explore the 
functional equivalents by a positive comparison to investigate whether shareholders 
are able to exercise their corporate control mechanisms effectively to prevent 
management from pursuing their own interests and whether the legal duties imposed 
on the directors can be effectively enforced if the directors abuse their powers. In so 
doing, the comparative legal variables are identified through a close look at the legal 
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and institutional framework in three main areas - (i) share ownership and shareholder 
1i. 
rights: including company share ownership structure, type of shares, identities of 
shareholders, shareholder general meetings, resolutions, shareholder voting rights and 
related certain procedures rules, and information disclosure; (ii) the role of the board' 
and directors' accountability: including the structure and composition of boards, 
independent/non-executive directors, and board activities; (iii) directors' duties and 
enforcement: including common law fiduciary duties, duty of care, skill and diligence, 
and judicial efficiency in enforcing directors' duties. The primary sources for 
comparison include company law, securities regulations, listing rules, codes of 
corporate governance, and a number of cases dealing with specific issues of corporate 
governance. Empirical data are used to demonstrate the ownership structure patterns, 
general meetings and shareholder voting results, board characteristics and to explore 
how corporate governance mechanisms currently operate in practice in China and the 
UK. The detailed empirical data collection method is presented in section 3.6. 
The economic analysis of law approach in this thesis attempts to test the relationship 
between corporate governance and corporate performance in China. This study 
overcomes the shortcomings identified in previous empirical studies which focus on 
only one or two corporate control mechanisms to explain corporate performance, 
instead adopting and developing a broad view of corporate governance characteristics, 
including ownership structures, shareholder activism and board of director 
characteristics, to identify the complex relationship between the corporate governance 
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structure and the economic performance of the firm in China. The theoretical 
underpinning behind this notion is that the correlation of the corporate governance 
structure with firm performance could be explained in several ways since various 
corporate control mechanisms coexist and possibly are interdependent within the 
company. Simply conducting regression analysis relating the use of any single 
mechanism to corporate performance may be spurious because of interrelations 
among the control mechanisms. 
174 The research approach of the study is distinguished 
from other studies in that it not only examines an array of governance mechanisms 
used within corporations and their effects on corporate performance, but also analyses 
the interdependence among these mechanisms and investigates the triangle of 
strategic interactions in the corporate governance system, which combines the 
selected optimal corporate control mechanisms, to explore their relationship with 
corporate performance. Although the study is concerned with the interaction among 
control mechanisms and their relationship with corporate performance, which is not 
entirely new, it is the first to address directly the importance of shareholder meetings 
and voting control mechanisms on corporate performance. The relationships among 
the alternative corporate control mechanisms and, in turn, their relationships with 
corporate performance are designed in a diagrammatic presentation in Figure 3.1. The 
detailed research method involving the development of hypotheses, data and 
methodology for regression analysis are discussed in Chapter 9. 
174 Since various control mechanism coexist within a firm, greater use of one mechanism need not be positively 
related to firm performance. Where one specific mechanism operates less effectively, others may operate more 
effectively which can be expected to increase firm performance equally. Therefore, Agrawal and Knoebcr insist 
that in a study that "fails to consider interrelationship among the corporate control mechanisms, any findings may 
be spurious. " See Agrawal, A. and C. R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems 
Between Manager and Shareholders, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 31. No. 3, p377, (1996). 
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Figure 3.1 
The relationships between corporate control mechanisms and corporate performance 
3.6 Data Sources and Sample Sizes 
Each country has its unique corporate governance system, formed as a result of its 
own particular historical, economic, political, legal, social culture and technological 
influence. To enhance the understanding of how a country's system was evolved and 
developed, a documentary survey of corporate practice at the firm level in China and 
the UK was employed. Data were collected relating to corporate governance factors, 
including ownership structure (ownership pattern and identities of shareholders), 
shareholders' rights (voting rights and voting processes), and the main board 
characteristics (the size of the board, number of non-executive directors/independent 
directors, board leadership, the frequency of board meetings, etc. ) from randomly 
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selected companies listed in China (Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange markets) 
and the UK (London Stock Exchange market) for the 2002-2003 financial year. These 
factors were assessed based on a review of relevant laws, regulations and best practice 
currently implemented in China and the UK. All Chinese companies' data on 
ownership, shareholder rights and board characteristics came from the annual reports 
of companies (2002/2003), supplemented by referring to official and professional 
securities analysis bodies' websites, including the CSRC website 
(http: //www. csrc. gov. cn), the Thomson One Banker database 
(http: //banker. thomsonib. com/), the Huaxia Security House website 
(http: //www. csc108. com/), the Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Zixun website 
(http: //www. cnlist. com/search/search. htm), and the Hexun company website 
(http: //www. hexun. com). All UK'companies' data on ownership structure and the 
characteristics of the boards of directors were extracted from the Fame database 
(http: //fame. bvdep. com), the Thomson One Banker database 
(http: //banker. thomsonib. comn, the companies' annual reports (2002/2003) and the 
Waterlow stock exchange yearbook. However, in the UK, there was no requirement 
imposed on the listed companies either under statutes or the Listing Rule to disclose 
the information on shareholder voting and voting processes at the shareholder 
meetings to the public, so we failed to gather these data through the documentary 
survey. We tried to collect these data directly from the companies through email, but 
only 20 companies responded to our survey. Nevertheless, surveys conducted by 
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PIRC, the Myners' Report and the TUC's survey 175 provide sufficient information to 
allow us to compare how shareholders' rights are exercised in practice between China 
and the UK. 
The initial samples included a total of 300 listed companies selected from China and 
300 listed companies from the UK. However, the number of companies dropped to 
267 for China and 196 for the UK (see appendix), due to the unavailability of data 
with respect to certain governance factors. As shown in Tables 3.1(a) and (b), there is 
a wide range of company sizes in our samples. Table 3.2 shows that the Chinese 
company sizes ranged from RMB 5.07 million to RMB 7,427.87 million, with a mean 
of RMB 295.75 million. The UK company sizes ranged from £0.11 million to 
£86,555.77 million, with a mean of £1,607.40 million. The fact that the survey 
samples were in part determined by data availability rather than a probability criterion 
may limit to some extent the generalisability of the results. However, the remaining 
samples are reasonably large and we have no reason to suppose that they are 
unrepresentative of the population. 
Table 3.1 (a) Size Distribution of the Chinese Sample Companies 
Total assets (RMB Million) Frequency Percent 
Less than 50 23 8.6 
50 -less than 100 46 17.2 
100 - less than 500 167 62.5 
500 - less than 1000 25 9.4 
1000 - less than 5000 4 1.5 
5000 or more 2 .7 
Total 267 100.0 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's SH and SZ Stock Exchange markets. 
175 See PIRC Proxy Voting Annual Review (2004), Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review, 
Myners' Report, Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares, Report by Paul Myers to the Shareholder Voting 
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Table 3.1(b) Size Distribution of the UK Sample Companies 
- Total assets (£ Million) Frequency Percent 
Less than 50 32 16.3 
50 -less than 100 29 14.8 
100 - less than 500 69 35.2 
500 -less than 1000 - 
25 12.8 
1000 - less than 5000 30 15.3 
5000 or more 11 - 5.6 
Total 196 100.0 
Source: the survey of 196 companies listed in London Stock Exchange market. 
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Sample Companies 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Deviation 
China 267 5.07 7427.87 295.75 167.60 614.59 
UK 196 . 11 86555.77 1607.40 234.45 6858.52 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's SH and SZ Stock Exchange markets and 196 companies 
listed in London Stock Exchange market. 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter we have explained the research methodology which combines the 
comparative law research method and the economic analysis of law research method. 
The comparative law method allows us to understand the existence and meaning of 
legal rules, the structure of institutions, and the effects of legal rules and institutions 
as realities. The economic analysis of law emphasises the evaluation of legal rules and 
institutions, and testing hypotheses on the effects of changes in the law. Research 
following the comparative law and economic analysis in this study aims at explaining 
the legal, economic and financial environments that shape the development of 
corporate governance systems in China and the UK. The empirical part of our 
approach involves collecting and analysing data and enables us to isolate the 
Working Group, March 2005, and TUC Fund Manager Voting Survey (2004). 
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underlying problems and thereby recognise the weakness of the Chinese corporate 
governance system with reference to the UK system. In approaching corporate 
governance from the perspective of economic analysis, the study also includes 
hypothesis tests on the relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
performance in China to deepen our understanding beyond that available from casual 
observation and comparison, and appreciate the effectiveness of the Chinese corporate 
governance system. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ANATOMY OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
4.1 Introduction 
The property rights theory discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that the structure of share 
ownership may have an important role to play in corporate governance. This chapter 
examines the literature on ownership structure and control, and then focuses on three 
key aspects of corporate ownership structure in the UK and China - the type of 
ownership, ownership concentration and the identities of the shareholders. Research 
of the different types of ownership, the degree of ownership concentration, and the 
different identities of share-owners allows us to clarify the nature of corporate 
governance problems and to identify the ability of different owners to deal with these 
problems. The empirical research presented in this chapter demonstrates that there are 
substantial differences in the ownership and control of companies between China and 
the UK. The findings suggest that the agency problem in China is not the classical 
Berle and Means problem which is of dispersed shareholders not being able to control 
management, but rather the potential expropriation of minority shareholders by the 
controlling shareholders. This chapter explores the various means that the controlling 
shareholders have used to expropriate corporate interests, and discusses the issue of 
the protection of minority shareholders as one of the key determinants of the 
development of corporate governance in China. 
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4.2 Literature on Ownership Structure and Control 
When Berle and Means first raised the issue of the relationship between ownership 
(shareholders) and control of the corporation (directors) in their influential book `The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property', 176 they identified five major control 
types based on ownership structure, namely, (1) control through almost complete 
ownership; 177 (2) majority control; '78 (3) control through a legal device without 
majority ownership; 
179 (4) minority control; 
180 
and (5) management control. 
181 
Regarding the above classification of corporate control, Berle and Means concluded 
that 44 per cent of the largest 200 corporations in the US were subject to management 
control in 1929.182 Berle and Means argued that as the dispersed ownership and 
control was concentrated in the hands of directors, they might possess uncontrollable 
powers to pursue their own interests or social objectives rather than maximise profits 
for the shareholders. 183 Berle and Means theory indicates that ownership patterns 
potentially influence the evolution of the country's corporate governance system. 
176 See Berle and Means, op cit. fn. l. 
177 This was where a single individual or a small group of individuals owned all or practically all of shares. See 
ibid. p70 
I' This was considered by Berle and Means as the first step towards the separation of ownership from control, and 
involves the ownership of a significant part of the assets. See ibid, pp70-72. 
179 Berle and Means referred to the process of `pyramiding' which would involve the ownership of a majority of 
shares in one company which, in turn, would hold a majority of shares in another. See ibid, pp72-80 
10 This existed where an individual or small group held sufficient stock interest so as to be in a position to 
dominate a corporation. Such a group is often said to have a working control of the company. In general, their 
control rests upon their ability to attract from scattered owners, to control a majority of the votes at the annual 
elections. See ibid, pp80-84. 
Ill This existed where ownership was so widely distributed that no individual or small group had an interest 
significant enough to dominate the affairs of the company. See ibid. pp84-90. 
See ibid, p94. 
"' See Ibid p121. 
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Following Berle and Means's analysis of corporate control problems, in 1963, Larner 
claimed that the figure on management control of a corporation had risen to 84 per 
cent in the US. 1M In a study conducted in the mid-1970's, Herman found that 82.5 
per cent of the top 200 non-financial corporations in the US were controlled by 
management. 185 In comparison, in the UK, the matter of ownership and control has 
been less extensively researched than in the United States. Florence reported in 1961 
on the basis of data from 1936 that two-thirds of the `very largest' companies were 
controlled by management and that the tendency towards the dispersal of 
shareholdings was increasing. 86 However, Nyman and Silberston's study cast some 
doubt on the growth of management control, reporting that 56.25 per cent of the top 
250 companies in the UK were still controlled by shareholders, and concluding that 
`the extent of managerial control is more limited than has been thought and may not 
have an inexorable tendency to increase'. 187 Cubbin and Leech also found that 47 out 
of a sample of 85 large UK companies were under management control and the rest 
were owner-controlled. 188 
Inevitably, the pattern of the dispersion of shareholdings based on Berle and Means 
theory no longer reflects today's ownership structure in the US and the UK. 
According to the statistics, in 1950, institutional investors owned merely eight per 
184 Lamer, R. J., 1966. Ownership and Control in the 200 Largest Non-Financial Corporations, 1929 and 1963: 
American Economic Review, 56: 777-87. 
195 Herman, E. S., 1981. Corporate Control, Corporate Power: A Twentieth Century Fund Study, Cambridge 
University Press, p66. 
" Florence, P. S., 1961. Ownership, Control and Success of Large Companies: An Analysis of English Industrial 
Structure and Policy 1936-1951, Sweet & Maxwell, p85. 
117 Nyman, S. and A. Sillberston, 1978. The Ownership and Control of Industry, 30 Oxford Economic Papers p74. 1B' Cubbin, A. D. and D. Leech, 1983. The Effect of Shareholder Dispersion on the Degree of Control in British Companies: Theory and Measurement, 93 Economic Journal, pp351-369. 
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cent of the equity in US corporations. By 1980, institutions held 33 per cent of all 
publicly held shares, and by 1988, institutional holdings owned 45 per cent. By 1990, 
institutional shareholdings had reached 55 per cent in the 100 largest corporations in 
the US. 189 In the UK, institutional shareholders also increased from 17.9 per cent in 
1950 to about two-thirds of the total shares in the UK equity market in the 1990s. 
190 
In comparison, the individual ownership of shares in UK listed companies had 
declined from 54 per cent in 1963 to only 14.3 per cent in 2002.191 The concentration 
of holdings in institutional hands makes it possible for corporate monitoring and 
corporate governance by the resurgence of shareholders. Indeed, the pattern that 
emerges not only shows the transformation of ownership structure, but also the 
possibility for institutional investors actively to participate in corporate affairs and 
intervene in the management of the company through shareholder activism. 192 
Meanwhile, another dimension of ownership structure concerning the identity of 
shareholders has also received considerable attention from the transferral of 
ownership from individuals to institutions. The basic Berle and Means theory, 
concerned with the problem in typical US corporations, regarding widely-dispersed 
189 Benjamin T. Lo, 1993. Improving Corporate Governance: Lessons from the European Community, Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 1, Issue 1, p219. 
190 Company Law Review Consultation Document, Modem Company law for a Competitive Economy: Company 
General Meetings and Shareholder Communication (October 1999) states that 70-80 of shares In listed companies 
are registered in the names of financial institutions. See para. 20. The Ilampel Report: Committee on Corporate 
Governance, Final Report, (Hereafter Hampel Report) s. 5.1 states that 60% of shares in listed UK companies are 
held by UK institutions - pension funds, insurance companies, unit and investment trust. Of the remaining 40%, 
about half are owned by individuals and half by overseas owners mainly institutions. January 1998, Gee Publishing 
Ltd. More details see: Share Ownership- Share Register Survey Report 2002. (hereafter Share Ownership Report 
2002)Available from: http: //www. statistics. p-oN,. tik/downloads/theme economy/ShareOHmership2002 pdf. 
[Accessed 8 March 2005]. 
191 See ibid, Share Ownership Report 2002. 
11 Paul L. Davis, 1993, Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom, in D. D. Prentice and P. R. J. Rolland, ed. 
Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance, Oxford University Press, pp69-96. Also see Solomon J. and A. 
Solomon, op cit. fn. 33, p91. 
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share ownership, is that individual shareholders own a very tiny fraction of the 
company's shares and therefore have little or no incentive to expend significant 
resources to monitor or scrutinize management decision-making within the 
company. 193 However, the dispersion of share ownership among private individuals, 
which had the effect of reducing the impact of shareholder control, has to some 
extent been countered by the growing concentration of shareholding in the hands of 
institutional investors. In fact, today, in the UK and the US, to some extent the 
control of corporation is dominated by institutional investors, such as pension funds, 
mutual funds and insurance companies. Compared with individual shareholders, 
institutional investors are in a better position to access corporate information and to 
exercise their voice because they have professional expertise and lower costs of 
intervention. 194 
Monks points out that institutions could influence managerial behaviour in three 
important ways in Western capitalist economies: "(a) they are fiduciaries, subject to 
the standard of conduct devised by their legal system, and therefore obliged to take 
any action that is "prudent" to protect and enhance value; (b) they are full-time, 
knowledgeable, sophisticated investors, in close touch with trends, transactions, and 
markets; and (c) they are large enough to make their involvement in monitoring and 
other corporate governance initiatives meaningful and effective. "195 For these reasons 
193 See Berle and Mean, op cit. fn. 1. 
194 see C. A. Riley, 1994. Controlling Corporate Governance Management UK and US Initiatives, Legal Studies, 
Vol. 14, pp244-256. 
15 Monks, R. A. G, 1995. Sleeping Giants: Expectations of Institutional Investors and Their toting Behaviour, 
Corporate Governance - Structural Reforms in the American and German Corporation Law, l leidelberg, Available 
from: hlW: //www. raam. comlarchpublragrnisicel2ing ciants html [Accessed 13 November 2005]. 
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it is realistic to expect that institutional investors will play an active role in corporate 
governance. '96 
Research on ownership and control in countries outside the US and the UK has been 
growing rapidly in recent years. Most studies suggest that the dispersed ownership 
structure identified by Berle and Means is not the norm elsewhere. For example, in 
1999, La Porta et al utilised the ultimate ownership of the 20 largest corporations in 
27 countries and found that only about one-third of countries were characterised by 
dispersed ownership structure, whereas the rest had a concentrated ownership 
structure and family and state control were relatively common in many emerging 
markets (e. g. Argentina, Mexico, South Korea and Israel). 197 However, when 
ownership is concentrated, the controlling shareholders may act in their own interests 
at the expense of minority shareholders. 
La Porta et al 1999 recognised the proposition that corporate ownership structure is 
important in corporate governance. 198 By examining corporate governance and 
ownership around the world, they concluded that in many economies the principal 
agency problem is the risk of the expropriation of minority shareholders by the 
controlling shareholders, rather than the conflict of interest between managers and 
"It noteworthy that although the institutional investors are large, with knowledge and expertise, this does not 
necessarily imply that they will be aggressive monitors. On the contrary, institutional investors may have weak 
incentives to engage in managerial monitoring of their portfolio companies because of the cost of monitoring, 
collective action or the fear of insider dealing. See Coffee, J. C. 1994. The SEC and the Institutional Investor. A 
Iialf-Time Report, 15 Cardozo Law Review. 837-907. For example, evidence shows that there is a much lower 
level of voting by institutional investors in the UK than might be expected. This issue will be discussed in Chapter 
5. 
197 See La Porta et al. 1999, op cit. fn. 154. 
1% ibid 
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shareholders. 199 More recently, Claessens et at examined evidence of the 
expropriation of minority shareholders for 2,658 corporations in nine East Asian 
countries in 1996.200 They affirmed that the risk of expropriation is the major 
principal-agent problem for large corporations, as suggested by La Porta et al. Their 
study concluded that the degree to which certain ownership structures were associated 
with expropriation depends on country-specific circumstances. Lemmon and Lins 
investigated 800 listed firms in eight East Asian countries and also found that 
ownership structure plays an important role in determining whether insiders 
expropriate minority shareholders. 01 
As we have seen, the ownership structure has changed from a dispersed pattern to a 
concentrated pattern because institutional investors have emerged as the largest 
owners of equity in the US and the UK over the past 40 years. In comparison, the 
Asian Development Bank Briefing Notes (No. 13 & 14, hereafter the Briefing Notes) 
on `Some Conceptual Issues of Corporate Governance' report that in most East Asian 
countries, family and family groups are usually ultimate controlling shareholders of 
many corporations. 02 The Briefing Notes point out that in family-controlled firms, 
the chairman of the board of directors and chief executive officer are often the same 
individual or from the same family. The controlling shareholders appear capable of 
conducting expropriation by paying themselves special dividends, exploiting business 
'99 ibid. 
200 Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. P. H. Fan, and L. H. P. Lang , 1999. Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence from East Asia, Working Paper No. 2088, Wold Bank. 
201 M. L. Lemmon and K. V. Lins, 2003. Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence 
from the East Asian Financial Crisis. The Journal of Finance, Vol. 54(4), 1445-1468. 
202 Zhuang, J., 1999. Some Conceptual Issue of Corporate Governance, Economics and Development Resource 
Center Brief Notes 13 and 14. 
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opportunities for other companies they control, and taking on excessively risky 
projects at the expense of minority shareholders and other investors. 
03 
There was recent similar research regarding the matter of ownership and control in 
China. Liu found that, among the 1,412 enterprises reformed into limited liability 
companies with multi-shareholder or limited liability stock companies, 65.7 per cent 
are companies absolutely controlled by state-ownership. 
204 For public companies that 
have significant shareholdings by the state, however, the matter is more complicated. 
Based on Berle and Means' classification of control where about 70 per cent of the 
value of the issued capital of China's listed companies is held in the form of state- 
owned shares and legal person shares, majority control seems to be the dominant form 
of control in China's industrial world. However, who actually plays the role of a 
shareholder of the state is more complicated in China's corporate practice. 
Indeed, Peev argues that a dominant ownership stake by some individual or group is 
only one of the relevant signals to yield effective control of the firm, but it does not 
automatically determine who has real decision-making authority in a given 
company. 205 In China, the state or the SOEs own a significant proportion of shares in . 
most publicly listed companies. Unlike private blockholders, state ownership is 
funded with money that ultimately belongs to the state as a whole and is controlled by 
203 Ibid. 
204 Liu, D., 2000. Corporate Governance of ! he State-owned Enterprises in China. Available from: 
http-1/www. oecd. org/dataoccd/47/59/1929582pdf. [Accessed 25 February 20051. 
205 Peev, E., 2001. Corporate Governance Transformation in Transition Economics: Evidence from Bulgaria. 
Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, Vol. 1, pp. 290-301. 
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the government or its agents who have no ownership rights personally. In this regard, 
it is still unclear whether the state shareholder will be able to effectively monitor the 
companies under the Chinese corporate system. Therefore, we set out to examine the 
following questions in the remaining sections: what is the legal form of ownership for 
creating' a corresponding classification of shares? What is the key feature of 
ownership concentration and its effects on corporate governance in China? Does 
ownership structure need to be changed toward dispersed ownership compared with 
the UK? These questions are extremely important for the understanding of corporate 
ownership and control in China and the development of the Chinese corporate 
governance system. 
4.3 Classification of Shares and Ownership Structure 
There is a unique classification of shares in China which differs quite substantially 
from that observed in the Anglo-American system. Shares are categorised into four 
main groups on the basis of the characteristics of the investors and the transferability 
of the different types of shares in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange 
markets. They are: 1) state shares; 2) legal person shares; 3) tradable A shares; and 4) 
B shares. 
State shares are company issued shares held by the state. These shares include (1) the 
shares converted from the net assets of SOEs which have been transferred into listed 
companies; (2) shares initially issued by the companies and purchased by government 
77 
departments investing on behalf of the state; and (3) shares initially issued by 
companies and purchased by investment companies, assets management companies, 
and economic entities authorised to make investments on behalf of the state206 
Legal person shares are company issued shares held by domestic institutions, 
including "industrial enterprises, securities companies, trust and investment 
companies, foundations and funds, banks, construction and real estate development 
companies, transportation and power companies, and technology and research 
institutes". 207 The shareholder identity in legal person shares has become more 
complex as a result of foreign investor involvement since November 2001 208 
However, both state and legal person shares are not allowed for trading at the two 
stock exchange markets. They are only transferable to other SOEs, domestic 
institutions, or certain foreign institutional investors, 209 upon approval of the CSRC 
and the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. The original 
purpose of barring state shares and legal person shares from free trading was to 
maintain the government's leading role in the Chinese economy. 
206 See "Interim Measure for Administering the Rights of State shares in Joint Stock Limited Liability Companies', 
promulgated by the State Assets Bureau and SCRES. China Securities Daily, Nov 5,1994, at 2, citing in Fang, L. 
1995. China's Corporatization Experiment, 5 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 
pý 149-269, at 203. 
Tenev, S. and C. Zhang, 2002. Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: Building the 
Institutions of Modern Markets. World Bank and the International Finance Corporation Washington, D. C. p76. 208 See `Some Opinions Concerning Foreign Investment in Listed Companies' issued by the CRSC and Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 2001, and 'Measures on the Takeovers of Listed Companies' issued by 
the CSRS, and 'Circular on the Transfer of State Shares and Legal Person Shares to Foreign Investors' issued by 
the CRSC, ZhengJianFa [20021 No. 83, November 2002. Available from: 
httn"//www. ec. 
209 Ibld 
cn/pubnews/2003 02_1 U200616/1000747[Accessed 15 March 2005]. 
78 
Tradable A shares are also called individual shares. Under China's company law, they 
are issued by companies to Chinese citizens and domestic institutions and the total 
amount of tradable A shares has to exceed 25% of total outstanding shares when a 
company is listed. 210 However, the CSRC and the People's Bank of China 
jointly 
issued "Provisional Measures on Administration of Domestic Securities Investments 
of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors" (Hereafter, the QFII) on 5 November 
2002, which came into effect on 1 December 2002. The new rule defines four types of 
QFII, which are (1) fund management institutions; (2) insurance companies; (3) 
securities companies; and (4) other asset management institutions, and all are allowed 
to trade A shares in China's stock markets. 11 
B-shares are created for foreign investors with the aim of raising funds in foreign 
currency for companies involved in international trade. B shares issued by companies 
listed on the Shanghai stock exchange market are denominated in US dollars, while 
those listed on the Shenzhen stock exchange market are in Hong Kong dollars. Until 
2001, Chinese citizens were also allowed to trade B shares through their foreign 
currency accounts. 212 However, as A shares and B shares are issued by the same 
companies, how the various shareholders who own A shares or B shares or both 
exercise their voting rights is an open question in corporate practice 
? 13 
210 Section 4 of Article 152, the CCL 1994. 
211 See Art. 2 of the QFII. 
212 See the Circular of the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange, Notice on Issues Concerning Individual Domestic Residents' Investment in Foreign Currency Stocks 
Listed in the Domestic Stock Markets, CSRC No. 22 2001. 
213 The CCL 1994 provides no indication of whether A shares and B shares should vote as a common group or be 
separated by class. However, because the shares are issued in different currencies, there are potential conflicts with 
the value of A and B shares. As a result, how these two shares' voting rights are actually exercised in practice is 
unclear. 
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In addition to the four types of shares listed in China's two stock exchange markets, 
there are also other types of shares - employee shares and overseas listing shares. 
Employee shares are only issued to the incumbent workers and management of a 
listed company with a substantial discount. In fact, they are usually designed much 
like an incentive stock scheme and can only be traded 6- 12 months after the date of 
granting in the stock exchange markets upon approval of CSRC. 214 However, 
directors, supervisors and managers are required to report their shareholding in the 
company they serve and are not allowed to transfer their shares during their tenure. 15 
Overseas listing shares are issued by companies which are listed outside China. These 
shares include those issued in Hong Kong (H shares), New York (N shares), London 
(L shares) and Singapore (S shares). 
A typical listed company in the Chinese stock markets has a mixed ownership 
structure comprising three predominant groups of shareholders - the state, legal 
person and tradable A shareholders. 216 Despite the incredible growth in China's 
securities' markets over the last decade, its stock issuing activities are still very 
limited because only one-third of shares in listed companies can be freely traded in 
the Chinese stock markets [see table 4.1(a)]. By the end of 2002, there were a total of 
1,224 companies listed in China's two stock exchange markets. 47.2% of total equity 
was held by the state, 16.41% was held by legal persons, 25.69% were tradable A 
shares, and only 2.85% were B shares. A further investigation by Green shows that by 
214 Xu, X. and Y. Wang, 1999. Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies, 
China Economic Review 10, pp75-98, at79 
21 Article 147 of the CCL 1994. 
216 See Xu and Wang, op cit. fn. 214, p80 
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the end of 2002, only 6% of listed companies had non-tradable shares accounting for, 
less than 40% of total equity capital, while only 0.4% of listed companies had no non- 
tradable shares at all. 217 The large proportion of non-traded state and legal person 
shares has created a number of problems. Russell claims that in early 2004 nearly 
two-thirds of companies' issued shares were held by controlling shareholders in the 
form of state bodies and other legal persons in China, and this has had the effect of 
distorting share prices and creating a conflict of interest between the large and small 
shareholders 218 
In contrast, shares under UK company law may be classified as ordinary shares, 
preference shares, deferred shares, non-voting and multiple voting shares, share 
warrants, or depositary receipts etc219 A special share class may have special rights 
which depend on the particular terms of issue of the class as set out in the company's 
articles of association or in particular contracts of allotment. Article 2 of the 
Companies (Table A) Regulations 1985 provides that "subject to the provisions of the 
Act and without prejudice to any rights attaching to existing shares, any share may be 
issued with such rights or restrictions as the company may by ordinary resolution 
determine". 220 However, the London Stock Exchange encourages public listed 
companies to restrict themselves to one class of shares, favouring the equality of 
treatment and the transparency of rights which such a capital structure ensures 221 
217 Green, S. 2003. 'Two-third Privatisation': How China's Listed Companies are - Finally - Privatising, Chatham 
house Briefing Note, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Asia Programme. 
218 Russell, M. E. 2004. The People's Republic of China-17sit Report: Banking on Reform. Available at 
httn: //www. citlon, co. uk/t)df/features/China Report2 04 ndf [Accessed 23 March 2005]. 
219 See Pettet, op cit. fn. 39. pp286-288. 
u0 Art. 2, Table A. 
221 Hannigan, B., 2003. Company Law, LexisNexis UK, p389 
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In addition, section 182 (1) (b) of the Companies Act 1985 (hereafter, the CA 1985) 
provides that shares in a company are to be transferable. The relevant rules are also 
set out in Chapter 3 of the Listing Rules which requires all the sureties to be freely 
transferable as far as the issuer is concerned. Ownership patterns in the UK are 
unusual in that a high proportion of the equity in listed UK companies is owned in 
aggregate by financial institutions such as pension funds, insurance companies, unit 
trusts and investment trusts (see Table 4.1 (b)). At the end of 2002, the largest 
institutional beneficial owners of UK shares were insurance companies with 19.9% 
and pension funds with 15.6% respectively. Nevertheless, individuals are also major 
shareholders with 14.3% in listed companies in the UK. 
4.4 Concentration of Ownership and Corporate Control 
Property rights theory provides useful insights stressing that shareholders, who 
provide the share capital, are the ultimate owners of companies. The role of 
shareholders in exercising corporate control is closely linked with the proportion of 
shares owned. Despite the fact that the official classification in China provides a clear 
view about ownership structure, which is highly concentrated in the hands of state 
bodies and other legal persons, the data do not reveal a clear picture about the identity 
of the large shareholders. The official statistical data on ownership structure are still 
rather poor and comparability is limited. 
222 See Para 3.15, Chapter 3: Conditions for Listing, the Listing Rule, UKLA, December 2003. 
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In this study, we take a static view of the relationship between ownership and 
corporate control by looking at the proportion of shares held by the five largest 
shareholders, to examine how corporate control is distributed in our samples of listed 
companies in China and the UK and to describe their differences. As explained in 
Chapter 3, the Chinese sample consists of 267 companies randomly selected from the 
Chinese Stock Exchange markets and the UK sample consists of 196 companies 
randomly selected from the London Stock Exchange market. Table 4.2(a) and 4.2(b) 
show the mean, median, and the standard deviation of the top five shareholders' 
shareholdings in China and the UK respectively. 
Table 4.2(a) The Concentration of Ownership in China 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
The largest shareholders . 39 85.00 45.39 18.57 
The second largest shareholders . 07 33.00 7.81 7.62 
The third largest shareholders . 06 18.42 3.08 3.40 
The fourth largest shareholders . 05 9.04 1.64 1.74 
The fifth largest shareholders . 04 8.88 1.12 1.29 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's SH and SZ Stock Exchange markets. 
Table 4.2(b) The Ownership Concentration in the UK 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ne largest shareholder 3.50 53.90 15.12 8.59 
The second largest shareholders 1.80 25.04 9.31 3.88 
The third largest shareholders 1.29 16.22 6.72 2.54 
The fourth largest shareholders . 10 12.98 5.38 2.11 
The fifth largest shareholders . 05 12.77 4.39 1.84 
Source: the survey of 196 companies listed in London Stock Exchange market. 
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Table 4.2(a) shows the overall proportion of firm equity held by the five largest 
shareholders in the Chinese sample. The largest shareholder in each company owns on 
average 45.39%; the second largest owns on average 7.81%; the third largest owns on 
average 3.08%, the fourth largest owns on average 1.64%, and the fifth owns on 
average 1.12% of the total shares listed in China's stock exchange markets. 
Comparing the concentration pattern we can see the largest shareholder owns about 
5.8 times more than the second largest shareholder and about 3.3 times more than the 
aggregate shareholding owned by the second, third, fourth and fifth shareholders 
combined together. The picture indicates that the voting power which is concentrated 
on the largest shareholder cannot easily be challenged by a coalition of the remaining 
shareholders in China. 
Table 4.2(b) reports the overall proportion of firm equity held by the five largest 
shareholders in the UK. The largest shareholder in each company owns on average 
15.12%; the second largest 9.31%; the third largest 6.72%, the fourth largest 5.38%, 
and the fifth largest 4.39%. Comparing the concentration pattern, we can see that the 
gap between each shareholding owned by the top five shareholders is much less than 
in China. On average, there is no single shareholder which has sufficient power to 
discipline management. 
Figures 4.1(a) and 4.1(b) present histograms showing a comparison of the distribution 
of the shareholdings held by the largest shareholder in China and the UK respectively. 
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Further inspection of the cumulative ownership data set out in Table 4.3 reveals that 
the concentration of share ownership in China's companies is much higher than in the 
UK companies. For example, there are 184 cases, representing 69% of the companies, 
in which the largest shareholders own a stake of more than 30% of total shares in 
China. In contrast, there are only 6 cases, represent 3.1% of the companies, in which 
the largest shareholders own more than 30% of total shares in the UK. 
Figure 4_1 (a) Frequency Distribution of Shareholdings Held by 
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Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's SEI and SZ Stock Exchange markets and 196 companies 
listed in London Stock Exchange market. 
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Table 4.3 Frequency Distribution of Shareholdings Held by the Largest 
Shareholder in China and the UK 
China UK 
Range Frequency Cumulative 
Percent 
Frequency Cumulative 
Percent 
0-4.99 1 .4 
5 2.6 
5-9.99 1 .7 
54 30.1 
10-14.99 6 3.0 61 61.2 
15-19.99 11 7.1 33 78.1 
20-24.99 23 15.7 22 89.3 
25-29.99 41 31.1 15 96.9 
30-34.99 9 34.5 1 97.4 
35-39.99 20 41.9 3 99.0 
40-44.99 20 49.4 2 100.0 
45-49.99 15 55.1 - - 
50-54.99 24 64.0 - - 
55-59.99 24 73.0 
60-64.99 27 83.1 - - 
65-69.99 17 89.5 - - 
70-74.99 19 96.6 - - 
75-79.99 3 97.8 - - 
80-84.99 5 99.6 - - 
85-89.99 1 100.0 - - 
Total 267 100.0 196 100 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's S11 and SZ Stock Exchange markets and 196 companies 
listed in London Stock Exchange market, 
In addition to the largest shareholder in China owning about 3 times more than the 
largest shareholder in the UK, Table 4.4 shows that the average proportion of shares 
held by the top five shareholders are 59.04% and 40.91% in China and the UK 
respectively. Figure 4.2(a) and 4.2(b) present histograms showing the visual 
distribution of shares held by the top five shareholders which makes a clear 
comparison between China and the UK. Independent-Samples T Tests with two-tailed 
probabilities and a 5% significant level show that the differences between China and 
the UK are significant [see table 4.5]. 
88 
Table 4.4 Comparison of Shares Owned by the Top 5 Shareholders in China and the UK 
Country of origin N Minimum Maximum Median Mean Std. Deviation 
China 267 1.18 86.54 62.11 59.04 13.89 
UK 196 14.50 88.02 39.6550 40.91 14.21 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's SH and SZ Stock Exchange markets and 196 companies 
listed in London Stock Exchange market. 
Figure 4.2(a) Frequency IDistribution of Shareholdings Held by 
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Table 4.4 Comparison of Shares Owned by the Top 5 Shareholders in China and the UK 
Country of origin 'S Minimum Maximum Median Mean Std. Deviation 
China 267 1.18 86.54 62.11 59.04 13.89 
UK 196 14.50 88.02 39.6550 40.91 14.21 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in Chinas Si I and Si, Stock Exchange markets and 196 companies 
listed in London Stock Exchange market. 
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The statistical comparisons above allow us to see that corporate control is largely 
concentrated in the hands of the largest shareholder in China. However, it does not 
indicate who is the ultimate owner of these shares. Gugler argues that judging 
separation of ownership and control on the basis of ownership concentration alone is 
misleading because holding companies, banks, institutional investors, other non- 
financial corporations, and family owners may have different business objectives. 
Managers of corporations under governmental, quasi-governmental, or even under 
direct state control are likely to have different incentives and behave differently from 
corporations owned by the private sector. 223 
Liu and Sun claim that the Chinese official classification of shareholding in China 
fails to identify the ownership identity of the legal person shares which makes unclear 
who will be the ultimate owners of the firm and actually exercise the corporate control 
rights over management. 224 They also argue that the ambiguous nature of the 
identification of ultimate owners in publicly listed companies, in turn, has misled a 
large number of previous empirical studies on the ownership structure and firm 
performance for Chinese corporations. 225 It becomes apparent that the source of 
capital of state shares and legal person shares which are from different legal entities 
and the identity of these share owners is uncertain and puzzling. Liu and Sun's 
arguments set out a caveat that tracing the identity of state and legal person shares is 
223 See K. Gugler, op cit. fn. 40. p24. 
22' Liu, CL S. and S. P. Sun, 2003. The Class of Shareholdings and Its Impacts vn Corporate Performance -A case 
of State Shareholding Composition in Chinese Publicly Listed Companies, The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, Asia Programme Working Paper No. 2. 
us Ibid 
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crucial for studying the Chinese corporate governance system. Keeping this caveat in 
mind, therefore, in this study, we tackle the problem of the identities of shareholders 
by comparing our sample of Chinese listed companies with our sample of UK listed 
companies to identify the distinctive features of the Chinese ownership structure, in 
the next subsection. 
4.5 Identities of Shareholders 
By the observation and discussion of corporate ownership and control, we have seen 
that the nature and character of the ownership structure within each country's 
corporate system is unique. This calls for an examination of the exact nature of 
ownership - the identities of the shareholders. It is not possible to discover the 
identities of all shareholders in a company because of the difficulty of obtaining 
information, but the rules of information disclosure allow this study to detect some 
information concerning the identity of the largest shareholder and the controlling 
shareholder of a company through examining the company's annual report or other 
public sources. Under the corporate system, it is apparent that the largest shareholder 
or the controlling shareholder normally has the power and incentive to exert influence 
on a company's operational management or general and specific policies. Therefore, 
identification of the largest shareholder and the controlling shareholder is a 
particularly important factor in evaluating the role they play in corporate governance. 
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As we have seen, high ownership concentration is a distinctive feature of China's 
companies compared with UK companies. It is also evident that the shareholders' 
identities vary in the listed companies between the two countries. One natural 
question for China in relation to the fundamental characteristics of the different types 
of shareholders involved with companies is about who is an ultimate owner of the 
`state', `legal person' and `tradable A' shares. In China, the state shares are either held 
by the central and local government agencies, including central government ministries 
and commissions, local government bureaux and departments which manage the 
state's assets, or by state owned enterprises (SOEs) which are ultimately controlled by 
the government, or its agencies. The legal person shares are generally held by 
domestic corporations or institutions including private limited companies, public 
limited companies, joint ventures and unincorporated partnerships. However, most of 
them are SOEs or corporative enterprises which are partially owned by the local 
governments. 
So ownership structures assessed on the basis of information provided by the listed 
companies or by the official reports may not be adequate to present an accurate 
picture of the exact control pattern of the company. Therefore, this section discusses 
six classes of shareholder's identities, namely: SOEs; government agencies; financial 
institutions; non-financial companies; individuals; and foreign investors. 226 This 
226 Gugler categorises common share holdings into several groups, namely families, households, and individuals; 
non-financial corporations; banks; other financial firms; the state; foreign holdings; and pension funds, mutual 
funds, and dispersed holdings. See K. Gugler, op cit. fn. 40, p47. However, this thesis does not take pension funds, 
mutual funds, and dispersed holdings as a group because these are relative small in Chinese stock exchange 
markets. 
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classification contributes to a better understanding of the different corporate control 
structure in China compared with the UK. The detailed method of classification of the 
share-owners is as follows: 
" SOEs are business entities which are owned by the central government or local 
government. 
9 Government agencies comprise central government ministries and commissions, 
local government bureaux and departments which exercise the ultimate control rights 
over the state's assets in a listed company. 
" Financial institutions include all banks, insurance firms, pension funds, investment 
trusts, and other security brokers, dealers, and venture capital companies etc. 
" Non-financial companies contain all domestic corporate entities or institutions 
including private limited companies, public limited companies, joint ventures and 
unincorporated partnerships which are not classified as SOEs or financial institutions. 
" Families and individuals include all families, householders, and individual persons 
who are resident in the UK or China. This group also includes shares held for 
employee share-ownership and shares held in trusts with named individual 
beneficiaries. 
. 
" Foreign investors include all individuals or institutions resident outside the 
territories of China or the UK. 
Visual inspection of Figure 4.3 suggests that the major shareholders are often SOEs, 
government agencies and non-financial companies in China, whereas the major 
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shareholders are often financial institutions, families and individuals and foreign 
investors in the UK. For example, in the 267 companies randomly selected from the 
Chinese stock exchange markets, approximately 54% of the largest shareholders are 
SOEs, 15% of the largest shareholders are government agencies and 20% are non- 
financial companies. Family or individual investors and financial institutions are less 
than 10% and 3% respectively. Interestingly, there was no foreign investor as the 
largest shareholder in our sample of Chinese firms in 2002. In contrast, in the 196 
companies randomly selected for the UK London Stock Exchange market, 
approximately 59% of the largest shareholders are financial institutions, 18% are the 
families or individual investors, 14% are foreign investors, and 10% are non-financial 
companies. However, listed companies where SOEs or government agencies own a 
substantial block of the shares do not exist at all in the UK sample. (see table 4.6) 
Figure 4.3 
Distribution of the Largest Shareholder by Identity 
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13 Foreign investors 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's SH and SZ Stock Exchange markets and 196 companies 
listed in London Stock Exchange. 
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Table 4.6 Distribution of the Largest Shareholder by Identity in China and the UK 
Identity of the SOEs Government Financial Non- Family and Foreign 
largest Agency Institutions Financial Individual Investors 
. 1,.. Anlderc 
Companies Shareholders 
China 142 40 6 52 26 0 
(53.6%) (15.0%) (2.2%) (19.5%) (9.7%) 
UK 00 115 19 s. ) ci 1 
(58.7%) (9.7%) (17.9°/6) (13.8) 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's SH and SZ 
Stock Exchange markets and 196 companies 
listed in London Stock Exchange. 
There is no unanimous definition of the controlling shareholders. In China, a 
controlling shareholder is defined by Section 41 of the Directive on the Article of 
Association of Listed Companies as any person (or persons acting jointly) who is able 
to appoint more than half of the members of board of directors; or entitled to exercise, 
or control the exercise of 30% of the voting rights; or owns 30% of the company's 
shares; or able to exercise de facto control over the listed company by other 
methods 227 Although the term "controlling shareholder" does not appear in the CCL 
1994, Article 217 (2) of the CCL 2006 provides that the term "controlling 
shareholder" shall mean a shareholder whose capital contribution accounts for more 
than 50% of a limited liability company, or a shareholder whose shareholding 
accounts for more than 50% of the total equity of a company limited by shares, or a 
shareholder whose capital contribution or shareholdings accounts for less than 50% 
but who holds the voting rights on the strength of the capital contribution or 
shareholding that are enough to have an important influence on resolutions of the 
shareholder meetings. 228 In the UK, the Listing Rules specify that a controlling 
"'The Directive of the Article of Association of Listed Companies, No. 16, Zhenjian [19971, (hereafter, the 
Directive 1997) art. 41. 
228 See ArL217 (2) of the CCL 2006. 
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shareholder is any person or persons acting jointly by agreement whether formal or 
otherwise, who is entitled to exercise, or to control the exercise of 30% or more of the 
rights to vote at a general meeting of the applicant; or able to control the appointment 
of directors who are able to exercise a majority of votes at board meetings of the 
applicant. 29 However, whether persons may act jointly to exercise their control rights 
or be able to exercise de facto control by other activities, it is not possible to 
investigate due to the difficulties of obtaining such information. 
Thus, the focus of the study in this section is to describe and compare the average 
number of controlling shareholders who actually held more than 30% of company's 
shares and its identities in China and the UK. In seeking to present a clear picture of 
the relative position of the controlling shareholder, with more than 30% of company's 
shares, the controlling shareholders have been divided into three different groups: de 
facto controlling shareholder; legal controlling shareholder; and absolute controlling 
shareholder. A de facto controlling shareholder, is defined as one who holds more 
than 30%, but less than or equal to 50% of a company's shares; a legal controlling 
shareholder is defined as holding more than 50% but less than or equal to 75%; and an 
absolute controlling shareholder is defined as holding more than 75%. Since the 
investigation of the ultimate owner of these controlling shareholders, the ultimate 
control structure maychange if different cut-off levels are considered. 
229 See Listing Rules, op cit fn. 222. Para. 3.12 & 3.13. 
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The actual extent to which the concentration of power is held by the largest 
shareholder has been explored in China and the UK in section 4.4. As Figure 4.3 
shows, the largest majority shareholders are the SOEs in China. More striking still, 
however, is the ratio held by the controlling shareholders and their identity in Chinese 
listed companies. Table 4.7 gives a clear picture of the distribution of the controlling 
shareholders and the average of the ultimate control power in China compared with 
the UK. There are a total of 184 companies, accounting for 69% of the sample 
companies, in which a controlling shareholder holds more than 30% of company 
issued shares in China. In contrast, the figures show that dispersed share ownership is 
the norm in the UK, where only 3.1% of the sample of listed companies have the 
largest shareholder with more than 30% of company's shares. Further analysis by 
- 
breaking down the proportion of shares held by the controlling shareholder, shows 
that approximately 24% of companies in China have a de facto controlling 
shareholder; 41% have a legal controlling shareholder; and 3% have an absolute 
controlling shareholder. In contrast, there are only 2% of companies in the UK with a 
de facto controlling shareholder; 1% with a legal controlling shareholder; and no 
listed company in the UK sample has an absolute controlling shareholder. 
As compared with the UK companies, it is apparent from these figures that a 
considerable portion of controlling shareholders exist in the listed companies in China. 
However, these figures appear to be no adequate basis for estimating who has 
ultimately control of the companies in both countries. To find who is the ultimate 
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controlling shareholder it is necessary to examine in greater detail the identity of the 
controlling shareholders in the listed companies. 
Table 4.7 Distribution of the Controlling Shareholder and Ultimate Control Pattern in 
China and the UK 
Country Types of the 
controlling shareholder 
Shares owned by the 
controlling shareholder 
Distribution of the 
controlling shareholder 
De facto controlling 
China (267) shareholder (DCS) 
30%< DCS <_50% 65 (24.3%) 
Legal controlling 
shareholder (LCS) 50%< LCS _<75% 
110 (41.2%) 
Absolute controlling 
shareholder (ACS) ACS < 75% 9(3.4%) 
Total controlling 
shareholders 184 (68.9%) 
De facto controlling 4(2.0%) 
The UK (196) shareholder (DCS) 30%< DCS <_50% 
Legal controlling 2(l. 0%) 
shareholder (LCS) 50%< LCS _<75% 
Absolute controlling 0 
shareholder (ACS) ACS < 75% 
Total controlling 6(3.1%) 
shareholders 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's SH and SZ Stock Exchange markets and 196 companies 
listed in London Stock Exchange market. 
Table 4.8 reports that in all 267 Chinese companies, there are 115 companies 
(approximately 43%) in which the controlling shareholders are SOEs; 30 companies 
(approximately 11%) in which the controlling shareholders are non-financial 
companies; 28 companies (approximately 10%) are government agencies; and only 11 
companies (approximately account for 4%) in which the controlling shareholders are 
families or individual investors. In contrast, in the UK, although approximately 59% 
of the largest shareholders are financial institutions, only 2 companies (approximately 
1%) have an institutional investor as a controlling shareholder holding more than 30%. 
Similarly, there are only 3 companies (less than 2%) having controlling shareholders 
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who are from non-financial companies, and only I company (less than 1%) in which 
the controlling shareholder is a family or individual investor. 
Table 4.8 Distribution of the Controlling Shareholder by Identity of Ownership in China 
and the UK 
Country Identity of SOEs Government Financial Non- Family and Foreign 
the Agency Institutions financial Individual Investors 
Controlling companies Shareholders 
Shareholder 
Total 115 28 0 30 11 0 
China controlling (43.07%) (10.49%) (11.24%) (4.12%) 
shareholders 
De facto 33 14 0 11 7 0 
controlling (12.36%) (5.24%) (4.12%) (2.62%) 
shareholder 
Legal 75 13 0 18 4 0 
controlling (28.09%) (4.87%) (6.74%) (1.50%) 
shareholder 
Absolute 7 1 0 1 0 0 
controlling (2.62%) (0.37%) (0.37%) 
shareholder 
Total 0 0 2 3 1 0 
UK controlling (1.02%) (1.53%) (0.51%) 
shareholders 
De facto 0 0 2 1 1 0 
controlling (1.02%) (0.51%) (0.51%) 
shareholder 
Legal 0 0 0 2 0 0 
controlling (1.02% 
shareholder 
Absolute 0 0 0 0 0 0 
controlling 
shareholder 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's Sli and SZ Stock Exchange markets and 196 companies 
listed in London Stock Exchange market. 
4.6 Problems Associated with Concentrated Ownership Structure 
in China 
On the basis of the statistics for the identities of shareholders and the actual control of 
listed companies, the listed companies in China are typically differentiated by the 
absence of significant ownership by financial institutions and foreign investors, and 
the extent to which the state is in de facto control of most corporations compared with 
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the UK. These differences can be explained by the theory of path dependence230 as 
China's traditional public economic structure (structure-driven path dependence) and 
the preference for public ownership under China's legal system ensure the continued 
dominance of state-owned or controlled companies in the national economy (rule- 
driven path dependence). Zheng argues that the path dependence of the Chinese 
ownership structure manifests itself in the government or its agencies having their 
own benefits and immediate interests in the ownership and governance structures of 
listed companies. Unless the low efficiency of the current ownership structure and 
governance structure have threatened its own benefits and immediate interests, there 
is no reason to suppose that the government wants to achieve the aim of diversifying 
the concentrated equity structure and improving the governance structure and the 
quality of the company through reducing state shares 
231 However, since most listed 
companies are directly or indirectly controlled by the government or its agencies, 
there are many problems created by the abnormal conduct of state shareholders within 
its current corporate governance system232 The problems are essentially attributed to 
a lack of ownership and a misplacement of the role of government in the position of 
230 Path dependence is the idea that "what we are today is a result of what has happened in the past". See Margolis, 
S. J. and S. J. Leibowitz, 1998. Path Dependence, in Peter Newman ed. New Palgrave Dictionary of Law and 
Economics. Bebchuk and Roe applied path dependence to the study of comparative corporate governance. They 
distinguished two source of path dependence: one is called structure-driven path dependence which concerns the 
direct effect of initial ownership structure on subsequent ownership structures. They show that the ownership 
structures are influenced by the initial ownership structure that the country's economy had earlier. Another source 
of path dependence is called rule-driven path dependence which arises from the effect that initial ownership 
structures have on subsequent structures through their effect on the legal rules governing corporations. The 
corporate rules are path dependent. They contend that corporate structure might vary among countries and continue 
to do so over time. See Bebchuk, L. A. and M. J. Roe, op cit. fn. 161. 
231 Zheng, J., 2001. Agency Conflict, Equity Value and Path Dependence in Reducing State-held Shares. Available 
from: http: //www cipe. or china/p4 Jiafl lluai. htm [Accessed 12 March 2005]. 
232 The problems are summarised as: (1) there is inappropriate government interference and dominance by a single 
shareholder with government background; (2) the state shareholder exceeds the level of intervention in personnel 
issues permitted by the Company Law; (3) state-owned and legal person shares are not circulated on the capital 
market; and (4) the listed company has inappropriate connections with the parent company. Chen, Q., State 
Shareholders Should Become an Active Force in Establishment of Effective Corporate Governance, Shanghai 
OECD Corporate Governance Forum, Feb. 26,2004. 
101 
corporate governance, in such a way that either the government exerts too much 
influence on listed companies and the company's objectives are affected by political 
considerations, or a lack of monitoring of the shareholders, resulting in insider control 
in the form of misusing of their position or power against the interests of shareholders 
and pursuing of private objectives by the government officials or its appointed 
company's directors. 233 
Although much corporate governance literature suggests that large shareholders 
possess a greater incentive as well as ability to serve as a check on management, 
whether this incentive can be translated into reality in Chinese publicly listed 
companies is far from clear. Without a clear definition of the controlling ownership, 
the SOEs mean that the company's assets are owned by all people of the state, but 
controlled by the government and its agencies. The government and its officials, 
unlike private shareholders, have no direct economic connection with the performance 
of the company. Consequently, their role in corporate governance largely depends on 
political incentives and individual utility maximisation instead of shareholders' 
value. 34 Furthermore, if the controlling shareholder is an SOE, the appointment of the 
company's managers is not usually determined by managerial market forces and 
expertise related to the company's development, but by the relationship with 
government officials. Inevitably, this approach to appointments has resulted in the 
government becoming a key figure of corporate governance in China. As a 
211 
234 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, China Corporate Governance Report (2003), Shanghai: Fudan University Press. 
Ibid. 
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consequence, on the one hand, the government is able to use administrative measures 
to directly affect the business and burden the management with public welfares; on 
the other hand, the members of the management also usually have political incentives 
to take an active role to satisfy the government's public interests or government 
official's private welfare for the benefit of their future political or business career, 
instead of the interests of shareholders as a whole. 
However, the quantitative differences in ownership structure and corporate control 
between China and the UK may hide other important differences. The agency 
problem created by the separation of ownership from control in Chinese publicly 
listed companies is more qualitative. In practice, many members of the board of listed 
companies who are from the board of other companies have a dual directorship role to 
play. This situation has been named a `big brother directorship' (yigu duda) in which 
the same batch of people service two separate companies at the same time, and this 
inevitably results in conflicts between the controlling shareholder and minority 
shareholders. This dual directorship also induces and facilitates controlling 
shareholders to tunnel the listed companies' assets through related transactions. For 
example, in some cases, listed companies and the controlling shareholder are often in 
the same business sector so that it is a common occurrence for the controlling 
shareholder to take advantage of a privileged position to gain additional benefit 
through distributing products, supplying raw materials, sharing resources or other 
103 
related business transactions. 235 In some cases, even where the non-financial 
corporation as the controlling shareholder is in a different business sector from the 
listed company, it can still abuse its power through occupying the funds of listed 
companies for an indefinite period. 236 In some cases, the listed companies help the 
controlling shareholder to gain additional benefit in a disguised form, such as offering 
loan guarantees to the controlling shareholder, or leasing the controlling shareholder's 
facilities at a high price to exploit the minority shareholders of the listed company 237 
Some listed companies suffer from being what is sometimes referred to as 'ATMs' of 
the controlling shareholder and the "tunnelling" activities of the controlling 
shareholders 238 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this Chapter, ownership structure has been analysed in terms of the types of 
ownership, ownership concentration and the identities of shareholders. One important 
result arising from this research is that in Chinese publicly listed companies the 
235 The associated trading between listed companies and large shareholders is popular in China. Statistics shows 
that nearly 40% of listed companies have associated trading with the top ten large shareholders in sales, 
procurement, providing services, acquirement or leasing assets. See Jiang, Q., Vice Minister of the State Economic 
and Trade Commission, Standardizing Behavior and Deepening Reform, to be Creditworthy and Responsible 
Shareholders of Listed Companies, Speech at the Meeting on Summarising the Experience of Establishing Modern 
Enterprise System in Listed Companies, December 27,2002. 
236 ST Monkey King (000535) is a typical case in which the controlling shareholder- Monkey King Group 
occupies as much as RMB 0.19 billion from 1995 to 1999, but pays only about RMB 0.3 -0.4 million fees per 
years as return. According to the statistics of 2002 from CSRC, the problem of controlling shareholders diverting 
the capital for other uses exists in 676 listed companies with total RMB 96.669 billion. See ibid, Q. Jiang's speech. 237 About 20% of listed companies in China provide loan guarantees for the controlling shareholders and 
associated parties, see ibid, Q. Jiang's speech. 
238 See Tong, D., 2001. Current Conditions, Problem of Listed companies and f low to Exercise Regulation: 
Positioning of the Responsibilities of Regulatory Department and Regulatory Measures, in Corporate Governance 
Reform: China and the World. Available from: http: //www. cipe org/china/cg book toe htm. [Accessed 12 March 
2005]. Johnson et al. use the term "tunneling" to describe the transfer of resources out of rams for the benefits of 
their controlling shareholders. Such transactions include outright theft or fraud, transfer of assets from a firm to its 
controlling shareholder at non-market price, excessive executive compensation, loan guarantees, expropriation of 
corporate opportunities, an so on. See Johnson S. et al. op cit fn. 101. 
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problem of separation of ownership and control is not the classical Berle and Means 
problem, which is of dispersed shareholders not being able to control management, 
but rather the potential expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling 
shareholders. Though the model of corporate ownership seems to be widespread and 
shareholders have limited influence over company's affairs in the UK, a large liquid 
stock market undoubtedly makes the market for corporate control become quite 
dynamic and its functions can be effectively brought into play. In contrast, both 
research and the practical situation described in this chapter have shown that state- 
owned assets in a publicly listed company in China remain non-tradable in the stock 
markets and these shares have almost exclusively become concentrated in the 
government bureaucratic agencies or SOEs. This means that the minority shareholders 
have little possibility and ability to takeover a company through acquiring sufficient 
shares in the stock markets. As a result, the market for corporate control, which is an 
important corporate control mechanism, is largely non-existent in China. 
In addition, the stock market is dominated by institutional investors in the UK. In fact, 
by the end of 20th century, institutional shareholders had increased dramatically and 
many had been prominently involved in challenging management over matters of 
corporate governance through the exercise of voting rights at general meetings. This 
takes the form of ongoing dialogue, meetings, -information transfer and informal 
discussion with managers, and the attachment of conditions to further injections of 
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funds etc. 239 It is apparent that the role played by institutional shareholders 
in 
monitoring corporate management is based on their shareholdings and the 
responsibilities of institutional shareholders in relation to the companies in which they 
invest. In China, the existing law stipulates that a mutual fund is not allowed to invest 
more than 10% of its net asset value in a single company, and that it 
is also not 
allowed to hold more than 10% of a listed company's shares. These provisions limit 
the voting shares of institutional investors and discourage them from actively 
participating in uplifting the corporate governance of listed companies. 
240 Some SOEs 
" such as "state authorised investment institutions" are supposed to manage the state 
owned assets on behalf of the people of the state. To some extent, such investment 
companies are comparable with the fund management companies in the UK. However, 
the managers of the state authorised investment company have no contract specifying 
their obligations for financial returns and the appointment of managers is also 
constrained by the government administrative system. The situation does, however, 
mean that institutional investors have no interest in corporate governance. Some 
institutional investors even collude with listed companies to manipulate stock prices 
through insider information and false financial information to generate their own 
interests at the expense of the minority shareholders of these listed companies. 
All the problems mentioned in this chapter, which are associated with the state 
ownership controlling structure, raise some interesting questions in relation to the 
23 See Armour, J, S. Deakin and S. J. Konzelmann, 2003. Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK 
Corporate Governance, ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, working paper No. 266. 
240 Shanghai Stock Exchange, op cit, fn. 233. 
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rules governing controlling shareholders and minority shareholder protection. What is 
the legal basis for corporate control in China? Does China have an effective legal 
system to mitigate the conflicts of interest between the controlling shareholder and the 
minority shareholders? Do the highly concentrated ownership structure and 
state/government-dominated control have detrimental effects on corporate 
performance? These questions will be discussed in the following chapters. 
107 
CHAPTER 5 
SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS AND VOTING RIGHTS 
5.1 Introduction 
The potential influence of the separation of ownership and control in corporations, as 
identified by Berle and Means, suggests that the objective of corporate governance 
systems depends very much on what type of ownership structure the countries 
have. 241 In countries where the ownership of the company is dispersed, internal 
control mechanisms should ensure that managers do not pursue their own interests, 
rather than those of the shareholders. 42 In countries with a concentrated ownership 
structure, the internal mechanisms of corporate governance should not only ensure 
that the interests of the managers of the company are aligned with those of the 
shareholders, but should also prevent the expropriation of minority shareholders in 
cases where there is a controlling shareholder. The explorative approach to ownership 
structure which was discussed in Chapter 4 gave rise to a number of practical and 
theoretical research questions that are related to the corporate governance structure in 
China and in the UK. Given highly concentrated ownership in the hands of controlling 
shareholders, such as the state and the SOEs, in China compared with a relatively 
dispersed ownership held by institutions and family and individual investors in the 
UK, the central research question of this chapter is: how do the countries' corporate 
governance systems ensure that the shareholders can exercise residual control rights 
X01 See Berle and Means, op cit. fn. I. 
242 See B. Pettet, op cit. fa. 39. p157. 
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to prevent management from pursuing their own agenda rather than the interests of 
shareholders and that the controlling shareholders do not expropriate the interests of 
the minority shareholders? 
According to incomplete contracts theory discussed in Chapter 2, voting is an 
important means of dealing with the incomplete contracts concerning the conflicts of 
interest between managers and owners of the firm. In the Anglo-American corporate 
system, the voting of shareholders in the corporate governance structure of a company 
is viewed as ancillary to their claim on its investments 243 Therefore, the shareholder 
general meeting is perceived as the ultimate source of corporate power which allows 
shareholders to challenge in a meaningful way the performance of the board of 
directors in a company. 244 Theoretically, from a governance point of view, the 
shareholder meeting is a core corporate control mechanism for providing shareholders 
with an opportunity to exercise their voice in the management of a company's 
business. Farrar et al argue that shareholder general meetings are often described as 
the key mechanism whereby shareholders have an opportunity to participate in the 
decision-making process and hold the directors of companies accountable to them. 45 
Easterbrook and Fischei contend that voting provides a mechanism by which 
shareholders can fill gaps in their contract with the managers of the corporation 246 
The Pensions and Investment Research Consultants (PIRC) highlight three reasons 
243 Griffiths, Andrew, 1995. Shareholding and the Governance of Public Companies, in Saleem Sheikh and William Rees ed. Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, p61, Cavendish Publishing Ltd. 244 Butcher, Donald B. 1995. Reform of the General Meetings. In Saleem Sheikh and William Rees cd. Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, p231, Cavendish Publishing Ltd. 245 See John Farrar et al, 1998. Farrar +: Company Law, 4s' ed. p308 246 Easterbrook, F. H. and D. R. Fischel, 1983. op cit. fn. 82, pp401-02. 
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why the company AGM is a key forum for exercising good corporate governance: "(i) 
It is vital that shareholders have a formal means to hold company boards to account 
for the stewardship of the company's business. (ii) The AGM should also enable 
shareholders to make representations on a range of governance matters for discussion 
and approval by their fellow owners. (iii) It should be seen as a democratic 
mechanism for a company board to secure a shareholder mandate for key policy 
proposals and practical matters on the way the company is governed. )9247 
However, in practice, it seems that the shareholder general meetings do not usually 
achieve these objectives very satisfactorily. 
48 If the general meetings are to assume 
their intended role as important components of corporate governance structures, it is 
essential for the law to set out a comprehensive list of rules to enhance their 
effectiveness, to ensure that shareholders are heard and to facilitate the information 
for the purpose of debate and decision taking served by the meetings 249 A question of 
major interest is therefore: does the existing corporate legal system adequately 
provide mechanisms for enhancing the effective conduct of the shareholder meetings? 
Despite persistent and widespread concerns that have been given to issues of 
shareholder meetings and the voting process in both China and the UK regulatory 
framework, by some institutions, as well as by corporate governance academics, there 
247 See PIRC, The AGM. " A Focus for Shareholder Involvement, PIRC's Response to the Consultation Document 
from Company Law Review Steering Group on Shareholder General Meetings and Shareholder Communications, 
January 2000. 
248 See Company Law Review, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy, Company Genera! Meetings 
and Shareholder Communication, A consultation from the Company Law Review Steering Group, Department of 
Trade and Industry, October 1999 [URN 99/11441, pl. 
249 See Brenda Hannigan, op cit. fn. 221, p476 
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is no systematic, empirically informed assessment of whether shareholder meetings 
have functioned as a forum in the expression of shareholders' rights and in ensuring 
transparency and the accountability of directors to investors. 
This chapter covers a detailed comparative discussion of the legal and technical rules 
on shareholder meetings, because in practice many arguments about the effectiveness 
of the shareholder meetings depend on whether these rules can be or have been 
applied. This chapter asserts that the traditional comparative test which was applied 
by some scholars in reviewing shareholder general meetings examining `law on the 
book' is inadequate. 250 As an alternative, the study proposes two approaches to this 
test. One is to review the legal requirements on publicly listed companies to hold an 
Annual General Meeting (AGM) and Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) for 
promoting transparency and accountability in the management of company affairs. 
The other is to examine how these legal rules are applied in relation to publicly listed 
companies in practice. The empirical evidence on the voting behaviour of 
shareholders (e. g. the turnout ratio of shareholder meeting, the number of shareholder 
resolutions presented at the shareholder meeting) and voting results delivered at the 
shareholder meetings provides helpful insights in relation to corporate governance 
issues in China compared with the UK. The findings demonstrate that the shareholder 
general meeting under a country's corporate system may not play the role envisioned 
250 Wei, Y., 2001. Seeking a Practical Chinese Model of Corporate Governance, 10 Michigan State University - 
DCL Journal of International Law, 393, at400-01. Hong, T. L., 2000. Corporate Governance Issues in PRC 
Companies, International Company and Commercial Law Review, 11(3), pp87-95, at89-90. Ong, K. and C. Baxter, 
1999. Comparative Study of the Fundamental Elements of Chinese and English Company Law. International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 48, pp88-127, at108. 
III 
by the legal model in the real world. By examining a variety of factors and some 
extensive statistical data, the chapter concludes that further company law reform to 
improve the voting system is fundamental for the development of corporate 
governance in China. 
5.2 Legal Status and Functioning of Shareholder General Meetings 
It is difficult to describe concisely what the legal status of shareholder general 
meetings constitutes within a corporation in the UK . 
251 At the end of the nineteenth 
century, the concept of general meeting sovereignty seems to have been adopted by 
the common law system. In Isle of Wight Railway v. Tahourdin252 the court states: 
"... if you want to alter the management of the affairs of the company go to a 
general meeting, and if they agree with you they will pass a resolution obliging 
the directors to alter their course of proceedings. "253 
In 1906, however, the division of powers between the board and the shareholder 
general meeting was clearly established with respect to the evolution of large-scale 
modem companies. The Court of Appeal in Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate 
Co. v. Cuninghame254 held that the general meeting could not interfere with the 
directors' decision if the powers had been vested to the board in the construction of 
ZS' Davis, P. L. and D. D. Prentice, Gower c Principles of Modern Company Law, 6s' ed. 1997, p188. also see Ben 
Petzet, op cit. fn. 39. p164. 
252 (1883) 25 Ch. D. 320, C. A. 
253Ibid at p329 
254 [1906] 2 Ch. 34, C. A. 
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the articles of association. In John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd. v. Shaw255 the modern 
doctrine of the legal status of the shareholder general meeting was expressed by Greer 
L. J. as follows: 
"A company is an entity distinct alike from its shareholders and its directors. 
Some of its powers may, according to its articles, be exercised by directors, 
certain other powers may be reserved for the shareholders in general meeting. If 
powers of management are vested in the directors, they alone can exercise these 
powers. The only way in which the general body of the shareholders can control 
the exercise of the powers vested by the articles in the directors is by altering the 
articles, or... by refusing to re-elect the directors of whose actions they 
disapprove. They cannot themselves usurp the powers which by the articles are 
vested in the directors any more than the directors can usurp the powers vested by 
the articles in the general body of shareholders" 256 
The typical division of powers within a company has now been defined by art. 70 of 
the Companies (Table A) Regulations 1985, which apparently affirmed the case law. 
It provides that: 
"Subject to the provision of the Act, the memorandum and the articles and to any 
directions given by special resolution, the business of the company shall be 
managed by the directors who may exercise all the powers of the company. "257 
255 [193512 KB 113 C. A. 
256 Ibid at p 134 
257 Table A, art. 70. 
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The provision above reflects that the power to manage the company is vested in the 
board of directors. However, it allowed the articles of a company to limit or restrict 
the powers of directors and thereby to place those powers to the shareholder general 
meeting. These powers are normally connected with shareholder statutory rights, such 
as the right to alter the memorandum and articles; 
258 right to increase or reduce the 
share capital; 259 right to appoint or remove the directors and auditor and their 
remunerations; 260 right to declare the final dividend; 261 right to grant directors to allot 
shares. 262 In addition, the common law also empowered the shareholder general 
meeting to ratify an irregular act of the directors. 263 In certain circumstances, both 
common law and the statutes require shareholders to approve substantial property 
transactions involving directors. 264 Moreover, under the Directors' Remuneration 
Report Regulations 2002, shareholders have been empowered to have an advisory 
vote on the directors' remuneration report. 265 
It is noteworthy that the CA 1985 contains four relevant provisions that require the 
annual reports and accounts to be laid before the company in a general meeting, but 
does not require the meeting to consider any resolution in relation to them. 266 
28 See s. 4 and s. 9, CA 1985 
259 See s. 121,135, CA 1985 
260 See arts. 73-80, Table A, s. 303 and s385 (1) & (2), s386, s390A and 241(A), CA 1985 (setting auditor 
remuneration in practice is often delegated to the board). Also see Brenda Hannigan, op cit. fn. 221, p478. 
261 See Table A art. 102. 
262 See s. 80 and s. 95 CA 1985 
263 See Bamford u Bamford [1970] Ch. D. 135 C. A., Re Ilorsely v Weight Ltd. [1982] 3 All ER 1045. 
264 See s. 320 CA 1985 and British Racing Drivers'Club Ltd V. Hextall Erskine & Co. [1997] 1 BCLC 182 
265 The Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 came into force on 1" August 2002 and apply to 
financial periods ending on or after 31 December 2002. The Regulation has been inserted as a new schedule 7A of 
the CA 1985. 
1 See s. 238(1), s241, s. 239, and s242, CA 1985. Notably, however, earlier Table A of the CA 1948, art. 52 
stipulated that the ordinary business of the annual general meeting was the declaration of a dividend, the 
consideration of the accounts, balance sheets and the reports of the directors and auditors, the election of directors 
in place of those retiring, and the appointment of and the fixing of the remuneration of the auditors. 
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However, the general meeting gives the shareholders an opportunity to question the 
board generally on the accounts and reports, and to express their views on matters 
with which they are concerned. 267 Nevertheless, in 1997, the Hampel Report 
suggested that the AGM should contain a resolution on the annual report and 
accounts. 268 In addition, many of these issues relating to what may be conducted at the 
general meeting of a company have also been addressed by the Company Law 
Review269 and the subsequent Company Law Reform Bill 2006 (the Bill), 270 which 
stipulates that the directors of a public company must lay the company's annual 
accounts and reports before general meeting of the company with on later than 6 
months of that financial year 271 If directors fail to meet this requirement, they may 
commit an offence 272 
In China, the shareholder general meeting is the supreme organ of the authority of 
companies and the shareholders have extensive powers to exercise considerable 
control over companies' affairs. The powers of the shareholder general meeting under 
China's company law (the CCL 1994) are as follows273 
(i) To make decisions regarding company strategies and investment plans. 
267 See P. L. Davies, op cit. fn. 241, p343 
M See Guideline 5.20 Ilampel Report 1997 
269 See Company Law Review, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy, Final Report (the CLR Final 
Report, hereafter), Vol. (I), (2001) paras 7.5 - 7.61; Company Law Review, Modem Company Law for a 
Competitive Economy: Completing the Structure (hereafter, Completing the Structure), London: DTI, (2000), 
paras 5.18 . 5.40 and Company General Meetings and Shareholder Communication, October, (1999). 270 On 1 November 2005 the Company Law Reform Bill was finally introduced to the Ilouse of Lords. The Bill 
sets out wide ranging reforms in a number of areas which will repeal about two-third of the Companies Act 1985 
and amend other parts. The Bill contains 885 clauses and has 15 schedules, and yet it will not contain the full body 
of UK company law. It is not a consolidating measure, but it has to be read alongside the Companies Act 1985. 
Read the text of the Company Law Reform Bill [1-IL] available from: 
http: //www. publications. parliament. uk/pa)1d200506/ldbills/034/20060 4 pdf [Accessed 25 March 2006]. 271 See cl. 415 and cl. 420(lb) of the Bill. 
272 See cl. 416 of the Bill. 
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(ii) To elect and dismiss the members of the board of directors and the 
supervisory board, and determine their remunerations. 
(iii) To examine and approve the reports of the board of directors and the 
board of supervisors. 
(iv) To examine and approve the annual financial budget plans and final 
accounting plans of the company. 
(v) To examine and approve the profit distribution plans, dividend policy and 
plans of recovery losses. 
(vi) To approve resolutions regarding increase or reduction of registered 
capital by the company. 
(vii) To approve resolutions on the issuance of bonds. 
(viii) To make decision regarding merger, division, change of corporate form, 
dissolution, clearance of debt and liquidation of the company. 
(ix) To amend the articles of association of the company. 
In addition, the CCL 1994 provides that shareholders also have the right to examine 
the minutes of the shareholder general meeting and the financial and accounting 
statements, and to make suggestions and inquiries about the business operation of the 
2 Art. 103 of the CCL 1994. 
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company. 274 The CCL 2006 made no change on the status of the shareholder meeting 
as the supreme organ of the company and replicated the provisions of the functions 
and powers of the shareholder meeting and shareholder right to check and copy the 
company's account books and minutes of shareholder meetings. 275 
Examining this list of powers, however, it is clear that the Chinese company law has 
granted shareholders in a general meeting with absolute sovereignty to control all the 
powers of the company. It is evident that the powers of the shareholder general 
meeting resemble those powers under the UK company law, but also provide 
shareholders with more inalienable powers of engagement and determination than in 
the UK. For example, in China, it is notable that shareholders in the general meeting 
have the power to decide a company's operation strategies and investment plans, and 
profit distributions, as well as dividend policy. In contrast, these powers under UK 
company law are clearly vested in the scope of the directors' authority. The rationale 
behind the institutional arrangement which gives the board of directors more powers 
to run the company is that efficiency is thought to be a primary goal of company 
law276 In economic theory, in a company with a substantial number of shareholders, 
eliciting a response and obtaining the approval of all members is likely to be costly 
274 See Art. 110 of the CCL 1994. 
215 This provision was not revised by the CCL 2006, see Arts. 98,99 and 100 of the CCL 2006. 
21 Maughan and Copp argue that "the firm was in effect a governance structure that allowed one party (the 
directors/manager) to make decisions on the way in which the internalised contracts were to be interpreted. The 
insight that derives for this rationale is that if efficiency is thought to be a primary goal of company law, then, 
according to Coase's theory, one of the primary purposes of company law should be to facilitate the formation and 
operation of firms and to facilitate their governance by directors". See Maughan, C. W. and S. F. Copp, 1999. The 
Law Commission and Economic Methodology: Values, Efficiency and Directors' Duties, Company Lawyer. 20(4): 
109-116, at11S. 
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and time-consuming process. 277 Therefore, the merits of shareholder meeting 
sovereignty in China, which give shareholders more opportunities to exercise their 
rights effectively and influence the corporate governance of companies, need further 
monitoring. 
To take a particular example, the power enjoyed by the shareholder meeting reveals 
that the frequency of shareholder meetings is very high in China. Table 5.1 reports the 
frequency distribution of shareholder meetings in the sample of 267 companies in the 
2002/2003 financial year. The companies hold shareholder meetings with a range 
between 1 to 9 times during the sample period, Only 65 firms (24% of the sample) 
held just one AGM, 117 firms (44% of the sample) held an AGM and an EGM; the 
remaining 85 cases (32% of the sample) held 3 or more shareholder meetings in the 
year. More interestingly, Table 5.1 shows that there was one company which 
convened 9 shareholder meetings in the year. 
Table 5.1 Frequency Distribution of Shareholder Meetings in China 
Number of shareholder 
meetings in 2002/2003 
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
1.00 65 24.3 24.3 
2.00 117 43.8 68.2 
3.00 53 19.9 88.0 
4.00 22 8.2 96.3 
5.00 7 2.6 98.9 
6.00 2 
.7 99.6 
9.00 1 
.4 100.0 
Total 267 100.0 100.0 
Source: survey of the AGM/EGM (2002/2003 financial year) for 267 companies listed in China's Sit and SZ 
Stock Exchange markets 
277 Cheffins, B. R 1997. Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation, P17, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
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It is doubtful whether or not the board of directors has the power to make decisions 
and run the company on behalf of shareholders in China. Shareholder involvement 
might mitigate agency problems, but these extensive powers granted to the 
shareholder meeting definitely raise transaction costs because a high frequency of 
shareholder meetings will generate potential costs for a company and its shareholders. 
In addition, individual shareholders might not be interested in attending the 
shareholder meetings because they are time-consuming, stressful and incur travelling 
expenses. Consequently, the shareholder meeting might become a controlling 
shareholder meeting because only the controlling shareholders are likely to take an 
active interest in the meetings. But evidence indicates that the interests of the 
controlling shareholders do not always fully overlap with those of minority investors, 
and the controlling shareholders might try to take advantage of the situation by 
supporting or withholding their votes in order to extract some extra benefit for 
themselves. 278 In fact, it should be emphasised that, in China, most companies' 
shareholder meetings are manipulated by the controlling shareholders because no 
resolution can be passed without their consent. 
Further, the potential difference between the role of shareholders in general meetings 
in China and the UK is that decision-making power exercised by the shareholders in 
China may have a different meaning when the majority shareholder is the 
government's agents or the SOEs. As for specific business decisions, the 
279 See section 4.6 of Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
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government's agent or the SOE acting as a controlling shareholder is different from 
residual claimants in the private sector. In China, where there is not any personal 
interest directly connected with the economic performance of the companies, the 
controlling shareholders may decide to pursue an objective other than the 
maximisation of profits. 279 For example, the government might have a strong control 
over the shareholder meeting and sacrifice a corporation's profits to achieve another 
state objective, such as higher employment in the region. 280 In this aspect, on the one 
hand, the powers granted to the shareholder meeting in China will be meaningless to 
minority shareholders because the majority votes are controlled by the government or 
its agents and the tiny proportion of voting shares held by individual shareholders is 
too small to influence the outcomes. On the other hand, without adequate constraint 
and incentives, the managers appointed by the government or its agents are able to 
divert the controlling power to attenuate the state's ownership in the company, and 
use some of the company's resources to increase their personal satisfaction at the 
expense of the government objectives. Thus, on this view, although actual control 
power is allocated to the shareholder general meeting in China, in current 
arrangements, shareholders seeking to exercise their statutory power to minimise 
agency cost face substantial impediments. 
179 IFF Equity Advisory Group reports "at the end of 2003 there are 1287 listed companies on the Shanghai and 
Shenzlien stock exchange markets, 940 of which were restructured by SOEs... Continued state control of these 
companies reflects various public policy objectives such as the maintenance of urban employment and direct 
control of sensitive industries. " See IT Equity Advisory Group, Corporate Governance in China: An Investor 
Perspective. Task Force Report, April 2004. Available from: 
http: //www. iifcom/data/public/china task force final. pdf. [Accessed 12 February 2006]. 
280 See Osgathorpe, J. D. 1996. A Critical Survey the People's Republic of China's New Company Law, 6 Indiana 
International and Comparative Law Review, 493, at 510. 
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5.3 Legal Procedural Rules of Shareholder Meetings 
According to incomplete contract theory, shareholder meetings provide all members 
of a company with an opportunity for an exchange of information and opinion on the 
company's affairs. Therefore, it may be said that the effectiveness of the shareholder 
meetings is a controversial question, which depends upon certain legal requirements 
of convening the meeting, notification of the date and resolutions of the meeting, as 
well as voting policies. Without extensive procedural rules governing shareholder 
meetings, the substantive rights can never be fulfilled in terms of their respective 
influence, determination, control and implementation of corporate power. Therefore, 
to allow a shareholder meeting to function legally and efficiently, several important 
technicalities on holding a shareholders' general meeting (e. g. convening of general 
meeting, notice of the general meeting, method of service and quorum), the rules of 
voting and shareholders' resolution process are of crucial importance. 
5.3.1 Types of Meetings and Legal Requirements on Convening a Meeting 
Both the UK and China have a common classification of shareholder general 
meetings, which are the annual general meeting and all general meetings other than 
the annual general meetings, called extraordinary general meetings281 They also have 
" See Arts. 43 and 104, the CCL 1994 and s. 366 and Table A, art. 36. The EGM is also called an interim meeting 
in China Ilowever, in the UK, there is another classification, so called class meeting which is normally called to 
consider variations in class rights. See Carruth v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. [1937) AC 707, IIL, and s372 
(proxies), s374 (voting on a poll), s375 (representation of corporations), and S381 (resolution passed at an 
adjourned meeting) are also expressed to cover class meetings. The CCL 1994 is silent on such a classification. 
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the same requirement that every listed company must hold at least one annual general 
meeting each year. 282 
In the UK, an annual general meeting is normally convened by the board of directors. 
If a company defaulted on its statutory obligation to hold an annual general meeting it 
may be directed to do so by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry acting on the 
application of any member. 283 A publicly listed company must call a shareholder 
general meeting in circumstances where its net assets have fallen to one-half or less of 
its call-up capital. 284 In other respects, a shareholder general meeting may be 
convened when directors think necessary. 285 Alternatively, shareholders of a company 
holding one tenth of the paid up capital carrying the right to vote at a general meeting 
can require the directors of the company to convene a general meeting? 86 However, 
the requisition must state the objective of the meeting and sign the written demand for 
the meeting, leaving it at the registered office of the company ? 87 
The Bill replicates the individuals' power to call a shareholder general meeting. 288 
Apart from the threshold requirement that the shareholders calling the meeting must 
together hold at least 10 per cent of paid-up capital of the company and hold voting 
rights at the general meetings of the company, 289 the Bill specifies that directors must 
282 Under the Bill, every public company in the UK must hold a general meeting as its annual general meeting in 
each period of 6 months beginning with the day following its accounting reference date. See cl. 3 11 of the Bill. 
283 See s. 367(l), CA 1985. 
284 See s. 142(l), CA 1985 
285 See Table A, art. 37. 
296 See s. 368(l) and (2), CA 1985. 
287 See s. 368(3), CA 1985 
288 See cl. 279 of the Bill 
289 See c1.279 (2) of the Bill 
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call a shareholder general meeting requisitioned by the shareholders within 21 days 
from the date on which they become subject to the requirement and the shareholder 
general meeting must be held on a date not more than 28 days after the date of the 
notice convening the meeting. 290 The Bill also stipulates that the request must state 
the general nature of the business to be dealt with at the meeting, and may include the 
text of a resolution that may be moved and is intended to be moved at the meeting 
291 
Under the CA 1985, the meeting can also be `called, held and conducted in any 
manner the court think fit' and `the court may give such ancillary or consequential 
directions as it thinks expedient and these may include a direction that one member of 
the company present in person or by proxy be deemed to constitute a meeting' 292 The 
Bill has the same provision on a meeting convened by the court, but specifies that this 
only applies if for any reason it is impractical to call a meeting of a company in any 
manner in which meetings of that company may be called, or to conduct the meetings 
in the manner prescribed by the company's article or the law. 293 
In China, a shareholder general meeting is convened by the board of directors. 
However, an extraordinary general meeting must be held within two months if any 
one the following events occurs: (i) the number of members of the board of directors 
falls below the number set forth in the CCL 1994, or less than two-thirds of the 
290 See cl. 280 (1) of the Bill 
291 See cl. 279 (3) of the Bill. 
292 See s. 371, CA 1985. This provision is very useful where a quorum is required. The detailed discussion sees P. L. 
Davis, op cit. fn. 251, p349. 
293 See cl. 282 of the Bill. 
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number of the articles of association of the company; (ii) the company's net 
accumulated losses reach one-third of its total paid-up capital; (iii) a meeting is 
required by shareholders who hold 10% or more of the company's issued shares; (vi) 
the board of directors or the supervisory board considers a meeting necessary. 
294 
However, the CCL 1994 is silent on the procedural rule concerning when and how a 
shareholder or the supervisory board may request the board to convene a shareholder 
general meeting. 
Until May 2000, `the Opinions on the Standardisation of Shareholder General 
Meeting' (the Opinions 2000) was promulgated by the CRSC295 which adopted 
various provisions to regulate the shareholder general meeting of listed companies. 
The Opinions provide that the supervisory board or the requisition shareholders 
should make a written request with the detailed resolution to the board of directors to 
convene a shareholder general meeting, and report to the CRSC or its local securities 
agencies 296 The board of directors should make a decision within 15 days to decide 
whether or not to call a meeting, and inform the requisition parties and the CRSC or 
its local securities agencies. The requisition shareholders or the supervisory board 
may convene a meeting by themselves if the directors do not agree to call a meeting 
or fail to inform shareholders. 97 Reasonable costs can also be recoverable from the 
company. 298 But an important question is if the shareholders convene a general 
Z" Art. 104, the CCL 1994 
295 See Zhenjiangongsi [2000] No. 53,18 May 2000 
296 Art. 19 the Opinion 2000 
297 Art. 20,21 and 23 the Opinion 2000 
298 Art. 25 the Opinion 2000 
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meeting while the board of directors refuse their requisition, will a resolution passed 
at the general meeting be legally effective? If the board considers that the resolutions 
passed at such a shareholder meeting are not effective or refuses to implement them, 
what will the shareholders do? There is no clear answer to this question. However, as 
we have seen, section 371 of the UK Companies Act provides that "the court may, 
either of its own motion or on the application... of any member of the 
company... order a meeting to be called, held and conducted in any manner the court 
thinks fit"299. This indicates that in the UK, if there is conflict upon convening the 
general meeting, the court can intervene and give the resolution legal effect as it 
thinks fit. Unfortunately, there is no statutory provision which deals with whether the 
meeting can be convened by the court or other state authorities under China's 
company law. 
Comparing the legal requirements on convening shareholder meetings between China 
and the UK, it can be seen that both countries' company laws have empowered the 
board of directors and the members of the company who hold 10 per cent of the 
company's paid-up capital to call shareholder general meetings whenever they think 
proper. However, the thresholds at which one or more shareholders can exercise a 
requisition right to convene a shareholder general meeting could be criticised in 
China. Although the purpose of this provision is to allow the minorities to have an 
opportunity to convene a shareholder general meeting, the statutory requirement for a 
299 see 371 of the CA 1985. 
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minimum threshold shareholding of one-tenth of paid-up share capital, 
indicates that 
only the controlling shareholders will be able to requisition a general meeting 
in 
China. This is because, for historical reasons, most companies come from state-owned 
companies and still have highly concentrated ownerships. Most members of the 
board 
come from controlling shareholders and they are normally under the control of the 
majority. 300 For the minorities, they will never have a chance to exercise the right of 
requisition of a shareholder general meeting unless they can form a collective 
action 301 In consequence, it is unavoidable that the majority will take advantage of 
their position to make decisions in their own interests. 
302 Unfortunately, the CCL 
2006 did not reduce the threshold requirement in this regard, 
303 and so the difficulties 
for minorities to call a general meeting remain in Chinese publicly listed companies. 
300 Xiangcai Security Research Group, 2000. Corporate Governance Research. Chinese Security Association, 
Research on Advanced issues of Chinese Securities Market Development, China Finance Publishing Company, 
a59-60 
We have observed that in China, the largest shareholder in each company owns on average 45.39%; the second 
largest owns on average 7.81%; the third largest owns on average 3.08%, the fourth largest owns on average 
1.64%, and the fifth owns on average 1.12%of the total shares of the listed company. See Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
302 There were several cases in China since the Opinion 2000 came to effect, for example I lebei Xingfu Shiye 
Industry Co. (H}QCL) (600743) whose 60 million shares accounted for 19.2 per cent of total stock was auctioned 
by the Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court in 2000. Mingliu Investment Co. won the bid and became a 
shareholder of the H)UCL. Then Mingliu sent out a notice to the board of directors of I IXICL requiring them to 
convene an EGM and proposing a resolution in order to send its representative to the boardroom. After its proposal 
was denied by the board of directors, it convened an EGM according to the Opinion 2000. The second largest 
shareholder of international Building Co. (000600), Kaiyuan Group holding 18.77% of total shares of International 
Building Co. required more than ten EGMs within 3 years since 2000. In 2002, three largest shareholders of 
Tiange Keji Co. (000509) were fighting each other for convening an EGM and settled by litigation in the end. See 
Zhou, D., 2000. Shareholders May also Convene Shareholder Meting, Zhongguo Zhcnquanbao (China Securities 
Daily) September 28, W. Liu, J., 2003. EGM Disputes Need Judicial Intervention, Zhongguo Zhenquanbao 
(China Securities Daily) March 18, Available from 
//www. fsi. com. cn/policy200/explain203/203 0303/203 03031801. htm (in Chinese). [Accessed 12 February 
20061. 
303 see Art. 101(3) of the CCL 2006 
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5.3.2 Notice of Shareholder Meeting 
As an important part of the shareholder meeting system, the notice of shareholder 
meeting should give shareholders sufficient information about the meeting at the 
appropriate time. Davies notes that: 
"The main protection for the shareholder in such a case lies in the information 
made available to them in advance of the meeting and the length of notice 
required. On the basis of this information and during this period, they should 
be able to form a view whether the matter is sufficiently important for them to 
vote at the meeting or to attend it, and perhaps even to form an alliance with 
other shareholders to oppose the board... " 304 
With listed companies, in the ordinary course of events, shareholder meetings are 
normally convened by the board of directors. Thus, how much notice of the meeting 
should be delivered to the shareholders before the meeting, what kind of information 
should be contained in the meeting notice, what methods might be employed to serve 
the meeting notice, and the different meeting notice given regarding different types of 
resolution are vital to improve the functioning of shareholder meetings. 
In the UK, as regards notice of the meeting, the CA 1985 lays down that certain 
minimum periods of notice must be given and any provision in the articles providing 
30' See P. L. Davies, op cit. fn. 251, pp354-355. 
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for shorter periods than those specified in the statute is void 
305 Under the CA 1985, 
the case of an AGM or any EGM called to consider a special resolution must give at 
least 21 days' notice, and in other cases 14 days' notice is required in writing or by 
electronic communication methods. 06 There are three types of resolution referred to 
in the CA 1985 requiring a special notice. 07 They are: 
(i) to remove a director from office, or to appoint another director in his/her 
place; 308 
(ii) to appoint a director over the age limit (70 years old) ; 309 
(iii) to remove an auditor from his/her position, or to appoint any other auditor 
in certain circumstances; 310 
In practice, however, listed companies are governed by the Combined Code, which 
requires 20 working days' notice for the AGM (not other meetings) 311 In the Bill, the 
minimum notice period for a general meeting of a public company has been amended 
to (a) in the case of an annual general meeting at least 21 days, and (b) in any other 
case, at least 14 days. 312 A short notice for the AGM in a public company is not 
applicable, but for other general meetings is allowed if 95 per cent of members agree 
to it 313 In addition, the Bill states that "where by any provision of the Companies Act 
305 See s. 369(l) CA 1985 
306 See s 378(2), 369(2), (3), 369(4B) and 4(C), CA 1985, but Table A, art. 38 provides that the resolution 
concerning the appointment of a directors requires 21 days' notice. Under s. 15 of the Electronic Communication 
Act 2000, `electronic communication' is given a very wide definition, which embraces telephone, telex, fax and 
email communication. 
307 See s. 379, CA 1985 
308 See s. 303, CA 1985 
309 See s. 293, CA 1985 
310 See s. 388(3) and 391(A)1985 includes to fill a casual vacancy or reappointment of a retired auditor. 
311 Para. C. 2.4. the Combined Code. 
312 See cl. 283(2) of the Bill. 
313 See cl. 283(4) of the Bill. 
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special notice is required of resolution, the resolution is not effective unless notice of 
the intention to move it has been given to the company at least 28 days before the 
meeting at which it is moved" 314 The Bill also extends the method of the service as 
in hard copy form or in electronic form, or by means of website access. 15 However, 
notice of a general meeting must be sent to every member of the company and every 
director. 316 
In China, the minimum period of notice of the general meeting seems to have been 
regarded as an important matter under the CCL 1994. Art. 105 of the CCL 1994 
specifies that, when convening a shareholder general meeting, notice should be given 
to all shareholders thirty days before the meeting, stating the matters to be considered 
at the meeting. Notice of a meeting to the holders of bearer shares is required 45 days 
before the meeting by a public announcement. 317 However, the holders of bearer 
shares need to deposit their share certificates with the company for a period of five 
days before the meeting until the end of the meeting if they are attending 318 
Although the CCL 1994 sets out longer periods of notice of meetings compared with 
the UK, these requirements for increasing the effectiveness of meetings are not so 
definitive. The CCL 1994 makes no difference, relating to the content and time period 
of notice, between ordinary and special resolutions of the shareholder meetings. So 
314 See cl. 288(l) of the Bill. 
315 See cl. 285 of the Bill. 
316 See cl. 286 of the Bill. 
317 See Art. 105 pares (1) and (2) of the CCL 1994. 
"` See Art. 105 para (3) of the CCL 1994. 
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the effect is that the content of the notices and related detailed matters are largely left 
to the articles of association of a company. The State Council Securities Commission 
(the SCSC)319 considered that it was necessary to proscribe mandatory provisions in 
the articles of association of Chinese listed companies. In December 1997, the 
Directive was promulgated which prescribes detailed mandatory provisions to the 
articles of association of the listed companies in China. 
20 In particular, Article 48 of 
the Directive prescribes that the notice shall specify the time and place of the meeting, 
the proposed resolution, and shall clearly indicate that all shareholders and their 
representatives have the right to attend and vote at the general meeting. 
321 
Interestingly, the CCL 2006 did not give statutory backing to the requirements of the 
Directive. 
In January 2002, the CSRC and the State Economic and Trade Commission jointly 
issued the "Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China" 
(Hereafter, the CCGC)322 which provides limited consideration in this regard. Clause 
8 of the CCGC only specifies that "Besides ensuring that the shareholder meetings 
proceed legally and effectively, a listed company shall make every effort, including 
fully utilising modern information technology means, to increase the number of 
shareholders attending the shareholder meeting". 
323 However, whether such an 
319 The SCSC used to be the competent authority of the government responsible for regulating securities in China 
and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (the CSRC) used to be the executive body of the SCSC. 
However, in 1998, the CSRC took over all functions of the SCSC, and the SCSC on longer exists afterwards. 
320 See the Directive 1997, op cit. fn. 227. 
321 ibid art. 48 of the Directive. 
su See "Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China" (Zhenghianfa No. 12002). Available from: 
http: //www. csrc. gov. cn/en/isp/detail isp? infoid=1061968722100&tvpe=CMS STD [Accessed 12 February 2006 
31' See cl. 8 of the CCGC 2002. op cit. fn. 28. 
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abstract requirement will be able to secure all shareholders of a company who are 
scattered around the whole country to be fully informed is questionable. In practice, 
most companies do not notify shareholders of AGMs and EGMs individually. Instead, 
notices are published in local securities newspapers and placed on the company's or 
other relevant websites. The information contained is no more than the date of the 
meeting, venue, and duration; a simple structured meeting agenda; proxy rights, 
delivery date and location; shareholder registration date and place; attendance 
deadline; and meeting contact person details. Detailed information regarding the 
resolutions of the meetings and voting procedures are seldom disclosed to 
shareholders before the meeting. 
In theory, any notice of the meeting should contain sufficient information concerning 
the purpose of any proposed resolution for shareholders to be able to make reasonable 
judgement about whether or not to attend the meeting 324 In practice, since detailed 
resolution information is not delivered to the shareholders at the time before the 
meeting takes place in China, the shareholders have almost no time to understand the 
issues and raise appropriate questions to the board of directors during the meeting. 
Nevertheless, most resolutions of AGMs and EGMs in Chinese publicly listed 
companies can still be passed because the controlling shareholders who are normally 
the policy makers and a majority of the board of directors are their representatives, 
have first-hand information in most events. The practical problem of expropriation of 
" See J Farrar et. at., op cit. n. 245, pp313-314. 
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minority shareholders resulting in information asymmetry between the controlling 
shareholder and minority shareholders is particularly acute in China. However, the 
CCL 2006 did not make any amendment to the notice of the meeting and the potential 
problems of information asymmetry remain unsolved. 
5.3.3 Quorum Requirements 
A quorum is the minimum number of shareholders who have to be present for the 
business to be validly transacted at a meeting 325 In the UK, unless the articles provide 
otherwise, the quorum for all company meetings is two shareholders (or their proxies) 
entitled to vote personally present. 26 At common law, one person cannot constitute a 
meeting, even though he/she holds proxies for several other persons, the meeting will 
still be null and void. 27 However, in China, the rule on quorum did not appear in the 
CCL 1994, and the CCL 2006 has totally omitted this issue too. Although Clause 5 of 
the CCGC specifies that a listed company shall set out convening and voting 
procedures for a shareholder meeting in its articles of association328, whether or not a 
quorum system should be incorporated into the articles of association or an incumbent 
board and the controlling shareholders are willing to produce a quorum at a 
shareholder meeting, 329 is unclear. Regardless of the case, there is no doubt that the 
325 Ibid, p317. 
11 See s. 370(4), and Table A, art. 40. 
327 See Sharp v. Dawes (1876) 2 QBD 26, Byng v. London Life Association Ltd. [1990] Ch. 170 at 183, [1989] 1 All 
ER 560 at 565. 
323 See cl. 5 the CCGC. op cit. fn. 28. 
329 In English practice the quorum is part of a shareholder agreement designed to prevent the majority from 
thwarting the wishes of the minority. Therefore the majority shareholder may be unwilling to produce a quorum in 
order to avoid problems created by such a device. I lowever, the court has the power to overrule a quorum under 
certain circumstances. See Re British Union for Abolition of ti ivisection [1995] 2 B. C. L. C. 1, Re El Sombrero Ltd 
[1958] Ch. 900. some detailed interpretation see P. L. Davis, op cit. fn. 251, pp349-350 
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shareholder general meeting coupled with the absence of a quorum requirement may 
result in very low attendance rates. However, in reality, the effect is that a single- 
shareholder general meeting has existed in listed companies in China 
330 Without a 
quorum system, whether such a single-shareholder general meeting would pass 
resolutions in the best of interests of others is always questionable. 
From an economic perspective, it is true that the law should provide shareholders with 
a set of voting rules that enable them to exercise their voting rights at low cost, but the 
quorum requirements may impose transaction costs both on the firms and 
shareholders. However, an optimal quorum requirement might be necessary to ensure 
that any material corporate actions (e. g. amendment of the articles of association, the 
removal of a director who was elected by cumulative voting, transfer pricing 
advantages to the controlling shareholder, or providing loan guarantees etc. ) approved 
at the shareholder meeting are for the benefit of all shareholders. 
31 Underpinning this 
point is the view that an optimal quorum requirement could be an useful supplement 
to restrict the expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders 
in China. 
330 The survey shows that there are 2 companies out of 267 companies that held their shareholder general meeting 
with a single shareholder in the year 2002/2003. More details discussed in section 5.4 of this chapter. 
331 For example, under the Japanese Commercial Code, passage of a special resolution requires the attendance at 
the general meeting by shareholders possessing one-third of outstanding shares with voting rights - "the quorum", 
and a vote in favour of such resolution by shareholders representing more than two-third of those voting rights. See 
Ryoko Ueda, Corporate Governance and Reform ofJapan c Commercial Code. J-IRIS Research Newsletter, Issues 
No. 2, October 2002. 
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5.3.4 The Rules of Voting and Proxy 
In the UK, voting procedures are highly regulated by the CA 1985. The general 
principle under Table A, regs. 46 and 54 specify that voting shall be by show of hands 
(every shareholder present at the shareholders' general meeting has one vote 
irrespective of how many shares are held) unless a poll is demanded. 32 The normal 
practice for exercising voting rights in the shareholder meetings is by show of hands 
in the first instance, and then if a valid demand is made, for a poll to be held 333 
Section 373 of the CA 1985 also sets out the rights of shareholders to demand a poll 
on any question, but demanding a poll shall not be effective (except in the election of 
a chairman or the adjournment of the meeting) unless it is made by at least 5 
shareholders entitled to vote at that meeting or by any number of shareholders holding 
at least 10% of voting shares 334 
However, voting by a show of hands has been criticised as an inappropriate method 
for listed companies because of the rule of proxies under the current UK voting 
system 335 PIRC's research director Stuart Bell claims that: 
"... voting rights have a value and are an important part of the corporate 
governance process. But the current system is ramshackle. There is a clear 
need for radical reform of the dual voting system. It is ludicrous that a director 
332 See Table A arts. 46 and 54. 
333 See Farrar et al, op cit. fn. 245, p322. 
334 See s. 373(1), CA 1985. Table A, art. 46 extend this by allowing any two members (instead five shareholders) or 
the chairman to call for a poll. 
"' See Table A, art54 and 59, a proxy is not entitled to vote on a show of hands. The criticism has been made by CLR, Final Report. op cit, fn. 269, p20. 
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can still be elected even though a majority of votes opposed him 
336 Voting by 
show of hands is an unrepresentative anachronism which should be abolished 
at the earliest opportunity. 
037 
In contrast, UKSA's report argues that "abandoning show of hand voting would 
destroy the meetings as a forum for private shareholders to express their concerns 
collectively, and would lead to a collapse in attendance". 
338 
Voting by a show of hands has the merit of enabling uncontroversial resolutions to be 
disposed of quickly, and the right of the chairman on the one hand and a relatively 
small number of shareholders on the other to demand a poll is a safeguard against a 
decision being taken against the wishes of the majority shareholders, whereas a poll 
can provide a more accurate reflection of the voting strength among the members. By 
recognition that there is a potential conflict of voting results on a show of hands and a 
poll, the Company Law Review recommended that a quoted company will be required 
to disclose on its website the results of polls at its general meetings, and members of a 
quoted company will have a right to require an independent scrutiny of any poll, and 
that the scrutiny report will have to be published in the company's report 339 The Bill 
takes this recommendation into consideration, provides that quoted companies will 
336 PIRC's survey found that at computer distributor Northamber plc, 55% of proxy votes were cast against one 
director, but he was elected on a show of hands at the meeting without the proxies being used. See PIRC, 1999. 
New Survey Reveals Increase in Proxy J bting but System "Ramshackle ", PIRC Press Release, 7 November. 
331 Ibid. 
331 See UKSA's Response to Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Company General Meeting & 
Shareholder Communications, at p4,9 January 2000. 
339 See the CLR, Final Report, op cit. fn. 269, para. 6.19 to 6.40, and the White Paper, Company Law Reform, 
para. 3.1(Cm 6456,2005). 
135 
have to disclose the results of any poll on their website. 340 In addition, the Bill 
specifies that shareholders of a quoted company who hold at least 5 per cent of the 
voting rights, or who number at least 100 (with an average of at least £100 of share 
capital each) will be able to require the directors to obtain an independent report on 
any polled vote 341 The requirement for website publication of poll results is in line 
with current best practice. 
In China, the CCL 1994 adopted the `one share one vote' principle which means a 
shareholder meeting has to be conducted by a poll rather than a show of hands. 342 
However, to ensure board representation for larger minority shareholders, the 
cumulative voting system 343 was adopted by the Code. The Code requires that listed 
companies with a controlling shareholder (holding more than 30% shares of the 
company) should adopt a cumulative voting system to elect the members of the board 
of directors and supervisory board and stipulate the implementing rules in the articles 
of association of the company. 344 Nevertheless, the evidence shows that most 
companies have not fully complied with the Code's requirement to establish a 
cumulative voting system. Table 5.2 shows that only 61 companies out of the 185 
sample companies with a controlling shareholder employed a cumulative voting 
method to elect the members of the board of directors and supervisors 343 
See cl. 315 of the Bill. 
'41 See cl. 316 of the Bill. 
342 See Art 106, the CCL 1994. 
143 Cumulative voting means that it allows minority shareholders to accumulate all of their votes and allocate them 
among a few or even one candidate. This increases the chance of board representation for minority shareholders. It 
normally applies to shareholders' elections of directors, not to shareholder voting on other matters. See Palmiter, 
Alan 12 2003. Corporations: Examples & Explanations, 4ed. pl19, CITIC Publishing House. 
I" See cl. 31, the CCGC, op cit. fn. 29. 
341 In total, 267 companies were randomly selected from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Markets in this study. 
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Table 5.2 Frequency of Companies Exercising Cumulative Voting Method to Elect 
Directors or Supervisors at Shareholder Meetings in China 
Cumulative Voting Method Exercised at Frequency Percent Cumulative 
AGM/EGM (2002/2003) Percent 
NO 124 67.0 67.0 
YES 1 61 33.0 100.0 
Total 1 185 100.0 
Source: survey of the AGM/EGM (2002/2003 financial year) for 267 companies listed in China's S11 and SZ 
Stock Exchange markets. By observation of the ownership data, only 83 companies were identified to have no 
shareholder whose shareholding is more than 30 per cent of company issued shares. According to the code, the rest 
185 companies should establish a cumulative voting system to elect their directors and supervisors. 
The aim of the cumulative voting system is to provide the minorities with a chance to 
nominate directors and supervisors. The CCL 2006 ratified the cumulative voting 
system. The Art. 106 of the CCL 2006 stipulates that 
"A cumulative voting system may be implemented in accordance with the 
provisions of the articles of association of the company or a resolution passed 
at a shareholder general meeting to elect the member of board of directors or 
supervisory board. The "cumulative voting system" as referred to in this Law 
means that, when any directors or supervisors are elected at a shareholder 
general meeting, each share shall have the same number of votes as that of the 
directors or supervisors to be elected and the shareholders may pool their votes 
when such votes are cast". 346 
Clearly, the CCL 2006 gives the cumulative voting system statutory effect and 
enables minority shareholders to have a `voice' at the shareholder meeting for the 
I 
By observation of the ownership data, only 83 companies were identified to have no shareholder whose 
shareholding was more than 30 per cent of company issued shares. According to the CCGC, the remaining 185 
companies should establish a cumulative voting system to elect their directors and supervisors. 346 See art. 106 of the CCL 2006. 
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appointment of directors and supervisors. Under the cumulative system, the number 
of votes available to a shareholder is equal to the number of shares held times the 
number of positions up for election and all votes may be cast for the same director. 
However, whether the implementation of a cumulative voting system will enable 
China to improve the protection of minority shareholders remains to be seen. 
The voting rule of proxy is another vital way to promote shareholder democracy for 
shareholders unwilling or unable to attend and vote at a shareholders' general 
meeting. A proxy is a person authorised by a shareholder to attend and vote at a 
meeting on his/her behalf. The proxy system is very important because, shareholders 
in publicly traded companies are often geographically dispersed or have some 
principal business other then investing, so that inertia and lack of interest from 
shareholders in attending and voting at general meetings is understandable. Proxies 
enhance the shareholders' abilities to exercise their rights even when they are not 
present at the meeting in person 347 
In the UK, voting by proxies is mandatory. Section 372 (1) and (2) of the CA 1985 
specify that any member of a company who is entitled to attend and vote at a meeting 
of the company may appoint another person, whether a member or not, as his/her 
proxy to'attend and vote on his/her behalf. 348 A company may notify its shareholders 
of an address to which proxy appointments may be sent using electronic 
3" See John Farrar et al, op cit. fn. 245, p308 
"' See s. 372 (l)and (2), CA 1985 
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communications and may receive appointments electronically. 49 Articles. 60 and 61 
of Table A set out forms for appointing proxies and specify that an instrument 
appointing a proxy must be deposited at the company's registered office, or received 
electronically at the notified address not less than 48 hours before the meeting 
35° In 
addition, the Listing Rules also require that a notice convening a meeting must 
accompany a form for the appointment of a proxy every time and enable the appointer 
to specify how the proxy is to vote on each resolution other than procedural 
motions 351 
Regulation 63 of Table A of the CA 1985 specifies the procedures for revoking the 
appointment of a proxy. Nevertheless, common law also provides certain rules on 
revocation of proxies. For example, a proxy who acts knowing that his/her authority 
has been revoked will be in breach of duty to his/her appointer. 352 The appointment of 
a proxy does not prevent the shareholder from attending and voting in person. If a 
shareholder, who has appointed a proxy for a meeting actually attends the meetings, 
the company must then accept his/her vote instead of the proxy 353 
By implication, a. proxy at a meeting of a publicly listed company can attend and vote, 
but cannot speak at the meeting under the current system. Against that background, 
'"' See s. 372 (2A) CA 1985. 
350 See Table A, arts. 60 and 61. 
331 See para. 13.28(a) (b), the Listing Rules. This requirement has also been specified by Table A art. 61, as two- 
way proxies which are distinct from appointing a person to exercise the vote, under which a member can indicate 
whether he wishes to vote for or against a particular resolution. 
302 See Cousins v. International Brick Co. Ltd [193112 Ch. 90 at p104 
153 Ibid 
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0 
the Company Law Review proposed that proxies should be permitted to speak at 
meetings of public companies 354 The Bill adopts the recommendations to enhance 
statutory rights so that proxy appointments can authorise the proxy to attend, speak 
and vote at the meeting. 355 In addition, in line with a general trend towards more 
active shareholder engagement, the Bill proposed to allow indirect investors (those 
who hold shares through intermediaries such as nominee brokers) to exercise the 
governance rights through proxy 356 
In China, Article 108 of the CCL 1994 provides that a shareholder may attend a 
shareholders' general meeting by proxy. The proxy holder shall present the proxy 
statement issued by the shareholder to the company, and exercise his voting rights 
within the scope of the authorisation. 357 Although the company law does not stipulate 
the detailed procedure rules on proxies, the Directive 1997 specifies that a proxy has to 
be deposited at the company's registered office, or received at the notified address not 
less than 24 hours before the meeting commences 358 The proxy must be a notarised 
document if it was signed by a person other than the shareholder? 59 Clause 10 of the 
Code also states that the board of directors, independent directors and qualified 
shareholders of a listed company360 may solicit for the shareholders' right to vote in a 
shareholder meeting at the company's expense, and that adequate information should 
354 See the CLR Final Report, op cit. fn. 269, para. 7.13 at p156. 
ass See cl. 299 of the Bill. 
336 See cl. 136 & 137 of the Bill 
357 See Art. 108, the CCL 1994 
358 See op cit, fn. 227, art. 52 of the Directive 1997. 
759 ibid. 
"° The difficulties with this provision are that it provides no guidance on the definition of the qualified 
shareholder' and how the proxies should be initiated. 
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be provided to persons whose voting rights are being solicited. 361 However, the 
mechanisms of proxy voting provided by the Directive 1997 and the Code were not 
added into the CCL 2006 and the effectiveness of the proxy remains largely uncertain. 
Compared with the UK, although the proxy voting system has been adopted by 
China, 362 it seems that it does not function in the same way. In China, as we observed, 
the largest shareholder in listed companies owns on average 44.9%, 363 whereas each 
individual investor normally holds less than 0.5% of company issues shares 3" There 
are no powerful intermediaries like banks, insurance companies or other institutional 
investors who are able to solicit proxies. It can be seen that adopting proxy voting 
does not help minority shareholders. The controlling shareholder has absolute control 
in determining the effectiveness of the proxies, and hence makes the directors loyal to 
him/her, but not to minority shareholders or the company as a whole. In addition, 
because there is no legal instruction on how to vote by proxy, with little knowledge of 
proxy voting and insufficient information about the company's affairs, the small 
individual shareholders have neither the incentive nor the capability to scrutinise 
managerial performance 365 Not surprisingly, considering the substantive defects of 
the ownership structure and shareholders' perception on proxy voting, it is apparent 
that the proxy will be incapable of meaningful application in China. 
361 See cl. 10, the CCGC, op cit. fn. 28. 
362 See Art. 108, the CCL1994 and Art. 52, the Directive 1997, op cit, fn. 227. 
363 See Shi, S. and D. Weisert, 2002. Corporate Governance with Chinese Characteristics, China Business Review, 
Volume 28, No. 5. In our survey in Chapter 4, the largest shareholder on average owned 45.39% of the company 
issued shares. 
364 See Xu and Wang, op cit. fn. 214, p84. 
365 mid at p85. 
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5.4.5 Resolutions and Voting Restrictions 
In practice, there are three types of resolutions which may be encountered at the 
shareholder general meetings in the UK. An ordinary resolution is one which is 
passed by a simple majority of shareholders entitled to attend and vote at a meeting 
either in person or by proxy. It is used for all matters not requiring another type of 
resolution under the CA 1985 and the articles of association of a company. 366 A 
special or an extraordinary resolution is one which is passed by a majority of not less 
than three-quarters of such shareholders entitled to attend and vote at a meeting either 
in person or by proxy. 367 A special resolution is required in respect of fundamental 
changes to the company and an extraordinary resolution is required only for certain 
matters connected with winding up, or when a class meeting is asked to agree to a 
modification of class rights. 68 However, the Bill abolished extraordinary resolutions 
as a separate category. 
Shareholders have the power to vote for or against any resolution proposed at the 
shareholder general meeting. In the UK, common law proposes that a shareholder 
who is not a fiduciary of the company, is not subject to any rule against conflict of 
interest and duty when he/she exercises his/her voting. In Peter's American Delicacy 
Co. Ltd v. Health, 369 the Court states that 
366 For example, the removal of a director (s. 303, CA 1985); the removal an auditor (s. 391, CA 1985); and the 
alteration of capital (s. 121, CA 1985) 
367 The main difference between a special resolution and an extraordinary resolution is the notice period which is 
discussed in section 5.3.2. 
'68 See, s. 378 (1), (2) and (3), CA 1985, and s. 81 (1) (c), Insolvency Act, 1986. 
'ý' [1939] 61 CLR 457 
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"The shareholders are not trustees for one another, and, unlike directors, they 
occupy no fiduciary position and are under no fiduciary duties. The vote in 
respect of their shares, which are property, and the right to vote is attached to the 
share itself as an incident of property to be enjoyed and exercised for the owners' 
personal advantage. 070 
This statement clearly provides that a shareholder's vote is a property right, and prima 
facie may be exercised by a shareholder as he/she thinks fit in his/her own interest. 
71 
Nevertheless, English Courts hold that a resolution of the members of a company 
would be invalid if members voting for it did not vote bona fide in the interests of the 
companY172 or if the resolution was adopted for an improper purpose 
373 These issues 
were also considered by the Company Law Review which essentially concluded that 
the powers of the majority and of a blocking minority should be unconstrained by the 
Act374 However, the majority when deciding on an alteration to the constitution or 
class rights must take the decision bona fide in the best interests of the members, or 
the members of the class, as a whole. 75 The votes of a member who has an actual or 
threatened wrong on the company may be invalidated by the court when used to vote 
on the issue, whether as a member of a majority or a blocking minority. 76 There is no 
doubt that these recommendations are aimed at adopting a particularly strict approach 
370 Ibid, p. 504 
371 See Carruth v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd [1937] AC 707 at p. 765 
3n See Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd. [1900] I Ch 656 
373 See Re Western Mines Ltd. [1975] 65 DLR (3d) 307 at 313 
374 See op cit. fn. 269, Completing the Structure para. 5.110 
'n Ibid 
376 Ibid 
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to the exercise of majority voting powers so as to prevent misuse of the power to the 
detriment of minority shareholders. 
In China, resolutions of shareholder general meetings are categorised into two types: 
ordinary resolutions and special resolutions. An ordinary resolution of the shareholder 
general meeting shall be passed with a simple majority vote, apart from resolutions on 
the merger, division, liquidation, or amendment to the articles of association which 
require a two-thirds majority vote. 77 In addition, the Directive 1997 provides that the 
shareholders' general meeting may decide through an ordinary resolution that certain 
important matters should be decided by a special resolution 378 The Directive 1997 
further specifies that a shareholder who has related transaction interests in a 
resolution, except in special circumstances and subject to the approval of the 
competent authorities, 379 is not permitted to vote on this resolution and his/her vote is 
not counted in a poll. 380 The Directive 1997 clearly attempts to extend corporate 
fiduciary duties to those who have sufficient voting shares to determine the outcome 
of a shareholder vote - i. e. the controlling shareholders. By adopting the approach of 
the Directive 1997, the CCL 2006 specified that any shareholders whose liabilities are 
to be secured by the guarantee or assets of the company, or any shareholder which is 
controlled by the de facto controller, whose liabilities are to be guaranteed by or 
37' See Art. 106,107, the CCL 1994. 
378 See art. 65, the Directive 1997, op cit. fn. 227. 
379 There is no consensus official interpretation on the vague term "competent authorities". See Gang, Yu and Allen 
Wong, A new Listed Company Law: CSRC Guideline on Article of Association for Listed Companies in China. 
July 1998. Available from: httl2: //www. omm. com/webcode/navi atP a. qp? nodCl landle=817 [Accessed 12 March 
2006] 
390 See art. 72, the Directive 1997, op cit. fn-227. 
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secured with the assets of the company, is prohibited from voting on such a resolution 
at the shareholder general meeting. To some extent, the exclusion rule will prevent a 
controlling shareholder from misusing voting powers for his/her own purposes to the 
disadvantage of the minority shareholders. 81 However, no provision has been added 
to regulate a shareholder who has related transaction interests in a resolution. 
5.3.6 Shareholders' Resolutions 
In the UK, the law provides that shareholders with five per cent or more voting rights 
of a company, or 100 or more shareholders with shares upon which an average of not 
less than £100 has been paid up can require a company to put a resolution to a 
shareholder general meeting. 382 However, for a shareholders' resolution to be 
considered at a meeting, it must meet certain requirements stated in s. 376 of the CA 
1985. These requirements are that a copy of the requisition must be signed by all the 
requisitionists and deposited at the registered office of the company at least six weeks 
before the meeting, and in the case of a statement, not less than one week before the 
meeting. 83 A statement of the proposed resolution must keep to within 1,000 words 
and the requisitionists should tender a sum reasonably sufficient to meet the 
company's expenses in giving effect to the requisition. 394 Subject to these 
requirements, the directors must circulate a resolution or statement unless "on the 
application either of the company or of any other persons who claim to be aggrieved, 
381 See Art. 16 of the CCL 2006. 
'B2 See s. 376 (2), CA 1985 
383 See s. 377 CA 1985 
3" See s. 376 CA 1985 
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the court is satisfied that the rights conferred by that section are being abused to 
secure needless publicity for. defamatory matter"385. Nevertheless, as the cost of 
printing and postage can be up to £100,000 for the largest companies, 
386 such a 
requirement has been described as a significant barrier to shareholders to exercise the 
powers under s. 376 387 
However, the right for shareholders to requisition resolutions to be put forward at an 
AGM has been amended by the Bill. Clause 313 of the Bill provides that shareholders 
holding at least 5 per cent of the shares or more than 100 in number have the right to 
requisition a resolution at the AGM at the company's expense if the requisition is 
delivered before the end of the financial year. 388 Nevertheless, the Bill also makes 
clear that a resolution may not be proposed by requisitionists if it would be ineffective 
(for example, because it is inconsistent with the company's constitution or a provision 
of statute), or is defamatory, frivolous or vexatious. 89 In addition, shareholders in 
quoted companies who hold at least 5% of the voting rights, or who number at least 
100 (with an average of at least £100 of share capital each) will have the right to 
publish on the company's website free of charge a statement of any concerns about the 
3e5 See s. 377(3) CA 1985 
386 See Knowles, G., 1996. Shareholder Communication: Proposed Changes to the Companies Act, Company 
Lawyer, 17(6), 188-189. 
387 See P. L. Davis, op cit. fn. 251. p351. 
388 See cl. 313 of the Bill. 
389 See cl. 269 of the Bill. This clause enables members to require a written resolution to be circulated. They may 
also require circulation of a statement about its subject matter. Like the members' right to require a resolution to be 
moved at an AGM, the percentage needed is 5% of the total voting rights (or lower if specified in the company's 
articles). Subsection (2) specifies some limits on the kind of resolution that may be circulated in this way, designed 
to stop the power being abused. See Section 525, Explanatory Notes to the Bill, prepared by the Department of 
Trade and Industry, are published separately the Bill 34-EN, (hereafter the Notes). Available from: 
http: //wwwpublicatigns. parliament uk/pa/ld2005O6/ldbills/034/2006034 htm [Accessed 12 March 20061 
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audit, or the circumstances in which the auditors have resigned, that they intend to 
raise at the AGM390 
In China, the CCL 1994 was silent on the right of shareholders' resolutions. However, 
the Directive 1997 provides a single section to ensure that shareholders are entitled to 
present the resolution at a meeting. Article 57 of the Directive 1997 provides that a 
shareholder or shareholders holding an aggregate of five per cent or more of the 
voting rights of a company may propose a resolution for a shareholder meeting 391 A 
proposed resolution must be submitted to the board of directors in writing and must 
contain specific subjects for discussion and matters to be resolved. The content of the 
resolution must be consistent with laws, regulations or the articles of association of 
the company, and should not exceed the business scope of the company and the 
shareholder authority. 392 The board of directors has discretion to decide whether the 
resolution should be submitted to the shareholders' general meeting in the light of the 
best interests of the company and its shareholders 393 If the board refuses to submit the 
resolution to the shareholder general meeting, the reasons must be given at the 
meeting and announced together with the resolution 394 If the requisitionists do not 
agree with the rejection decision made by the board, they may request to convene an 
extraordinary general meeting to vote on the resolution they proposed 395 However, 
there is no further requirement on the time for submission of shareholders' resolutions 
390 See c1.512 of the Bill. 
391 See art. 57 the Directive 1997, op cit, fn. 227. 
392 ibis, art. 58 
393 ibid. art. 59 
39 ibis, art. 60. 
39s ibid. art. 61. 
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and the circulation cost. In practice, the time for submission of shareholders' 
resolutions and the circulation costs are crucial to minority shareholders because, 
without such a requirement, the board of directors acts as a gatekeeper without the 
discipline of accountability and is free to determine whether or not to submit the 
resolution to the shareholders' general meeting and who bear the circulation costs. 
However, the CCL 2006 envisages the issue of shareholders' resolutions. The Art. 103 
of the CCL 2006 provides that 
"the shareholders that individually or collectively hold more than three per 
cent of the company issued shares may propose provisional resolutions and 
submit them in writing to the board of directors ten days before the 
shareholder general meeting commenced; the board of directors shall notify 
the other shareholders of such provisional resolution within two days of 
receipt thereof and present them to the shareholder general meeting for 
consideration. The contents of a provisional resolution shall fall within the 
scope of the functions and powers of the shareholder general meeting and it 
shall contain definite topics for consideration and specific matters to be 
decided on" 396 
From this provision we can see that any shareholder(s) who satisfy the three per cent 
shareholding and 10 days time requirements will be entitled to propose a resolution to 
396 see art. 103 of the CCL 2006. 
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the shareholder meeting. No powers or advantages have been given to the board of 
directors to exercise their discretion to prevent the shareholder resolution being placed 
on the agenda. However, the shareholder proposal rule adopted by the CCL 2006 may 
be criticised as being too lax and inapplicable in practice. Firstly, as ownership 
structure is concentrated in the hands of the large shareholders, this will lead large 
shareholders to use their initiation power to gain financial or other benefit from 
management. Secondly, the circulation time is limited for the board of directors to 
notify all other shareholders, especially the dispersed individual shareholders. The 
information asymmetry would enable some shareholders to obtain the benefits for 
themselves at the expense of their fellow investors. Thirdly, even though the minority 
shareholders have a chance to put their proposals on the agenda of the shareholder 
general meeting, without the controlling shareholder's consent such a resolution will 
never be adopted by the company. Therefore, the impact of this provision will be 
nominal to solve corporate governance problems because China's companies continue 
to be dominated by controlling shareholders. 
5.4 Voting Practices: Some Empirical Evidence 
Attendance and voting levels are important for measuring the effectiveness of 
shareholder resolutions as a mechanism of corporate governance. A lower attendance 
or voting level is an indication of the ineffectiveness of the shareholder general 
meeting in fulfilling its role in the corporate governance of publicly listed companies. 
As far as attendance is concerned, Kackenzie reports that in the UK, attendance in 
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person at the annual general meeting of listed companies is less than 1% and most 
voting is cast by proxy. 97 A Consultation Document from the Company Law Review 
Steering Group - "The Modern Company for a Competitive Economy: 
Developing 
the Framework" reports that the average proportion of votes cast on resolutions at 
AGMs remains at less 50 per cent. 398 PIRC's annual proxy voting survey (2003) 
highlights shareholders' continued failure to vote at the UK listed companies 
399 PIRC 
reports that despite the introduction of the CREST electronic platform and the weight 
of regulatory pressure towards encouraging shareholder activism, there is no 
substantial increase in average voting levels compared with their previous survey. The 
average voting level for FTSE 350 companies was 49% in 2001 and 57% in 2002, but 
in 2003 it was only about 55%. The average voting level for FTSE All Shares 
companies was 51% in 2001 and 56% in 2002, but in 2003 was 53%! 
' However, 
PIRC's reports indicates that the average voting level at FTSE 100 companies was 
about 53%, whereas FTSE MidCap (the next largest 250 companies) average voting 
level was recorded over 61%. The most likely contributory evidence given for this 
difference is due to the cross border voting problems aot Pettet argues that the poor 
attendance of the AGM stems from the fact that shareholders always leave their 
proxies to one of the incumbent directors. Because of the soliciting of proxy votes by 
397 See Kackenzie, C. 1993. The Shareholder Action Handbook: Using Shares to Make Companies More 
Accountable, pp119,166, Newcastle: New Consumer Ltd. 
398 See The Modem Company for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework, A Consultation Document 
from the Company Review Steering Group, p86, para. 4.11. March 2002. 
399 PIRC, 2003. Upward Voting Trend Halted Says PIRC: PJRC '5 Annual Voting Survey Highlights "Shareholders 
Continued Failure to töte at UK Listed Companies ". Available from: 
bttp // www. thecorporatelibrarv. com/special/PR/PIRCvotin 2g 003. pdf [Accessed 12 March 20061. 
'0° Ibid 
401 ibid, PIRC reports that 32.1% of UK equity is held by non-UK ownership and 91.5% of this overseas is held in 
the FTSE 100 companies. 
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the board at the company's expense, it is unusual for the board's proposals to be 
defeated by any opposition. 402 Indeed, according to PIRC's report only 9.1% of 
companies had resolutions receiving an oppose vote of 20% or more and only 16.4% 
of the sample companies showed abstain votes in excess of 20% in the 2004 proxy 
voting annual review. 403 
In the UK, it seems apparent that an important reason for existing voting patterns is 
the passive approach taken by institutional shareholders. In the UK, institutional 
shareholders are the dominant investors with approximately 80 per cent of shares in 
publicly listed companies and they have been required to take a more active role in 
monitoring company management 404 However, most companies find that their AGMs 
are rarely attended by institutional investors or their representatives. Instead those 
present are predominately private investors with small shareholdings. 405 By 
observation of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance, Solomon 
and Solomon describe three forms of shareholder activism which are usually 
employed by institutional investors to monitor company management and resolve 
agency problems: (1) vote at investee companies' AGMs; (2) engage in one-to-one 
meetings between institutional investor representatives and investee company 
management; (3) compile shareholder resolutions. 406 However, there are signs that 
402 See Ben Pettet, op cit. fn. 39, p171 
403 See PIRC Proxy Voting Annual Review 2004, Growing Opposition, p14. 
'04 See the CLR, Final Report, op cit. fii. 269, at 141. 
+0S Gaved, Mathew, 1998. The Role of Disclosure in Strengthening Corporate Governance and Accountability: 
Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom. OECD, February. Available from: 
ham'//www oecd orgldataoecd/63/14/1932499 pdf [Accessed 12 March 2006] 
41 J. Solomon and A. Solomon, 2004, op cit. fn. 33. p97. 
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institutional shareholders are increasingly recognising the importance of voting as part 
of their role in responsible corporate governance, but many of them still view general 
meetings as a waste of time and money and prefer to rely on methods other than 
casting votes at general meetings to exercise their influence. Instead of personally 
attending shareholder meetings, casting their votes by proxy reflects their attitude. 
Davies argues that there are three main reasons for institutional shareholders failing to 
attend the AGMs: conflicts of interest, a desire for a quiet life, and technical 
difficulties of voting. 407 Hannigan explains that institutional investors' intervention 
more likely occurs behind the scenes and not through the public forum of putting 
resolutions to the AGM and/or voting against the reappointment of incumbent 
management. 408 Solomon et al's survey finds that institutional investors "clearly 
preferred not to `waste time' attending annual general meeting (AGM) and considered 
that they could perform their active function perfectly well without such 
attendance". 409 However, the Myners' Report focuses on various aspects of 
institutional investment in the UK and argues that institutional investors merely 
meeting with management of portfolio companies and expressing polite reservations 
about strategy is not effective shareholder activism 410 The report points out that the 
fund managers are reluctant to intervene in companies where they own a substantial 
407 See Paul L. Davies, op cit. fn. 251, pp340-342. 
408 See Hannigan, B. op cit. fn. 221, p171. 
409 See Solomon, J. F., A. Solomon, N. Joseph, and S. Norton (2000), Institutional Investors' View on Corporate 
Governance Reform: Policy Recommendations for the 21's Century, Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, Vol. 8 215-226, at 220. 
`10 See Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review, Myners' Report (London 2001) at para 5.79, at 
p90 
152 
shareholding. 411 The Company Law Review Steering Group gave detailed 
consideration to the issues mentioned above and provided some radical solutions to 
allow institutional shareholders to actively and effectively exercise their powers in the 
AGMs, such as the technical rules concerning the transparency and efficiency of the 
voting process and the rules concerning the conflicts of interest 412 The White Paper, 
Modernising Company Law adopted the rule of transparency of voting! 13 Although 
the White Paper did not make a mandatory rule to regulate the conflict of interest 
issues, it envisaged that "in principle it would be in the public interest for institutional 
investors to be required to disclose publicly how they voted in respect of their 
shareholding in British quoted companies" 414 
Indeed, institutional investors either own or manage assets on behalf of and for the 
benefits of clients or members and have an obligation to manage those assets in their 
interests. Voting is central to the exercise of ownership control and an important 
element in adding value to a company. However, the ability of clients or members to 
monitor the way in which institutional investors exercise voting rights is limited in 
practice. 415 In addition, voting transparency could be expected to enhance the 
efficiency of institutional investment. First, it will reduce the risk of conflicts of 
interest - which institutional investors may face when voting shares - from distorting 
voting decisions. Secondly, it will increase the accountability of institutional investors 
411 ibid, para 5.83 - 5.88, at 91-92 412 See the CLR Final Report, op cit. 269, para 6.19-6.40. 
413 CLR, the Modernising Company Law White Paper, (Cmnd 5553-I), pp24-25, Para 2.42-2.48. 414 ibid p25, para. 2.47. 
4" See DTI, Transparency of Voting by Institutional Investors, Available from: 
http"//www dti gov uk/cld/votin ri he tsexp] doc . [Accessed 25 September 2005] 
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to retail investors, both for voting shares and for the signals being sent to company 
management by voting. 416 The Bill confers on the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry and on the Treasury power to make regulations requiring voting disclosure 
by specified categories of institutional investor. 417 These include unit trust schemes, 
open-end investment, investment trust, pension schemes, insurance companies and 
collective investment schemes 418 Under the Bill these institutional investors will be 
obliged to disclose how they exercise their voting rights on any resolutions at the 
shareholder meetings. 
The poor and incomplete voting process in Chinese listed companies reflects the fact 
that the shareholder participation in the meeting to exercise their rights is typically far 
less fulsome than its counterparts in the UK. Table 5.3 shows descriptive statistics on 
attendance of the AGM in China. It can be seen that the average attendance of the 
AGM is about 15 people, which means only about six in ten thousand shareholders 
attend the AGM. Observation on the frequency distribution of attendance of the AGM 
(Table 5.4) shows that there are 83.5% of the companies in the sample having less 
than 20 shareholders to attending the AGM. Further, Table 5.4 shows that there are 2 
companies which have held their AGM with only one shareholder present. 419 
Interestingly enough, one of them even amended the articles of association of the 
company by a special resolution. 420 One likely explanation for such an occurrence is 
416 Ibid 
417 See c1.966(1) of the Bill. 
418 See cl. 866(2) of the Bill. 
419 In China, company law does not provide the rule of quorum for holding a shareholder meeting. See section 
5.3.3 of this chapter. 
420 In China, there are two types of resolution referred to in the company law: ordinary resolution and special 
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that, although the shareholders keep corporate control power in China, this 
does not 
mean that the shareholder meeting has become an effective mechanism 
for quasi 
democratic control of the company's affairs. Indeed, the shareholder meeting in China 
has been criticised for being just like a rubber stamp for the wishes of the controlling 
shareholders. There is little or no opportunity for minority shareholders to exercise 
their voice and oppression of minority shareholders is a serious issue in practice 
42' 
The voting level at the shareholder general meetings in China is similar to UK listed 
companies. Table 5.5 shows that the average voting level in the 2002/2003 financial 
year was around 56.79% in Chinese listed companies. It was expected that the voting 
level would be much higher because of the high concentration of share ownership in 
China. Additionally, the data show that over 21.3% of the 267 companies in the 
sample recorded an oppose vote on proposals put forward by the board of directors 
(see table 5.6). However, Table 5.7 shows that the average voting level against the 
resolutions at the AGM does not exceed 2.5% except in 7 cases in 5 companies 
accounting for about 2% of the total sample, where the board of director's or 
supervisory board's proposals are defeated by opposed votes at the AGM 
422 
resolution. Amendment of article of association of the company is classified as a special resolution which is passed 
by two-thirds of majority votes cast in person or by proxy at a general meeting. See section 5.4 of this Chapter. 
41 See Schipani, C. A., and J. Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Then and Now, Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, p36. 
422 In Chengdu Yinhechuangxin (000519), the board proposal for changing company's accounting firm attracted 
the largest shareholder and the second largest shareholder's opposed votes, which resulted in only 6.98% votes in 
favour, 93.02% votes against, defeated at the AGM 2002. In Fujian Shenlongfazhan (600659), two board proposals 
were defeated at the AGM (2002). One was the appointment a new director which attracted 57.64% opposing votes, 
15.53% abstentions and only 26.83% of votes were cast in favour. In Guangxi Guitang (000833) at the AGM (2002) 
one board of directors' proposal concerning the remuneration of the 
board of directors and supervisory board was 
defeated by 81.36% votes against, 18.47% votes in favour and 0.17% abstentions, and one supervisory board's 
proposal for increasing the number of directors was also defeated by 57.24% opposing votes, 17.17% votes in 
favour and 25.02% abstentions. In Shanghai I Iainiao Co. (600634), board proposed resolution for dividend 
policies and allocation of shares to existing shareholders (8 sub items) failed to pass at the AGM (2002) by 99.7 1% 
opposing votes. In Hainan Diyitouzi plc. (600515) board's proposal for dividend policy and a new share scheme 
failed to pass at the AGM (20002) by 96.61% opposing votes, zero votes in favour and 3.39% abstentions. 
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Table 53 Descriptive Statistics of Attendance at the AGM in China 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Attendance of shareholder meetings 267 1.00 222.00 15.51 24.61 
Total numbers of shareholders 267 2115.00 522550.00 52482.68 57498.54 
Turnout ratio (per thousand) 267 . 
01 13.24 . 57 1.26 
Source: survey the AGM (2002/2003 fmancial year) for 267 companies listed in China's SH and SZ Stock 
Exchange markets 
Table 5.4 Frequency Distribution of Attendance at the AGNI in China 
Turnouts Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
0-1 2 .7 .7 2-5 85 31.8 32.6 
6-10 83 31.1 63.7 
11-20 53 19.9 83.5 
21-50 27 10.1 93.6 
51-100 12 4.5 98.1 
101-200 4 1.5 99.6 
201-500 1 .4 100.0 
Total 267 100.0 
Source: survey the AGM (2002/2003 fmancial year) for 267 companies listed in China's Sll and SZ Stock 
Exchange markets. 
Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics of Voting Level at the AGM in China 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Voting level at of the AGM 267 1.30 89.95 56.79 14.88 
Source: survey of the AGM (2002/2003 financial year) for 267 companies listed in China's SI I and SZ Stock 
Exchange markets. 
Table 5.6 Frequency of Companies whose Shareholders Exercise Voting Right Opposing 
Resolutions at the AGM in China 
rrequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
No 210 78.7 78.7 
Yes 57 21.3 100.0 
Total 267 100.0 
Source: survey of the AGM (2002/2003 financial year) for 267 companies listed in China's Sli and SZ Stock 
Exchange markets. 
Table 5.7 Descriptive Statistics of Voting Against Resolutions at the ACM in China 
N. Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Voting level against resolution at the AGM 49 . 00 25.53 2.35 6.20 
Source: survey of the AGM (2002/2003 financial year) for 267 companies listed in China's SII and SZ Stock 
Exchange markets. 
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In theory, the rule of shareholders' resolutions (or shareholders' proposals) is another 
control mechanism which provides an opportunity for shareholders to communicate 
with both corporate management and the other shareholders. However, Stapledon 
argued that although shareholders of UK quoted companies were entitled to vote upon 
a wide range of matters, almost all resolutions proposed at AGMs and EGMs were 
board- or management-initiated, rather than shareholder-initiated. 
423 PIRC claimed 
that the current rules governing shareholders' resolutions in the UK were "confused 
and a hindrance to action". PIRC's research showed that the shareholder resolution 
was little used. There were only three filed at FTSE 350 companies in 1998, and just 
13 companies had been the recipient of such resolutions since 1995.424 Further 
research on shareholder resolutions conducted by PIRC in 2002 showed that the 
situation has not improved very much. By observation of 523 company shareholder 
general meetings from January to September 2002, PIRC found that there were only a 
handful of shareholder resolutions out of over 6000 resolutions discussed 425 The TUC 
Fund Manager Voting Survey 2003 reported that shareholder resolutions attracted the 
biggest negative reaction from investors. The report discussed two companies which 
had shareholder resolutions put forward at their 2002 AGM. At BP Plc's AGM, a 
shareholder resolution for "the company to prepare a risk analysis report for any 
operations in environmentally or culturally sensitive areas" was proposed, but the 
voting result shows only one vote in favour, one vote abstention and 14 votes 
''u See Stapledon, G. P., 1995, Exercise of Voting Rights by Institutional Shareholders in the UK, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, Vo1.3, pp 144-155. 
424 See PIRC, 1999. Making Votes Count: PIRC Proposes Proxy Reform, PIRC Intelligence, February. 
425 See PIRC, 2002. Modernising Company Law: PIRC's Response the White Paper, December. 
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against 426 At British Land Co. Ple's AGM, three shareholder resolutions for urging 
directors to formulate proposals for (i) placing substantial property assets; (ii) an 
ongoing share buyback programme; (ii) a one-off share buyback were put forward for 
voting, the first two were opposed by every single respondent. Only the final 
resolution attracted two abstentions. 27 Although the TUC survey focused only on 
how various fund managers exercise voting rights in relation to controversial issues at 
company AGMs, it indicates that shareholder resolutions carried by institutional 
shareholders without an emphasis on collective action do not function effectively in 
the voting process. 
In China, shareholder resolutions are normally filed by the controlling shareholders. 
Table 5.8 shows the frequency of shareholder resolutions proposed at the AGMs in 
the 2002/2003 financial year. There were 18 out of the 267 randomly selected 
companies in which shareholders submitted resolutions at the AGMs. 
Table 5.8 Frequency Distribution of Shareholder Resolutions Proposed at the ACM In 
China 
Shareholder Resolution Proposed Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
at the A GM 200212003 
No 249 93.26 93.26 
Yes 18 6.74 100.0 
Total 267 100.0 
Sources: survey of the AGM (2002/2003 financial year) for 267 companies listed in China's Sit and SZ Stock 
Exchange markets. 
426 See TUC Fund Manager Voting System 2003 available from: Attn: //wHtiy. tuc. or l /pc++cinnc/týr. _Ri9-R) cfm ([Accessed 12 March 2006]. 
27 Ibid. 
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Table 5.9 shows that the issues covered by shareholder resolutions mainly focused on 
five main areas with a total of 23 items. They are (A) company's strategies and 
investment plan (6 items); (B) amendment of articles of association (5 items); (C) 
appointment and dismissal of members of board of directors and supervisory board (9 
items); (D) remuneration policies (2 items); and (E) dividend policies (1 item). 
However, Table 5.10 reports that the average attendance at the shareholder general 
meeting is just about 12 people. The limited number in attendance indicates that many 
shareholders are likely act as free riders, rather than collectively become involved in 
the corporate decision making process in China. By observation of the voting level, an 
important caveat is that most proposing shareholders control more than two-thirds of 
votes at the shareholder general meeting, which substantially allows them to pass their 
resolutions without any difficulties. 
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Table 5.10 Description of Voting Level on Shareholder Resolutions and Attendance at the 
AGM in Ching 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Total voting level 31.13 74.42 54.23 15.20 
Proposing shareholder voting level 5.59 63.63 36.76 18.26 
Attendance at the AGM 3.00 27.00 12.00 8.84 
Sources: survey of the AGMIEGM (2002/2003 financial year) for 267 companies listed in China's Sli and SZ 
Stock Exchange markets. 
Compared with UK institutional activism, Table 5.10 shows that shareholder 
participation at shareholder general meetings is higher in terms of both proposing 
shareholder resolutions and the voting level of proposed shareholder resolutions at the 
AGM in China. However, Table 5.11 shows that most proposing shareholders, who 
are either the SOEs or non-financial companies, are the controlling or majority 
shareholders in a company. Table 5.12 reports that the majority shareholder 
resolutions (in 10 companies) were proposed by the largest shareholder individually. 
There were three cases where there was no controlling shareholder (holding over 30% 
shares) in the companies, the largest shareholder got involved in proposing resolutions 
jointly with the second or the third largest shareholders or both. Two of them showed 
that the voting process on the proposed resolutions was cast with oppose votes and 
abstentions. The fact that the opposing voting levels and abstention voting levels were 
much lower compared with the voting level in favour of shareholder resolutions 
implies that shareholders are more active in a company where the ownership of a 
company is relatively dispersed. 
Table 5.11 Distribution of Shareholder Resolutions by the Identities of Shareholders in 
China 
but tu NEC SAMU TOTAL 
of Kesolutions 1 11 2g 
Percentage 1 47.82% 8.70% - 34.78%0 8.70% 100% 
sources: survey we AL MJbc, M (2UUZf1UU3 Imancial year) for 267 companies listed in China's S!! and SL Stock Exchange markets. SOE=State Owned Enterprise; FC=Financial Company; NFC = Non-financial Company; SAMB = State Asset Management Bureau. 
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Table 5.12 Frequency Distribution of Proposing Shareholders at the AGM in China 
Frequency Percent 
The largest shareholder 10 55.6 
The second largest shareholder 3 16.7 
The third largest shareholder 2 11.1 
The Ist and the 3rd combined 1 5.6 
The 1st and 2nd and 3rd combined 1 5.6 
The 1st and the 2nd combined 1 5.6 
Total 18 100.0 
Sources: survey of the AGM/EGM (2002/2003 financial year) for 267 companies listed in China's Sit and SZ 
Stock Exchange markets. Two companies are excluded from the table because the threshold of proposing a 
shareholder resolution is 5% of company issued shares in China, and need to be discussed separately. 
However, it is notable that in two cases the resolution proposals were put forward by 
the third largest shareholder (holding less than 5% of company issued shares428) in 
relation to the appointment of members of the board of directors and supervisory 
board. In the case of the appointment of members of the supervisory board, the 
resolution was passed with 100% votes in favour, whereas the other one with a 
nomination of an independent director failed to pass by cumulative voting at the 
AGM. 429 Such factors can be discussed with a review of the role of the board of 
directors and supervisory board. In China, under the CCL 1994, the role of a 
supervisory board is completely different from the German system, in which a 
supervisory board is not only a supervisory organ, but also a decision-making body of 
the company with authority over the board of directors. 430 In fact, the supervisory 
board in a Chinese listed company, as only a supervisory body, has nothing to do with 
the decision making process, since the decision making and business operations are 
carried out by the board of directors independently. In practice, most members of 
boards of directors are the representatives of the controlling shareholders or majority 
"' See Table 5.9 for the details. 
41 The third largest shareholder - China Gaoke group of Gezhouba (600068) plc proposed a shareholder resolution 
to nominate an independent director under clause 4.1 of the Guidelines (see op cit. fn. 28) - "shareholders holding 
1% company's shares have the right to nominate independent directors of a company". Four other nominations 
proposed by the board of directors together were put forward at the AGM (2002/2003). Three of the board's 
nominations were elected to be independent directors of the company by a cumulative voting process. There was 
no vote for the third shareholder's nomination. 
430 See Xu, Y. 1997. The Principles of Company Law, Law Publishing I louse, Beijing, p. 238. 
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shareholders and minorities normally have, no place in the boardroom, but may have a 
chance in a supervisory board. Thus, the picture that emerges is, typically, the 
minority shareholder has a very limited control power over management decisions. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter explores the status and the role of shareholders in general, and the 
shareholder general meeting in particular, by examining the legal aspects of 
shareholder rights, including the function of the shareholder general meeting, legal 
requirements on holding a meeting, and certain procedural rules such as notice, 
quorum, and voting policies etc. The comparison shows that shareholders' authority 
in the UK and China is enshrined in law, legislation and stock exchange listing rules, 
which give shareholders significant powers to participate and engage in the corporate 
decision making process. However, there are fundamental differences between the 
systems for the enforcement of shareholder rights at shareholder meetings in China 
and the UK. The poor and incomplete voting rules undoubtedly create problems for 
shareholders to exercise their rights properly in China compared with the UK. 
163 
CHAPTER 6 
THE STRUCTURE AND ROLE OF THE BOARD 
6.1 Introduction 
The primary function of a corporate governance structure is to mitigate or resolve the 
agency problems created by the separation of ownership and control and lacking of 
monitoring. 431 On a theoretical level, the agency and organisational theories discussed 
in Chapter 2 highlight the fact that boards of directors have a very important role to 
play in corporate governance, but there are some questions concerning their 
effectiveness in practice. By law, boards of directors are a legal requirement for 
publicly listed companies and, in general, are the ultimate managerial authority of the 
corporation to control and direct corporate affairs 432 But what role should the boards 
play in specifying the corporate governance of a publicly listed company? What is the 
most appropriate structure for a board of directors? How can the board of directors be 
made accountable? How does the board of directors work in practice? These questions 
are at the heart of corporate governance and there is no simple, unique answer for 
each question. 
In this chapter, the emphasis is therefore on the sorts of issues in relation to the 
structure and role of the board of directors, which form an important part of basic 
company law and corporate governance regulation, and the legal status and realities in 
"" Oliver Hart, 1995. op cit. fn. 71. 
432 Cheffins states that "the almost universal practice is for a company's articles of association to endow the 
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which corporate boards of directors operate in China compared with UK publicly 
listed companies. This chapter first draws on the legal status of the boards to identify 
the role of the boards of directors and to explore the systematic defect of the two-tier 
board system and recent corporate governance developments in China - in particular, 
the adoption of the independent director system which is influenced by Anglo- 
American corporate governance practice. This is followed by an empirical analysis of 
our samples of companies chosen from both China and the UK to demonstrate the 
reality of board practice 433 This section provides an overview of research evidence 
pertaining to a series of factors that impact on the structure, composition, leadership 
of the boards and board activities. The survey results illustrate to what extent the 
sample companies have conformed to the corporate regulations and corporate 
governance code. The results explore the distinctive characteristics of the boards of 
Chinese listed companies and pave the way for a further empirical study that expands 
and refines our understanding of the impact of the boards of directors on corporate 
performance. 
6.2 The Legal Status and Best Practices of the Board 
To understand the importance of the role of the directors in the governance of 
companies, it is helpful to take a broader view of corporate governance to examine the 
board system by employing a functional comparative analysis. It is not appropriate in 
this study to attempt to survey the scope of such rules and regulations around the 
directors with the power to manage the company. " See B. R Cheffins, op cit. fn. 277, p603. 
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world. However, a number of general points concerning a properly 
functioning 
system of corporate governance characterised by the role of the boards, the role of the 
non-executive/independent directors, the role of the chairman, the role of the board 
committees, and the frequency of board meetings, can be made by comparing China 
and the UK. 
6.2.1 The Roles of Boards of Directors 
There are many ways in which the fundamental role of the board of directors has been 
described in the literature. For example, research on the role of boards and the extent 
to which boards undertake each role were classified into two categories by Tricker - 
"the performance roles, in which the board is functioning on strategic and policy 
issues for the future, setting the corporate direction and contributing to the 
performance of the business; and the conformance roles, in which the board is 
ensuring that the company is conforming to policies, procedures and plans laid down 
by the board and being accountable for its activities. "434 Perrow argues that the 
board's position at the apex of the company, monitoring and counselling management 
and bearing a fiduciary relationship to the shareholders of the company, ensures that 
directors have constituencies both internal and external to the organisation and face 
contingencies from both domains 435 Stiles and Taylor note that the board's role in 
large organisations is not to formulate strategy, but rather to set the context of 
433 Data sources and sample sizes are described in section 3.6, Chapter 3. 
434 Tricker, R. I., 1994. International Corporate Governance: Text Readings and Cases, Prentice l lall, Sydney, p98 
431 Perrow, C, 1986. Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, New York: McGraw-I lilt. 
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strategy. 436 Lorsch and Maclver argue that the very essence of a process of 
governance is that the board must have the power to make decisions and to enforce 
their execution. 437 By observing the `recurrent corporate crisis', Millstein and 
MacAvoy suggest that the board's role should expand beyond monitoring managers to 
more substantive areas, including strategic planning and providing incentives for 
managers that are linked to corporate performance 438 There are many other studies on 
the subject, however, and almost all of them include among the essential functions of 
a board the determination of strategic and tactical directions, assessing the 
corporation's environment, organisation, personnel and political affairs, ensuring 
accountability and establishing and monitoring policies and practices introduced to 
ensure compliance with obligations. 
In the UK, the publicly listed companies employ the unitary system. However, UK 
legislation does not ascribe functions to company boards and is virtually silent about 
their structure and operations 439 Given consideration of the role of the boards, it is 
perhaps curious that the UK Companies Act puts very little restriction on the form of 
the board structure or the proper role of boards or their individual members. The 
answer was found in the Modern Company Law: Final Report which states that: 
"British law gives greater flexibility to the founders and controllers of companies to 
116 Stiles, P. and B. Taylor, 2001. Boards at Work: How Directors f iew Their Roles and Responsibilities, Oxford 
University Press, p31. 
477 Lorsch, J. W. and E. Maclver, op cit. fn. 94, p13. 
439 see MacAvoy, P. W. and I. M. Millstein, 2003. The Recurrent Crisis in Corporate Governance, Palgrave 
Macmillan, p27. 
439 See Cheffins, B. R. op cit. fn. 258, p604. 
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design and structure their business to suit their needs than any other legal system of 
which we are aware. 0 
In the same way, the functions of directors were not strictly described in the Bill, and 
that is evident in the Explanatory Notes of the Bill (the Notes, hereafter) as introduced 
in the House of Lords on 1"` November 2005. Clause 280 of the Notes stating that: 
"[T]his Part (Part 10) of the Bill does not generally directly give powers to the 
directors, but, under the draft model articles of association for private 
companies limited by shares, directors' functions are: to manage the 
company's business; and to exercise all the powers of the company for any 
purpose connected with managing the company's business""' 
Clearly, the flexibility provided by the UK legislators suggests that it may be more 
efficient to allow companies to tailor board structure and functions to the needs of a 
particular company. However, there has been much consideration of, and comments 
on, such a relaxed approach over the years. It has become evident that financial 
scandals in various nations during the last two decades have re-ignited many business 
practitioners, politicians, academics and public concerns - that continue to the present 
- on the phenomenon and the most appropriate mechanisms for the developments of 
the modern corporate governance system. In the UK, a number of committees (e. g. 
Cadbury Report 1992, Greenbury Report 1995, Hampel Report 1998, Turnbull Report 
440 See the CLR, Final Report, op cit. fn. 269, para. 1.26. 
"' See the Notes, op cit. fn 389. 
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1999, Higgs Report 2003, Smith Report 2003) were set up to investigate the 
governance structure of UK publicly listed companies. For example, in response to 
serious failure of financial monitoring by UK boards, "2 the Cadbury Report claims 
that the board's role is an important one in corporate governance, and states that: 
"Boards of Directors are responsible for governance of their companies. The 
shareholders' role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to 
satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place. The 
responsibilities of the board include setting the company's strategic aims, 
providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of 
the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The board's 
actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general 
meeting °'443 
The statement quoted above clearly sets out the range of board functions - 
formulating strategy, setting the corporate direction, supervising executive 
management and providing accountability to the shareholder meeting. In July 1998, 
the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports were amalgamated by Hampel to form one 
corporate governance code called "Principles of Good Corporate Governance and 
Code of Best Practice" (the Combined. Code' 1998, hereafter). The Combined Code 
1998 aims to promote good corporate governance by setting out checks and balances 
on the power of executive directors and by establishing the minimum requirements in 
"'There were a number of corporate collapses such as the Bank of Credit and Commercial International (BCCI), 
Polly Peck, and the Maxwell Communication Group etc. in 1990s 
443 see Cadbury Report, op cit. fn. 34, para. 2.5 
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relation to the composition and committees of the board, the determination of 
directors' pay and internal audit mechanisms. The Combined Code 1998 was revised 
in the light of the Higgs Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive 
Directors (the Higgs Report, hereafter) and the Smith Review of Audit Committees in 
2003. A. 1 of the Combined Code 2003 which provides further guidance on the role of 
the board, states as follows: 
"[E]very company should be headed by an effective board, which is 
collectively responsible for the success of the company. The board's role is to 
provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a framework of 
prudent and effective controls which enables risk to be assessed and managed. 
The board should set the company's strategic aims, ensure that the necessary 
financial and human resources are in place for the company to meet its 
objectives and review management performance. The board should set the 
company's values and standards and ensure that its obligations to its 
shareholders and others are understood and met. All directors must take 
decisions objectively in the interests of the company... " 4 
As we can see, the roles of the boards have been widened and strengthened by the 
new definition in the Combined Code 2003. Although compliance is not mandatory, 
companies incorporated in the UK with primary London listings are required to state 
whether they have complied throughout the accounting period with the relevant parts 
4" A 1. of the Combined Code (2003) 
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of the Combined Code aas The Listing Rules require a company that has not complied 
with the Combined Code provisions, or complied with only some of the Combined 
Code provisions, to specify the Combined Code provisions with which it has not 
complied, and (where relevant) for what part of the period such non-compliance 
continued, and give reasons for any non-compliance6 As a result, with a view to 
compliance with best practice, the board of directors has a much broader role to play 
to maintain a sound system of internal control and to safeguard shareholders' 
investment and the company's assets. 
In China, publicly listed companies operate a two-tier board system which is different 
from the unitary system applied in the UK. The two-tier board in China consists of a 
directorate and a supervisory board, an arrangement transplanted from the German 
corporate system. The composition of the supervisory board is quite similar to the 
German system. Art. 124 of the Chinese Company Law (the CCL 1994, hereafter) 
stipulates that the supervisory board shall include at least three members and comprise 
the shareholders' representative(s) and representative(s) of the employees of the 
company in an appropriate ratio which is prescribed by the articles of association aal 
However, the supervisory board in China functions quite differently from the German 
supervisory board 448 Art. 126 of the CCL 1994 provides that the functions of the 
4°s Under Listing Rule 16.2, a listed company must ensure that its directors accept full responsibility, collectively 
and individually, for the Company's compliance with the listing rules. 
'L46 This is the so-called 'comply and explain' approach which has played a crucial role in promoting effective 
corporate governance practice in the UK. See Listing Rule 12.43. 
44' See Art 124 of the CCL1994. 
448 In Germany the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) has the primary power lying in the ability to hire and, if 
necessary. fire the chief executive and other executives in the management board (lbrslrand). See §§76,111 of the 
German Stock Corporate Act 1965. Also Hopt K. J. 1997. The German Two-tier Board (Aufsichtsrat) A German 
View on Corporate Governance, in Hopt KJ and Wymeersch E (ed. ), Comparative Corporate Governance, Essays 
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supervisory board include examining the financial records; supervising directors and 
managers and requesting directors and managers to make correction to their behaviour 
if it damages the interests of the company; convening shareholder meetings; attending 
the meeting of the board of directors without voting power; and other functions 
provided by the articles of association. The CCL 1994 does not stipulate that the 
board of directors and management have to report regularly to the supervisory board. 
Thus, it can be seen that the law provides the supervisory board with neither any 
power in corporate decision-making nor the authority to appoint or dismiss the 
members of the board of directors. In practice, the monitoring role of the supervisory 
board is more `decorative' than functional »9 (see Figure 6.1). 
Unlike the UK, Art. 112 of the CCL 1994 expressly defines the roles of the board of 
directors. These roles include: (1) convening the shareholder meeting and reporting on 
the board's performance to the shareholder meeting; (2) implementing resolutions 
approved at the shareholder meeting; (3) determining the business operation and 
investment plans of company; (4) formulating the fiscal financial budgets and the 
final accounts of the corporation; (5) formulating plans for profit distributing and loss 
recovery; (6) formulating plans for increasing or reducing the registered capital of the 
company and plans for the issue of company bond; (7) formulating proposals 
and Materials, Walter de Gruyter, New York. 
4°9 World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (hereafter World Bank and IFC Report) identified that 
supervisory boards rarely contest decisions made by the board of directors and company executives because of the 
fact that supervisory board are formed of supervisors with less experienced than directors and managers means that 
they may be unable to supervise directors and managers effectively. See Tenev, S. and C. Zhang, op cit. fn. 207, 
pl00. Dahya et al find that most supervisory boards in Chinese listed companies tend to consist of an honoured 
guest or a friendly advisor or a censored watchdog rather than independent watchdog. See J. Dahya, Y. Karbhari, J. 
Xiao and M. Yang, 2003. The Usefulness of the Supervisory Board Report in China, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, Vol-l1, pp 308-321. 
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regarding merger, separation or liquidation of the company; (8) determining the 
internal management structure of the company, and (9) appointing or removing the 
general manager, approving nominations of vice general managers and chief financial 
officer by the general manager) and setting their compensations. 450 
Figure 6.1 The Roles of the Boards of Directors in China 
The performance roles 
The role of the 
supervisory boards 
$ 
Management action Independent Maintaining 
and performance directors ° accountability 
The conformance roles 
Nominal legitimate role Legitimate role Quasi legitimate role 
Note: The diagram is designed based on the CCL 1994. Under the CCL 1994, the legal status and attributes of the 
board of directors characterised as "lack of supervisory functions" on management action and performance. The 
independent director system is established according to the Guidelines and the CCGC, which has quasi-legislative 
effect to listed companies in China. Therefore, the monitoring role played by the board of directors through 
independent directors is capped as quasi-regulatory role in this diagram. The supervisory function is played by the 
supervisory board under the company law, but it seems to be more nominal than real. 
450 Article 112 of the CCL 1994 
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From the directors' perspective, obviously, the CCL 1994 empowers the board with 
authority to run the corporation, but problems arise as such a regulatory arrangement 
has produced limited and insufficient powers to enable the board of directors to 
supervise and monitor the executives and the management of the companies. Figure 
6.1 shows the performance and conformance roles of the board of Chinese listed 
companies according to Tricker's observation on the roles of the board of directors. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that the directors have no tools to help them think about 
management actions and performance before independent directors are introduced 
into listed companies, because the watchdog functions are supposed to be performed 
by the supervisory board under the Chinese two-tier board system. In fact, the board 
of directors in China is much like an executive organ to implement the resolutions of 
the shareholder meetings, to formulate strategies and plans of the company, and to 
maintain accountability to the shareholder meetings. As a consequence of this 
regulatory arrangement, shareholder meetings tend to be more frequently convened in 
China compared with the UK. As was discussed in'Chapter 5, this scenario often 
results in a weak board that is controlled by the controlling or majority shareholders 
of the company. In addition, it seems that the board of directors has no authority to 
supervise and monitor the performance of individual directors, the CEO, and other 
executives, although it has the power to decide on the establishment of the internal 
management structures of the company and the appointment of the managers of the 
company. 4451 
451 ibid. 
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Following a series of high-profile corporate scandals in listed companies in China 
since the late 1990s, 452 the board of directors has been at the centre of the corporate 
governance debate. It is generally accepted that an effective corporate governance 
system is very much reliant on the ability of the board of directors to monitor and 
assess the performance of the executive team and their own performance, as well as 
financial accounting practices. As a result, the independent director was introduced 
into China's corporate governance system. In August 2001, the CSRC, authorised by 
the State Council, promulgated the "Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors 
to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies" (the Guidelines, hereafter) 4" Four 
months later, the CSRC and the State Economic and Trade Commission jointly issued 
the "Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China" (the CCGC, 
hereafter). 454 The primary intent of these two documents is to encourage listed 
companies to establish and develop a modern enterprise system, regulate the business 
operations of listed companies, and promote the healthy development of the securities 
market in China. However, it is evident that both the Guidelines and the CCGC have 
failed to clearly specify the role of the boards of directors, except requiring the board 
to maintain accountability to the shareholder meeting. Nevertheless, the two quasi- 
legislative documents made it clear that the independent directors should be well 
placed in the boardroom to monitor executive performance and control the conflicts of 
interest between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (see Figure 
452 From 1998 to 2003, as many as 14 companies were involved in fabricating transactions or accounting records 
or misusing corporate funds. These companies are ST Shandong Bohai, ST Tongda, ST Dongfang Dianzi, Daqing 
Lianyi, ST Jiaobao Shiye, ST Ymguanxia; SanjiuYaoye; ST liongugang; ST Jiuzhou; Jinzhouguang; ST 
Shengfangke; Hubei Tianyi; PT Zhengbaiwen; Shenxinkai. 
`s' See the Guideline. op cit fn. 28. 
454 See the CCGC. op cit. fn. 28. 
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6.1) 455 However, Chinese policymakers have no intention of using the independent 
director system to substitute for the supervisory board's functions. Instead, the CCGC 
even provides overly strong obligations to enable the supervisory 
board to engage in 
the supervisory functions. 456 Of course, these obligations and related enforcing 
measures have strengthened the supervisory system to cope with perceived concerns 
over certain serious obstacles, such as information asymmetries. It 
is unrealistic, 
however, to expect the supervisory board to be able to perform a rigorous supervisory 
role effectively because the obligations and responsibilities addressed in the CCGC 
are unlikely to be enforced without granting more legislated powers to allow the 
supervisory boards to challenge executives in the corporate decision making process. 
6.2.2 The Roles of the Non-Executivellndependent Directors 
According to agency theory, the presence of independent/non-executive directors on 
the board will mitigate the agency costs through their mutual monitoring function. 
However, it needs to be borne in mind that to ensure that the role of non-executive or 
independent directors is effective in a company, the powers and responsibilities for 
455 The details about the role of the independent directors will be discussed in the following subsection. 
456 The CCGC provides five provisions in relation to the role of the supervisory board. They are: cl. 59: The 
supervisory board of a listed company shall be accountable to all shareholders. The supervisory board shall 
supervise the corporate finance, the legitimacy of directors, managers and other senior management personnel's 
performance of duties, and shall protect the company's and the shareholders' legal rights and interests. 
cl. 60: Supervisors shall have the right to learn about the operating status of the listed company and shall have the 
corresponding obligation of confidentiality. The supervisory board may independently hire intermediary 
institutions to provide professional opinions. cl. 61: A listed company shall adopt measures to ensure supervisors' 
right to learn about company's matters and shall provide necessary assistance to supervisors for their normal 
performance of duties. No one shall interfere with or obstruct supervisors' work. A supervisor's reasonable 
expenses necessary to perform their duties shall be borne by the listed company. cl. 62: The record of the 
supervisory committee's supervision as well as the results of financial or other specific investigations shall be used 
as an important basis for performance assessment of directors, managers and other senior management personnel. 
cl. 65: The supervisory board may report directly to securities regulatory authorities and other related authorities as 
well as reporting to the board of directors and the shareholders' meetings when the supervisory board learns of any 
violation of laws, regulations or the company's articles of association by directors, managers or other senior 
management personnel. 
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monitoring should be specified either by law or by self-regulations or both. Sheikh 
argues that the roles and responsibilities of executive and non-executive directors 
need to be clearly established in order that a board effectively leads and controls the 
business and provides direction in terms of strategy and policy 457 Generally speaking, 
the executive directors will have a much greater awareness of the day-to-day 
operations of the business, whereas the non-executive directors are not involved 
directly in the daily running of the corporation, but rather bring a broader perspective 
to the company's activities. In the UK, however, with regard to the role of non- 
executive directors, the Cadbury Report clearly suggests that "[N]on-executive 
directors should bring an independent judgment to bear on issues of strategy, 
performance, resources, including key appointments, and standard of conduct. "458 
The Hampel Report (1998) also found general acceptance that non-executive directors 
should have both a strategic and a monitoring function. 459 Focusing on the 
effectiveness of the role of non-executive directors, however, the Higgs Report argues 
that the Combined Code 1998 offers little guidance on the role of the non-executive 
director and the lack of clarity about the role has affected the performance of non- 
executive directors in corporate governance. 60 The Higgs Report suggests that the 
asp Sheikh, S. 2002. Non-Executive Directors: Self-Regulation or Codification, Company Lawyer, 23 (10), 296- 
307. 
458 See s. 4.30 of the Cadbury Report, op cit fn. 34. 
ßs9 See s. 3.9 of the Hampel Report 
460 See Higgs, D. 2003. Review of the Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors, London, Department of Trade 
and Industry. s. 6.4. Available from: http: f/www ece; ore%odec/dncumentsýort ndf [Accessed 12 March 
2006]. 1 
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Combined Code should clarify the core elements of the role of non-executives and 
have made following recommendations: 
"[N]on-executive directors must constantly seek to establish and maintain 
their own confidence in the conduct of the company, in the performance of the 
management team, the development of strategy, the adequacy of financial 
controls and risk management, the appropriateness of remuneration and the 
appointment and replacement of key personnel and plans for management 
development and succession. The role of the non-executive director is 
therefore both to support executives in their leadership of the business and to 
monitor and supervise their conduct. "461 
This recommendation has been embodied into the Combined Code 2003 as a 
supporting principle to the board of directors. Accordingly, the non-executive 
directors now have to not only play a monitoring or supervision role to control 
conflicts of interest, but also provide a broader view and bring a fresh perspective to 
bear on the deliberations concerning strategic and operational matters (i. e. strategy, 
performance and risk management, together with remuneration, appointment, and 
succession planning for the board itself and for senior management). 462 , The 
imposition of these functions to non-executive directors which is consistent with the 
theory of managerial hegemony and resource dependency theory, can be expected to 
improve the effectiveness of the board of directors. 
461 ibid. 
41 See A. 1 of the Combined Code 2003. 
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The issue of "independence" is at the heart of any debate on the role of non-executive 
directors, given the painful memories of past and recent corporate scandals. To ensure 
that non-executive directors fulfil their roles, they should be capable of providing an 
independent and impartial view of the board's considerations and challenging or 
questioning the executive decisions. The weight of current opinion 
is that it is 
desirable to have a majority of independent non-executive directors on a listed 
company. The Higgs Report points out that the Combined Code 1998 requires the 
majority of non-executive directors to be independent of management and leave the 
board to determine whether a non-executive director is independent. However, there 
is little guidance to companies as to what the independence should entail. 
463 The 
Higgs Report argues that without requiring a greater degree of independence on the 
board, it is insufficient to give full assurance that the potential conflicts will not have 
an adverse effect on board decision-making. 
4 The Higgs Report provides a "check- 
list" as to the circumstances which need to be considered in determining 
independence465 and recommends that the Combined Code should provide that at least 
half of the members of the board, excluding the chairman, should be independent non- 
executive directors. 
466 Most importantly, the Higgs Report points out that the 
463 See the Higgs Report, op cit. fn. 460, ss. 9.7 and 9.8. 
464 ibid, ss. 9.2 & 9.3. 
465 A non-executive director is considered independent when the board determines that the director is independent 
in character and judgement and there are no relationships or circumstances which could affect, or appear to affect, 
the director's judgement. Such relationships or circumstances would include where the director. (1) is a former 
employee of the company or group until five years after employment (or any other material connection) has ended; 
(2) has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the company either directly, or 
as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a body that has such a relationship with the company; (3) 
has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from a director's fee, participates in the 
company's share option or a performance-related pay scheme, or is a member of the company's pension scheme; 
(4) has close family ties with any of the company's advisers, directors or senior employees; (5) holds cross 
directorships or has significant links with other directors through involvement in other companies or bodies; (6) 
represents a significant shareholder, or (7) has served on the board for more than ten years. See, ibid. p37. 
466 Ibid, s. 9.5 
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independence should be defined, but not necessarily have to be in statute. However, it 
will be desirable if a definition lies in the Combined Code that addresses not just 
relationships or circumstances that would affect the director's objectively but also 
those that could appear to do. 467 The "check-list" and the level of independence 
identified by the Higgs Report have been incorporated into the Combined Code 
2003.468 Although it is impractical to comprehensively list all possible criteria in 
defining what independence really means, the "check-list" approach provides a 
snapshot of developing best practice and a wide range of initiatives aimed at 
increasing the accountability of the boards of UK listed companies. 
In China, the non-executive director is virtually non-existent in corporate legislation. 
However, the Guidelines clearly provide a definition of independent directors. Section 
I (1) of the Guidelines stipulates that an independent director cannot hold any other 
post than the position of director, and maintain no affiliations with the listed company 
and its major shareholders that might prevent him or her from making objective 
judgements independently. 69 According to the Guidelines, the independent director 
should express an independent opinion on the major events occurring in the listed 
companies and have some special power other than those stipulated in Company Law 
and other relevant laws and regulations. For example, they have power to approve all 
major related-party transactions, power to call extraordinary shareholder meetings and 
board meetings, and power to appoint outside auditors or consulting organizations 
'1' ibid. s. 9.11. 
°" See A. 3.2 of the Combined Code 2003. 
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independently. 70 In addition, the Guidelines stipulate that the independent directors 
shall earnestly perform their duties in accordance with laws, regulations and the 
company's articles of association, shall protect the overall interests of the company, 
and shall be especially concerned with protecting the interests of minority 
shareholders from being infringed apt 
Compared with the UK system, notably, the role played by the independent directors 
in China seems limited to monitoring the performance of management and controlling 
shareholder-related transactions, with particular emphasis on minority shareholder 
protection. It is unclear whether the independent directors should have any 
responsibility for reviewing and initiating strategic analysis, formulating strategy and 
setting corporate direction. Clearly, from the recent development of the UK non- 
executive system, the notion that independent directors only play the conformance 
function is no longer fashionable. The role of independent directors should include 
those of both monitoring the behaviour of management and more actively 
contributing to strategic policy-making. In addition, as the Guidelines are largely 
formed by using imprecise wording to describe actions and circumstances, 472 there are 
no clearly defined criteria for the role of the independent directors. Lu argues that due 
to the lack of unified requirements and related standards, the operation of independent 
directors in companies was like "eight immortals crossing the sea - each showing his 
See s. I. (1) of the Guidelines, op cit. fi. 28. 
"O Ibid. s. V& VI. 
471 Ibid. s. I(2). 
472 Ibid. s. II. 
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or her own prowess". 473 As a result, the independent monitoring functions reflect 
differences in individual interpretations of the remit of involvement, as well as 
different degrees of involvement. 
6.2.3 The Role of the Chairman 
The role of the chairman is another very important issue relating to the need to direct 
and control the board. In most countries the appointment and the role of the chairman 
is not mandated by statute, but is left to the company articles or rules. In some cases 
the chairman literally does no more than chair board meetings, in other cases the 
chairman may exercise considerable influence and power. 474 In the UK, Table A 
provides for the appointment of a chairman of the board to preside over the meeting 
of the board, and on questions to be decided at the meeting allows the chairman to 
have a second or casting vote in case of an equality of votes 475 In Table A, specimen 
articles of association, the chairman is referred to solely in the context of the conduct 
of meetings of the board and shareholders. The framework under company law 
therefore empowers the chairman with the -"public 
face" of the company and the 
ultimate arbiter (by virtue of his or her casting vote) in the case of a dispute at the 
meeting. 76 Common law also identifies the chairman's function in relation to the 
473 Lu, T., 2001. Corporate Governance in China, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of 
Social Science. Available from: 
http: //www. iwep. org. cn/ccc&/pdf/Corporate%2OGovernance%20in%20China%20%2OPrýfpdf. [Accessed 12 
March 2006] 
"a See the Higgs Report, op cit. fn. 460, p23. 
as Table A, arts. 88 and 91. 
476 Graham, L., 2002, Comments on the Biggs Review of Non-Executive Directors by Vicotia Younghusband. 
Available from: httn'//w Aw dti eov uk/cid/non exec review/pdfs/victoriavo nahusband. pff [Accessed 12 March 
2006] 
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conduct of the meeting to see whether it is conducted properly and in accordance with 
the common law of meetings, the articles and the companies legislation. 
77 
The Cadbury Report points out that the chairman's role is crucial in securing good 
corporate governance. In particular, the Cadbury Report states that 
"[C]hairmen are primarily responsible for the working of the board, for its 
balance of membership subject to board and shareholders' approval, for 
ensuring that all directors, executive and non-executive alike, are enabled and 
encouraged to play their full part in its activities" 
Further, the Cadbury Report emphasizes that it is the chairman's responsibility to 
"ensure that the non-executive directors receive timely, relevant information tailored 
to their needs, and to ensure that both non-executive directors and executive directors 
make an effective contribution and accept their full share of responsibilities of 
governance". 79 The Higgs Report also confirms that the chairman plays an important 
role in creating the conditions for overall board and individual non-executive director 
effectiveness 480 Compared with the Cadbury report, the Higgs Report points out that, 
as the leader of the board, the chairman also has the responsibility of leading the 
board in setting the values and standard of the company, of ensuring executive and 
non-executive directors working as a team, and of ensuring effective communication 
477 see John v. Rees [1970] Ch 345, at p382 and Byng v. London Life Association Limited, [1990] Ch. 170 
18 See Cadbury Report, op cit. fn-34, para. 4.7. 
ibid. para. 4.8. 
490 See the Biggs Report, op cit. fn. 460, p23. 
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with shareholders. 
81 Higgs' recommendations on the role of the chairman are now 
supporting principles incorporated into the Combined 
Code 2003 482 
In the UK, one of the basic principles on board leadership structure 
is the separation 
of the roles of chairman and chief executive, which was set out 
in the Cadbury Report 
in 1992. There are a number of arguments for separating the roles of chairman and 
chief executive. For example, Cadbury argues that putting the chairman and 
CEO 
positions together concentrates a great deal of power 
in the hands of one person which 
makes it more difficult for the board to carry out 
its supervisory function. 83 With 
recognition of a high level of separation of the role of chairman and 
CEO, 484 the 
Higgs Report identifies that the separation of these roles is "one of the strengths of the 
UK corporate governance regime, which can avoid concentration of authority and 
power in one individual and differentiate leadership of the board from running of the 
business" 485 The Combined Code 2003 further points out that "the role of chairman 
and chief executive should not be exercised by the same individual. The division of 
responsibilities between the chairman and chief executive should 
be clearly 
established, set out in writing and agreed by the board" 
486 Clearly, the benefits of the 
separation of the roles of chairman and the chief executive envisaged by the work of 
the Cadbury and Higgs Reports are now widely acknowledged. 
481 Ibid. 
482 see A. 2 of the Combined Code 2003 
483 Cadbury, Adrian, 2002. Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal Hew, Oxford University Press, 
p108. 
4'4 According to the Higgs Report, around 90 per cent of listed companies have split these roles. Sce I liggs Report, 
op cit, fn. 460, p23 
45 ibid. 
486 A. 2 of the Combined Code 2003. 
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It is striking that both the appointment and the role of the chairman is mandated by 
statute in China. The CCL 1994 provides that "the board of directors shall have a 
chairman, and may have one or two vice-chairmen. The chairman and vice-chairman 
shall be elected by the board of directors through affirmative votes by a majority of 
the directors. "487 Under the CCL 1994 the chairman has been legitimately named as 
the legal representative of the company. 488 The functions include the conduct of 
meetings both at board and company level, monitoring the implementation of the 
board's resolutions, and signing the share certificates and bond certificates of the 
company 489 In practice, it is common in most companies for the entitlement of the 
chairman as the legal representative of the company to be misinterpreted as having the 
ultimate authority over the management of the company. Although the CCL 1994 has 
clearly set out that the chairman has no any executive function, it is perfectly legal, if 
the board of directors decide, for the chairman to carry out executive functions 490 In 
addition to the duality of the chairman and the CEO, sometimes the chairman is 
considered to be more influential than the general manager of the company (zongjinh) 
when the chairman is working full-time in the company 491 The potential risk of this 
phenomenon was recognised by the CCL 2006. The provision that the chairman of the 
board of directors is automatically entitled to be the legal representative of the 
company has been abolished. Under the CCL 2006, apart from the chairman of the 
4B7 See Article 113 of the CCL 1994. 
4ss Ibid. 
499 ibid, art. 114. 
490 Art. 120 of the CCL 1994 provides that the board of directors of the company may decide that a board member 
is to serve concurrently as the general manager. According to art. 119 of the CCL 1994, the executive functions 
shall be carried out by general manager (Zongjingl') of the company who has similar responsibilities to the CEO in 
the UK or US. 
491 Zhong, Juyin., 2002. Chairman and General Manager (Zongjingli) Who is the CEO of the Chinese Companies? 
Chinese Securities, 31 January. , 
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board of director, other persons such as the executive director or the manager can also 
serve as the legal representative in accordance with the provisions of the company's 
articles of association 492 This reform is an important step toward improving corporate 
governance. 
6.2.4 The Roles of Board Committees 
The establishment of board committees comprising entirely or principally 
independent directors is very important to improve the effectiveness of the board. It is 
generally accepted that three board committees - the audit committee, the nomination 
committee and the remuneration committee - could provide an independent check and 
balance in an area where some board members, particularly executives, may have a 
conflict of interest. All committees of the boards serve two purposes, as Charkham 
observed: one is to "facilitate the dispatch of business"; the other is to "involve the 
non-executive directors by familiarising them in detail with some important aspect of 
the governance of the company' 493 In the UK, the authority to establish committees 
of the board is entirely at the discretion of the board of directors. 494 In China, the 
CCGC provides that the board committees may be established "in accordance with the 
resolutions of the shareholders' meetings". 495 However, as in the UK, the CCGC 
clearly stipulates that all board committees are accountable to the board of directors 
41 See art 13 of the CCL 2006. 
493 Charkham, J., 1994. Keeping Good Company: A Study of Corporate Governance in Five Countries, Oxford 
University Press, p274. 
494 Smerdon, R., 2004. A Practical Guide to Corporate Governance, Zed. Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. p161; Chambers, 
Andrew D. 2005. Audit Committee: Practice, Rules and Enforcement in the UK and China. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, Vo. 13 pp92.100, at 99. 
"' C1.52 of the CCGC provides that the board of directors of a listed company may establish a corporate strategy 
committee, an audit committee, a nomination committee, a remuneration and appraisal committee and other 
special committees in accordance with the resolutions of the shareholders' meetings. See the CCGC, op cit. fn. 28. 
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and not directly to shareholder meetings. 
496 In addition, both the UK and China 
require that all board committees shall be composed solely of directors and that a 
majority of the members of the committees must be independent 
497 The roles and 
duties imposed on the committees are not identical in China and the UK. Therefore, it 
is appropriate to refer in rather more detail to each of the three committees, given the 
role which they play in the corporate governance system. 
" Audit Committee 
It is commonly recognised that a close relationship between auditors and the senior 
executive management is one of the main factors which led to the corporate scandals 
and failures in recent years. 
98 The existence of a strong, independent audit committee 
can avoid any possibility of domination by top executive management of the board's 
links with the auditors. In the UK, the primary role of the audit committee is to ensure 
the integrity of financial reporting and the audit process by ensuring that the external 
auditor is independent and objective and does a thorough job, and by fostering a 
culture and an expectation of effective supervision 499 The main responsibilities of the 
audit committee now set out in the Combined Code 2003, include: (1) monitoring the 
integrity of the financial statements of the company, and any formal announcements 
relating to the company's financial performance, reviewing significant financial 
reporting judgements contained in them; (2) reviewing the company's internal 
16 ibid, cl. 58 of the CCGC. 
"' ibid c1.52 of the CCGC, and A. 4. I, B. 2.1 and C 3.1 of the Combined Code 2003. 
498 See Richard Smerdon op cit. 494, p161. 
499 See Smith Report, p22. 
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financial controls and, unless expressly addressed by a separate board risk committee 
composed of independent directors, or by the board itself, reviewing the company's 
internal control and risk management systems; (3) monitoring and reviewing the 
effectiveness of the company's internal audit function; (4) making recommendations 
to the board, for it to put to the shareholders for their approval in general meeting, in 
relation to the appointment, re-appointment and removal of the external auditor and to 
approve the remuneration and terms of engagement of the external auditor; (5) 
reviewing and monitoring the external auditor's independence and objectivity and the 
effectiveness of the audit process, taking into consideration relevant UK professional 
and regulatory requirements; (6) developing and implementing policy on the 
engagement of the external auditor to supply non-audit services, taking into account 
relevant ethical guidance regarding the provision of non-audit services by the external 
audit firm; and reporting to the board, identifying any matters in respect of which it 
considers that action or improvement is needed and making recommendations as to 
the steps to be taken. 500 
In China, the CCGC stipulates that the main duties of the audit committee would 
include: recommending the engagement or replacement of the company's external 
auditing institutions; reviewing the internal audit system and its execution; overseeing 
the interaction between the company's internal and external auditing institutions; 
inspecting the company's financial information and its disclosure; and monitoring the 
50° See C. 3.2. the Combined Code 2003. 
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company's internal control system. 
501 Compared with the UK, the CCGC has not 
given clear guidance on how audit committees should implement their 
duties, 
although the contexts of the duties are quite similar. 
In China, the main functions of the supervisory board are to check the financial affairs 
of the company, so it seems that some of the functions performed by audit committees 
overlap with those of supervisory boards. In fact, as discussed in Section 6.2.1, under 
the current Chinese legal system, the supervisory board is made up of a combination 
of shareholder representatives and company employee representatives. Thus, the 
supervisory board in China has no independent features compared with the audit 
committee. In addition, the CCGC specifies that there is at least one independent 
director from the audit committee who shall be an accounting professional. The 
qualification requirement warranted the audit committee to be more competent than 
the supervisory board for ensuring that the company's financial statements and reports 
are accurate and use fair and reasonable estimates. 
9 Nomination Committee 
Charkham points out that the nomination committee is designed to do three things: 
"give the chairman a conscience when he picks buddies"; "offer alternatives"; and 
"improve the selection process". In the UK, the Combined Code (2003) provides that 
the nomination committee should lead the process for board appointments and making 
511 See cl. 54 of the CCGC, op cit. fn. 28. 
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s. 
recommendations to the board. 502 The nomination committee should evaluate the 
balance of skills, knowledge and experience on the board and, in the light of this 
evaluation, prepare a description of the role and capabilities required for a particular 
appointment 503 For the appointment of a chairman, the nomination committee should 
prepare a job specification, including an assessment of the time commitment 
expected, recognising the need for availability in the event of crises. 504 
In China, according to the CCGC, the nomination committee is responsible for 
formulating standards and procedures for the election of directors and making 
recommendations, extensively seeking qualified candidates for directorships and 
management; and reviewing candidates for directorships and management and 
making recommendations 505 The World Bank and IFC Report shows that in China, 
large shareholders nominate new directors in 57 per cent of listed companies, the 
board of directors does so in 34 per cent of companies, the chair of the board in 6 per 
cent of companies, and the other 3 per cent is nominated by other existing directors S°6 
The existence of the nomination committee will bring an element of discipline into 
the nomination process and inevitably have a great influence on the choice of the 
candidates free from the control by large shareholders. However, patronage of 
independent directors is not enjoyed by the nomination committee alone in China. 
902 A. 4.1 of the Combined Code 2003. 
so' Ibid. A 4.1. 
so` ibid. A4.3. 
sos See cl. 55 of the CCGC, op cit. fn. 28. s°6 See S. Tenev and C. Zhang, op cit. fa. 207, p92 
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The CSRC Guidelines provide that the shareholders holding more than 1 per cent of 
outstanding shares (either individually or jointly) have the right to nominate 
independent directors. 507 Interestingly, the CSRC Guidelines also require that the 
company should submit the relevant background materials about the nominees of the 
independent directors to the CSRC and the stock exchange where the company is 
listed. The CSRC shall examine the qualifications of the nominated independent 
directors within 15 working days. If a nominee is rejected by the CSRC, he/she can 
still be a candidate for a directorship but not for an independent one S08 Clearly, the 
establishment of the system of independent directors in China has been promoted by 
compulsory government force and it is by no means a natural result of market 
development 509 
" Remuneration Committee 
Directors' remuneration is an important aspect of the corporate governance debate 
which plays a key role in mitigating `agency problems' between managers and 
shareholders. In the UK, the Companies Act 1985 imposes various limitations which 
can prevent a director from arranging to have his/her company pay an excessive 
amount for his/her service. 510 In 1995, the Greenbury Committee drew up a report on 
directors' remuneration which identifies good practice. 511 The Greenbury Report 
provisions were then included in the Combined Code which provides that "the 
S07 See s. IV(1) of the Guidelines, op cit. fn. 28. 
9OS See ibid, s. IV(3) 
5°9 See Lu, Tong, op cit fn.: 473. 
510 See ss. 312-314 and 319 of the CA 1985 
511 see Greenbury Report, 1995. Directors' Remuneration, Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard 
Greenbury. 
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(remuneration) packages should be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate executive 
directors of the quality required, but should avoid paying more than is necessary for 
this purpose. "512 In addition, the Combined Code 2003 requires that a proportion of 
executive remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and 
individual performance 513 Accordingly, most executive compensation packages are 
made up of four basic components: salary and benefits, annual bonuses, share options 
and long term incentive plans in the UK . 
514 
However, it was recognised that corporate governance issues relating to directors' 
remuneration needed to be addressed in a more rigorous manner. The role of the 
remuneration committee is to prevent an executive-dominated board from `using their 
left hands to mark their own examination papers and reward themselves the prize by 
using their right hands'. In the UK, the new Combined Code specifies that the 
remuneration committee should judge where to position their company relative to 
other companies'" The design of performance related remuneration should strictly 
follow the Schedule A of the Code 516 In addition, the remuneration should carefully 
consider what compensation commitments (including pension contributions and all 
other elements) their directors' terms of appointment would entail in the event of 
early termination. 517 Furthermore, the remuneration committee should consult the 
512 B. 1 of the Combined Code 2003. 
513 ibid. 
514 Martin J. Conyon, Simon I. Peck, Laura E. Read and Graham V. Sadler, 2000. The Structure of Executive 
Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence. Long Range Planning 33, pp478-503. The detailed Rules contained in 
B. 1.1- B. 1.4 of the Combined Code 2003. 
515 B. 1 Supporting Principle, the Combined Code 2003 
516 ibid, B1.1. 
517 ibid. B1.5. 
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chairman and/or chief executive about their proposals relating to the remuneration of 
other executives. The remuneration committee should also be responsible for 
appointing any consultants in respect of executive director remuneration. Where 
executive directors or senior management are involved in advising or supporting the 
remuneration committee, care should be taken to recognise and avoid conflicts of 
interest S18 Finally, the remuneration committee should have delegated responsibility 
for setting remuneration for all executive directors and the chairman, including 
pension rights and any compensation payments. The committee should also 
recommend and monitor the level and structure of remuneration for senior 
management. 519 It is clear that the remit of the remuneration committee has been 
extended to cover all aspects of directors' compensation and the pay-determination 
process. 
In China, there is a mandatory legislative requirement that either the form or amount 
of directors' and managers' remuneration must be approved by a resolution of the 
shareholder meeting. 20 Board remuneration is not comparable to the practice in the 
UK because a performance-related pay system has not been established by Chinese 
listed companies. However, the matters relating to directors' remuneration are 
considered further by the CCGC which draws up the principles of good practice with 
respect to remuneration and incentives of directors Sal The CCGC provides that: 
S1 B ibid, B. 2 Supporting Principle 
ibid. B2.2. 
s: o ArL 103 (2) of the CCL 1994 
521 See the CCGC. op cit. fn. 28. Cls. 77-79. 
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"[T]o attract qualified personnel and to maintain the stability of management, 
a listed company shall establish rewarding systems that link the compensation 
for management personnel to the company's performance and to the 
individual's work performance; the performance assessment for management 
personnel shall become a basis for determining the compensation and other 
rewarding arrangements for the person reviewed; and the results of the 
performance assessment shall be approved by the board of directors, explained 
at the shareholder meeting and disclosed. "522 
It is clear that the CCGC is attempting to encourage the listed companies to establish 
a system for rewarding managerial performance that will align the conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and the management of the company. However, the remit of the 
remuneration committee has been broadened and renamed as `remuneration and 
appraisal committee'. Accordingly, the main duties of the remuneration and appraisal 
committee are given by the CCGC and include studying the appraisal standard for 
directors and management personnel, conducting appraisal and making 
recommendations, and studying and reviewing the remuneration policies and schemes 
for directors and senior management personnel. 23 Nevertheless, although a system for 
rewarding managerial performance has not been generally accepted by the listed 
companies, their underlying objective can be considered as an attempt to make 
executive compensation changes reflect corporate performance. 
522 Ibid. 
523 Ibid. cl. 56. 
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6.2.5 Board Meetings 
Stiles and Taylor argue that the main area for the board to analyse and make 'a 
judgement upon the performance of the chief executive and other executives is at the 
board meeting. 524 Evidence regarding the significance of board meeting frequency 
carries potentially important governance implications. In the UK, the Companies Act 
1985 provides no legislative requirement on how often the board meeting should be 
held per year. Regulation 88 of Table A lays down fundamental principles which 
allow the directors to organise their affairs with some flexibility subject to the 
provisions of the articles. 525 However, to ensure that the board conducts their control 
and monitoring function effectively, the new Combined Code 2003 Provision A. 1.1 
requires that the board should meet regularly to discharge its duties effectively. 526 
Unlike the UK, Art. 116 of the CCL 1994 stipulates that the board of directors in 
China shall hold meetings at least twice a year. S2' However, the minimum 
requirement on the board meeting is obviously insufficient to ensure that the board 
fulfils their duties effectively. Thus, the CCGC points out that the board of directors 
shall meet periodically, and shall convene interim meetings in a timely manner when 
necessary. 528 Nevertheless, the word "necessary" is not defined to provide clear 
direction toward the fulfilment of their duties. 
s'" see Stiles, P. and B. Taylor, op cit. fn. 436, p73 
$25 Table A, art. 88 
12' See A. 1.1 of the Combined Code 2003. 
927 Art. 116 of CCL 1994. 
571 C1.45 of the CCGC. op cit. fn. 28. 
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6.3 Boards of Directors: Some Empirical Evidence 
6.3.1 Size of the Board 
As a basic measure of board structure, the size of the board has been argued to 
have a 
material impact on the quality of corporate governance. Zahra and Pearce review the 
theoretical perspectives on the board of directors and conclude that large boards are 
often argued to be more capable of monitoring the actions of management, as 
it is 
more difficult for CEOs to dominate large boards or to obtain consensus for making 
decisions that harm shareholders' interests. 529 Conversely, some researchers argue 
that large boards can be dysfunctional through poorer communication, delayed 
decision-making or more severe bureaucratic problems 530 By taking both sides of the 
model into consideration, all arguments discussed above seem to indicate that larger 
boards are beneficial from both the agency and resource dependence perspective, but 
dysfunctional from the strategic decision-making perspective. However, these studies 
provide little empirical evidence on what the optimal board size may be from an 
effective monitoring perspective 
531 
52' Zahra, S. A. and J. A. Pearce 11,1989. Boards of directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review and 
Integrative Model, Journal of Management, vol. 15, No. 2,291-334. 
"I Yermack, D. 1996. High Valuation of Companies with a Small Boards of Directors, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 40: 185-212; Dehaene, A., De Vuyst, V. and Ooghe, 11.200 1. Corporate Performance and Board 
Structure in Belgian Companies, Long Range Planing, 34,383-389; Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S. AND Wells, M. T. 
1998. Large Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms, Journal of Financial Economics, 48,35-54; 
John, K and Senbet, L. W. 1998. Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness, Journal of Banking & Finance, 
22,372-403; and Sigh, Ii., and F. Harianto, 1989. Management-Board Relatiosnhips, Takeowver Risk, and the 
Adoption of Golden Parachutes. Academy of Management Journal 32,7-24. Conyon, M. J. and Peck, S. I., 1998. 
Board Size and Corporate Performance: Evidence from European Countries, The European Journal of Finance, 4, 
291-304. 
"' Mak, Y. T. and Roush, M. 1.2000. Factors Affecting the Characteristics of Boards of Directors: An Empirical 
Study of New Zealand Initial Public Offering Firms, Journal of Business Research, 47,147-159. 
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Koontz suggests that there is an optimal size which ranges anywhere from five to 
thirteen members 532 Koontz argues that less than five is insufficient for covering all 
the legal board responsibilities, but more than thirteen becomes unwieldy with not 
everyone getting an adequate chance to participate 533 Lipton and Lorsch, note that the 
norms of behaviour in most boards are dysfunctional, although increased board 
membership may confer benefits in terms of improved monitoring of the 
organisation's activities 534 They argue that these benefits may be outweighed by costs 
such as slower decision making. Lipton and Lorsch recommend a maximum board 
size of ten and favour eight or nine, as this enables all the directors to get to know 
each other and to contribute effectively in board discussions with a true consensus 
emerging. 535 Jensen also contends that keeping boards small can help improve their 
performance. He argues that "when boards get beyond seven or eight people they are 
less likely to function effectively and'are easier for the CEO to control. Since the 
possibility for animosity and retribution from the CEO is too great, it is almost 
impossible for those who report directly to the CEO to participate openly and 
critically in effective evaluation and monitoring of the CEO"536 Indeed, Rebeiz's 
survey also shows that a small board size of about seven or eight directors is more 
likely to invite more active involvement from the members, and the directors tend to 
be more decisive and faster in their decision-making process. 537 As the foregoing 
332 Koontz, I1., 1967, The Board of Directors and Effective Management, New York, McGraw-1Ii11 Book Company 
121. 
;; Ibid. 
X34 Lipton, M. and J. W. Lorsch, 1992. A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, The Business 
Lawyer 48: 59-77. 
535 Ibid. 
I-' Jensen, M. C. 1993. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Mechanisms, 
Journal of Finance, XL VIII, 831-880, at 865. 
537 Rebeiz, K. S. 2002. Strategies for Corporate Governance in Engineering Corporations, IEEE Transactions on 
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analysis and recommendations suggest, the choice of the size of the board has a clear 
implication for the function of the boards. 
In the UK, s. 282 of the CA 1985 stipulates that "the number of directors of a public 
company shall not be subject to any maximum but shall not be less than two. "538 
Table A also provides that "unless otherwise determined by ordinary resolution, the 
number of directors... shall not be subject to any maximum but shall not be less than 
two. " 539 Based on our survey of 196 UK listed companies in this study, it is found 
that the board sizes of the UK sample companies ranged from 4 to 15, with an average 
of 7.5 directors in the 2002-2003 financial year. In comparison, in China, according to 
the company law, a board should consist of 5 to 19 directors. In our sample of 267 
Chinese listed companies, the study finds that this requirement has been strictly 
applied by all sample companies. Table 6.1a shows that the board size of Chinese 
companies ranged from 5 to 19, with an average of 10 directors in the 2002-2003 
financial year. Further comparative analysis of board size in the two countries is given 
in Table 6.1b, which shows that about 81% of Chinese companies have boards of 9 or 
more directors, whereas about 69% of the UK companies have fewer than 9 directors 
on the boards. Figure 6.2 shows bar charts of board size and highlights some 
significant differences in board size between the two countries. 
Engineering Management, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp398-408. 
"8 See s. 282 of the CA 1985. 
53' Table A, art. 64. 
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Table 6.1(a) Descriptive Statistics of the Size of Board 
Country N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
China 
UK 
267 
196 
5.00 
4.00 
19.00 
15.00 
10.04 
7.53 
2.38 
2.16 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's SI1 and SZ Stock Exchange markets and 196 companies 
listed in London Stock Exchange market. 
Table 6.1(b) Frequency Distribution of the Size of Board 
China l'K 
Size of boards Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Less than 6 5 1.9 73 37.2 
6-8 directors 45 16.9 62 31.6 
9-11 directors 167 62.5 51 26.0 
12-14 directors 29 10.9 9 1.6 
More than 14 directors 21 7.9 1 5 
Total 267 100.0 196 100.0 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's SH and SZ Stock Exchange markets and 196 companies 
listed in London Stock Exchange market. 
Figure 6.2 
Frequency Distribution of Board Siza 
2 
d1 
a a E 
v 
E 
"""., ,. """" " "" - ý. i- 
Board Size 
14 more than 14 
199 
Frequency Distribution of Board Size 
2( 
Ob i 
s C) U 
2' 
E 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's SH and SZ Stock Exchange markets and 196 companies 
listed in London Stock Exchange market. 
Board size has been examined by a number of researchers in the past decade in the 
UK. It is clear that the trend is toward small, but more qualified boards. 540 For 
example, Short and Keasey examined a sample of the listed companies in the UK 
between 1988 and 1992 and reported that the average board size was 7.36.541 More 
recently, the Higgs Report on the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors 
reported that the average size of the board of UK listed companies is seven, and the 
average FTSE 100 board is generally larger with an average of 12 members. 542 The 
empirical evidence discussed at the beginning of this section seems to suggest that 
there may well be an optimal board size. However, it is noteworthy that the literature 
also suggests that there is no one board size that is best for all companies. The Higgs 
540 Cook, L. and K. Leissle. 2002. UK Company Corporate (iovernance: Comparing the 1"T-1000 and FechMark- 
100 indices, available from: http: //www. boardroomanaIN'sis. com/gov/t? K%2OComt)anv%2ORcscarcil FY99- 
On March%202002. pdf [Accessed 25 September 2004] 
541 Short, H. and K.. Keasey. 1997, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom. 
in: K. Keasy, S. Thompson and M. Wright. eds.. Corporate Governance: Economic and Financial Issues. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, pp18-53. 
542 See Higgs Report. op cit. fn. 460, p22. 
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Report identifies that the size of the board is an important factor to make the board an 
effective decision-making body. 543 The Higgs Report suggests that "an effective 
board should not be so large as to become unwieldy. It should be of sufficient size 
that the balance of skills and experience is appropriate for the requirement of the 
business and that changes in the board's composition can be managed without undue 
disruption. °'S'' 
In China, although the listed companies have been required to introduce independent 
directors into their boardroom, the size of the board appears to have increased only 
slightly compared with the figure of 9.9 identified by the World Bank and IFC 
published report, which was based on a survey 257 companies listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchanges. 545 However, given that more than 81% of sample companies have 9 
or more directors, it is presumed that the majority of companies might have 
dysfunctional boards in China. 
6.3.2 Composition of the Board 
Many academic researchers have reviewed board. composition by investigating the 
ratio and number of executive and non-executive/independent directors on a board. 
From a logistical perspective, the supervision of management is a primary 
responsibility of the boards. Rebeiz argues that the board should act independently 
from management in exercising its fundamental duty of loyalty and care. He stresses 
5" See Higgs Report, op cit. fn. 460, s. 4.09. 
I See s. 4.10 of Higgs Report op cit fn460. 
545 See S. Tenev and C. Zhang, op cit. fn. 207. 
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that the standard of care should apply to the protection and creation of the firm's 
economic value, whereas the standard of loyalty should be directed first and foremost 
to the shareholders because of the board's fiduciary responsibility to the shareholders, 
and it is essential for the board to have an effective process for optimum corporate 
governance performance 546 Based an agency theory, Fama and Jensen argue that in 
order to ensure that the board acts independently from management, a preponderance 
of outside directors must be in place to ensure that management actions are consistent 
with shareholder value maximisation. 547 According to the resource dependence 
theory, Rebeiz points out that outside directors do' enjoy some advantages, such as 
being a critical link to the external environment by providing access to valued 
resources and information in their own respective companies for which they work full 
time or by providing advice and insight into the workings of government 548 
A variety of empirical studies explore the relationship between board composition and 
the board's monitoring function. For example, Fama and Jensen argue that 
independent directors are likely to be better monitors because their interests are less 
likely to be aligned with those of management and they have the incentive to `develop 
a reputation as experts in decision control'. sag Weisbach finds that firms with 
outsider-dominated boards are more likely to remove a CEO when a firm is 
performing poorly than firms with insider-dominated boards sso Mehran argues that 
5461bid. 
17 Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. 1983, Agency Problem and Residual Claims, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XXVI, pp327.349. 
s<s See Rebeiz, K. S. op cit fn. 537. 
509 See Fama and Jenson, op cit. fn 547. p315. 
550 Weisbach found that a board composed of at least 60% of outside directors was more likely than a board 
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non-executive directors are effective monitors when dealing with executive 
compensation by attempting to reduce agency costs and tie compensation more 
closely to firm performance. However, there are a number of recent studies which 
argue that independent directors will not monitor management without a significant 
stake in the firm 551 They insist that managerial shareholding is the key determinant of 
board's monitoring behaviour. 552 In addition, there are impediments to effective 
monitoring by non-executive directors. Baysinger and Hoskisson find that non- 
executive directors are external and part-time, and do not possess all the information 
that executive directors have, and the information asymmetry problem is likely to 
cause some difficulties for effective monitoring. 553 Nevertheless, much of the 
literature has established a clear picture of how the board should be structured and 
what the contribution of non-executive/independent directors should be. As a result, 
the importance of board composition is prominently recognised in many countries' 
corporate governance development agendas. Therefore, how the independent board 
system is implemented in different jurisdictions merits further research. 
The Higgs Report states that by July 2002, there were 5,172 executive, 4,610 non- 
executive and 1,689 chairman posts held by directors in UK listed companies. On 
average, non-executive directors comprise around half of FTSE 100 boards. In 
smaller companies the non-executive directors comprise on average just over a third 
comprising less than 60% of outside directors to dismiss an underperforming CEO. See Weisbach, M. S. 1988 
Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 Journal of Financial Economics, 431,433. 
511 See, Shleifer, Vishny, 1997, op cit. fn. 38. 
552 ibid. 
sss Baysinger, B. D. and R. E. Hoskisson, 1990. The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: 
Effects on Corporate Strategy, Academy of Management Review. 15,72-87. 
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of the boards 554 Among the 196 UK companies in this study the findings show that 
the overwhelming majority of boards of UK companies exceed the Combined Code 
requirement for one third of the board to be non-executives. The average percentage 
of non-executive directors is more than half (54%) and about 97% of boards have 
non-executive directors that comprise more than one-third of the board. About 14% of 
boards have non-executive directors that comprise more than two-thirds of the board 
(see Table 6.2a and 6.2b). 
In China, the Guidelines required that by June 30th, 2002, at least two members of the 
board of directors should be independent directors; and by June 30th, 2003, at least 
one-third of the board should be independent directors 555 According to the CSRC 
report, a total of 1,244 companies out of 1,250 listed companies on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges had established independent directors by the end of June 
2003, and most of the 1,244 companies had satisfied the requirement in respect of at 
least one of its independent directors being an accounting professional. 556 In this 
study, Table 6.2a reports that among all 267 Chinese companies, the proportion of 
directors who are independent averages just over one quarter. This figure indicates 
that the independent board system has not been well established in China by the date 
of this study. Table 6.2b indicates that approximately 2% of boards of Chinese listed 
companies have no independent directors at all, but more than 90% of companies 
55' see Higgs Report, op cit. fn. 460, p 18. 
s" See Section I (3) of the Guidelines, op cit. fn28 
556 See Four Measures to Improve China's Independent Director System, Shanghai Securities News, 6 February 
2004, citing in Lti et at. Corporate Governance Correspondence, vol. 1,2004, available at 
http: //www. iwep. or . cn/ccce/pdf/tongxun 
2003-5. pdf [Accessed 28 September 2005]. 
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have satisfied the requirement in respect of boards comprised of at least one-third 
independent directors. 
Table 6.2(a) Proportion of Non-executive/Independent Directors 
Country N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
China (INDs) 267 . 00 66.00 25.16 8.729 
UK (NEDs) 196 16.67 100.00 53.92 16.48 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's SH and SZ Stock Exchange markets and 196 companies 
listed in London Stock Exchange market. 
Table 6.2(b) Frequency Distribution of Non-executive/Independent Directors 
Proportion of NED/IND China 
Frequency Percent 
UK 
Frequency Percent 
None 5 1.9 0 0 
Less than 1/3 242 90.6 6 3.1 
Between 1/3 to 2/3 20 7.5 163 83.2 
Greater than 2/3 0 0 . 27 13.8 
267 100.0 196 100.0 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's SIi and SZ Stock Exchange markets and 196 companies 
listed in London Stock Exchange market. 
6.3.3 Board Leadership Structure 
It has been argued that the separation of the roles of chairman and CEO ensures an 
adequate system of checks and balances against potential abuses of power by 
management. Indeed, from an agency perspective, the separation of the roles of CEO 
and chairman of the board can dilute the power of the CEO and reduce the potential 
for a management-dominated board. 557 In addition, consistent with the managerial 
hegemony theory, Dalton and Kesner state that "the real threat to the exercise of 
independent judgement by the board of directors is the dual role of the CEO as board 
" L. A. A. Van den Berghe and A. Levrau, 2004. Evaluating Boards of Directors: What Constitutes a Good Corporate Board?, Corporate Governance, Vol. 12,461-478. 
205 
chairman. "558 Goyal and Park also argue that the dual leadership structure creates too 
much power in the hands of the CEO and makes it harder for a board to replace a poor 
performing CEO, which potentially results in reducing the flexibility of the board to 
address large declines in performance 559 However, some literature in favour of the 
CEO and chairman's duality argue that the duality leads to increased effectiveness, 
which result in a situation where there is a clear leader of the organisation so that 
there is no room for doubt as to who has authority or responsibility over a particular 
matter. 560 The literature discussed above suggests that the question of the separation 
of the CEO and chairman positions has been controversial in studies of corporate 
governance. 
In the UK, in accordance with the Cadbury recommendations, the vast majority of 
companies have separated the role of chairman (who runs the board) from that of the 
CEO (who runs the company) since the 1990s. For example, Dahya et al find that 
15.4% of the UK listed companies in their sample combined the CEO and chairman 
roles during 1993-1996 periods. 561 Similarly, Conyon and Murphy report that only 
18% of UK companies combined the CEO and chairman in 1997.62 In this study, the 
incidence of duality of the CEO and chairman in our sample of 196 UK listed 
558 Dan R. Dalton and Idalene F. Kesner, 1987. Composition and Duality of Boards of Directors: An International 
Perspective, Journal of International Business Studies, pp33-42, at p35. 
"9 Goyal, V. and C. Park, 2002. Board Leadership Structure and CEO Turnover, Journal of Corporate Finance, 
8: 49-66. 
S60 Donaldson L. and Davis J., 1991. Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: COE Governance and Shareholder 
Returns, 16(1) Australian Journal of Management 49. 
s6` Conyon, M. J. and K. J. Murphy, (2000), The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, Economic Journal, Vol. 110, No. 467, pp209-226. 
562 Dahya, J., McConnell, J. J. and CAN. Travlos, (2002), The Cadbury Committee, Corporate Performance and Top 
Management Turnover, Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, pp461-483. 
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companies is found to be slightly higher than the Higgs Report, with about 
16% of 
them combined in one person. In China, by contrast, neither company 
law nor the 
CCGC provides rules that the roles of chairman and CEO should 
be separated. 
However, the study finds that the chairman and CEO duality is not very high. Only 
12% of the sample companies in China have a combined board leadership structure 
in 
2002/2003 financial year (see Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3 Chairman and CEO Duality 
Country N Mean 
China 267 11.61 
UK 196 16.41 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's Sll and SZ Stock Exchange markets and 196 companies 
listed in London Stock Exchange market. 
MacAvoy and Millstein state that "... ideally, the board's chairman should be an 
independent director, thus separating the role in form as well as substance. "563 A 
board needs leadership separate from the CEO to serve as a check on management 
and to respond to expanded demands for accountability and transparency. Although 
the board leadership structure data in this study indicates that the majority of 
companies have separated the roles of chairman and CEO in China, it does not mean 
the chairman is an independent outside member of the board. Ho argues that it1 most 
563 They argue that "the first important initiative is for the board to develop an identified independent leadership, 
by separating the roles of chairman of the board and CEO and appointing an independent director as chairman. 
Independent leadership is critical to positioning the board as an objective body distinct from management and, in 
particular to the board's abilities to: (i) identify the issues it should focus on including, in particular, the strategic 
issues of importance; (ii) obtain the information it needs to assess management's performance against its chosen 
strategy, including the overall conduct of the business; and (iii) prevent any management efforts to obfuscate 
important issues or information needed thereby hindering the board's ability to fulfill its responsibilities. " see Paul 
W. MacAvoy and Ira M. Millstein, 2003. The Recurrent Crisis in Corporate Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, p4 
and p95. 
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cases either the chairman of the board or the CEO or both in China is nominated, 
appointed and dismissed predominantly by the controlling or majority shareholders. 
5" 
Obviously, this form of leadership structure could make the listed companies more 
like a wholly-owned subsidiary company of the controlling or majority shareholders 
so that board decisions are normally in the interest of the controlling or majority 
shareholders rather than the interests of the company as a whole. In addition, it is 
argued that the title of chairman and CEO can be very misleading in China because 
many chairmen of the board work full-time for the companies and are executives in 
all but name 565 This scenario suggests that the separation of the role of chairman and 
CEO seems to put the CEO in the `hot seat', that the CEO may be overawed by such a 
chairman and feel constrained in the day-to-day running of the company without 
frequent reference to the chairman. It also appears to be more difficult for such a 
chairman to be able to stand sufficiently back from the day-to-day running of the 
business. 
6 . 3.4 Committees of the 
Board 
Board subcommittees play a key role within the functioning of corporate boards, and 
committee structure and composition can be important indicators of board 
independence. Theoretical perspectives examining the antecedent and effects of board 
committees usually draw from agency theory and resource dependence theory. Based 
on agency theory, Dalton et al note that the impact of board committees has been 
5" Simon S. M. Ho, 2003. Corporate Governance in China: Key Problems and Prospects, Centre for Accounting 
Disclouse and Corporate Governance, School ofAccountancy, The Chinese University of I long Kong. 56s See Zhong, Juyin, op cit. fn. 491. 
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given special attention by both academics and practitioners since "many of the critical 
processes and decisions of boards of directors do not derive from the board-at-large, 
but rather in subcommittees. "566 Referring to the resource dependence perspective, 
Stiles and Taylor argue that a non-executive director with a financial background 
sitting on an audit committee (which reflects a good use of expertise) can improve the 
quality of financial reporting and reduce potential fraudulent practice. 
67 Klein notes 
that independent directors can only perform the monitoring function if they are 
embedded in an appropriate committee structure. 68 Managerial hegemony theory is 
also used to explain the function of the nomination committee. Shivdadani and 
Yermack construct a measure of CEO involvement in the director nomination process 
based on whether the board has such a committee and whether the CEO is serving on 
it. They find that the CEO involvement in the selection process decreases the board's 
independence. 569 In a survey of directors, Lorsch and Maclver find that when the 
CEO nominates a candidate, 11% of the directors indicated that that person was 
always accepted, while 57% said the CEO's choice was accepted "most of time", and 
42% of the directors reported that the CEO nominated candidates were rarely rejected 
by the nomination committee. 570 Similarly, the compensation committee is an 
institutional device to resolve the potential conflicts of interest between insider 
executives and the firm's owners. Newman and Wright's study; involving 161 of the 
566 Dalton, D. R., C. M. Daily, A. E. Ellstrand and J. L. Johnson, 1998, Mara-analytic Reviews of Board 
Composition, Leadership Structure, and Financial Performance, Strategic Management Journal, 19,3: 269-290. at 
284. 
" Stiles, P. and B. Taylor, op cit. fii. 436, pp69-70. 
568 Klein, A. op cit. fn. 112. 
s" Shivdasani, A. and D. Yermack, 1999, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An 
Empirical Analysis, Journal of Finance 54: 1829-54. 
570 Lorsch, J. W. and E. Maclver, op cit. fn. 94 - 
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250 largest US listed companies, find that CEO compensation is greater in firms 
having remuneration committees that include at least one executive director or 
affiliated non-executive director than in firms having remuneration committees 
consisting solely of independent non-executive directors. s? ' Indeed, as Williamson 
observed, the absence of an independent compensation committee is akin to the CEO, 
"writing his pay check with one hand and signing it with the other". 72 Despite many 
wide-ranging claims about the importance of the board subcommittee, more empirical 
research is required to understand the board subcommittees as they have emerged in 
different countries. 
Of the 196 sample companies from the UK, Table 6.4 shows that almost all 
companies in the study have standing audit committees (98.5%) and compensation 
committees (98.5%), and about three-quarters of the sample companies have a 
nomination committee, but the relative independence of these committees varies. The 
independence levels of the audit and compensation committees tend to be higher than 
that of nomination committees. 191 companies (99%) have a majority of independent 
members on their audit committees, with 95.3% being fully independent; 189 
companies (97.9%) have a majority of independent members on their independent 
compensation committees, with 92.7% being fully independent; and 129 companies 
(90%) have a majority of independent members on their nomination committees, but 
with only 45.1% being fully independent. 
s" Newman, H. A. and Wright, D. W. 1995. Compensation Committee Compensation and its influence on CEO Compensation Practices, Working Paper, School of Business, University of Michigan. 572 Williamson O. E. 1995. The Economic Institutions of Capitalisms. the Free Press: New York. 
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Table 6.4 Board Committees 
Board Committee China UK 
Frequency Per cent Frequency Per cent 
Audit committee No committee 183 68.5 3 1.5 
Majority independent " 74 88.1 191 96.4 
100 per cent independent 0 0 184 95.3 
Nomination committee No committee 190 71.2 52 26.5 
Majority independent " 67 87.0 129 65.8 
100 per cent independent 0 0 65 45.1 
Remuneration committee No committee 178 66.7 3 1.5 
Majority independent 75 88.2 189 97.4 
100 per cent independent 0 0 179 92.7 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's SII and SZ Stock Exchange markets and 196 companies 
listed in London Stock Exchange market. 
'Majority independent includes those that are 100 per cent independent. Independent figures calculated based only 
on those companies that have established a committee. 
Among the 267 sample companies from China, Table 6.4 above indicates that the 
proportions of companies with audit, nomination and remuneration committees only 
stand at 31.5%, 28.8% and 33.3% respectively. Among those companies with 
established committees, about 88% of audit and remuneration committees contain a 
majority of independent directors, and 87% of nomination committees contain a 
majority of independent directors. Nevertheless, none of these committees are formed 
entirely of independent directors. 
6.3.5 The Frequency of Board Meetings 
Brown's study on the effectiveness of UK independent directors reports that in 1997, 
among a sample of 480 UK listed companies, 9% of boards held less than 5 meetings 
per year; 23% held 5-8 meetings; 65% held 9-12 meetings; but 3% of boards held 
more than 12 meetings. 73 Cook and Leissle comparing the FTSE 100 and TechMark 
373 Peter Brown, 1997. The Effectiveness of UK Independent Directors, Corporate Governance, Vo1.5, pp232.235. 
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100 find that 66 of the 87 sample FTSE 100 companies reported that the average 
number of board meetings held in the 1999-2000 financial year was 9, whereas 45 of 
the 73 sample TechMark 100 companies reported that their average number of board 
meetings was 10 in the same period 5 74 In this study, 175 of the 196 sample UK listed 
companies disclosed the board activities in their annual reports, which show on 
average that the boards held 9 meetings with a range between 4 and 21 in the 2002- 
2003 financial year (see Table 6.6). 
Table 6.5 Frequency of Board meetings 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. D 
(0-4) 
Frequency 
(5-8) (9-12) (More than 12) 
China 267 3 27 7.75 3.18 25 155 67 20 
(9.4%) (58.1%) (25.1%) (7.5%) 
UK 175 4 21 8.81 3.18 18 68 86 3 
(10.3%) (38.9%) (49.1%) (1.7%) 
Source: the survey of 267 companies listed in China's Sli and SZ Stock Exchange markets and 175 companies 
listed in London Stock Exchange market. 
This study find that the boards of Chinese listed companies held an average of 8- 
meetings in the 2002-2003 financial year with a range between 3 and 27. In 
comparison, in 1999, the World Bank and IFC Report found that Chinese listed 
companies averaged 4.2 board meetings per year, 575 so the data suggest that many 
Chinese boards now tend to have more meetings. Table 6.6 shows that only one 
quarter of the sample companies in China had board meetings 9-12 times per year, 
whereas almost a half of the boards in the UK met 9 to 12 times. Figure 6.3 also 
provides a clear picture of the differences of the board meeting frequency between 
China and the UK. 
$74 Cook, L. and K Leissle, op cit. fn. 540. 
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Figure 6.3 
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There are at least three possible reasons for this difference. First, the board meetings 
of the UK listed companies serve both executive and monitoring functions, whereas in 
China the monitoring function, at least in law, is delegated to the supervisory board. 
Therefore, monitoring-related decisions are conducted by the meetings of the 
575 see S. Tenev and C. Zhang, op cit. fn. 207. 
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supervisory board. Secondly, as was seen in chapter 5, the distribution of decision- 
making rights between the shareholder meeting and the board of directors is not 
identical between China and the UK. Compared with the UK, Chinese boards have 
relatively little decision-making power within the existing legislative framework. 
Almost all strategic decisions have to be made at the shareholder meetings. This 
scenario has resulted in more shareholder meetings and fewer board meetings. 
Finally, a significant number of directors who come from large shareholders or their 
connected companies have executive or monitoring positions in these companies. The 
directors' dual role will not, to some extent, permit them to have sufficient time to 
meet more frequently. 
6.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter has been concerned with the legal status of boards of directors and board 
practices in both China and the UK. In each jurisdiction the focus has been on the role 
of the board of directors, non-executive/independent directors, chairman, board 
committees, as well as board activities with particular emphasis on the frequency of 
board meetings through both functional comparative analysis and empirical analysis. 
The functional comparative analysis provides a partial answer to the questions which 
are asked at the beginning of the chapter and shows that the Chinese board system is 
unique in many aspects. For example, the Chinese two-tier structure does not seem to 
provide adequate control and supervision functions over corporate affairs. In practice, 
the Chinese supervisory board works in a way that is quite different from the legally 
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defined model. Lin observes that the supervisory board which is usually formed 
by 
labour unions, party members, and major shareholder representations, has a loosely 
defined monitoring role over the board of directors and managers. 
76 Cheng argues 
that supervisory boards in China have great difficulty in performing their supervisory 
duties. 77 Guo states that the great weakness of supervisory boards in China is lack of 
independence 578 The members of a supervisory board are not "external" in nature. In 
fact, as employee representatives, most of them are senior or junior managers of the 
company, whereas the shareholder representatives are normally closely related with 
executive directors because they are all nominated by the controlling shareholders. 
79 
In such a scenario, it is doubtful that such a supervisory board could challenge the 
decisions made by the boards of directors and senior management. In addition, the 
supervisory board as a monitoring organ, which functions merely as a figurehead, has 
no more than formal power to contest decisions made by the board of directors and , 
company executives. For example, according to Art. 126 of the CCL 1994, although 
the supervisory board has the power to check the company's financial accounts and 
monitor the performance of directors and senior managers, it may have difficulties in 
obtaining sufficient information or lack expertise to fulfil its functions 
S80 If directors 
or managers have done something that is not in their corporations' best interests, the 
176 See Lin, T. W. 2004. Corporate Governance in China: Recent Developments, , Key Problems and Solutions, 
USC Marshall Research, University of Southern California, Marshall Business School. 
sn See Cheng, Y., 2000. Enterprises Demand Supervision, China Economic Daily, January 10. 
See Guo, R., 2002. Disinterested or Uninterested? Some Thoughts on the CSRC's Independent Directors 
Guiding. Perspectives, Vol. 3. No 5. available at 
http: //www oycf ore/Perspectives/17 063002/Disinterested Uninterested htm [Accessed 25 September 2004] 
079 Minkang Gu, 2003. Will an Independent Director Institution Perform Better than a Supervisor? Comments on 
the Newly Created Independent Director System in the People's Republic of China, 6 Journal of Chinese and 
Comparative Law. 59. Shen S. and J. Jia, 2004. Will the Independent Directors Institution Work in China? Loyola 
of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review. Vo1.27: 223-48. 
580 See art. 126(1) & (2) of the CCL 1994 
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supervisory board can only demand directors and managers to make amends. 581 In 
addition, if such a demand fails, the supervisory board may propose to hold an 
extraordinary general meeting. 82 However, it can be easily rejected by the board of 
directors as the power to convene a shareholder meeting is only vested in the board of 
directors 583 
The weak monitoring function of the supervisory board in China's publicly listed 
companies can be attributed to various loopholes of the CCL 1994. Although the 
CCGC reinforced the role of the supervisory board, in many cases, the supervisory 
board has no real "teeth" to fight with the board of directors. As mentioned earlier, the 
supervisory board, unlike the supervisory board in Germany, is neither involved in the 
selection of directors and managers, nor has the power to dismiss them or bring an 
action against them. However, the problems associated with the role of the 
supervisory board have been envisaged by the CCL 2006. Article 54 of the CCL 2006 
allows the supervisory board to propose the dismissal of any directors or senior 
managers who are in violation of laws, administrative regulations, the articles of 
associations of the company, or resolutions of the shareholder meeting S84 In addition, 
under the CCL 2006, the supervisory board will have the power not only to propose 
the convening of an extraordinary general meeting, but also be able to convene and 
preside over the meeting itself if the board of directors fails to perform its function of 
581 ibid art. 126 (3) 
$ee ibid. art. 126(4) 
393 ibid. art. 104(4) & (5) 
584 See art. 54 (2) of the CCL 2006. 
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convening and presiding such a meeting as provided by law. 
585 Furthermore, the 
supervisory board has been given the power to initiate legal proceedings against any 
directors or senior managers in breach of their duties. 
86 However, it is noteworthy 
that law in itself has not resolved all previously mentioned problems, in particular, the 
lack of independence of the supervisory board. Empirical evidence has shown that 
this system is still controlled by the controlling shareholders or board of directors of 
the company. The effectiveness of the two-tier board system is not guaranteed as it is 
still unclear whose interests the supervisory board represents. 
Nevertheless, as has been seen, China is also seeking to enhance the board monitoring 
functions through the use of independent directors. Yet, it is noteworthy that the 
effectiveness of the independent director system can be affected by the way in which 
corporate governance principles are put into practice. Tam argued that the 
independent director system transplanted from the Anglo-American system by China 
is based on competitive external markets, and with a strong role played by the court 
system. 87 In the UK, the market based corporate governance system relies on arm's- 
length transactions and shareholder sovereignty that protect the small and diverse 
individual shareholders. In contrast, it is clear that China does not have the 
accompanying ownership structure conditions (structure driven path) which allows 
the external market to come to its own, conclusions. Therefore, whether the 
585 ibid. art. 54(4). 
5911 ibid. arts. 54(6) & 152. 
517 On Kit Tam, 2000. Models of Corporate Governance for Chinese Companies, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, Vol. 8 pp52-64. 
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development of corporate governance arrangements in the external market-based 
Anglo-American model and the role that corporate governance has played could be 
achieved in China is still questionable. 
Within the current independent director system, empirical analysis in this study 
shows that the independent director system has now been adopted and 'applied by 
most Chinese listed companies. Certainly, the legal environment is the most 
important condition which will influence the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
In fact, the CSRC identified three major problems which have prevented companies 
from exploiting the advantages of independent directors in China: (1) some 
independent directors are not sufficiently independent; (2) some independent 
directors lack corporate management knowledge; and (3) it is difficult to ensure that 
the right independent directors obtain sufficient information about the companies 
they serve 588 In addition, achieving good corporate governance requires increased 
enforcement capability for regulatory bodies and a corresponding legal environment. 
Practice shows that the CRSC has met many practical difficulties in the 
implementation of the CCGC, such as collecting evidence, lack of power and ability 
to enforce the law, and the cooperation of other judicial departments S89 Although the 
CCL 2006 now affirms that a listed company shall have independent directors in the 
boardroom, 590 the lack of tradition and institutions for law enforcement in China 
casts doubt on both the implementation and the effectiveness of the new corporate 
58' See Shanghai stock exchange, op cit fn. 233. 
589 See Lu, T. op cit. fn. 473. 
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governance system. Given the above, it seems clear that merely adopting such 
`modern' corporate governance measures and structures does not mean that an 
effective governance system has been. developed. To support this proposition, 
Chapter 9 attempts to conduct a regression analysis of the relationship between the 
current Chinese board structure and firm performance to test the effectiveness of the 
internal mechanisms within the Chinese corporate governance system. 
590 see arL 123 of the CCL 2006 
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CHAPTER 7 
DIRECTORS' DUTIES: THE LEGAL AND 
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 
7.1 Introduction 
Sheikh and Chatterjee define corporate governance from a legal perspective as "a 
system whereby directors are entrusted with responsibilities and duties in' relation to 
the direction of a company's affairs" 591 The Company Law Review Steering Group 
(the CLR) recognises that the rules on directors' duties lie at the heart of corporate 
governance 592 Indeed, it is generally agreed that an effective corporate governance 
system should provide mechanisms for regulating directors' duties in order to prevent 
them from slacking, shirking or abusing their power and to ensure that they act in the 
best interests of a company and its shareholders. From a legal perspective, therefore, 
the concern in this chapter is with how well the duties of directors have been 
established in order to ensure that directors devote adequate attention to the 
company's affairs and carry out their functions competently in China compared with 
the UK. 
In this chapter, the comparative analysis is approached from the UK point of vicw to 
identify how a company's directors are generally expected to satisfy two common law 
59' See Saleem Sheikh and SK Chatterjee, Perspective on Corporate Governance, in Salccm Sheikh and William 
Rees, ed. Corporate Governance & Corporate Control, Chi. at p5, London : Cavendish, 1995. For other 
definitions see section 2.2.1 of this thesis. 
592 See the CLR, Final Report, op cit, fn. 269, para. 3.2. 
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duties - fiduciary duties and duties of care, skill and diligence, and to highlight 
certain recent developments both in case law and the growing impact of the company 
law reform in respect of codification of directors' duties. This is followed by a similar 
approach to examine the general legal requirements imposed on directors and how 
they have evolved in order to enhance the accountability of directors in China and to 
critically assess the perceived problems compared with the UK in relation to the 
uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding directors' duties. The criticisms articulated in 
this chapter highlight certain aspects of law on the basic standards of directors' 
accountability which need to be amended by reference to the UK rules. 
7.2 The Duties of Directors in the UK 
7.2.1 The Fiduciary Duties 
In the UK, fiduciary duties imposed on directors are similar in broad terms to those of 
trustees to ensure that they act with good faith and loyalty in managing the 
company. 593 The governing principle is that, the company has placed trust in the 
director who is expected to reciprocate by acting with the utmost good faith towards 
the company when dealing with it or acting on its behalf. 594 The substance of the 
fiduciary duties owed by a director to the company has developed over time through 
decisions of the courts in numerous different cases, but falls into four main areas. The 
S93 See, Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421; Allen v Hyatt (1914) 30 TLR 444; Re Smith & Fawcett (1942) Ch. 304; 
Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378; Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley [1972] 1 
WLR 443. 
See Bristol and West Building Society v. Afothew [1998] Ch 1, p. 18 per Milieu states: 'A fiduciary is someone 
who has undertaken to act for of on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a 
relationship of trust and confidence'. 
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first is the primary duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company. 
595 In 
Dorchester Finance v. Stebbings96 Foster J stated that `A director must exercise any 
power vested in him as such, honestly, in good faith and in the interests of the 
company.... 9597 In examining a bona fide exercise of a power by a 
director of a 
company, Pennycuick J in Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v. Lloyds Bank Ltd598 said 
that "the proper test, I think, of whether a director of a company has acted bona fide in 
the interest of the company ... must be whether an 
intelligent and honest man in the 
position of a director of the company concerned, could, in the whole of the existing 
circumstances, have reasonably believed that the transactions were for the benefit of 
the company. "599 
The second point is that directors must exercise their powers for a proper purpose and 
must not act for any collateral purpose 600 In Re Smith & Fawcett LU! °' Lord Greene 
MR said that directors were bound to exercise the powers conferred upon them "bona 
fide in what they consider - not what the court may consider - is in the interest of the 
company, and not for any collateral purpose" 
602. In Howard Smith v. Ampol 
Petroleum Ltd603, Lord Wilberforce emphasized that in a case which the court has 
sus See Dorchester Finance v. Stebbing [1989] BCLC 498; Charterbridge Corporation Lid v. Lloyds Bank Lid 
[1970] Ch 62; Regentcrest plc v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80, Runciman v Halter Runciman plc [1992] BCLC 1084, 
and Extrasure Travel Insurance Lid. v. Scottergood [2002] All ER (D) 307. 
sý See Dorchester Finance v. Stebbing [1989] BCLC 498. 
See Dorchester Finance v. Stebbing [1989] BCLC 498, pp501-02. 
[1970] Ch 62. 
[1970] Ch 62, p74. 
600 See Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304, Punt v. Symons & Co Ltd It 90312 Ch 506, Piervy VS Mill & CO 
Ltd [1920] 1 Ch 77, Caiman v. National Association for Mental Health [ 19711 Ch 317. Howard Smith Lid v. 
Ampol Peteroleum Ltd. [1974] AC 821, Criterion Properties PLC V Stratford UK Properties LLC [2003] BCC 50, 
CA, Bishopsgate Investment Lid v. Maxwell (No. 2) [1993] BCLC 1282, Extrasure Travel Insurance Ltd v. 
Scattergood [2002] All ER (D) 307. 
601 [1942] Ch 304. 
602 [1942] Ch 304, p306. 
603 [1974] AC 821. 
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found that directors have believed they were acting bona fide in the interests of the 
company, the court must find whether the purpose for which the director acted was 
objectively proper or improper. 
604 On the facts in Howard Smith v. Ampol Petroleum 
Ltd the court held that the directors' use of their fiduciary powers over the shares in 
the company for the purpose of destroying an existing majority or creating a new 
majority was unconstitutional. The directors' primary objective was to alter the 
majority shareholding and the allotment was invalid 
605 In Extrasure Travel Insurance 
Ltd v. Scattergood606, it was suggested that the test of improper purpose was an 
objective one. In any case where the exercise of a power by directors is challenged, it 
is for the court to take a four-step test: (i) identify the power whose exercise is in 
question; (ii) identify the proper purpose for which that power was delegated to the 
directors; (iii) identify the substantial purpose for which the power was in fact 
exercised; and (iv) decide whether that purpose was proper. 607 In Extrasure Travel 
Insurance Ltd v. Scattergood, the claimant alleged that the decision to transfer 
£200,000 out of Extrasure's bank account to another company in the group in order to 
meet the demands of a pressing creditor of that other company by two of its formal 
directors was not in its best interests and was made for an improper purpose 6os 
604 [1974] AC 821, [1974] All ER 1126. The case involved a takeover battle for a company where the directors 
favoured a particular bidder and made an allotment of shares to that bidder with a view to diluting the holdings of 
the potential rival bidders for the company. As the directors' primary objective was to alter the majority 
shareholding, although the directors had acted honestly, it was unconstitutional for directors to use their fiduciary 
powers over the shares in the company for the purpose of destroying an existing majority. It was held that the 
directors had improperly exercised their power. In practice, improper allotments of shares are now constrained by 
statute. Ss. 80 and 89 of the CA 1985 requires the general meeting to give the directors authority to allot and 
require that allotments be on a rights basis unless the shareholders agree otherwise. 
05 Ibid. 
[2002] All ER 307. 
607 See Extrasure Travel Insurance Lid v. Scattergood [2002] All ER 307, Ch D. para. 92. The four stages were 
developed from Howard Smith v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821. ' 
608 By applying the four-steps test, the court concluded that: (i) the power in question was the directors' ability to 
deal with the assets of Extrasure in the course of trading; (ii) the purpose for which that power was conferred on 
the directors was broadly to protect Extrasure's survival and to promote its commercial interests in accordance 
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The third point is that directors must not place themselves in a position of a conflict of 
interest (no-conflict rule) 609 The principle against conflict of interest can be traced to 
Aberdeen Railways Co. v. Blaikie Brothers610, where Lord Cranworth LC states that 
no fiduciary director "shall be allowed to enter into engagements 
in which he has, or 
can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which may possibly conflict, with the 
interests of those whom he is bound to protect" 
611 The no-conflict rule established in 
this case allowed a company to avoid any contract which the directors entered into on 
its behalf in which one or more of the directors had an interest, unless that interest had 
been disclosed to the company and approved by the general meeting. The disclosure 
of directors' interests in corporate transactions is important for the application of the 
no-conflict principle. As can be seen from the Court of Appeal case JJ Harrison 
(Property) Ltd v. Harrison, a director who failed to make sufficient disclosure of his 
interest on the purchase of a property from the company some 11 years before 
proceedings were commenced, was held liable to account for the profits made from 
the transaction 612 
with the objects set out in its Memorandum; (iii) the Defendants' substantial purpose in making the transfer was to 
enable the recipient company (Citygate) to meet its liabilities, not to preserve the survival of Extrasurc; and (iv) the 
purpose for which the transfer was made was plainly an improper one. See Extrasure Travel Insurance Ltd v. 
Scattergood [2002] All ER 307, Ch D. para. 140. ,- 
Aberdeen Railways Co & Blaikie Bros (1845) 1 Macq 461; Ifefy-Hutchinson v. Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 349. 
Guinness plc v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663, Runciman v. Maker Runciman plc [1992] BCLC 1084 
610 (1845) 1 Macq. HL 461. 
611 In this case the conflict is obvious as the chairman of the claimant's board of directors was also the managing 
partner of the defendant. The director is obliged to act in the interests of the company to purchase goods on behalf 
the claimant's company at the lowest price, while as a managing partner of the defendant, he wishes to sell the 
goods at the highest price. Where such a conflict exists, the court allowed the claimant to set aside a contract for 
the purchase of equipment entered into between it and the defendant. See Aberdeen Railways Co. v. Blaikie 
Brothers (1854) 1 Macq. HL 461, at 471 
612 [2002] 1 BCLC 162, CA. 
224 
Finally, directors owe a duty not to make secret profit (no-profit rule) 
613 The no- 
profit rule is derived from the leading trust case of 
Keech v. Sandford614 , but the 
leading authority for the application of the no-profit rule was Regal (Hastings) 
Lid v. 
Gulliver. 615 In this case, the House of Lords held that the directors had made their 
profits "by reason of the fact that they were directors of Regal and 
in the course of the 
execution of that office. 
9616 
The common law fiduciary duties are supplemented by a number of provisions 
in Part 
X of the CA 1985 617 For example, s. 317 of the CA provides that a 
director of a 
company who is in any way, whether directly or indirectly, interested 
in a contract, or 
proposed contract, with the company must declare the nature of the interests at a 
613 Keech v. Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61; Cook v. Decks [1916] AC 554; Regal (Hastings) Ltd v. Gulliver [1942] 
1 All ER 378, HL; Guinness plc v. Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663; Don King Productions Inc v. Warren [2000] 1 
BCLC 607; Industrial Development Consultants Ltd. v. Cooley [1972] 2 All ER 162. 
614 (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61. 
615 [1967] 2 AC 134n, [1942] 1 All ER 378,11L. The plaintiff company (Regal), the owner of a cinema, was 
contemplating the purchase of the leases of two other cinemas which were to be transferred to a subsidiary 
company formed by Regal called Amalgamated. 
Concurrently, Regal was contemplating the sale of all three 
cinemas to a third party. The intention of the directors was that Regal should subscribe 
for shares in Amalgamated 
and then Regal would sell those shares to the third party. 
There was some trouble over providing a guarantee; the 
transaction was changed so that the directors of Regal subscribed for shares 
in Amalgamated instead of Regal itself 
and then those directors sold those shares to the third party, thereby making an 
immediate and handsome profit. 
The purchasers of Regal brought an action against the former directors claiming that they 
had made a profit in 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
616 The governing principle laid down in Regal (Hastings) Lid v. Gulliver was applied in Phipps v. Boardman. In 
that case, Lord Upjohn stated four stages to test whether a fiduciary is misusing his position for his personal 
advantage as follows: "(i) The facts and circumstances must be carefully examined to see whether in fact a 
purported agent and even a confidential agent is in a fiduciary relationship to his principal. It does not necessarily 
follow that he is in such a position; (ii) Once it is established that there is such a relationship, that relationship must 
be examined to see what duties are thereby imposed upon the agent, to see what is the scope and ambit of the 
duties charged upon him; (iii) Having defined the scope of those duties one must see whether he has committed 
some breach thereof and by placing himself within the scope and ambit of those duties in a position where his duty 
and interest may possibly conflict. It is only at this stage that any question of accountability arises; and (iv) Finally, 
having established accountability it only goes so far as to render the agent accountable for profits made within the 
scope and ambit of his duty. " See Phipps v. Boardman [1967] 2 AC 46 at 127. In Industrial Developments v. 
Cooley, Rosjill J referred the four propositions above and found that the defendant had deliberately placed himself 
in a position where his duty to the company and his personal interests were conflicted. Roskill J. held that the 
defendant was accountable to the company for all the profits he received under the contract because "information 
which came to him while he was managing director and which was of concern to the plaintiff and relevant for the 
plaintiffs to know, was information which it was his duty to pass on to the plaintiffs. " See Industrial Developments 
v. Cooley[1972] 1 WLR 443. 
617 Part X are intended to reinforce the common law rules by regulating a wide range of certain transactions or 
arrangements by directors with their companies which give rise to possible conflict interest. See Part X of the CA 
1985. 
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meeting of directors of the company. 18 S. 324 imposes a duty on directors and shadow 
directors to notify the company of interests in shares in or debentures of the company 
or associated companies. 19 In addition, as a particular conflict of interest which may 
give rise to problems when directors purchase assets from, or sell assets to, their 
companies or companies in which they have an interest, s. 320 of the CA provides that 
a director of a company or of its holding company may not enter into any arrangement 
to acquire from or transfer to the company a "non-cash asset" without first obtaining 
approval for the transaction from the members by ordinary resolution passed in 
general meeting. 20 These statutory duties of disclosure under Part X are necessary to 
prevent any self-preserving director from contracting with his or her own or 
associated companies. 
7.2.2 The Duty of Care and Skill 
In addition to directors' fiduciary duties, in the UK, directors have a duty of care and 
skill in relation to the management of company business. 621 The common law 
standards of reasonable care and skill were summarised by Romer J in Re City 
Equitable Fire Assurance Co, 622 as comprising three main propositions: (i) A director 
need not exhibit in the performance of his duties a greater degree of skill than may 
reasonably be expected of a person of his knowledge and experience; 623 (ii) A director 
618 S. 317 of the CA 1985. 
61 S. 324 of the CA 1985. 
620 See s. 320 (1) of the CA 1985 which regulates `substantial property transactions'. 
621 See Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407 Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Slebbing [1989] 
BCLC 498. 
6u [1925] Ch 407. 
623 [1925] Ch 407 at 428. 
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is not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of his company. His duties are 
of an intermittent nature to be performed at periodical board meetings, and at 
meetings of any committee of the board upon which he happens to be placed. He is 
not, however, bound to attend all such meetings, though he ought to attend whenever, 
in the circumstances, he is reasonably able to do so 624 (iii) In respect of all duties that, 
having regard to the' exigencies of business, and the articles of association, may 
properly be left to some other official, a director is, in the absence of grounds for 
suspicion, justified in trusting that official to perform such duties honestly 625 Under 
the principles established by the case of Re City Equitable, few directors have ever 
been found liable in negligence for the corporate losses which resulted from what 
appeared to be clear mismanagement of the company's business. 
Although Re City Equitable still remains good law, it is notable that the scope and 
extent of those obligations is somewhat vague, since there are no generally recognised 
standards of the degree of skill and care, 626 and the elements of the test are out of date 
and not robust enough for the protection of the interests of a company in modern 
times. 627 -Nevertheless, these propositions have been substantially modified by the 
later case laws and statutes. In Dorchester and Finance Co Ltd v. Stebbing, Foster J. 
applied the proposition laid down in Re City Equitable, but held that non-executive 
624 Ibid at 429. 
625 Ibid. 
626 Sheikh and Chateerjee criticise that the duty of care, skill and diligence imposed on directors is too lax so that a 
director is only obliged under common law to have the minimum qualifications and show only minimal care and 
attention to company affairs. See Saleem Sheikh and SK Chatterjee, op c1t. fn. 591; Riley argues that the duty of 
care, skill and diligence with its lax characteristic standards have offered too little protection for companies and 
their shareholders. See C. A. Riley, 1999. The Company Director's Duty of Care and Skill: The Case for an 
Onerous but Subjective Standard, Modern Law Review, Vol. 62, pp697.724, at 698. 627 See Guy Nesbitt, 2006. Directors' Duties under Common Law and Statute, The Tax Journal, 825, ppl 3-14. 
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directors who were qualified accountants or who had considerable accountancy and 
business experience had been negligent in signing blank cheques which allowed the 
managing director to misappropriate the company's money. This 
implied that the 
professional directors would use reasonable skill in performance of the 
duties of the 
office based on what might reasonably be expected from a person in their position. 
But more significantly, the general standard of care has been changed since the 
judicial initiative was seized by Hoffmann LJ in the case of Re D' Jan of London 
Limited 628 by the application of both subjective and objective tests under section 214 
of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the IA 1986). 
629 In Re D' Jan of London Limited, 
Hoffmann LJ held that "the duty of care owed by a director at common law is 
accurately stated in s. 214 (4) of the IA 19869,630 lt is the conduct of "a reasonably 
diligent person having both: (a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may 
reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same function as are carried out 
by that director in relation to the company, and (b) the general knowledge, skill and 
experience that director has. "631 Accordingly, a director who signed an inaccurate fire 
insurance proposal form to insure the company's property without checking its 
content was regarded as negligent 632 
628 Re D'Jan of London Limited [1993] BCLC 646. 
629 S. 214 (4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides that: `the facts which a director of a company ought to know or 
ascertain, the conclusions which he ought to reach and the steps which he ought to take are those which would be 
known or ascertained, or reached or taken, by a reasonably diligent person having both - (a) the general 
knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same function as are 
carried out by that director in relation to the company, and (b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that 
director has. " 
630 Re D'Jan of London Limited [1993] BCC 646. 
631 ibid. 
632 ibid. 
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A modern statutory approach laid down in s. 214 (4) of the IA 1986 
indicates that 
company directors will be judged by the objective standards of the reasonably 
diligent 
person, but that standard will apply with regard to the functions which an 
individual 
undertakes in relation to the company and his/her 
knowledge and experience in 
question. In addition, with regard to the content of the duty of care, skill and 
diligence 
in terms of what can be expected of a reasonably diligent director, the particular role 
and responsibilities which the director has in the company, including whether 
he/she 
is an executive or non-executive director needs to be taken into account. Hoffmann LJ 
in Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd (in liq) v. Maxwell533 suggested that "the 
existence of a duty to participate must depend upon how the particular business is 
organised and the part which the director could be reasonably expected to play" 
634 
Similarly, in Re Barings plc (No. 6)635 the Court of Appeal upheld that directors must 
carry out their supervisory duties, but to what extent the duty is to be discharged 
"must depend on the facts of each particular case, including the director's role in the 
management of the company" 
636 In the more recent case Equitable Life Assurance 
Society v. Bowley637, Langley J observed the nature and extent of the duties of non- 
63 [1993] BCLC 1282. 
634 [1993] BCLC 1282, para. 12.7 
635 [2002] 1 BCLC 523. 
636 lbid, para. 36, the Court of Appeal agreed with the following statement by Johathan Parker 3 at the first instance: 
(i) Directors have, both collectively and individually, a continuing duty to acquire and maintain a sufficient 
knowledge and understanding of the company's business to enable them properly to discharge their duties as 
directors; (ii) Whilst directors are entitled (subject to the Articles of Association of the company) to delegate 
particular functions to those below them in the management chain, and to trust their competence and integrity to a 
reasonable extent, the exercise of the power of delegation does not absolve a director from the duty to supervise 
the discharge of the delegated functions; (iii) No rule of universal application can be formulated as to the duty 
referred to in (ii) above. The extent of the duty, and the question whether it has been discharged, must depend on 
the facts of each particular case, including the director's role in the management of the company. 
637 Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Bowley [2004] 1 BCLC 180. 
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executive directors, and in particular the extent to which they could be discharged 
from responsibility for the action of other executives, and held that: 
"[I]t is well known that the role of non-executive directors in corporate 
governance has been the subject of some debate in recent years. For present 
purposes, as Mr Milligan submitted, it in any event suffices to say that the 
extent to which a non-executive director may reasonably rely on the executive 
directors and other professionals to perform their duties is one in which the 
law can fairly be said to be developing and is plainly `fact sensitive'. It is 
plainly arguable, I think, that a company may reasonably at least look to non- 
executive directors for independence of judgment and supervision of the 
executive management. "638 
The above dicta clearly indicate that there is a changing area of the law as it clarifies 
the dual standards of care, skill and diligence. Clearly, by formulating the duty of care 
in this way, the duty owed in law by a non-executive director to a company could 
differ from the duty owed by an executive director because different roles have been 
performed by different type of directors. To be sure, as we have discussed in chapter 
6, the directors have different roles in running a company's affairs which have 
appeared in the provision of the new Combined Code. Therefore, the common law 
would have to develop to react to the changing demands of society. In fact, in the 
cases examined above, the court appears to have rightly taken into consideration the 
63$ %bid, para. 41. 
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differences between executives and non-executives, independent directors, chairman, 
members of board committees, and so on. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that there is 
no difference between the test to be applied to non-executives and those applied to 
executives or others; the differences lie in their functions they shall fulfil and the 
extent of the care and diligence that they can be reasonably expected to exercise 639 
7.2.3 Statutory Statement of Duties 
As discussed above, it is evident that many principles regulating directors' behaviour 
are established by case law rather than in a provision of the CA 1985. The complexity 
and overlap of the many and varied rules governing directors' fiduciary duties have 
made it difficult for directors to understand what to do before they act. M0 In 1999 the 
Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission investigated the law regulating 
directors' duties and produced a joint report - `Company Directors: Regulating 
Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a Statement of Duties, 64' which clarified that 
there should be a statutory provision codifying the principal duties of company 
directors. In 2002, the CLR took a step further and proposed a statutory statement of 
duties642 and recommended that the general duties imposed on directors should be put 
on a statutory footing, to provide greater clarity on what is expected of directors and 
make the law more accessible; and to make development of the law in this area more 
639 See R. Slynn, 2003. Directors' Duties. In Glen James, Slaughter and May ed. A Practitioners Guide to Directors 'Duties and Responsibilities, City & Financial Publishing, p87. 6'0 See Boyle, A. J. and J. Birds, 2004. Boyle & Bi ds'Company Law, St' ed. Jordans, p535. Law Commission Report `Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a Statement of Duties', Law Com. No. 153, (London: Stationery office, 1999), para. 14.4, at p273-274. 
64' Ibid. Law Commission Report. 
642 See the CLR, Final Report, op cit. fn. 269. 
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predictable; and to correct the defects in the present duties relating to conflicts of 
interest. 3 
A new statutory statement of directors' general duties under the Bill set out seven 
general duties based on certain common law rules and equitable principles and are 
to be interpreted and applied in the same way as common law rules or equitable 
principles as they apply in relation to directors 
M5 The statutory duties specified in 
sections 154-170 of the Bill which are owed by a director of a company to the 
company include: 
(1) Duty to act within powers. 46This duty codifies the current principle of equity 
under which a director should exercise his/her power in accordance with the terms of 
articles of associations of the company and use that power for a proper purpose 647 
However, this stark statutory statement offers no specific guidance to the courts. The 
application of this duty will still need the courts to make their assessments of what 
should count as a breach. 
(2) Duty to promote the success of the company. 648 This duty enshrines in the 
statutes what is commonly referred to as the principle of "enlightened shareholder 
value" 649 Under this principle a director must act in a way that he or she considers, in 
" See the Notes, op cit. fn. 389. para. 301. 
641 See ibid, para. 304. 
641 See cl. 154 (3) & (4) of the Bill. 
646 See ibid, 155 of the Bill. 
64" Common law principle of proper purpose has been discussed in section 7.2.1. 
64' See c1.156 of the Bill. Some concerns have been raised as to the meaning of 'success' in this context and there 
will be considerable uncertainty as to how success is to be judged. I lowever, the government has stated that 
'success' will normally mean "long-term increase in value". See Lord Sainsbury of Turville, Second Reading 
debate, Hansard Col. 245,11 January 2006. 
649 See cl. 156 of the Bill. 
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good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members as a whole. In doing so, there is a non-exhaustive list of factors 
which a director has to consider: (a) the likely consequences of any decision in the 
long term; (b) the interests of employees; (c) the need to foster the company's 
business relationships with suppliers, customers and others; (d) the impact on the 
community and environment; (e) the desirability of the company maintaining a 
reputation for high business conduct, and (f) the need to act fairly between 
members 650 The scope of these obligations is somewhat vague, since there are no 
general recognized standards as to what "promoting the success of the company" 
means in practice. In addition, it is also ambiguous as to whether a director could be 
held in breach of his duty when he or she fails to consider the factors (a) to (f) listed 
above or give one factor less weight than others when making day-to-day decisions. 
(3) Duty to exercise independent judgment 651 This duty requires directors not to 
fetter their discretion to act other than in accordance with an agreement which has 
been duly entered into by the company or in a way authorised by the company's 
constitution. 652 This duty provides a departure from the common law - `prohibit 
directors from fettering their future discretion' the meaning of which the courts have 
interpreted over many years. 
(4) Duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence 653 This duty which derives 
from the recent case law and s. 214 of the IA 1986 (discussed in s. 7.2.2 above), sets 
650 Ibid. 
61' See cl. 157 of the Bill. 
652 Ibid. 
653 See cl. 158 of the Bill. 
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out a combined objective and subjective test. The combined dual standard test 
recognises that a director owes a duty to his/her company to exercise the same 
standard of care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent 
person with: (a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be 
expected of a person carrying out the same functions as the director in relation to that 
company - "an objective test", and (b) the general knowledge, skill and experience 
that the director actually has - "a subjective test". The codified dual test approach 
confirmed the fact that not every director will have an equal knowledge and 
understanding of a company's business. Consequently, the duty imposed will vary 
according to the role of each individual played in the company. In effect, the test will 
ensure that those directors with more experience, including non-executive directors, 
will be subject to a higher standard by virtue of their particular knowledge, skill and 
experience. 
(5) Duty to avoid conflict of interest 6M This duty covers all conflicts, actual and 
potential, between the interests of the directors and interests of the company. This 
includes conflicts relating to exploitation of the company's property, information or 
opportunity for personal purposes. This duty does not apply to a conflict of interest 
arising in relation to a transaction or arrangement with the company. However, such a 
transaction or arrangement must be declared under clause 161 in the case of proposed 
transactions or clause 165 in the case of existing transactions unless an exception 
applies under those clauses. 6ss in addition, the Bill clarifies that this duty is not 
654 See c1.159 of the Bill 
655 See the Notes, op cit. fn 389, para. 337. 
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infringed if the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as arising in relation to a 
conflict of interest; or the matter has been authorised by the directors (i. e. 
authorisation has been given by the independent directors in a public company) and 
the authorisation is effective (i. e. satisfied with the quorum of the meeting or voting 
procedural requirements) 656 
(6) Duty not to accept benefit from third party 657 This duty aims to prohibit the 
exploitation of the position of director for personal benefit. However, it will not 
prohibit directors from accepting a benefit from a third party as a result of their 
directorship if its acceptance cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a 
conflict of interest. 58 Nevertheless, in practice, this duty may give rise to debate and 
some uncertainty over what benefit may be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict. 
(7) Duty to declare interest in proposed transaction with the company 659 This 
duty requires a director not only to disclose any interest, direct or indirect, that he/she 
has in relation to a proposed transaction or arrangement with the company, but also 
declare the nature and extent of his/her interests to the other directors. In addition, a 
director must make further declaration if the earlier disclosure is no longer accurate or 
complete. A director will breach the duty if he/she fails to declare something he/she 
ought reasonably to have known, but the duty does not otherwise require a director to 
declare anything he/she does not know 66° 
656 See the Notes, op cit. fn 389 pars 339-34 1. 
657 See cl. 160 of the Bill. 
658 See the Notes, op cit. fn 389 Para 342 - 344. 659 See cl. 161 of the Bill. 
60 See the Notes, op cit. fn 389 Para 345-352. 
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Inevitably, the Bill initiated the main elements of the directors' fiduciary duties 
established by both common law and the equitable principles which set out the basic 
standards of directors' accountability. The statutory statement of directors' fiduciary 
duties intends to provide greater clarity and useful guidance for directors to 
understand what the law expects them to do and make the law more accessible. The 
codification of directors' fiduciary duties will in turn help to improve standards of 
governance in UK listed companies. 
7.3 Duties of Directors in China 
7.3.1 The Duty of Loyalty 
Unlike the UK directors' fiduciary duties which have been developed over a century 
with a process of judicial decisions setting precedents and applying or distinguishing 
them in various circumstances by the judges, China did not start developing a range of 
directors' duties until the early 1990s. Prior to 1990, there was little codification to 
regulate corporate directors and managers. With the promulgation of the CCL 1994 
the legal underpinning for the concept of directors' duties was put into place. 
Although the words "fiduciary duties" were not clearly expressed, certain concepts 
akin to these duties manifested themselves in the context of the CCL 1994. For 
example, Article 59 of the CCL 1994 states that the directors, supervisors and 
managers shall abide by the company's articles of association, faithfully perform their 
duties and protect the interests of the company and shall not take advantage of their 
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position, functions and powers in the company to seek personal gains, 
661 which is akin 
to a fiduciary duty of loyalty under common law. Under this provision, 
it seems that 
directors, supervisors and general managers should act in a bona fide and diligent way 
in the interests of the company. However, the words "faithful" and "the interests of 
the company" employed in the context of the Article 59 of the CCL 1994 
have not 
been clearly defined so that they are not well understood by either the directors or 
shareholders. 
In addition, Article 60 of the CCL 1994 provides that the directors and managers of a 
company shall not misappropriate company funds including lending company funds 
to others, depositing company assets in the directors' own personal accounts or in 
personal accounts of other individuals, or using company assets as security for the 
personal debts of shareholders of the company or of other individuals 
662 This strict 
rule seems to function against any director and manager who might misuse his or her 
power in a particular situation mentioned above. However, this provision is difficult 
to enforce because most listed companies in China are controlled by the majority or 
controlling shareholders. 
663 As we have seen these shareholders are mainly SOEs, 
government agencies, or other corporate entities and they frequently dominate the 
board of directors. An outstanding problem in these companies is that the controlling 
shareholders divert the capital of listed companies for other uses and listed companies 
provide guarantees for controlling shareholders. According to data from the CSRC, 
661 Art. 59 of the CCL 1994. 
662 Art. 60 of the CCL 1994. 
"3 See Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
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the problem of controlling shareholders diverting the capital for other uses existed in 
676 listed companies with a total value of RMB 96.669 billion (£7.4 billion) and 20% 
of listed companies provided guarantees for controlling shareholders and associated 
parties in 2002 664 This problem becomes even more serious when it is realised that 
some listed companies have suffered great economic losses or a considerable threat to 
the operation of the company by breaching this provision, but none of these 
companies' directors has been held in breach of fiduciary duties 
665 
At common law, the "no-conflict" rule is probably the most important of the 
directors' fiduciary duties. Article 61 of the CCL 1994 also provides a mandatory 
context which regulates two distinct factual situations in which conflicts of duty and 
interests are likely to arise. Firstly, directors and managers are prohibited from 
engaging in their own business or operating business for others in the same business 
category as the company which they are serving, or engaging in any acts which may 
damage the interests and benefits of the company, and any profits derived from such 
acts will be appropriated by the company. 
66 Secondly, directors and managers are 
prohibited from entering into contracts or conducting transactions with the company 
unless they are authorised by the articles of association or approved by the 
664 See Q. Jiang, op cit. fn. 235. 
66' For example, on 31 December 1999, Monkey King plc provided funds for an amount of RMB890,000,000 and a 
guarantee for RMB244,000,000 to Monkey King Group, its majority shareholder. The aggregate amount of the two 
items exceed RMB1,130,000,000 and represent 121.4% of its total assets. As a result, Monkey King plc was 
operating under great difficulties. On 27 February 2001, the Monkey King Group was declared bankrupt in 
accordance with law. Monkey King plc was also close to bankruptcy. Jinan Motorbicycle, a publicly listed 
company, provided funds and guarantee for an amount of more than RMB2,500,000,000 to Jinan Motorcycle 
Group, its majority shareholder. This resulted in huge losses for 2001. See Gao Xianmin (Ed. ), Secrets of Listed 
Companies World Publication Press, 2001, pp. 101-110; Jinan Motorcycle: Replay of Monkey King Fiasco, 
published on 17 June 2001 in Nanfang Weekend 
pu Para. l ofArt. 6lof the CCL 1994. 
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shareholder meeting. 667 It seems clear that the CCL 1994 seeks to ensure that the 
company's interests are favoured by a strict no conflict rule that whenever a director 
acts in these circumstances, any profits he might make will have to be disgorged to 
the company. Nevertheless, what is notable compared with the UK no-conflict 
principle is that the duty of disclosure has been entirely omitted under Art. 61 of the 
CCL 1994. In the absence of a detailed provision on the duty of disclosure, the proper 
functioning of the fiduciary duties designed to control conflicts of interest should be 
difficult to enforce in China. 
Unlike UK fiduciary duties of directors, in China a "no-profit" rule was not specified 
as a duty to directors under the CCL 1994. Instead, Article 62 of the CCL 1994 
stipulates that directors, supervisors and managers must not disclose any company 
secrets unless otherwise in accordance with the law or approved by shareholder 
meeting. 668 This provision seems to present the rule against the exploitation of 
corporate opportunities or information in order to resolve the problem of conflicts of 
interest. However, the term "company secrets" is not defined by the law. Such a 
provision has been criticised as being too skeletal with a lack of operating 
standards 669 In practice, without the support of equitable principles and precedents, it 
is doubtful that the Chinese courts, especially the local courts, 'will interpret the term 
"company secret" under Art. 62 and implement it to penalise directors. 
667 Ibid para. 2. 
668 ibid, art. 62. 
19 Zhang, X. C., 1998. Practical Demands to Update the Company law, Hong Kong Law Journal 28,248-260 at 
254. Yuan, A. 2000. Foreign Direct Investments in China - Practical Problems of Coping with China's Company 
Law and Laws for Foreign-invested Enterprises. Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, 20: 
475-508, p493. 
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As have been discussed above, there are a number of problems with directors' duties 
under the CCL 1994, compared with the established case law and new statutory 
statement of directors' duties in the UK. First, the CCL 1994 imposes fiduciary duties 
on directors, but these apparently fall short of the generally accepted standards to test 
whether the directors act bona fide in the interests of the company. Moreover, without 
requiring the declaration of interests of directors, the no-conflict of interest rule will 
not be effectively implemented. Finally, the vague language of the law creates some 
difficulties for the courts and judges to penalise the directors. 
The CSRC has clearly realised the problems and tried to pursue the quasi-regulation 
to improve the standards of behaviour of directors. In 1997, the CSRC published the 
Directive of Articles of Association of Listed Companies (the Directive 1997) which 
applies to all companies listed in China's Stock Exchange Markets. The Directive 
1997, with twelve chapters and 194 Articles, attempt to provide a uniform model for 
listed companies to formulate their articles. Several articles in the Directive 1997 
concern the problems of directors' duties mentioned above. For example, in addition 
to duties and responsibilities of directors specified by the CCL 1994, the Directive 
1997 imposes additional fiduciary duties on directors. Article 80 of the Directive 1997 
stipulates that directors shall comply with the law, corporate regulation and the 
company's articles of association, -faithfully perform their duties and protect the 
interests of the company. Once a director is in a position in which his or her duty to 
the company conflicts with this personal interest, the director must act in the best 
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interests of the company and shareholders, and ensure that: (i) directors should remain 
within the scope of powers which have been conferred on them-, 670 (ii) directors must 
not take advantage of their office to obtain for themselves or others any business 
opportunity which ought to belong to the company, or accept commissions in 
connection with the company's transaction without the informed consent of the 
shareholders in a shareholders meeting 671 
In order to ensure that directors are precluded from entering into engagements in 
which they have, or can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which may conflict, 
with the interests of the company they serve, the Directive 1997 further provides that: 
"[E]xcept as permitted by the articles of association or legally authorized by 
the board of directors, a director may not act on behalf of the company or the 
board of directors in his own name. If a third party reasonably believes that a 
director, who is acting in his own name, is acting on behalf of the company or 
the board of directors, such a director must clarify his position and status in 
advance"672 
In addition, if a director or an enterprise in which he/she assumes a position has an 
interest, directly or indirectly, in any existing or proposed transaction, contract or 
arrangement of the company (other than a service contract), such a director must 
disclose his/her interests to the board of directors at the earliest opportunity. The 
670 Article 80 (1) of the Directive 1997, op cit. fn. 227. 
671 Ibid. art. 80 (7) - (8). 
672 Ibid. art. 82. 
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interested director may not be counted in the quorum for or vote at the board meeting 
with respect to such matters. A related party transaction approved by the board of 
directors in violation of the above requirements may be avoided at the option of the 
company, unless the transaction is entered into between the company and a third party 
acting in good faith 673 
As we have seen, all these provisions clearly reflect the trend of improving the current 
legal framework of company law by introducing more familiar common law rules and 
doctrines. Although the title of the Directive 1997 may not readily indicate its 
mandatory nature, the CSRC has made it clear that any change or deletion of the 
necessary contents of the Directive 1997 without acceptable justification will cause 
CSRC's refusal to process any application from the companies concerned for their 
listing matters. 74 Nevertheless, because this Directive 1997 is neither the formal law 
nor a judicial explanation promulgated by the Supreme Peoples' Court (SPC), it 
carries very weak legal authority, which casts doubt on whether courts in China would 
recognize its legal effects. Indeed, experience has shown that regulations and 
enforcement have provided neither the companies nor shareholders with the 
protection they require 675 
673 Ibid. art. 83. 
674 See the Notice of the CSRC Concerning Promulgation of the Directive of on Article of Association for Listed 
Companies, (Zhengjian) [1997] No. 16. 
673 See Deng, J. 2005. Building an Investor-Friendly Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit System in China, Harvard 
International Law Journal, (46), p347. 
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Although the Chinese government has realised that it is very important to reinforce 
the directors' duty of loyalty to the company by placing a maximum constraint on a 
director against them to gain personal benefits from corporate opportunities, we note 
with considerable disappointment that the CCL 2006 did not reframe much of the 
duties imposed on directors by the Directive 1997. The legal effects of the non- 
conflict rules and the rule of disclosure imposed on directors by the Directive 1997 
remain unclear. The duty of loyalty of directors provided under the CCL 1994 simply 
reappeared in the CCL 2006 with a refined list of eight principles that could properly 
guide the consideration of individual issues in relation to the duty of loyalty. 
676 
However, there is no detailed rule to describe either the content of the relevant 
obligations, or the appropriate enforcement mechanism to ensure how gains made 
from the breach can be restored to the company. 
7.3.2 Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence 
In China, the absence of the duty of care, skill and diligence of company directors is 
the weakest portion of the CCL 1994. However, the Directive 1997 clarified that 
directors must exercise their powers given by the company with care, 
676 Art 149 of the CCL 2006 provides a checklist prohibiting directors and senior officers from the following acts: 
(1) to misappropriate any funds of the company; (2) to deposit funds of the company in bank accounts opened in 
their own names or in the names of others; (3) to lend funds of the company to others or put up assets of the 
company as security for others in violation of the articles of association of the company or without approval by the 
shareholder general meeting or the board of directors; (4) to enter into any contract or transaction with the 
company in violation of the articles of association of the company or without approval of the shareholder meeting 
or shareholder general meeting; (5) to take advantages of their positions to obtain for their own benefit or the 
benefit of others any business opportunities that belong to the company or to engage in the same type of business 
as that of the company for their own account or for the account of others without approval of the shareholders' 
meeting or the shareholders' general meeting; (6) to accept commissions on transactions between others and the 
company and keep such commissions as their own; (7) to disclose any secret of the company without authorisation; 
and (8) to commit any other act that is in violation of their duty of loyalty to the company. Gains made by a 
director or a senior officer in violation of any of the provisions above shall be restored to the company. 
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conscientiousness and diligence677 so as to ensure that: (i) the company's business 
activities comply with state laws, regulations and economic policies and do not 
exceed the business scope stipulated by its business license; 678 (ii) directors treat all 
shareholders fairly; 679 (iii) directors read all commercial or financial reports of the 
company carefully and timely acquaint themselves with the business operation and 
management of the company; 68° (iii) a director personally exercises the lawful powers 
to manage the company free from the control of others and shall not delegate his 
powers to others, except as permitted by laws, regulations or approved by informed 
shareholders in a shareholders meeting; 681 and (iv) directors accept the lawful 
supervision and reasonable suggestions on their performance of their duties provided 
by the supervisory committee. 82 In addition, Article 85 of the CSRC Directive 1997 
provides that a director who fails to attend two successive board meetings, whether in 
person or through delegating his duties to others, is deemed incapable of performing 
his duties and the board of directors shall propose to the shareholder meeting to 
remove that director. 683 
From the above provisions we can see that China has employed a different approach 
to define the duty of care, skill and diligence compared with the UK. As previously 
examined, in the UK there is a clear emphasis on both subjective and objective 
677 Art. 81 of the Directive 1997, op cit. fn. 227. 
678 Ibid. art. 81 (1). 
67 Ibid. att. 81 (2). 
680Ibid art. 81(3) 
691 Ibid. Wt 81 (4) 
682Ibid art. 81(5) 
683 ibid. art. 85 
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standards to justify directors' conduct in running a company's affairs. In comparison, 
the CSRC Directive 1997 just provides a radical restatement of duty of care with a 
checklist for the compliance with due diligence (the objective test), but no 
consideration is given to whether directors might come to the task with different 
backgrounds in terms of knowledge, ability and experience (the subjective test). 
Accordingly, directors could easily be held liable just by virtue of their failure to 
perform some required activities, such as failure to attend the board meetings, or 
failure to treat all shareholders fairly, or failure to pay attention to the company's 
financial reports, or failure to be involved in the management and independent 
business decision making, or failure to accept supervisions. For example, Baiw cn plc 
allegedly exaggerated its profits by 19 million RMB before its initial public offering 
in 1996 and then invented another 143.9 million RMB in profits during its three years 
as a listed company. The company was also accused of providing misleading financial 
statements in its annual reports. In September 2001, Jiahao Lu, a retired English 
professor, was charged with failure to perform his duties as an independent director of 
Baiwen from January 1995 to 2001 by CSRC. The CSRC alleged that Lu attended a 
meeting in 1995 where the board discussed the firm's financial statement, but failed to 
object or voice any opinion on the financial statements 684 
"4 Jiahao Lu was fined 100,000 RMB (£7400) by CSRC. This is the first case in which an independent director 
has been charged as breach of duty of care, skill and diligence in China. Lu appealed against the CSRC's 
judgement to the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Courts, but failed since he failed to file his appeal within the 
prescribed period under the Administrative Procedural Law. See Y. Yang, Ex-Baiwen Independent Directors Case 
Rejected, She=hen Daily, August 15,2002, available from: httn: //pdf sznew eo /(iß/ nntct/? nm n 
08/1S/content_, 1225103. htm [Accessed September 25,2005]. 
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However, it should be emphasised that operating an objective standard test without 
reference to any subjective consideration 
685 or a so-called `Business Judgment 
Rule'686 would render directors not to take appropriate business risks and also cause 
some practical problems which may hinder the enforcement of directors' duties. 
87 
Indeed, Li reports that directors have become increasingly frustrated with the CSRC's 
requirements on directors' duties so that more than 10 independent directors have 
resigned from listed companies after the Baiwen's independent director incident 
688 
To some extent, this tendency could be , attributed 
to the CSRC's decision to fine 
Jiahao Lu which made it impossible for directors to be excused by their inability or 
inexperience. To avoid possible adverse effects, China should, therefore, consider 
adopting either the subjective standard test or a general business judgement defence, 
with a restatement of duty of care, skill and diligence, in order to control directors' 
accountability effectively. Unfortunately, the CCL 2006 made no provision setting the 
parameters as to whether the duty of care and skill should be imposed upon directors, 
and if so, what degree of duty of care and skill is expected of a director. 
65 As discussed in section 7.2.2, the common law appears to endorse the view that if a company appoints a 
director who is not competent, or does not possess the requisite level of knowledge or experience, the company 
and its shareholders should bear the consequences of their own selections. 
' The Business Judgment Rule doctrine employed by the US courts when they are required to evaluate the 
potential liability of a corporate director to the corporate for damages allegedly sustained as a result of the 
director's lack of due care or attention. The rule was addressed in 4.01(c) of the Principle of Corporate Governance: 
Analysis and Recommendations, published by the American Law Institute in 1941. The rule requires that "a court 
will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the latter's decision can be attributed to any rational business 
purpose". See Cox, J. D., 1982. Searching for Corporation's Vote in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata 
and the ALI Project, Duke Law Journal, 959-1011, p962. 
687 See C. A. Riley, op cit. fn. 626. pp697-724. Similar point is made by the Law Commission Report `Company 
Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a Statement of Duties', Law Com. No. 153, (London: 
Stationery Office, 1999) paras. 3.85-3.91 
688 See Li, C., 2002. Independent Directors Quit as CSRC Gets Tough, South China Horning Post (I long Kong), 
August 21. 
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7.4 Conclusion 
Having determined that the key role of directors is to manage the company's business 
and exercise its powers, the legal system must devise some means of controlling the 
directors in the exercise of those powers to ensure that they act in the best interests of 
the company. The discussion in this chapter, which contains a detailed comparison of 
directors' duties between China and the UK, shows how the law has been developed 
in order to control directors' accountabilities. This chapter not only critically 
examines and analyses the duties imposed on the directors in the UK and China, but 
also highlights certain aspects of the law which need to be amended in China 
compared with the UK. Although the context of fiduciary duties and the duty of care, 
skill and diligence elaborated by the CSRC has shown a positive attempt to control 
directors' accountabilities, it is noteworthy that a regulatory regime will not be 
successful unless it has efficient and effective enforcement mechanisms. With this in 
mind, the next chapter will provide a detailed examination of the different 
mechanisms for the enforcement of directors' duties in China and the UK in order to 
determine the effectiveness of the legal control of directors' accountability in China 
compared with the UK. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF DIRECTORS' DUTIES 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has examined the role of legal duties in obliging directors to act 
in the interests of the company and its shareholders. We have seen that the rules and 
standards relating to directors' fiduciary duties and duty of care, skill and diligence 
have received considerable attention in both China and the UK over the years. We 
have also noted that although the formulation of these duties differs between China 
and the UK, the substance is much the same since China has apparently recently 
adopted some common law rules. The essential process of the imposition of the duties 
on directors obviously attempts to set bounds to directors' exercise of corporate 
powers and to prevent their corporate managerial powers from being used arbitrarily. 
However, Parkinson argues that for any of these functions to be fulfilled effectively, 
there must be a realistic prospect of enforcement which is largely dependent on 
shareholder action. 689 Fischei and Bradley argue that directors' duties enforced by 
derivative action play a fundamental role in aligning the interests of directors and 
shareholders. 690 Boyle claims that in the context of public listed companies, 
shareholders, especially institutional shareholders pursuing derivative actions, should 
be encouraged in their special role of providing a sanction for the system of corporate 
689 See J. E. Parkinson, 2000. Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues In the Theory of Company Law, Oxford 
University Press, p237. 
690 See Daniel R. Fischet and Michael Bradley, 1986. The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in 
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cornell Law Review, 261. 
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governance established by the Cadbury Report. 691 Pistor and Xu argue that simply 
transplanting the substantive rules, such as fiduciary duties, from one country to 
another might not always lead to the intended consequences. To ensure that the 
substantive rules are effective, procedural rules should also be designed in such a way 
that minority shareholders would have standing in court to seek compensation of 
damages 692 Indeed, the enforcement of directors' duties and the rights and remedies 
of shareholders raise not merely substantive provisions in company law, but also 
inevitably involve procedural issues that would enable shareholders to bring and 
pursue a lawsuit. 
It is with this issue in mind that the present chapter aims to examine the following 
questions: In what circumstances and upon what grounds will shareholders be able to 
bring an action against the wrongdoing directors in the UK and in China? How 
effective are the rules on shareholder action to ensure directors' accountability in 
China compared with the UK? If the enforcement rules in China are rather weak 
compared with the UK, how can the rules be improved? 
69' A. J. Boyle, 1997. The New Derivative Action, Company Lawyer. 18: 256, at 258. 692 Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, 2002. Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions: Lessons 
from the Incomplete Law Theory. Law Working Paper No. 01/2002. European Corporate Governance Institute. Available at httn: //econ. lse ac u /staff/cxuJpub/Pistor-Xu FidUcia ypuh, t1 pdf (Accesscd on 25 April 20051. 
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8.2 Enforcement of Directors' Duties in the UK 
8.2.1 The Rule in Foss v. Harbottle 
In Foss v. Harbottle693, two shareholders in a company 
sued its directors for 
fraudulent misapplication of the company's funds, arguing that the directors should 
compensate the company. The suit was brought on behalf of all of the shareholders 
except the director who was also a shareholder. It was held that the shareholders could 
not succeed, because the proper plaintiff was the company to whom the wrong had 
been done. The legacy of rule in Foss v Harbottle, was set out by Sir James Wigram 
VC who stated that in respect of wrongs done to the company, "the corporation 
should sue in its own name and in its corporate character, or in the name of someone 
whom the law has appointed to be its representative"694. Thus, if an action did not 
have the support either of the directors of the company, in whom the power to bring 
proceedings on the company's behalf generally rests, or of a majority of 
shareholders, 695 it could not proceed. 
The rule in Foss v. Harbottle was developed in MacDougall v. Gardiner where Lord 
Mellish said: 
693 (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
694 Ibid at 491. 
695 Generally, the management of a company is vested in its board of directors. Thus it is usually only the board 
which has the right to initiate proceedings in the company's name, and a board cannot be compelled to comply 
with a resolution of shareholders. See Automatic Self-Cleaning Filter Sydicate Co. Ltd v. Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 
34,45; John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v. Shaw [1935] 2 K13113,134; and Breckland Group Holdings Ltd v. 
London & Suffolk Properties Ltd. [1989] BCLC 100,104-105.1 lowever, in practice, and as noted in the above 
cases, a majority of shareholders will control the composition of the board, and may vote to remove directors if 
their wishes are not followed. 
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"in my opinion, if the thing complained of is a thing which in substance the 
majority of the company are entitled to do, or if something has been done 
irregularly which the majority of the company are entitled to do regularly, or if 
something has been done illegally which the majority of the company are entitled 
to do legally, there can be no use in having litigation about it, the ultimate end of 
which is only that a meeting has to be called, and then ultimately the majority 
gets its wishes"696 
This statement reflects that if the alleged wrong is ratifiable by a majority of the 
company's shareholders at the general meeting, the minority cannot bring a derivative 
action on behalf of the company against the wrongdoing directors. In this respect, the 
majority rule principle has generated the greatest legal uncertainty with the existing 
derivative action which is dependant upon shareholder ratification. Indeed, the 
possibility of ratification is sufficient to deprive the ability of a shareholder to bring a 
derivative action. 697 For example, majority shareholders may by lawful ratification 
preclude or terminate a derivative action regardless of whether it is in the interests of 
the other shareholders. 698 The most important question, however, is whether the 
minority shareholder has been improperly prevented from bringing such an action. It 
is therefore arguable that an unrestrained majority rule principle could provide no 
justification for depriving a shareholder of locus slandi to sue because the majority 
696 See MacDougall v. Gardiner [1875] 1 Ch 13 
697 See, Saul Fridman, 1992. Ratification of Directors' Breaches, 10 Company and Securities Law Journal, p252. 698 See Pender v Lushington (1877) 6 Ch. D. 7; Re Ringtower Holdings plc (1989) 5 BCC 82; and Re Astec (BSR) 
plc [1998] 2 BCLC 556. 
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might be ill-motivated or have a false impression of the meaning of ratification 
for the 
company's benefit. 
8.2.2 Fraud on Minority 
The above description of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle seems that it has rendered a 
minority shareholder unlikely to pursue proceedings on behalf of the company against 
wrongdoing directors. However, the courts have not taken this simple view, but rather 
a number of exceptions from the rule have been established. In Prudential Assurance 
Co Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd (No. 2) 
699 the Court of Appeal summarised Jenkins 
LJ's judgement in Edwards v. Halliwe11700 which established that: 
"... [T]here is no room for the operation of the rule if the alleged wrong is 
ultra vices the corporation, because the majority of members cannot confirm 
the transaction; there is also no room for the operation of the rule if the 
transaction complained of could be validly done or sanctioned only by a 
special resolution or the like, because a simple majority cannot confirm a 
transaction which requires the concurrence of a greater majority; and there is 
an exception to the rule where what has been done amounts to fraud and the 
wrongdoers are themselves in control of the company. "70' 
699 [1982] Ch 204. 
700 [1950] 2 All ER 1064,1066-1069. 
701 [1982] Ch 204 at 210-211. These exception principles were summarised in four headings (i) actions relating to 
personal rights. (ii) actions relating to ultra vires and illegality; (iii) actions relating to transactions which require a 
special majority; (iv) actions relating to transactions which constitute a "fraud on the minority". I lowever, it was 
said that the first three categories are usually treated as personal actions, while the only true exception to the rule 
of Foss v Ilarbottle is the fourth category - "fraud on minority". See Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies 
(Law Commission Report No. 246, Cm 3769, Stationary Office, 1997) p. 28; Wedderbum, Y. W. 1957. 
Shareholders' Rights and the Rule in Foss v llarboule, Cambridge Law Journal. 194,203, P. L. Davis, op 
cit. fn. 251, pp460-461. J. H. Farrar et al., op cit. fn. 245. pp433-436. 
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The scope of the exception principles to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle described above 
is important in determining the extent to which minority shareholders may enforce the 
duties owed by directors to their company by way of a derivative action. In the 
Prudential case, Vinelott J based his decision on the derivative action against the 
directors on the doctrine that a minority action should be allowed if "the interests of 
justice require that a minority action should be permitted. "702 The fraud on minority 
exception is typically an example created by the court to allow the injured 
shareholders to bring a derivative action on behalf of the company. However, to bring 
a derivative action within the scope of fraud on a minority a shareholder must 
establish: (i) the breach of duty by directors necessarily amounts to a fraud; and (ii) 
wrongdoer control which prevents an action being brought to vindicate the rights of 
the company 703 The first proposition is concerned with the kind of wrong for conduct 
for which the minority may maintain a derivative action. A clear example of wrongful 
conduct giving rise to a derivative action is the misappropriation of "money, property 
or advantages which belong to the company or in which the other shareholders are 
entitled to participate". 04 Such conduct amounts to a fraud on the minority if the 
majority attempt to sell worthless assets to the company, 705 or to divert business from 
the company to themselves in breach of fiduciary duties, 706 or to act in bad faith in 
702 [1982] Ch 204,327. 
703 See Burland v. Earle [1902] AC 83 (PC), at 93, and also Estmanco (Kilner h louse) Ltd v. Greater London 
Council [1982] 1 All ER 437 at 444. also see Brenda Hannigan, op cit. fn. 221, p458. 
704 See Burland V Earle [1902] AC 83 at 93. 
705 See Arwood v. Aferryweather (1867) LR 5 Eq 464, where the plaintiff claimed rescission of a contract entered 
into by directors and the return of money and shares paid to them in consideration for the sale, claiming that they 
had made a concealed profit. The court held that the directors had acted fraudulently and upheld the plainWT's 
claim. 
706 See Cook V. Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554, where the directors appropriated to themselves a contract which the 
company was actively pursuing, the court refused to permit the general meeting to ratify such conduct. This 
question is discussed further below. 
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exercising their power against a litigation for their own person benefit, rather than in 
the interests of the company, 707 and the minority shareholders are entitled to bring 
derivative actions. 
However, mere negligence by directors, even when it causes significant losses to the 
company, will not normally be sufficient, 
708 unless it is self-serving negligence where 
the directors have profited from their wrongdoing. 709 In the case of Daniels v. 
Daniels, Templeman J said that: "to put up with foolish directors is one thing; to put 
up with directors who are so foolish that they make a profit of £150,000 odd at the 
expense of the company is something entirely diferent. "710 Templeman J concluded 
that directors who exercised their powers, intentionally or unintentionally, 
fraudulently or negligently, in a manner which benefits themselves at the expense of 
the company was within the scope of fraud on the minority exception and a minority 
shareholder could bring an action against them on behalf of the company. 711 This 
decision was affirmed in Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd. V. Greater London Council, 
where Sir Robert Megarry V-C states that "fraud in the phrase `fraud on a minority' 
seems to be being used as comprising not only fraud at common law but also fraud in 
707 See Menier v. Hooper's Telegraph Works (1874) 9 Ch App 350. 
708 see Pavides v Jensen [1956] Ch 565. where a minority shareholder was denied standing to sue in respect of an 
allegedly negligent sale of a corporate asset at an excessively low price, the court held that there is no "allegation 
of fraud on the part of the directors or appropriation of assets of the company by the majority shareholders in fraud 
of minority, the action did not fall within the admitted exceptions to the rule in Foss vI larbottle.. ". Per 
Danckwerts J. at 576. 
709 See Daniels v. Daniels [1978] Ch 406, where minority shareholders brought an action against the company's 
directors, alleging they had caused the company to seek a piece of land to one of them at an undervalued price. 
Templeman J states that "if minority shareholders can sue if there is fraud, I see no reason why they cannot sue 
where the action of the majority and the directors, though without fraud, confers some benefit on those directors 
and majority shareholders themselves". Per Templeman J. at 414. 
710 Ibid. 
711 Ibid. 
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the wider equitable sense of that term, as in the equitable concept of a fraud on a 
power' , 712 power'. The term "fraud" interpreted above is valuable in clarifying the meaning of 
`fraud on minority' and restricting the scope of Pavlides v Jensen713 where although 
directors had been guilty of gross negligence in selling a valuable asset of the 
company at a price greatly below its true market value, the action was not held within 
the fraud on minority as no benefits accrued to the directors. 
In addition to establishing a fraud on minority, the court in the UK has always 
required a shareholder to satisfy the second proposition which is concerned with the 
degree of control of the wrongdoers in the company. The court will not allow a 
derivative action to proceed unless it is clear that the person who has committed a 
wrong against the company is also in control of that company! 14 It might be enough 
to show "wrongdoer control" of the company if, for example, the wrongdoers had dc 
jure control over a majority of the votes, or controlled another company and it owned 
a majority of votes to which the wrong had been done. The case of Cook v Deeks71 s is 
the leading authority which entails the wrongdoers being the owners of a majority of 
the company's shares. In this case, three directors who held three-quarters of the 
company's issued shares, diverted a contract that "belonged in equity to the company 
and ought to have been dealt with as an asset of the company" to another company 
which they also controlled. Subsequently, a resolution* was passcd at a genoral 
712, See Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd V. Greater London Council [1982] 1 All ER 437 at 445. 
713 [1956] Ch 565. 
714 See Burland v Earle [19021 AC 83 (PC) at p93. 
715 See Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554. 
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meeting to ratify what they had done since the wrongdoing directors commanded the 
majority votes. The Privy Council refused to permit the general meeting to ratify such 
conduct by noting that: 
".. .a resolution that the rights of 
the company should be disregarded in this mater 
would amount to forfeiting the interests and property of the minority shareholders 
in favour of the majority and that by the votes of those who are interested in 
securing the property for themselves, such use of voting power has never been 
sanctioned by the courts. "716 
However, the difficulty which might arise in a public listed company with a large 
number of dispersed shareholders, as we have discussed in Chapter 4, and many 
shares are held by nominees and trustees, causes de facto control or the rational 
apathy and the free rider problem. Therefore, there is a risk that a minority 
shareholder will be denied seeking to bring a derivative action even if the wrongdoers 
may deserve to be litigated. The courts were aware of considerations like the one 
discussed above. In Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd (No. 2) 717, 
Vinelott J held that there was "no good reason why the court should not have regard 
to any other circumstances which show that the majority cannot be relied on to 
determine in a disinterested way whether it is truly in the interests of the company that 
proceedings should be brought". 
718 English courts have adopted a conservative 
approach to the rule of fraud on minority exception which requires the minority 
716 Ibid, at 564. 
717 See [1981] Ch 257, [198012 All ER 841. ... 
718 Ibid, [1981] Ch 257 at 324, [1980] 2 All ER 841 at 857. = 
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shareholders to show that defendants control a majority of the voting rights in the 
company, and this has rendered the minority shareholders unlikely to bring an action 
under this exception. 719 The Law Commission Report on Shareholder Remedies 
argues that the law has provided little guidance in the cases for a minority shareholder 
seeking to prove `wrongdoer control' for the purpose of the `fraud on minority' 
exception to the rule. 720 The difficulties of determining `wrongdoer control' act as a 
major curb on derivative actions, particularly in large public companies. 
8.2.3 Personal Actions 
As noted in the statement of the Edwards v. Halliwell case discussed above, a 
shareholder may bring an action against a director of a company in respect of 
transactions requiring a special majority, or an ultra vires or illegal act; or breaches of 
personal rights arising from the company's constitution. 21 However, these actions are 
to be thought of as personal actions, not true exceptions to the rule of Foss v 
Harbottle, as the wrong was done to the shareholders' personal rights as opposed to 
wrongs done to the corporate body. The shareholders' personal rights arise in part 
from the memorandum and articles of a company which constitute a contract betwccn 
the company and the members and the member inter 723 and in part from the 
general law. 724 However, unlike any other contract, this arrangement creates 
719 See A. J. Boyle, 2002, Minority Shareholders' Remedies. Cambridge University Press, p29. 
10 See Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies, op cit. fn. 701. p32 
721 See Simpson v Westminster Palace Hotel Co. (1860) 8111, Cas 172, Wood v Odessa Il aterworks Co. (1889) 42 
ChD 636. 
722 See J. l i. Farrar et al., op cit. fn. 245, p433. 
723 See section 14 (1) of the Companies Act 1985.11bod v Odessa Il'aierwork Co. (1889) 42 ChD 636. 
724 Pennington surmised that under the contract (the memorandum and articles of association) a shareholder has a 
right to be entered on the register of members; to transfer shares; to vote and participate in shareholder meeting, to 
receive dividends properly declared or capital payments validly determined upon. See R. R. Pennington, (2001), 
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individual legal rights in the parties which may not be enforced by the courts 
725 A 
director acts ultra vires which amounts to a breach of the `statutory contract' 
constituted by the articles and will be actionable by an individual shareholder. 
726 The 
standing given the right of a shareholder to bring an action restraining an ultra vires 
transaction by case law is expressly recognised in s. 35 (3) of the CA1985. However, it 
is notable that if the ultra vires or illegal act has been completed, any loss accruing to 
the company can be recoverable in an action brought by the company itself, so the 
individual shareholder will lose the right to bring an action to recover that loss, unless 
he/she can bring a derivative action as an exception to the rule in Foss v Harboule 
727 
In addition, the directors and the majority must follow the procedure specified in the 
articles, otherwise the minority shareholders can bring an action to restrain them 728 
Moreover, the courts have allowed personal actions to enforce a wide range of 
personal rights which accrue to a shareholder. For example, a shareholder has been 
entitled to enforce a right in the articles to be paid a cash dividend, 729 to challenge the 
resolution that was not passed bona fide in the interests of the company, 730 or to bring 
Pennington's Company Law, 8th ed. Butterworths, p794 
MS For example, breaches of certain provisions relating to the conduct of general meetings are mere 'internal 
irregularities' for which no personal action may lie if the majority can ratify these irregularities. See Cotter v 
National Union of Seamen [1929] 2 Ch 58, the court refused to allow the shareholder to bring a personal action to 
restrain the carrying out of certain resolutions passed at improperly convened meetings. 
7 see Soden v British and Commonwealth Holding plc [1998] AC 298, it was observed by Lord Brownc- 
Wilkinson that: `to the bundle of rights and liabilities created by the memorandum and articles of the company 
must be added those rights and obligations of members conferred and imposed by the Companies Act. For ease of 
reference I will refer to the combined effect of section 14 and the other rights and liabilities of members imposed 
by the Companies Acts as the "statutory contract". '; also see Simpson v Westminster Palace Hotel Co (1860) 81 IL 
Cas 712; Hoole v Great Western Rly Co (1867) 3 Ch App 262 at 277. s. 35 (2), CA 1985. 
727 See Smith v Croft (No-2) [1988] Ch 114. 
7n See Automobile Self-Cleaning Filter Syndicate Co Lid v Cunninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34; Quin & Axtens Lid v 
Salmon [1909] AC 442; Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064. 
729 Woods v Odessa Waterworks Co (1889) 42 Ch D 636 
730 MacConnell vE Prill & Co [1916] 2 Ch57; Baillie v Oriental Telephone and Electric Co Ltd 1191511 Ch 503 
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claims based on irregularities in voting procedures. 31 Nevertheless, there does not 
seem to be any generally accepted test of what is and what is not a personal right so 
that the court will normally incline to treat a provision in the memorandum or articles 
as conferring a personal right on an individual only if the rights have accrued to the 
shareholder individually and not simply to him/her in common with other 
shareholders. 32 If a wrong is alleged to have been done to the company, a shareholder 
with only an equitable interest in shares of a company will not be allowed to bring a 
derivative claim unless it falls into the exception of the rule in Foss v Harbottle. 
8.2.4 The Unfairly Prejudicial Remedy 
In addition to the fraud on minority and certain personal actions discussed above, 
sections 459 to 461 of the CA 1985 provide shareholders with a remedy where the 
company's affairs are conducted in a manner that is unfair to their interests 733 There 
is no statutory definition to confine . what might constitute the "unfair prejudicial 
conduct" in the context of s. 459. However, according to case law, it includes: (i) 
exclusion of a minority shareholder from management; 734 (ii) misappropriation or 
diversion of corporate assets; 735 (iii) failure to provide information; 736 (iv) improper 
731 Oliver v Dalgleish [1963] 1 WLR 1274; Re British Sugar Refining Co (1857) 3 K&J 408; and Wood & Odessa Waterworks Co (1889) 42 Ch D 636. 
732 See R. R. Pennington, op cit. fn. 724, p795. 
` See s. 459(l) of the CA 1985 provides that "a member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an 
order under this Part (Pt XVII of the CA 1985) on the ground that the company's affairs are being or have been 
conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of its members generally or some part of its 
members (including at least himself) or that any actual or proposed actor omission of the company (including an 
act or omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial. " 
74 See Re Saul D Harrison [1995] BCLC 14, Re Haden Bill Electrical Ltd [1995] 2 BCLC 280 and Re a Company (No 007623 of 1984) BCLC 362. 
735 See Re London School of Electrics Ltd [1986] Ch 211; Re Slewarts (Brixton) Ltd [1985] BCLC 4; Re Elgindata 
Ltd [1991] BCLC 959; and Re Little Olympian Each-Ways Ltd (No. 3) [1995] BCLC 4. 736 See Re Ringtower Holding plc [1989] BCLC 427; Re Elgindata Ltd [19911 BCLC 959; and Re Blue Arrow plc [1987] BCLC 585 
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increases in share capital; 737 (v) excessive remuneration; 738 (vi) non-payment or 
payment of inadequate dividends; 739 (vii) mismanagement and oppression; 740 and 
(viii) alteration of articles of association. 41 In addition, the court always has wide 
discretion to interpret the concept of `unfair prejudice' in accordance with the relevant 
background and the context in which the term is used. 42 But this does not mean that 
the court can do whatever the individual judge happens to think fair. The concept of 
fairness must be applied judicially and based on rational principles. If the unfairly 
prejudicial circumstances are established, the court may make a variety of orders as it 
thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the matters which the petitioner complained of 
under s. 461 of the CA 1985. There are four main orders, namely: (i) an order 
regulating the future affairs of the company; 743 (ii) an order requiring the company to 
act or to restrain from 744 (iii) an order authorising the shareholder to bring civil 
proceeding on the company's behalf; 745 (iv) an order requiring the company or other 
shareholders to purchase the complainant's shares. It was said that the restriction on 
the use of the derivative action caused by the Foss v Harbottle may be avoided in 
some, but not all, cases by petitioning the court under the unfairly prejudicial 
remedy. 47 
737 See Re Saul D Harrison [1995] 1 BCLC 14; Rea Company (No 002623 of 1984) [1985 BCLC 80; Re DR 
Chemicals Ltd [1989] BCLC 383. 
ng See Re a Company (No. 002612 of 1984) (1986) BCC 99. 
739 See Re a Company (No. 00370 of 1987), ex pane Glossop [1988] 1 WLR 1068; Re Sam {feller & Son Ltd 
[1990] Ch 682 
40 See Re Five Minute Car Wash Service Ltd [1966] 1 WLR 745; Re Elgindata Ltd [19911 BCLC 959; and Re Macro (7pseich) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 354 
741 See Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656 and Greenhalgh v Andern Cinemas Ltd [195 11 Ch 286. 
742 See O Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092. - 743 S. 461 (2)(a) of the CA 1985 
741 ibid s. 461 (2)(b) 
745 ibid, s. 461 (2)(c). 
746 ibid, s. 461 (2)(d). 
747 See Anthony L. Marks and William M. Rees, Shareholders' Actions, International Company and Commercial 
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8.2.5 A New Derivative Action 
As we have seen from the above analysis, UK company law has imposed strict 
principles for governing shareholder actions which constitute the proper plaintiff rule, 
the principle of majority rule, the rule of fraud on minority, the rule of personal right 
actions and the rule on unfairly prejudicial remedy. 
748 These principles have been 
"problematic and unsatisfactory "749 since they have made it difficult for an individual 
shareholder to bring an action against the wrongdoing directors. Davis argues that 
directors' duties are not likely to play a significant role in the governance of UK 
companies as they are rarely enforced, either in actual litigation or in the threat of 
it. 750 Parkinson observes that directors' duties are better regarded as playing an 
educative role rather than as acting as a mechanism of control because strict 
enforcement of those rules is impracticable 751 
The rationale behind these notions can be attributed to the rule in Foss v Ifarbottle 
that the duties of directors are owed to the company rather than to individual 
shareholders. If a wrong is done by a director, the company is the proper person to sue 
for the damage. However, directors are unlikely to cause the company to commence a 
claim in negligence against its own board members for breach of duty because the 
wrongdoers may be a majority of the board or may be able to influence a majority of 
Law Review, 1991,2(2), 39-46. 
748 See Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies, op cit. fn. 701, para. 1.9, p5. 
71' Richard C. Nolan, 2006. The Legal Control of Directors' Conflicts of Interest in the United Kingdom: Non. 
Executive Directors Following the Biggs Report. Theoretical Inquiries in Law Vol. 6, pp363-412. 750 See P. L. Davis, op cit. fn. 251, p443, 
751 Parkinson, J. 1997. Reforming Directors' Duties. Policy Paper No. 12. University of Sheffield: Political 
Economy Research Centre. 
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the board. On the other hand, where the board declines to sue, the general meeting 
may be able to do so. 752 - In this circumstance, it is open to a majority of the 
shareholders to decide not to sue the wrongdoing director or to ratify the director's 
breach of duty. 753 However, Davis points out that it has long been recognised that an 
ordinary majority of the shareholders in a general meeting may release the directors 
from many of their fiduciary duties, including duties of care and skill, provided at 
least the company is a going concern. 754 Indeed, in practice, even if it is impossible 
for directors to control the general meetings, through their own shareholdings alone or 
in combination with those of other shareholders whose decision they can influence, 
the majority shareholders, for instance, might properly take the view that the 
publicity, costs, and the inevitable loss would outweigh the benefit to the company 
successfully prosecuting an action, and therefore might properly decide not to sue. 55 
Apart from the arguments above, the traditional view of `fear of floodgates opening' - 
namely, the courts' belief that to allow a minority shareholder to commence an action 
on behalf of a company whenever the company has suffered some alleged wrong 
would be to open the floodgates to many future actions, has obliterated the potential 
for derivative action. 756 Moreover, the courts have always feared that, if a minority is 
able to bring all its grievances to court, the company and its management may become 
752 see Alexander Ward & Co Ltd v. Samyang Navigation Co Ltd [ 19751 1' WLR 673 at 679. 733 See Taylor v. National Union of Mineworkers [1985] BCLC 237 at 254.5 
754 See P. L. Davis, op cit. fn. 251, p437. 
iss see Taylor v. National Union of Mineworkers [1985] BCLC 237 at 254-5 756 See, e. g. the judgment of Mellish LJ in MacDougall v. Gardiner [1875] 1 Ch 13. 
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bogged down in the distractions and costs of litigation at the expense of its business 
and, ultimately, of all the members. 57 
The Law Commission Report on "Shareholder Remedies" which identified the 
problems of the rule in Foss v Harbottle - "the uncertainty of its exceptions for a 
shareholder bringing proceedings on behalf of a company" and recommended that 
there should be "a new derivative procedure with more modern, flexible and 
758 accessible criteria for determining whether a shareholder can pursue an action". 
The Report suggests that the proposed new derivative action would enable a 
shareholder to enforce any cause of action vested in the company against any person 
arising from any breach or threatened breach of duty by any director of any of his or 
her duties to the company. 759 In May 2005, the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) published Company Law Reform White Paper setting out its proposal which 
confirmed that the derivative action is an important mechanism by which shareholders 
can hold directors to account for the proper exercise of their duties in pursuit of their 
company's short and long-term interests. 60 The Bill has proposed, as recommended 
by the Law Commission Report, to put derivative action on a statutory footing. 61 
757 Loose, P., M. Griffiths and D. Impey, 2000. Company Director: Power, Duties and Liabilities, p 237,8th cd. Jordans. 
75$ See Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies, op cit. fn. 701, para. 6.15. 759 See ibid para. 15.2 
760 See DTI, Company Law Reform White Paper, March 2005, Ch3, available from: 
htt2: #%vNmdli. gov. uk/cIdMlhltcPaper. htm [Accessed 25 September 2005] 
761 See part 11 of the Bill 
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Under the Bill, a derivative action may be brought only in respect of a cause of action 
arising from an actual or proposed act or omission involving negligence, default, 
breach of duty or breach of trust by a director of the company, 762 or in pursuance of an 
order of the court in proceedings under section 459 of the CA 1985763 which we have 
discussed above. The cause of action may be against the directors (include shadow 
directors) or another person or both 7" The derivative action shall be available not 
only to a member of a company, but also a person who is not a member but to whom 
shares in the company have been transferred or transmitted by operation of law. 65 
The Bill stipulates that a shareholder who brings a derivative action must apply to the 
court for permission to continue it. The court may give permission to continue the 
claim as it thinks fit, or refuse permission and dismiss the claim, or adjourn the 
proceedings on the application and give such directions as it thinks fit, or refuse 
permission and dismiss the claim, or adjourn the proceedings on the application and 
give such directions as it thinks fit 767 The Bill also specifies that a shareholder may 
apply to the court for permission to continue the derivative action on the ground that: 
(a) the manner in which the company commenced or continued the claim 
amounts to an abuse of the process of the court; 
(b) the company has failed to prosecute the claim diligently, and 
'62 ibid cl. 239 (2) and (3). 
763 ibid 
764 ibid. c1.239 (3) 
765 ibid. c1.239 (4) 
766 ibid. c1.240 (1) 
767 ibid. c1.240 (2) 
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(c) it is appropriate for the shareholder to continue the claim as a derivative 
action. 68 
In considering the issues of leave, the court should take into account all relevant 
circumstances, in particular: 
(a) whether the shareholder is acting in good faith in seeking to continue the 
claim; 
(b) the importance that a person acting in accordance with clause 156 (duty to 
promote the success of the company) would attach to continuing it; 
(c) where the cause of action results from an act or omission that is yet to 
occur, whether the act or omission could be, and in the circumstances would 
be likely to be, authorised by the company before it occurs, or ratified by the 
company after it occurs; 
(d) where the cause of action arises form an act or omission that has already 
occurred, whether the act or omission could be, an in the circumstances would 
be likely to be, ratified by the company; 
(e) whether the company has decided not to pursue the claim; and 
(f) whether the act or omission in respect of which the claim is brought gives 
rise to a cause of action that the member could pursue in his owe right rather 
than on behalf of the company. 69 
768 ibid. c1.240 
769 ibid. cl. 242(3). 
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Nevertheless, permission must be refused if the court is satisfied on the following 
circumstance: 
(a) a person acting in accordance with clause 152 (duty to promote the success 
of the company) would not seek to continue the claim, or 
(b) where the cause of action arises from an act or omission that is yet to 
occur, that the act or omission had been authorised by the company, or 
(c) where the cause of action arises from an act or omission that has already 
occurred, that the act or omission was either authorised by the company before 
it occurred or has been ratified by the company since it occurred. 70 
La Porta et. al. conclude that a strong system of legal enforcement could substitute for 
weak rules since active and well-functioning courts can step in and rescue investors 
abused by management 771 It can be seen that the Bill not only provided a statutory 
circumscription of the availability of the derivative action, but also made it clear that 
the action would be subject to tight judicial control at all stages. To be sure, it is 
evident that the new derivative procedure is actually governed by rules of court, as 
new rules of procedure could easily be amended in the light of changing 
circumstances. Operating the new derivative action in this way, the new derivative 
action will undoubtedly result in the more effective enforcement of directors' duties in 
the UK. 
7" Ibid. c1.242 (2). 
771 See La Porta, et al., 1999. op cit. f i. 6. 
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8.3 Enforcement of Directors' Duties in China 
8.3.1 Law Enforcement Problems under Incomplete Law 
In respect of the breach of directors' duties, Art. 63 of the CCL 1994 stipulates that "a 
director, supervisor or manager of a company who violates the law, administrative 
regulations or the company's articles of association while performing his corporate 
duties resulting in harm to the company, shall be liable for damages. "772 Similar to the 
UK, this provision intends to ensure that directors who breach their duties to the 
company are made accountable. However, whether such a strict provision can be 
enforced in practice is dependent upon whether the law provides effective ways in 
which the damages caused by the wrongdoers can be remedied. Under this provision, 
it seems that only the company can take an action to hold the directors, supervisors or 
managers liable for their acts that violate the law, administrative regulations or the 
articles of the company. Added to this is the doubt whether, because the company is 
an artificial person run by the board, the directors can be relied upon to invoke the 
legal remedies against themselves. If_the company is unwilling to proceed or is 
prevented from bringing an action against the wrongdoers, the question is whether the 
shareholders could be endowed with the right to bring derivative actions whenever the 
company's interest is damaged or threatened by directors', or managers' breach of 
duties. Compared with the UK, where an action was taken in breach of a requirement 
in the articles of association requiring a special resolution to ratify the action, a 
M AIt63 of the CCL 1994. 
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derivative action could be brought by a shareholder against a director for the breach of 
duty if the breach was unable to be ratified by the company. However, the CCL 1994 
is silent on the issue of shareholder derivative suits. 
Pistor and Xu argue that because law, is incomplete, law enforcement by courts cannot 
be expected effectively to deter violations. 773 The lack of provisions dealing with 
derivative actions inevitably poses difficulties to both injured shareholders and local 
people's courts to enforce directors' duties through civil litigation proceedings. For 
example, in September 2001, the CSRC discovered that Sanjiu plc had allowed its 
majority shareholders and other affiliated parties, without proper disclosure, to 
misappropriate RMB 2.5 billion (£192 million) of corporate funds in violation of 
securities laws and other regulations. The misappropriated funds amounted to ninety- 
six per cent of Sanjiu's corporate net assets, and posed a considerable threat to the 
corporation's operation. On July 4,2002, the CSRC fined Sanjiu plc RM13 500,000 
(£38.5K), its chairman Zhao Xinxian RMB 100,000 (£7700), and its board secretary 
RMB 50,000 (£3850). The CSRC also imposed fines of RMB 30,000 (£2300) on each 
of the seven board members. On April 8,2003, one of Sanjiu's individual 
shareholders in Shanghai applied to the Shenzhen Futian District People's Court to 
file a lawsuit against its chairman Zhao. There were three claims in his petition: (i) 
that Zhao should pay RMB 10,000 (£770) to Sanjiu pie as compensation for damages 
in connection with the misappropriations in Sanjiu plc; (ii) that Zhao should pay RMß 
773 K. Pistor and C. Xu, 2003. Deterrence and Regulatory Failure in Emerging Financial Markets: Comparing 
China and Russia, April, 2003, working paper available from: 
jittp: //wwwwcf ia harvard edu/papers/660 Distorxu ndf [Accessed 25 September 2005]. 
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10,000(£770) to Sanjiu plc as compensation for mismanagement that resulted in the 
CSRC fine for disclosure irregularities; and (iii) that the filing fee of this lawsuit 
should be paid by Zhao. 774 The court ruled that the claimant "must obtain 
authorization from all shareholders of Sanjiu before bringing the lawsuit to the court 
if he wants to institute an action in the interest of all Sanjiu plc shareholders' : 
77s 
Clearly, in the Sanjiu case, the defendant has breached his fiduciary duties and should 
be liable under Article 63 of the CCL 1994 for violating the Securities Law and 
relevant regulations on information disclosure, as well as Article 80 of the CSRC 
Directive 1997 which we have discussed in Chapter 7. However, the court rulcd that 
the claim had to be approved by the unanimous consent of the shareholders. In the UK, 
the courts have the power to permit a shareholder to bring an action despite the rule in 
Foss v. Harbottle (the majority rule) when the interest of justice required it. 776 
Compared with the UK, the Chinese court primarily applied the majority rulc, which 
was curiously borrowed from common law, without being aware that the rule must 
prevent a director or a majority shareholder from using their position to commit a 
fraud on the minority or have been conducted in an `unfairly prejudicial' manner. 777 
In fact, there are certain cases that have recently been initiated by injured shareholders 
"` See Wang, L, 2003. Another First Case Arose in Stock Market - Shareholder Sue Chairman of the Board on 
Behalf of Company, Shanghai Securities News, 9 April. ' 
ns See Wang, L., 2003. The First Derivative Action was not Accepted, Shanghai Securities News, 22 April. 
776 See Foss v Harbotlle and its exceptions discussed in section 8.2 above. 
"According to Sanjiu plc 2002 -2003 annual report, the total number of shareholders was 117,174, and the top 
two shareholders collectively held 72.91%of company shares. Both of them were Sanjiu plc's affiliates which 
were involved in the misappropriation of Sanjiu's corporate funds. In addition Zhao was the CEO of the two 
largest shareholder companies. Obviously, the court simply relied on the majority rule which partially borrowed 
from the common law rule, and disregarded the concentrated ownership structure and other special circumstances, 
would allow the wrongdoers to escape redress. 
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in China, in which there appears to be reluctance on the part of the courts to hear a 
case through a derivative action because of a lack of detailed procedures applicable to 
derivative actions. Consequently, although many company directors have been 
punished by either administrative sanction or criminal prosecution as a result of 
making false disclosures, frauds and market manipulations, the injured shareholders 
have been left without proper remedies in respect of matters of illegal actions. 
Article 111 of the CCL 1994 seems to empower the shareholders with the right to 
assert claims in the event where a resolution of the shareholders' general meeting or a 
resolution of the board of directors violates the law or administrative regulations or 
infringes the lawful rights and interests of the shareholders 778 This provision seems to 
allow a shareholder to sue in his/her own name to protect his/her personal rights 
within a company. Compared with the rule of personal action in the UK, however, 
this provision fails to specify any necessary substantive and procedural conditions of 
such an action. Firstly, in the context of Article 111 of the CCL 1994, the 
shareholders can only bring an action against the violation of the law or 
administrative regulations, but not in respect of violating the memorandum and 
articles of association. 779 There appear to be no remedies available to the shareholders 
of a company where there is a breach of articles of association of the company by 
directors or managers of the company, or its controlling shareholders. Secondly, this 
See Art. 111 of the CCL 1994 
Art. 1l of the CCL 1994 stipulates that the articles of association of a company shall be binding on its 
shareholders, directors, supervisors and managers. Art. 118 of the CCL 1994 also provides that any directors, 
supervisors or managers acting in breach of the articles of association of a company shall be liable to compensate 
the company for its loss. It is not clear why the violation of articles of association should be excluded from Art. 11 I 
of the CCL 1994. 
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provision only provides that the shareholders have a right to bring an action to the 
court for an injunction to stop the illegal acts or infringing acts, but fails to guarantee 
any equitable remedies for injured shareholders. 
780 Thirdly, the provision provides 
limited scope for shareholder actions. As the provision stipulates, the actionable 
wrongdoing is limited to violation of the law and regulations by a resolution of the 
shareholder meeting or of the board of directors and prejudices the interests of 
shareholders. It is not clear at all whether other conduct of the company such as ultra 
vires, which is not violating any law or regulation but is only beneficial to the 
majority shareholders (e. g. a resolution for providing a loan guarantee for the majority 
or controlling shareholder of the company), can be challenged by the minority 
shareholders. Finally, the provision fails to indicate any procedural rule on 
shareholder litigation. It is far from clear that an action brought by shareholders under 
Article 111 of the CCL 1994 should be a direct action (personal action) or a derivative 
action. It also fails to indicate whether the shareholders can sue directors or managers 
or the majority shareholders who are harmed the interest of the company and its 
minority shareholders. 
8.3.2 Private Securities Litigation against Misrepresentation: 
Apart from those actions concerning unlawful decisions made at shareholder meetings 
and board meetings under the CCL 1994, the Chinese Securities Law (the CSL)781 
provides other grounds for shareholder litigation. Article 63 of the CSL states that 
I See X. C. Zhang, 1998. Practical Demands to Update the Company Law, 28 (long Kong Law Journal, 248. 
78' The Chinese Securities Law (the CSL) was promulgated on December 29,1998 and came into effect on July 1, 1999 
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"[I]f the share prospectus, measures for offer of corporate bonds, financial or 
accounting report, listing report document, annual report, interim report or ad hoc 
report announced by an issuer or securities underwriting company contain any 
falsehood, misleading statement or major omission, thus causing losses to investors in 
the course of securities trading, the issuer or the company shall be liable for the losses 
and the responsible director(s), supervisor(s) and/or the manager of the issuer or the 
company shall be jointly and severally liable for such losses. "782 Article 207 of the 
CSL also stipulates that "[I]f the property of a person, who violates the provisions of 
the law and who therefore bears civil liability for damages and is required to pay a 
fine, is insufficient to pay both the damages and the fine, such person shall first bear 
the civil liability for damages. "783 However, such provisions have never been properly 
enforced due to a lack of detailed procedure rules for how such a private securities 
litigation (PSL) should be initiated by injured investors and heard by the court. 
For example, in April 1999, a shareholder in Shanghai filed a civil suit against 
Hongguang Enterprise plc. and its directors and managers for financial damage due to 
the defendant's accounting fraud, but the court decided not to hear the case even 
though the CSRC previously determined that the company engaged in fraudulent 
activities including falsely inflating profits and hiding negative financial information 
to the public. 84 The case was dismissed by. the court on the ground of that the case 
782 See Article 63 of the CSL. 
71' See Article 207 of the CSL. 
"4 According to the CSRC, Hongguang Enterprise had been engaged in fraudulent behaviour such as: 1) the 
company falsely reported its 1996 profits and fraudulently obtained qualification to publicly issue shares; 2) the 
company underreported its 1997 deficit, which defrauded investors; 3) the company concealed a major event when it did not disclose production problems; 4) the company used capital raised from the offering to pay back bank 
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should be referred to the CSRC to determine and the court had `no jurisdiction' to 
hear such a case. S5 
As a result of a series of corporate scandals involving a large number of false 
disclosures, accounting' frauds and market manipulation perpetrated by listed 
companies, the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China (SPC) 
enacted new rules entitled "Several Regulations Regarding the Adjudication of Civil 
Compensation of Securities Cases on the Ground of Misrepresentation" (the 
Misrepresentation Regulation) which attempts to deal with the irregularity of the 
procedural and jurisdictional issues. 786 The -Misrepresentation Regulations which 
contain 37 articles provide detailed rules on the jurisdiction of the courts, 797 the proper 
plaintiffs and defendants, 
788 definition of misrepresentation, 789 the form of PSL 
litigation, 790 prerequisites of litigation, 791 and damages 792 
loans and make up for past losses, uses which were not in the company prospectus; 5) the company illegally used 
funds raised from the public offering to buy and sell its own securities in 217 individual securities accounts; and 6) 
the company was also under suspicion for bribery because 1.66 million yuan could not be accounted for. Sec 
Zhengjiacazi [1998] No. 75, (CSRC Administrative Investigation No. 75,1998); Cai, W. 1999, Privative Securities 
Litigation in China: Of Prominence and Problems, 13. Columbia Journal of Asian Law. 135.51, p146. 
785 See Jiang, D. 2003. Company Law Report (11), Citic Publishing Ilouse, p454. 
716 See "Guanyu Shenli Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa dc Minshi Pcichang Anjian dc Ruogan 
Guiding (Several Regulations Regarding the Adjudication of Civil Compensation of Securities Cates on the 
Ground of Misrepresentation), S. P. C. 2003 No. 2. The Misrepresentation Regulations were promulgated on January 
10,2003 and came into effects on February, 2003. Before the promulgation of the Misrepresentation Provisions, 
the SPC issued a circular on September 21,2001, imposing a temporary ban on acceptance any personal action 
against securities fraud by lower courts of on the ground that legislative and judicial conditions were not ripe for 
hearing such cases. The ban was lifted on 15.01.2002, but only allowed shareholder to sue after the CSRC or its 
local branches had imposed administrative sanctions. See Lu, G., 2003. Private Enforcement of Securities Fraud 
Law in China: A Critique of the Supreme Peoples' Court 2003 Provisions Concerning Private Securities Litigation. 
12, Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, 718; 1 lutchens, W., 2003. Private Securities Litigation in China: Material 
Disclosure about China's Legal System, 24, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, 
pp599-689; also see J. Deng, op cit fn. 675. -' 
Articles 8,9 and 10 of the Misrepresentation Regulation provide that the PLS can only be heard by an 
intermediate-level courts at the place where a defendant is located 
781 Article 2 of the Misrepresentation Regulations articulates the proper plaintiffs include individuals, legal person 
or other organisations investing or trading securities in the approved primary or secondary securities markets by 
the state. However, if the securities transaction is conducted outside the approved securities markets or transactions 
made by agreements in the approved securities markets could not be sued under the Misrepresentation Regulations. 
Article 7 of the Misrepresentation Regulations stipulates the proper defendant should be a person who committed 
misrepresentation, include: (i) promoters and controlling shareholders; (ii) issuers or listed companies; (iii) 
security underwriters; (iv) listing sponsors; (v) accounting fines, law firms, assets appraisal firms and other 
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The rules established by the Misrepresentation Regulations could certainly 
deal with 
the fraud on minority issues. Compared with the rule of fraud on minority in the UK, 
however, the Misrepresentation Regulations provide far more restrictive standing 
requirements which have made it difficult for shareholders to 
bring an action and 
recover sufficient damages. Under Misrepresentation Regulations, the shareholders 
who have been injured by a misrepresentation, made by a person with a 
duty of 
disclosure in violation of the law, may bring an action to the people's court to assert a 
claim for damages. However, in order to bring an PSL, the plaintiff has to overcome 
many procedural and substantive hurdles, such as jurisdiction limitations, 
prerequisites of litigation, and burden of proof of the causal connection between the 
shareholders' loss and defendants' misrepresentations. By the end of 2003, as many as 
14 companies were involved in shareholder litigation, and more than 900 cases were 
accepted by the nine courts across the country 793 Some cases have been heard by the 
professional intermediaries; (vi) directors, supervisors and senior executives of the firms listed in (ii), (iii) and (iv) 
above and individuals who employed by the professional intermediaries listed in (v), are directly responsible for 
the misrepresentation; and (vii) a misrepresentation is committed by other organisations or individuals. 
`9 The misrepresentation is clearly defined as "a misrepresentation made by a person who is with a disclosure duty, 
violates the securities law and regulations in the process of issuing or trading securities, provides an untrue 
statement of fact in the form of materially false records, misleading statements, material omission, or inappropriate 
disclosures". See Article 17 of the Misrepresentation Regulations. 
790 The PSL may be filed by the plaintiff either as an individual action or a joint action. If two or more litigations 
arose by multiple plaintiffs on the ground against the same defendant for the same misrepresentation, the court 
may merge these litigations into a joint action. The court may notify those plaintiffs who filed an individual action 
to join a joint action if individual actions and joint actions arose by multiple plaintiffs on the ground of the same 
misrepresentation against the same defendant. The number of plaintiffs in a joint action must be fixed before the 
case is heard. A representative action is allowed if there are numerous plaintiffs in a joint action. 
791 Article 6 of the Misrepresentation Regulations that shareholders cannot bring an action until an administrative 
or criminal sanction has been imposed on the defendant. 
792 Under article 30 of the Misrepresentation Regulations, the injured shareholders are only allowed to claim the 
actual damages. The damages are counted including the differences between the buying and selling price, 
commissions and stamp duty paid by transaction, and interests which computed in reference to the bank deposit 
interest rate. See Article 30 of the Misrepresentation Regulations. 
"" Companies as defendants sued by shareholders include: ST Shandong Bohai, ST Tongda. ST Dongfang Dianzi, 
Daqing Lianyi, ST Jiaobao Shiye, ST Ynguangxia; Sanjiu Yaoye; ST ilongugang; ST Jiurhou; Jinzhouguang; ST 
Shengfangke; Hubei Tianyi; PT Zhengbaiwen; Shenxinl: ai. Sec N. Li, 2004. Civil Litigation against China's Listed 
Firms: Much ado about nothing? ' Asia Programme Working Paper, No. 13, February; 1. Yang, 2005. Comparative 
Corporate Governance: Reforming Chinese Corporate Governance. International Company and Commercial Lam 
Review, 16(l), 8-17. 
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courts and a few cases have been withdrawn because of an inconsistency with 
Arts 18 
and 19 of the Misrepresentation Regulations 
794 Nevertheless, there has been no single 
compensation judgment made by any of the courts; instead some of them 
have been 
settled out of court795 In some cases, judgment is overdue according to the 
Chinese 
Civil Procedural Rules. 
8.3.3 New Rules Governing Shareholder Actions 
In China, apart from the inadequacy of the law in respect of directors of duties, the 
other problem which is often discussed by both academics and legal practitioners is 
the lack of an effective mechanism for shareholders to bring an action against 
directors for wrongdoing. For example, Liu points out that "to make directors and 
managers accountable to the corporation and its stakeholders, it is urgent to deal with 
the loopholes in current legislation and enforce the responsibility of the directors and 
managers through various means, in particular the shareholders' derivative 
actions. " 796 Lee argues that the lack of express remedies for the aggrieved 
shareholders in the Securities Law creates unnecessary ambiguity and confusion 
which is wholly inconsistent with other statutory remedies in Chinese Law 797 11 u 
argues that due to the insufficient legal infrastructure in China, it will be difficult to 
hold violators of the laws accountable for their wrongdoings. 99 Indeed, although the 
791 Arts 18 and 19 of the Misrepresentation Regulations provide certain elements of the legal reliance and causation 
for testing the link between the alleged misrepresentation and the claimant's buy-sell decision and the link between 
the securities transaction and the claimant's loss. 
"s To date, only two cases have been settled through court mediation in Chengdu and Shanghai. 
see Liu, J., 1999. Legal Reforms in China, ZEF Discussion Papers on Development Policy 13, Centre of 
Development of Research, Bonn, August. 
79' See Lee, S. M., 2001. The Development of China's Securities Regulatory Framework and the Insider Trading 
Provisions of the New Securities Law, (14) New York International Law Review, 1. 
792 1 iu, R., 2002. The Recent Development of Corporate Governance in Great China Area, Shareholder Rights and 
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CCL 1994 demonstrates significant effects in making directors and managers perform 
their duties in the best interests of companies and their shareholders, evidence shows 
that the enforcement of the law has been very problematic in China. 
The recently published "Regulation on Some Issues Concerning Trials for Corporate 
Dispute Cases (I)" by the Supreme People's Court (the "SPC Regulation") contains 
twelve provisions regarding shareholder actions, aimed at improving minority 
shareholder protection. 799 Under the SPC Regulation, besides being able to sue a 
company for wrongs committed directly against them (including the infringement of 
shareholders' right to corporate information, violation of articles of association; 
dividends paid against the resolution of the shareholder meeting etc. ), individual 
shareholders may bring derivative actions against directors, supervisors, managers or 
other members of senior management for violation of their fiduciary duty of loyalty, 
and the controlling shareholders who take advantage of their controlling power to the 
detriment of the company's interests 800 
Article 44 of the SPC Regulation stipulates two prerequisites for a derivative action. 
First, it requires the derivative suit shareholders to meet the `contemporaneous 
ownership rule', which means the derivative suit plaintiff must havc bccn a 
the Equitable Treatment of Shareholders, The Fourth Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance, November. 
7" See Guanyu Shenli Gongsi Jiufen Anjian Ruogan Wenti dc Guiding (Y) (Zhcngqiu Ygian Gao), (The 
Regulations on Some Issues Concerning Trails for Corporate Dispute Case (1) of the Supreme Pcopla e Court. 
November 04,2003. Available from: bttn: //www. chinacourt. org(j! ublic /dc+aýt pJ pj4=ltsttt 
(Accessed 15 October 2005 ]. 
S00 See Article 36-43 of the SPC Regulation. 
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shareholder and continuously held shares at the time that the cause of action arose 801 
Second, it requires the derivative suit shareholders to satisfy "threshold 
requirements"- a complainant shareholder of a limited liability company filing a 
derivative action shall hold not less than 10% of company issued shares, and a 
complainant shareholder of a publicly listed company should hold not less than 1%. 
802 
Although the first prerequisite is not grounded on antipathy to derivative action, it is 
still difficult to justify the contemporaneous ownership rule because, on the one hand, 
the existence of the rule might prevent the buying of shares by litigious persons who 
might bring frivolous suits. 03 On the other hand, the rule might allow the wrongdoers 
to escape from damages which they deserved to compensate the shareholders because 
those shareholders did not hold the stock before the wrongdoing has been 
discovered. 04 Nevertheless, the second prerequisite is somewhat unrealistic because 
apart from the top three shareholders, no individual shareholder in general can meet 
this requirement individually. 805 Consequently, a collective action is required for 
minority shareholders to initiate a derivative action. 
Under Article 45 of the SPC Regulation, the demand requirement for a derivative 
action is specified. Before bringing a derivative action, a complainant shareholder 
eo' There is an alternative opinion stipulated in Article 44 (1) of the SPC Regulation, which is the so-called "six- 
month shareholding rule" which requires that the plaintiff shareholder own shares of the company for an 
uninterrupted six-month period to the occurrence of the wrongdoing. The rule was derived from the Japanese law. 
See Shiro Kawashima and Susumu Sakurai, 1997. Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan: Law, Practice, and Suggested Reforms; 33 Stanford Journal of international Law. 9-60, atl 0. 
802 See art. 44(2) of the SPC Regulation. 
s03 See Robert Clark, 1997, Corporate Law, Aspen Law & Business, Panel Publisher, 115.4 at p651. 80° lbid. 
80 According to our survey of the ownership structure of companies listed on the Chinese Stock Exchange, the 
median proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder is in excess of 45%, the second largest is about 5%, the 
third is about 3%, and afterwards, no individual shareholder held more than 1% of company's issued shares. See Table 4.4(a) in Chapter 4. 
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requirements"- a complainant shareholder of a limited liability company filing a 
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complainant shareholder of a publicly listed company should hold not less than l% 
802 
Although the first prerequisite is not grounded on antipathy to derivative action, it is 
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the existence of the rule might prevent the buying of shares by litigious persons who 
might bring frivolous suits. 803 On the other hand, the rule might allow the wrongdoers 
to escape from damages which they deserved to compensate the shareholders because 
those shareholders did not hold the stock before the wrongdoing has been 
discovered 804 Nevertheless, the second prerequisite is somewhat unrealistic because 
apart from the top three shareholders, no individual shareholder in general can meet 
this requirement individually. 805 Consequently, a collective action is required for 
minority shareholders to initiate a derivative action. 
Under Article 45 of the SPC Regulation, the demand requirement for a derivative 
action is specified. Before bringing a derivative action, a complainant shareholder 
$01 There is an alternative opinion stipulated in Article 44 (1) of the SPC Regulation, which is the so-called "six- 
month shareholding rule" which requires that the plaintiff shareholder own shares of the company for an 
uninterrupted six-month period to the occurrence of the wrongdoing. The rule was derived from the Japanese law. 
See Shiro Kawashima and Susumu Sakurai, 1997. Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan: Law, Practice, and 
Suggested Reforms; 33 Stanford Journal of International Law. 9-60, atl0. 
`02 See art. 44(2) of the SPC Regulation. 
t°7 See Robert Clark, 1997, Corporate Law, Aspen Law & Business, Panel Publisher, § 15.4 at p651. 
s°41bid. 
. $05 According to our survey of the ownership structure of companies listed on the Chinese Stock Exchange, the 
median proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder is in excess of 45%, the second largest is about S°/% the 
third is about 3%, and afterwards, no individual shareholder held more than 1% of company's issued shares. See 
Table 4.4(a) in Chapter 4. 
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must first make a demand on the company to act so as to remedy the situation about 
which he/she complains. 806 Only if the company fails to act within two months may 
the demanding shareholders initiate a derivative action on behalf of the company. 807 
The exemptions from this prerequisite are: (i) the property stake related to the action 
will be transacted to the third party and the related rights allegation period or 
limitation of action will expire; or (ii) any other case of urgency forcing the plaintiff 
to initiate an immediate action. The demand requirement is apparently derived from 
the common law system which aimed at implementing the basic principle that 
directors owe duties to the company, not to the shareholders 808 Whether to sue or not 
to sue is ordinarily a matter for the business judgement of directors. 
The demand requirement has been supported for the judicial economy purpose in 
practice. It seems to be justified because: 
(i) if the directors decide that the company should take an action against 
the wrongdoer, then making the derivative action would be 
unnecessary. 809 
(ii) in some cases the directors may take such steps as to correct or remedy 
the situation that formed the basis for the derivative action, thus the 
courts will be saved from ruling such cases 810 
206 See art. 45 of the SPC Regulation. 
so see art. 45 (1) of the SPC Regulation. 
'0f See Robert Clark, op cit. fn. 803. p641 
t° ibid. 
"'ibid. 
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(iii) the demand requirement will also prevent the litigious shareholders 
from bringing frivolous suits and for personal gains 811 
Although the benefit of having the demand requirement for derivative action cannot 
be denied, many commentators have felt that the approach may still require 
clarification or elaboration. For example, in China, the publicly listed companies 
operate a two-tier board system with independent directors incorporated in the board 
of directors. Therefore, when it is alleged that directors or supervisors or managers 
have breached their duties, who should be responsible on the demand requirement to 
decide whether the company should initiate litigation against the wrongdoers or not? 
In addition, the SPC Regulation fails to specify what happens if a shareholder does 
make a demand to the company to sue someone and the directors refuse to do so or 
the company commences an action, but fails to prosecute diligently. In both 
situations, the question arises as to whether the individual shareholders can apply to 
the court for leave to take over the action. Finally, the notice requirement stems to be 
sound. However, given that the intention of the notice requirement is to allow the 
company to decide whether to bring proceedings itself, it must be considered doubtful 
that some companies may not make a proper response in the time specified, while a 
long waiting period can potentially cause irreparable harm to the company. 812 lndccd, 
the derivative action rule aims initially to promote a more rational process with less 
cost and more time efficiency than the traditional litigation process. Clearly, the SPC 
III ibid. 
112 see J. Deng, op cit. fn. 675. 
279 
Regulation requiring the derivative action's plaintiff to serve a notice to the company 
two months before instituting a derivative action would be time consuming and 
expensive for the individual shareholders. 
The problems mentioned above reveal some aspects of inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness of the Chinese judicial system. Lack of the basic principles, rules and 
standards that govern the proper behaviour of directors is very cumbersome for an 
individual shareholder to sue directors who breach their duties. The loopholes of the 
CCL 1994 certainly made it difficult for the court to deliver the law to protect the 
interests of the company and its shareholders. The proposed new measures under the 
SPC Regulation seem to have not been formulated properly during the development 
of the proposal. Nevertheless, the CCL 2006 envisages the foregoing problems. 
Article 150 of the CCL 2006 states that a director, a supervisor or any senior officer 
' shall be liable for any losses of the company if he/she violates any provisions of laws, 
or administrative regulations, or the articles of association of the company in 
performance of his/her official duties. 13 In addition, Article 152 of the CCL provides 
certain procedural rules, stating that shareholder(s) who have either individually or 
collectively held more than one per cent of the shares of the company for mors than 
180 consecutive days may petition in writing to the supervisory board to initiate legal 
proceedings against the wrongdoing director or senior officers in the people's court. If 
a supervisor commits any of the acts described in Article 150 of the CCL 2006, the 
t13 See art. 150 of the CCL 2006 
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aforementioned shareholders may, petition in writing to the board of directors to 
initiate civil proceedings against the supervisor in the people's court. 
814 if the 
supervisory board or the board of directors refuses or fails to initiate any legal 
proceedings upon receipt of the written petition put forward by the shareholders, or 
fails to initiate any proceedings within 30 days of the receipt of shareholders' petition, 
or the situation is so emergent that the company will suffer irreparable losses if legal 
proceedings are not initiated immediately, the shareholders as prescribed above shall 
have the right to directly initiate legal actions in the people's court in their own name 
for the benefits of the company. 815 The CCL 2006 also extends the right for 
shareholders to sue any person who encroaches upon the lawful rights and interests of 
the company, thus causing any loss to the company in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 152. Inevitably, the CCL 2006 has strengthened the position of both 
minority shareholders and the supervisory board. 
Nevertheless, certain rules governing the derivative action, such as the threshold 
requirement and the demanding requirement under the CCL 2006 may still be quite 
expensive and burdensome, and could unduly deter the bringing of derivative actions 
by minority shareholders in China. 816 In comparison, in the UK, the nccd for a 
particular number of shareholders or a percentage threshold of shareholding to launch 
814 ibid. art. 152 
as ibid. 
X16 In China, on the one hand, 1% of company issued share capital in most listed companies would mean hundreds 
of thousands of shares and a collective action by minority shareholder will be always necessary to satisfy the 
threshold requirement. On the other hand, most companies are controlled by the majority/controlling shareholders 
who have their representatives seating in the boards. Therefore, both demands on shareholders based on a 
percentage and demands on the board of directors/supervisory board will make it difficult for minority 
shareholders to initiate a derivative action. 
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a derivative claim is not literally stated in the Bill. Instead the Bill leaves the power to 
the court to exercise its discretion to refuse or grant permission to continue a 
derivative claim based on the facts of the breach and the principle of good faith. Note, 
however, this approach would need strong courts as independent institutions and 
ensure that they have sufficient resources to fulfil this task. However, it seems unwise 
to transplant this approach to China because the Chinese courts are widely perceived 
to: lack independence or inexperience in dealing with corporate and securities' 
disputes or both. While in China, some problems seem to remain, implementation of 
the new rules will take time. The key question of whether the amended rules 
governing shareholder derivative action have any real `teeth' against the wrongdoing 
directors in China remains to be seen. 
8.4 - Conclusion and 
Comparative Perspectives 
An effective corporate governance system comprises a series of laws, regulations, 
voluntary codes and by-laws, along with well-established enforcement mechanisms to 
govern the relationships between the people who effectively control corporations 
(directors or majority shareholders) and those who invest in them (minority 
shareholders). From a comparative perspective, the enforcement rules in China are 
essentially weak and incomplete compared with the UK. Although there is the case 
law in the UK spawned by the rule in Foss v Harbottle which has made it difficult for 
minority shareholders to bring an action on behalf of a company against wrongdoing 
directors, certain exceptions have been formulated and affirmed to allow minority 
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shareholders to enforce directors' duties by the courts. In comparison, in China, the 
Misrepresentation Regulations seem to have provided shareholders with a private 
right of action against wrongdoing parties, including directors. However, the 
incomplete procedural and substantive rules and an insufficient justice system have 
inevitably been barriers to the effectiveness of law enforcement in China. In addition, 
both China and the UK have proposed to incorporate statutory derivative action into 
their company law. In this way, there is no doubt that China has decided to encourage 
shareholders to use the statutory derivative action to improve the enforcement of 
directors' duties. Technically, however, a derivative action rule would not work 
without a clearly defined procedural framework. By examining the proposed 
provisions of derivative action, it is evident that the proposed new derivative action by 
the SPC has limitations in many aspects, including the prerequisites to the derivative 
action and demanding requirements. Some provisions are enacted merely in an 
abstract way which may cause some difficulties for the shareholders and the courts to 
apply them in practice. Therefore, the derivative action rules drafted by the SPC need 
to be modified in the light of the CCL 2006 before they come into operation. 
Effective enforcement also demands a properly functioning, creditable, and 
independent judicial system. In the UK, the courts have long wrestled with the issue 
of when and with what degree of scrutiny they should consider a shareholders 
entitlement to bring an action on behalf of the company. However, the Chinese courts 
and judges have not been empowered in the same way as in the UK. Although China 
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has adopted the principles of minority shareholder protection from the Anglo- 
American system under the CCL 2006, Chinese courts have not yet fully evolved to 
deal effectively with disputes among company minority shareholders, directors and 
majority shareholders by a derivative action or private securities litigation for the 
infringement of rights in the securities markets, and to provide a specific and effective 
juridical basis for the protection of the lawful rights and interests of investors. 
Government intervention, political influence, local protectionism and other forms of 
corruption significantly affect judicial independence and impartiality in the litigation 
process. The legal and judicial independence assumes greater importance in 
safeguarding the interests of minority shareholders in China. If the courts do not act 
independently, they will be unable to deliver real justice and remedies for injured 
shareholders. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE 
PERFORMANCE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
9.1 Introduction 
From an economic perspective, the corporate governance system is concerned with 
the creation of wealth through the maximisation of the economic efficiency of 
corporations. The previous chapters explored how the corporate governance system 
was formed and evolved in China compared with the UK and identified the key 
factors that have significantly influenced the health of corporations and the 
institutional environment for better corporate governance in China, using a functional 
comparative approach. However, it is difficult to predict how China could improve its 
corporate governance system without a further investigation of the relations between 
Chinese corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance. Therefore, 
this chapter reviews empirical evidence concerning the impact of corporate 
governance on economic performance and investigates the relationship bctwccn 
corporate governance and corporate performance in Chinese listed companies, which 
will be highly valuable for the development of the Chinese corporate govcrnancc 
system. However, this study does not measure the market for corporate control as an 
external mechanism in determining the changes of firm value because it is virtually 
non-existent in China. In addition, as the legal duties imposed on directors and the 
role of shareholders in enforcing directors' duties through shareholder litigation 
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cannot be precisely quantified, this study does not assess their relationship with 
corporate performance either. Thus, the focus of this investigation is to test mainly the 
relationship between the internal part of corporate governance (specifically the 
ownership structure, shareholder activism, and internal monitoring and control of 
management mechanisms) and corporate performance. 
9.2 Literature Review and the Development of Hypotheses 
9.2.1 Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance 
Property rights have been broadly discussed by both law and economic theory for 
many decades. Property rights in a firm confer shareholder's ownership with the 
residual right over the firm's assets. 817 But shareholders in a modern publicly listed 
company may not be able to make such a claim effectively because of the separation 
of ownership and control emphasised by Berle and Means. 818 The dispersion of 
ownership which creates agency problems has an important impact on the objective of 
implementing value maximisation for shareholders! 19 
Studies directly applying insights from property rights theory and investigating the 
link between ownership structure and corporate performance began to appear in the 
1980's. The characteristics of these studies focus on the relationship between 
117 1lart and Moore state; "we identify a firm with the assets it possesses and take the position that ownership 
confers residual rights of control over the firm's assets: the right to decided how these assets are to be used except 
to the extent that particular usages have been specified in an initial contract". 1 lart, 0. and J. Moore, op cit. fn. 70, 
at 1120. 
III' See Berle and Means, op cit. fn. 1. 
$" M. Jensen and J. Meckling, op cit. fn. 84. and Fama, E. and M. Jensen, op cit. fn. 547. 
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concentration of shares and firm performance. For example, an empirical study based 
on a cross-section of 511 U. S. firms by Demsetz and Lehn claims that there is no 
cross-sectional relation between accounting rates of return and the concentration of 
shareholding. 820 Mehran finds no significant relation between firm performance and 
the holdings of a variety of different types of blockholders, including individuals, 
institutions, and corporations. 821 Goergen examines the relationship between financial 
performance and ownership in German and UK firms, by classifying the identity of 
shareholders into six categories - families, domestic companies, foreign companies, 
banks, non-bank institutional investors, and charities. He finds that the evolution of 
ownership depends on certain corporate characteristics, but that differences in 
financial performance cannot be explained simply by differences in the concentration 
of ownership. u 
In contrast, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny find that there is a nonlinear relationship 
between board ownership and company performance, as measured by Tobin's Q ý'ý 
. 
McConnell and Servaes finds that the relationship between insider equity ownership 
and Tobin's Q is an "inverse U-shape", with Tobin's Q reaching its maximum valuc 
when insiders own approximately 40 per cent of the shares 824 In a study of 435 of the 
520 This study was conducted by an OLS regression of ownership concentration on size, control potential, 
regulation, and amenity potential and a recursive regression of the mean accounting rate of return on the 
alternative predicted values of ownership concentration, regulations, book value of assets, capital expenditure, 
advertising and R&D expenses. Ownership concentration is defined as a continuous variable representing either 
the holding of the top five shareholders and of the top twenty shareholders. See Dcmsctz, 11. and Lehn K. op cit. fn. 110. . 121 Mehran, 11. op cit. fn. 112. 
'922 
Goergen, M. 1998. Corporate Governance and Financial Performance: A Study of German and UK Initial 
Public offerings, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
123 See Morek, R., A. Shleifer, and IL Vishny, op cit. fn. 38. 
124 McConnell, J. J. and Servaes, ll. 1990. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value. Journal 
of Financial Economics 27,595-612 
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largest European companies, Thomsen and Pedersen also find that the relationship 
between ownership concentration and economic performance is nonlinear so that 
ownership concentration beyond a certain point leads to entrenchment and has 
adverse effects on performance. 825 To reflect ownership identity on firm performance, 
Agrawal and Knoeber argue that concentrated shareholding by institutions or by 
blockholders can increase managerial monitoring and improve firm performance 826 
Using a cross-section study of 706 firms from the Czech Republic for the period 
1992-97, Claessens et at find that there is a significant positive relationship between 
the concentrated ownership and firm market valuation or profitability. 827 Compared 
with other owner identities, Thomsen and Pedersen also find that financial investor 
ownership is associated with higher shareholder value and profitability 828 
Several empirical studies of China have demonstrated that ownership structure is an 
important determinant of the performance of a corporation. For instance, Xu and 
Wang find that a firm's profitability is correlated with the fraction of legal person 
shares, but is negatively correlated with the fractions of state shares and tradablc A- 
shares held mostly by individuals. 829 Hovey et al claim that ownership concentration 
has little explanatory power but ownership structure does matter. Legal persons' 
shareholdings are positively related to firm valuation 830 Chen and Gong suggest that 
Thomsen, S. and T. Pedersen, 2000. Ownership Structure and Economic Performance in the Largest Europcan 
Companies, Strategic Management Journal, 21: 689-705. 
"b Agrawal, A. and C. R. Knoeber, op cit. fn. 174. 
'r Claessens, S., Diankov, S. and Pohl, Cs 1997. Ownership and Corporate Governance: Et'idence from the C-ech 
Republic, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1737. 
See S. Thomsen and T. Pedersen op cit. fn. 825. 
229 Xiaonian Xu and Yan Wang, op cit. fn. 214. 
130 M. Hovey, L. Li and T. Naughton, 2003. The Relationship between Valuation and Ownership of Listed Firms in China. Corporate Governance. 11(2), 112-122. 
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there is a strong relation between ownership concentration and corporate performance, 
measured by Tobin's Q. A further classification of owners reveals that while shares 
held by the state play a negative role in corporate governance, domestic institutional 
and managerial shareholdings improve the firms' performance. 831 Tian finds an 
"inverse U-shaped" relationship between the shareholding stakes of the government 
and corporate value. His results indicate that corporate value is lower with a larger 
stake of government ownership when the government is a small shareholder, but it 
increases with increased state shareholding when the government is a large 
shareholder. 832 
z 
Although the relationships between ownership structure and firm performance have 
been investigated by many empirical researchers over many countries, it is 
noteworthy that they have yielded some mixed or inconsistent results. This 
inconsistency can be attributed in part to the measure of ownership structure used by 
different researchers in different countries. Indeed, since ownership structure varies 
greatly across countries, 833 while firm performance may have a positive relationship 
with ownership structure in one country, it may have a negative or no relationship in 
another country. Therefore, the findings in a particular country cannot be generalised 
to other countries. In addition, there is a unique classification of shares in China 
which differs quite substantially from that observed in the Anglo-American. system. 
"' Y. M. Chen and S. C. Gong, 2000. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performancc - Some Chinese Evidence, Advances in Pacific Basin Financial Markets, 6,177-193., 
932 CL L. Tian, 2000. State Shareholding and the Value of Chinese Firms. Working paper London Business School. $33 See La Porta et al. 1999. op cit. fn. 154. 
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As we discussed in Chapter 4, a typical listed company in the Chinese stock markets 
has a mixed ownership structure comprising three predominant groups of shareholders 
- the state, legal person and tradable A shareholders. Therefore, a set of variables that 
is used to study a specific country cannot be an appropriate set of variables in China. 
Simply following the empirical method and the definition of ownership structure or 
concentration of ownership without taking into account the essential insight on the 
identity of the shareholders may lead to a wrong conclusion. SM 
Both theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between firm performance 
and ownership structure reviewed above have motivated this study to use a 
multivariate approach by considering both ownership concentration and identification 
of ownership to capture the relationship with firm performance. The descriptive data 
on ownership concentration and the identity of shareholders in China have been 
discussed in Chapter 4. The results indicate that the shareholding and identity of the 
largest shareholder is a fairly good measure of ownership structure because in China 
the largest shareholder generally holds a high proportion of a company's shares with 
their unique identities. Based on the distinctive features of ownership structure of 
Chinese listed companies, the tested hypothesises are as follows: 
Hl,; There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and 
company performance (first increasing, then decreasing). 
f" Liu, G. S. and P, Sun, 2005. Ownership and Control of Chinese Public Corporations: A State-dominated 
Corporate Governance System, in Corporate Governance: Accountability, Enterprise and International Comparisons, ed. K. Keasey, S. Thompson and M. Wright, John Riley & Sons Ltd. 
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HIb: Where the government agency retains a substantial stake, company performance 
is lower. 
HIS. Where an SOE retains a substantial stake, company performance is higher. 
Hid: Where a non-financial company retains a substantial stake, company 
performance is higher. 
HI,: Where a family or individual investor retains a substantial stake, company 
performance is higher. 
9.2.2 Shareholder Activism and Corporate Performance 
Shareholder activism is defined as a process in which the shareholders exercise the 
rights of share ownership to influence management decisions and enhance the benefits 
of the company's shareholders. There are many ways for shareholders to get involved 
in corporate control, including correspondence and meetings with management, 
communication with other shareholders, raising questions at the AGM, proposing 
shareholder resolutions, and proxy voting. In the UK and the US, large companies arc 
listed in the stock markets and have their ownership dispersed among institutional and 
individual investors. By the end of 20th century, institutional shareholders had begun 
to perform a very significant function in challenging management over matters of 
corporate governance through shareholder activism to prevent directors from abusing 
their power. 835 Despite some successes resulting -from the implementation of 
tss For example, the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) survey shows in 1987, the average vote in 
favour of proposal opposing poison pill was 29.4%, and the vote in favour of proposal to declassify the board was 17.5%. By the year 2002, both sets of votes averaged more than 60%. See Klausner, M., 2003. Institutional 
Shareholders, Private Equity, and Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 132 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review. 755, at 757. 
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shareholder activism, there has been very limited empirical research investigating the 
effects of shareholder meeting-related mechanisms on firm performance. 
Nevertheless, there are several empirical works concerned with the activities of 
particular institutional investors in the US. Michael Smith, for example, focuses on 
the California Public Employees' Retirement System (Ca1PERS) and finds statistical 
evidence that shareholder activism results in a significant increase in shareholder 
wealth. 836 Carleton et at examine shareholder proposals produced by the Teachers 
Insurance Annuity Association - College Retirement Equity Fund (TIAA-CREF) and 
argue that the benefits from activism are highly related to the type of governance issue 
targeted. The average abnormal return for proposals to increase board diversity is 
negative, whereas the proposals for blank check preferred issues are significantly and 
positively associated with the average abnormal returns. However, they find no 
significant changes in accounting measures of performance surrounding targeting or 
changes, regardless of the issues. 137 To measure the success of shareholder 
mechanisms, Gillan and Starks examine the short-term stock market reaction to the 
revelation of a corporate governance proposal in the proxy statement. They find that 
the market reaction differs somewhat across issues, with significant investor reaction 
only in the case of institutional or co-ordinated `poison pill' and individual proposals 
seeking, the adoption of cumulative voting. 
838 It is clear that this litcraturc on 
! 36 Smith, M. 1996. Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CaWPERS, Journal of Finance 
51,227-252, at251. 
'37 Carleton, W. T., J. M. Nelson, and M. S. Weisbach, op cit. fn. 1 11. 
13' Stuart L. Gillan and Laura T. Starks, 2000. Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: the 
Role of Institutional Investors. Journal of Financial Economics 57, pp275-305, at 209. 
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shareholder activism which is mainly based on the activities of US institutional 
shareholders, offers some ambiguous evidence on corporate performance. 
It is apparent that the shareholder meeting has provided a permanent platform for the 
emergence of shareholder activism. The effectiveness of shareholder activism is 
supposed to lead to better corporate performance by generating shareholder 
engagement and interference as necessary in a shareholder meeting to ensure an 
appropriate board with an incentive to deliver long-term shareholder value. Edkins 
and Bush argue that any movement towards "activism" without an economic focus on 
outcomes could result in more voting and more meetings with companies, but no 
improvement in performance. 39 Thus, this study measures the relationship between 
corporate performance and shareholder activism through a broader set of activities at 
shareholder meeting, including the turnout ratio at the AGM, voting level at the 
AGM, and shareholder proposals submitted at the AGM. 
The AGM is a central element of the corporate governance system in every 
jurisdiction. The study's emphasis on the empirical implication of the impact of the 
turnout ratio of the AGM on firm performance is novel in corporate govcrnancc 
studies. Under agency cost theory, on the one hand, there are definitely some costs 
generated by taking part in the shareholder meeting, including both time and travel 
1939 Edlcins, M., and T. Bush, 2002. Encouraging Shareholder Activism: An Consultation Document, 17 May. 
Hermes, at p1. The document is available from: 
httn"//ww . 
hgrmes. co. uk/pdf/corporateRovernance/comentg enco ra ýýý charnho1dcr ., ý ism ýf 
[Accessed 22 February 2005]. 
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expenses for any active individual shareholder. On the other hand, there are also 
benefits, including seeking to influence management decisions, exercising voting 
power on controversial or exceptional resolutions, and appointment or removal 
directors. If certain shareholders are acting as monitors of management behaviour, 
corporate performance will be better, and the turnout ratio at the AGM is a good 
proxy for the measurement of the active monitoring of the board of directors, which 
will reduce agency costs, and in turn, increase firm value. 
Under contractual theory, voting exists in corporations because shareholders must 
have the residual power to act or delegate when contracts are not complete 840 The 
exercise (or rather non-exercise) of voting rights by the eligible shareholders at the 
shareholder meetings has been a matter of concern in many countries. As we have 
discussed in Chapter 5, the company law and the constitutional document of the 
company do not actually require the shareholders to exercise their votes in China and 
the UK. The voting level entirely depends on shareholders' incentive and their 
capacity which are again in line with agency cost theory. In China, there has been 
some evidence that the shareholder meetings in listed companies have, in general, a 
lower attendance ratio with a higher voting level, which results from the concentrated 
ownership structure. 841 A common approach in empirical studies in corporate 
governance has been to focus on the impact of ownership structure. However, little 
i0 Easterbrook and Fische!, 1983, op cit. fn. 82, p403. 
'4' The survey of the 2002/2003 AGMs of Chinese listed companies conducted by the author shows that the 
average turnout at the AGM was about 15 people, which means only about six in ten thousand shareholders attend 
the AGM. About 64% of companies had less than 10 shareholders attending the AGM. I lowevcr, the average 
voting level represented by these shareholders was about 57% of the total voting capital of the company. Sec 
chapter S. 
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has been said about how voting rights are exercised and the impact on corporate 
performance. This study will fill a gap in this field, and test the 
hypothesis that the 
shareholder voting level is positively associated with corporate performance. 
Shareholder proposals represent direct attempts to improve the operating and 
governance performance of publicly listed companies 
842 Smith examines the wealth 
effects of 51 US firms during the period of 1987-1993 and finds that for the 
shareholder proposals passed at annual meetings, abnormal returns are positive and 
significant on proxy mailing dates. For those proposals that fail, abnormal returns arc 
negative and significant. He concludes that the largest and most powerful institutional 
investor, such as CaIPERS, plays an important role in monitoring managers, 
improving performance, and increasing firm value. 
43 In China, shareholder proposals 
are normally filed by the top three shareholders of the company either individually or 
jointly 844 and most of these shareholders are either SOEs or non-financial 
companies 845 Although they differ from institutional investors in terms of identity, as 
commercial entities both SOEs and non-financial companies have the power and 
incentive to exert influence on a company's operational management or gcncral and 
$42 J. M. Forjan, 1999. The wealth effects of shareholder-sponsored proposals, Review of Financial Economics 8, 
ý61-72. 
' M. Smith, op cit. fn. 836, at25 1. 
In the 2002/2003 survey, out of 22 proposals put forward by shareholders at the AGM in 18 Chinese listed 
companies, 18 proposals were submitted by the top three shareholders 
individually, and 11 of them wert from the 
largest shareholders, 6 of them were from the second largest shareholder and I of them was from the third largest 
shareholder, 2 proposals were submitted by the largest shareholder and the third largest shareholder jointly; I 
proposal was submitted by the top two shareholders jointly; and 
I proposal was submitted by the top three 
shareholders jointly. See chapter 5. 
"s In the 2002/2003 survey, out of the 22 proposals put forward by the shareholders at the AGM in 18 Chinese 
listed companies, 20 proposals involved either SOE shareholders or non-financial company shareholders or both, 
whereas only 2 proposals had institutional shareholders involved. See chapter 5. 
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specific policies. Therefore, the study expects that there is a positive effect of 
shareholder proposals on corporate performance. 
The hypotheses on the relations between shareholder activism and firm performance 
are as follows: 
HZ,: Where the turnout ratio at the AGM is higher, company performance is higher. 
Heb: Where the company voting level at the AGM is higher, company performance is 
higher. 
Hzc: Where the company has shareholder proposals put forward at the AGM, 
company performance is higher. 
9.2.3 The Board of Directors and Corporate Performance 
There are a large number of academic studies that have investigated the role and 
characteristics of the board of directors and their effects on firm performance. Fama 
and Jensen focus on contract theory and suggest that the separation of decision 
management and decision control in the decision process can alleviate the agency 
problem. 846 Fama and Jensen argue that there. are internal control devices, such as 
outside board members and mutual monitoring systems to limit the discretion of 
executive directors. Outside directors have an incentive to monitor management 
actions since they have staked their reputation as professional corporate referees. 
Consequently, the board of directors with a higher proportion of independent directors 
116 Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, op cit. fn. 547. 
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will perform the critical function of monitoring and rewarding top executives to 
ensure maximisation of shareholders' wealth. 847 
Fama and Jensen's theory has motivated much of the discussion of the influence of 
the board, non-executive directors, separate chairperson and chief executives, and the 
board committees on different dimensions of company performance. Baysinger and 
Butler examine the relationship between board composition and corporate financial 
performance. They find that outside directors monitor management, reduce agency 
costs and therefore increase profitability. 848 Weisbach shows that there is a close 
relation of CEO turnover to performance in firms where non-executive directors 
dominate the board. 849 Rosenstein and Wyatt also find that outside directors arc 
perceived to improve shareholder wealth. 
850 
In addition, many board composition studies state that independent directors arc better 
monitors because their interests are less likely to be aligned with those of 
management and they have the incentive to `develop reputation as experts in decision 
control'. 851 Some research presents a different view on the effects of board 
composition on firm performance. For example, Hermalin and Wcisbach study a 
sample of 134 NYSE firms from 1971 to, 1983 to test the relationship bctwccn 
$47 ibid. 
"" Baysinger, B. D. and ILN. Butler, 1985, op cit. fn. 94. 
t09 Weisbach, M. S. 1988. Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 20, pp43 I. 
460. 
650 Their study shows that there is a positive stock price reaction to the announcement of the appointmcnt of an 
additional outside director. See Rosenstein, S. and Wyatt, J. IL 1990. Outside directors, Board independence, and 
Shareholder Wealth, Journal of Financial Economics, 26,175.191. 
151 Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, op cit. fn. 547. 
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Tobin's Q and the fraction of outside directors of the boards with various control 
variables. Their regression analysis shows that firm performance is not significantly 
correlated with the fraction of outsider directors. 52 Bhagat and Black's study finds 
that firms experiencing poor performance may tend to appoint more outside directors, 
but no significant relationship between board composition and various measures of 
firm performance including Tobin's Q, return on total assets ratio, sale/assets ratio, 
and long-term stock returns. 53 
Audit committees have long been part of the traditional framework of corporate 
governance. Deli and Gillan show that audit committee independence and activity are 
positively related to proxies for a firm's need for accounting certification 8M Klein 
evaluates the link between board composition and firm performance for firms listed 
on the S&P 500 by assessing the composition of boards' committee structures and 
finds little association between firm performance and the existence of an audit 
committee 855 The literature on executive compensation as a control device has also 
been well established. Ellingson finds that the association between CEO 
compensation and firm performance is stronger when the board is composed of a 
majority of outside directors. 856 Shleifer and Vishny argue that a proportion of 
executive directors' remuneration should be structured so as to link the rewards to 
852 Iiermalin, B. E. and Weisbach, M. S., op cit. fn. 112 
853 See Bhagat, S. and Black, B., op cit. fn. 112 
'" Deli, D. and Gillan S. 2000. On the Demand for Independent and Active Audit Committees, Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 2000, Vol. 6, Issue 4. pp427-445. 
"ss Klein A., op cit. fn. 112 
'" Ellingson, Dee Ann Iletland, 1996, Board Composition and the Use of Accounting Measures: The effects of the 
Relationship Between CEO Compensation and Firm Performance, PhD. Dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute of and State University. 
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corporate and individual performance. 
57 Core et al give their attention to how board 
characteristics are related to the composition of executives. They use CEO 
compensation as a metric for assessing the effectiveness of corporate governance 
in 
aligning the conflicts of interest between shareholders and management. 
858 However, 
by using 10 variables to assess board characteristics, Dulewicz and Herbert find that 
board composition and structure have no visible impact on company performance 
8S9 
As a contributor to the effectiveness of the board of directors, the intensity of board 
activity has been measured by the frequency of board meetings and corporate 
performance. Vafeas argues that board meeting frequency which is an important 
dimension of board operation is consistent with contracting and agency theory. lie 
finds that the annual number of board meetings is inversely related to firm value 86'0 
However, he further finds that the firm's operating performance improves following 
years of abnormal board activities 
861 He concludes that the board responds to poor 
performance by raising the level of board activities in order to , 
improve operating 
862 
performance. 
asp Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, op cit. fn. 38. 
"' Core, J., liolthausen R. and Larcker, D. 1999. Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation 
and Firm Performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51, pp. 371-406. .I 
"19 The measures used to assess board characteristics include (1) total number of directors (board zisc); (2), number 
of executive and non-executive directors (with and without the chairman); (3) proportion of NEDs in relation to 
total board and to number of executive directors, (4) tenure of chairman, executive (average) and NEW (average) 
and all directors; (5) pay (average) (6) potential equity 
held by all directors, (7) chairman/CEO separation; (8), 
Chairman: executive or non executive; (9) audit committee's existence; (10) remuneration committee existence. 
See Victor Dulewicz and Peter Herbert, 2004. Does the Composition and Practice of Boards of Directors Bear any 
Relationship to the Performance of Their Companies? Corporate Governance, v. 12, No. 13, July. 
`60 The research finds that the higher board activity is associated with poor prior firm performance. See Nil os 
Vafeas, 1999. Board Meeting Frequency and Firm Performance, Journal of Financial Economics 53, p 113.142. 
261 ibid 
$62 ibid 
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As discussed above, the various studies of the relationship between board 
characteristics and company performance appear to show that the size of the board, 
board composition, the existence of an audit committee, directors' compensation and 
the frequency of board meetings may (or may not) affect the way in which boards 
accomplish certain tasks in corporate governance in the developed Western 
economies. This is because differences in economic conditions and institutional 
environment have an influence on the effectiveness of the board as an important 
determinant of effective corporate governance. However, in China, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, the hybrid two-tier board system has not been well-established. Although 
the CCGC 863 recommends that listed companies establish audit committees 
comprising a majority of independent directors in order to monitor companies' 
internal control system, whether the implementation of the audit committee is able to 
improve the corporate performance merits further monitoring. In addition, in China, 
compensation packages are mainly salary-based and equity-based compensation (such 
as stock options) was not adopted until early 2003.864 Whether corporate performance 
is sensitive to the salary-based compensation system is problematic. Moreover, as far 
as the board meeting is concerned, Art. 116 of the Chinese Company Law stipulates 
that the board of directors shall hold meetings at least twice a year. However, whether 
the minimum requirement on the board meeting can be sufficient to ensure that the 
board fulfils its duties effectively has never been tested. Therefore, the hypotheses on 
263 See the CCGC, op cit. fn. 28. 
'" In China, less than 10% of listed companies adopted stock option incentive plan and only two of them (Dongfang Tongxin and Shanghai Beiling) were approved by the CSRC as Stock Option plan expcrimcntal 
company in 2003. see Long, Xudong, 2003. Stock Option Dream I lardly Becomes True (Gupiao Qiquan de Nanyuan Zhimeng), International Finance News. (Guoji Jinrong Bao), 28 April. 
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the relationship between characteristics of the boards and firm performance are as 
follows: 
H3a: Where the company has a larger size of board, company performance is higher. 
H3b: Where the company has more independent directors in the board, company 
perform is higher. 
H3.: Where there is an audit committee in the company, company performance is 
higher. 
Had: Where the roles of Chairperson and CEO are separated, company performance is 
higher. 
Hie Where the company pays higher compensation to its executives, company 
performance is higher. 
H3f Where the company convenes more board meetings, company performance is 
lower. 
9.3 Data and Methodology 
9.3.1 Data Sources 
Since the introduction of the independent director system and the CCGC in 2001, a 
new area of corporate governance has emerged in China in pursuit of propcr and 
efficient corporate practice. Unlike previous empirical research, this study uses the 
data available after the new system came into existence in China and so is morc 
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relevant to understanding of the impact of corporate governance on corporate 
performance. 
As described in Chapter 3, the original sample for this study consisted of 300 listed 
companies which were randomly selected from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
markets for the 2002/2003 financial year. A random sample was selected so that the 
sample results can reasonably be regarded as representative of the population. In order 
to compile a complete dataset at the firm level on ownership structure, shareholder 
activism, board characteristics, and firm performance, data were collected from a 
wide variety of sources available at the Thomson Analytics database, official and 
professional securities analysis bodies' websites, and companies' websites. However, 
33 companies had to be eliminated because of data deficiencies. For the remaining 
267 firms, performance data were collected from the Thomson One Banker database 
and company's annual reports (2002/2003). The data for ownership structurc, 
shareholder meetings and board characteristics were collected mainly from 
company's annual reports (2002/2003), supplemented by referring to official and 
professional securities analysis bodies' websites, including the CSRC wcbsitc 
htti): //www. csrc. jzov. cn), the Huariä Security House wcbsitc 
(http: //www. cscl08. com/1, the Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi ` Zixun wcbsitc 
(http //www. cnlist. com/search/search. htm), 'and the ' Hezun ` company wcbsitc 
(http: //www. hexun. com). 
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9.3.2 Variable Description 
" Firm Performance Measures 
The concept of corporate performance can be interpreted by either accounting-based 
measures such as the rate of return on total assets (ROA) and the rate of return on 
equity (ROE), or by market-based measures such as Tobin's Q . 
96s Accounting-based 
ratios measure the past and current performance of the firm whereas Tobin's Q 
captures the expected future performance of the firm. Although both measurements 
are well accepted in the literature, recent research has tended to use Tobin's Q to 
measure the valuation of listed companies. In many cases, Tobin's Q is measured by 
the sum of the market value of common stock, book value of preferred stock, long- 
term debt, and short-term debt, divided by total assets g66 However, the calculation of 
the market values of Chinese listed companies is obviously complex and cumbersome 
as the state shares and legal person shares are not traded in the stock markets. 
Although in practice all classes of shares of listed companies in China have enjoyed 
the same voting and residual rights, in theory, the state and legal person share price 
would be neither treated as the same as the market price of shares, nor simply treated 
as preferred stock shares measured only by the book value. Cheri and Xiong's 
research focuses on the price differences between the state and legal person shares 
which are not traded in the stock exchange markets and common shares of the same 
`bs For example, as discussed in section 9.2.1 of the chapter, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) employ accounting rate of 
return (average annual net incomelbook value of shareholders equity) whereas Morck, Shicifcr and Vishny and 
McConnell and Servaes use Tobin's Q to measure firm performance. See Dcrosctz, 11. and Lehn K. op cit. fn. )10; Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R Vishny, op cit. fn. 38; McConnell, J. J. and Servaes, 11.1990. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value. Journal of Financial Economics 27,595-612 
`66 Kee H. Chung and Stephen W. Pruitt, 1994. A Simple Approximation of Tobin's Q. Financial Afanagement, 
23(3): 70-74 
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company, observing both auction and private-transfer transactions for non-tradable 
shares. They found that the average discount for non-tradable shares relative to their 
floating counterpart was 77.93% and 85.59%. 867 Thus, how to compute the market 
value of the state shares and legal person shares is still an unsolved problem. 
Therefore, this study adopts the accounting-based ratio ROA as a measurement of 
firm performance. 868 Table 9.1 shows that the mean value of ROA is 3.64 in the 
sample with a standard deviation of 7.05. 
" Corporate Governance Characteristics 
1 
Corporate governance characteristics in this study comprise three groups of proxy 
variables - ownership structure, shareholder activism and the characteristics of the 
board of directors. 
Ownership structure is measured by both ownership concentration and shareholder 
identity. Initially, the study attempts to , 
investigate the impact of ownership 
concentration on corporate performance. The proportion of shares held by the largest 
shareholder (PLS) is used to capture concentration of share ownership. The PLS data 
was collected from companies' annual reports and the descriptive statistics arc 
presented in Table 9.1. To measure the potential nonlinear relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance, the study constructs the square of the 
PLS variable (PLSS) as an additional independent variable in the regression analysis. 
""See Zhiwu Chen and Peng Xiong, 2001. Discounts on Illiquid Stocks: Evidence from China. Yale 1CF Forking 
Paper No. 00-56, September. 
"" The study also uses ROE (return on equity) and ROIC (return on invested capital) as alternative measures of 
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In addition, consistent with existing evidence on the relationship between shareholder 
identity and economic performance, the study proposes that the identity of the largest 
shareholder is important as an influence on shareholder value. Shareholder identity in 
China can be classified as state-owned enterprises (SOE), government agencies (GA), 
non-financial companies (COM), financial institutions (FIS), family and individual 
shareholders (FAI) and foreign investors (FIN). In our sample, 142 companies 
(accounting for 53% of the sample size) have an SOE as their largest shareholder, 41 
companies (accounting for 15% of the sample size) have a GA as their largest 
shareholder, 52 companies (accounting for 19% of the sample size) have a COM as 
their largest shareholder, and 26 companies (accounting for 10% of the sample size) 
have an FAI as their largest shareholder. However, there are no foreign investors and 
only 6 companies (accounting for 2.2% of the sample size) have the largest 
shareholder from financial institutions. Hence their relationship with corporate 
performance is not predicted in this study. With respect to other identities, the study 
includes them as dummy variables. Thus, if a state-owned enterprise is the largest 
shareholder, the variable SOE = 1, and 0 otherwise. If a government agency is the 
largest shareholder, GA = 1, and 0 otherwise. If a non-financial company is the largest 
shareholder, COM = 1, and 0 otherwise. If a family or individual investor is the 
' largest shareholder, FAI = 1, and 0 otherwise. 
firm performance and all results are qualitatively the same. 
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Shareholder activism is measured by three shareholder meeting variables. They are 
the turnout ratio (TR), voting level (VL) and shareholder proposals (SP). All these 
data are collected from company annual reports and shareholder meeting resolution 
statements. Table 9.1 shows that the average turnout is less than 6 out of ten thousand 
shareholders at the AGM. The voting level on average is 56.79% of total company 
voting rights. The firm reporting the lowest voting level at the AGM has a VL of 
1.30%, while the highest voting level is 89.95% of the company's total voting right. 
However, the distribution of the raw data for TR is very skewed. To obtain a more 
symmetric distribution of the measure of shareholder activism, the TR data are 
converted to natural logarithms for the regression analysis (denoted by LTR). 
Shareholder proposals are included as a dummy variable in this study, so SP -I 
where a company has a shareholder proposing a resolution at the AGM, and 0 
otherwise. The incidence of shareholder proposals was not high in the 2002-2003 
financial year with only 6.74% of the firms having shareholders proposing resolutions 
to the AGM. 
S 
Six variables are selected to measure the characteristics of the board of directors: the 
size of the board (SBOD), the proportion of independent directors on the board 
(PIND); the presence of an audit committee (AUC), CEO/chairperson duality (CCD), 
executive compensation (EC), and frequency, of board meetings (FBM). Table 9.1 
shows the descriptive statistics for the characteristics of the board of directors of the 
sample companies. SBOD shows that the size of the boards varies from 5 to 19. The 
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average board size is 10. PIND shows that the proportion of independent directors on 
the board is less than the one-third required by the Corporate Governance Code, with 
a mean of 25.16%. AUC is defined as a dummy variable which equals I if the 
company has established an audit committee, and 0 otherwise. AUC shows that there 
are only 31.34% of companies with audit committees. EC is calculated as the average 
annual salary of the highest paid three executive directors. 
69 The figures in Table 9.1 
indicate that the average compensation of executives is 187,717 Yuan (approximately 
£14,440). 870 The distribution of the raw data for EC is also very skewed, so 
logarithms are used to reduce the skew (denoted by LEC). CCD is defined as a 
dummy variable taking a value of I if the company's CEO is also chairperson of the 
board of directors, and 0 otherwise. In about 11.57% of listed companies the CEO and 
chairperson positions are held by one individual at the same time. Finally, FBM 
shows that the board, on average, held about eight meetings during the 2002-2003 
financial year with a range of 3 to 27. However, the nature of the association between 
the frequency of board meetings and corporate performance is complex and its 
causality may run in both directions. For firms experiencing poor performance the 
board of directors will be under pressure and tend to convene more meetings to 
improve performance. Therefore, the raw data for the frequency of board meetings arc 
26' In China, executive compensation is normally disclosed by company's annual report showing either 
total annual remuneration of the board (some may include supervisors' salaries) or the total annual 
salary of the highest paid three executive directors. No equity-based compensation (e. g. stock option) 
has been disclosed in our sample companies' annual report. Thus, the data for executive compensation 
in this study adopted the total annual salary of the highest paid three executive directors and divided it 
by three in order to reflect executive compensation. 
$70 Exchange rate base on £1 = RMB 13.00 according to Bank of China exchange rate on 31st 
December 2002. 
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converted to a new variable by using instrumental variables in order to avoid 
simultaneous equation bias in the regression analysis. 
71 
0 Control Variables 
There are two principal control variables employed in this study. They are company 
size and company age. Company size is measured by the natural logarithm of the 
company's total assets (LTA). Since larger companies have a greater capacity for 
financing expansion, LTA can have a significant influence on corporate performance. 
Company age (AGE) has been used in many studies to explain firm performance 
since the profit of older firms may be enhanced by productivity gains resulting from 
learning by doing or reputation effects leading to increased demand; on the other 
hand, new firms may tend to have higher value as they use up-to-date technology and 
modem management. 872 In addition, since the company's business sector can havc a 
potential impact on corporate performance, the study also includes industrial sectors 
as. dummy variables. All companies are classified into three main industrial 
categories, included as dummy variables - primary industry (PI), which includes 
agriculture, forestry and fishing; secondary industry (S[), which includes 
manufacturing, production and distribution of electricity, gas and watcr, and 
construction; and tertiary industry (TI), which includes wholesale and retail trade, real 
estate, tourism, banking and financial industries, information transfer, computer 
"1 When causality runs "backwards" from Y to X as well as "forwards" from X to Y, there is 
simultaneous causality bias which multiple regression simply cannot eliminate. Instrumental variable 
regression uses additional variables as tools to isolate the movements in X that are uncorrelated with 
the error term `u', which in turn permits consistent estimation of the regression coefficients. See Stock 
and Watson, 2003, Introduction to Econometrics, International Edition, Addison Wesley. pp331.335. 
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services and software etc 873 The descriptive statistics of the control variables are also 
provided in Table 9.1. 
Table 9.1 Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ROA (%) 267 -50.03 32.09 3.64 7.05 
PLS (%) 267 . 39 85.00 45.39 18.57 
PLSS 267 . 15 7225.00 
2403.98 1726.03 
SOE 267 . 00 1.00 . 54 . 50 
GA 267 . 00 1.00 . 15 . 36 
COM 267 . 00 1.00 . 19 . 40 
FAI 267 . 00 1.00 . 10 . 30 
VL (%) 267 1.30 89.95 56.79 14.88 
TR (per thousand) 267 . 
01 13.24 
. 
5737 1.26 
LTR 267 -4.65 2.58 -1.35 1.19 
SP 267 . 00 1.00 . 07 . 25 SBOD 267 5.00 19.00 10.04 2.38 
PIND (%) 267 . 00 66.00 25.16 8.73 
AUC 267 . 00 1.00 . 31 . 47 EC (RMB, 000) 267 14.40 3493.590 187.717 309.71 
LEC 267 2.67 8.16 4.62 1.04 
CCD 267 . 00 1.00 . 12 . 32 
FBM 267 3.00 27.00 7.75 3.18 
FBMP 267 6.59 14.07 7.76 1.05 
AGE 267 1.00 10.00 4.60 2.50 
TA (RMB, million) 267 5.07 7427.87 295.75 614.59 
LTA 267 1.62 8.91 8.15 0.97 
PI 267 . 00 1.00 . 07 . 26 Si 267 . 
00 1.00 
. 49 . 50 TI 267 . 00 1.00 . 43 . 50 
ROA (return on total assets) = (Net Income before Preferred Dividends + ((Interest Expense on Debt-Interest Capitalized)' (1- 
Tax Rate))) / Last Year's Total Assets * 100. The cited formulas are from Thomson Analytics database (Thomson One Banker 
data); PLS (the proportion of shares held by the biggest shareholder); PLSS (the square of PLS); SOE (identity of the largest 
shareholder is an SOE); GA (identity of the largest shareholder is a government agency); COM (identity of the largest 
shareholder is a non financial company); FAI (identity of the largest shareholder is a family or individual); VL (voting level at 
the AGM); TR (turnout ratio at the AGM); LTR (logged turnout ratio at the AGM); SP (shareholder proposals submitted at the 
AGM); SBOD (size of board of directors) PIND (proportion of independent directors in the board); AUC (audit committee); EC 
(executive compensation); LEC (logged executive compensation) CCD(chairpcrson and CEO duality); FBM (frequency of board 
meetings); FBMP(frequency of board meetings coefficient estimated by instrumental variable method); TA (total assets); AGE 
(age of the company); PI (primary sector); SI (secondary sector); TI (tertiary sector). 
=n See Leech, D. and Leahy, J. op cit. fn. 113. 
173 Industrial classification standard employed in this thesis is based on "Industrial Classification in Chinese 
National Accounts". See Tonglu Zhao, (2004), Zhao, Tonglu, Comparison between Industrial Classification in 
Chinese National Accounts and International Standard Industrial Classif ication for All Economic Activities (ISIC), 
(Nov. 30,2004). Available at http: //www. oeed. orz/dataoecd/32125/33982328. pdf (last visited Sep. 28, 
2005). 
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9.3.3 Correlation Matrix 
Table 9.2 presents Pearson's correlation matrix for the variables employed in this 
study. The results indicate that the independent variable ROA is significantly 
correlated with some ownership structure variables, including a positive correlation 
with ownership concentration measured by PLS (p<0.01), a positive correlation with 
the identity of the largest shareholders SOE (p<0.05). In addition, the results also 
show that ROA is significantly correlated with shareholder activism measured by 
voting level at the shareholder meetings (p<0.01) and the logged turnout ratio 
(p<0.01). Furthermore, the relationship between board characteristics and ROA shows 
a positive correlation with audit committee AUC (p<0.05) and logged executive 
compensation (p<0.01). However, Table 9.2 also reports that ROA is negatively 
correlated with company age (p<0.01) and positively correlated with logged total 
assets. It is also noted that there is some correlation among the independent variables 
and control variables, but none of the correlation coefficients are sufficiently high to 
create multicollinearity problems in the regression analysis. 
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9.4 Multivariate Analysis 
The study comprises two stages to present the results of the empirical work. In the 
first stage the study provides preliminary evidence on the association between each 
corporate governance mechanism and corporate performance. In the second stage the 
study provides a systematic measurement, examining a number of governance 
variables that have not been previously examined simultaneously, in order to find the 
relationships between the strategic governance configurations and corporate 
performance. The estimated regression models are designed as follows: 
Model (1) 
ROA = ft(ownership structure variables + control variables) 
Model (2) 
ROA = f2(shareholder activism variables. + control variables) 
Model (3) 
ROA = f3(board characteristics variables + control variables) 
Model (4) 
ROA = f4(ownership structure variables + shareholder activism variables + board 
characteristics variables + control variables) 
9.4.1 The Effects of Ownership Structure on Corporate Performance 
Table 9.3 reports the results of the main effects of ownership concentration on 
corporate performance. According to the regression results, it is noted that the naturc 
of the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance is not 
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monotonic, but rather a curved relation with an `inverse U-shape' which is consistent 
with HI.. Table 9.3 shows that the ROA is influenced positively and significantly by 
the largest ownership shareholding (p<0.01) and negatively and significantly by the 
square of the largest ownership shareholding (p<0.01). The parameter estimates 
indicate that corporate performance begins to increase as the ownership concentration 
ratio rises to certain point, and then drops with further increases the ownership 
concentration ratio. This result is consistent with related studies such as Morck et at, 
McConnell and Servae and Thomsen and Pedersen. 874 Figure 9.1 suggests that the 
ROA increases with the largest shareholder's shareholding up to approximately 48.83 
per cent of company's issued shares and decreases afterwards in China. 75 
Table 9.3 The effects of ownership concentration and corporate performance* 
ROA' 
Model B Std. Error 
( 
Beta 
I 
t Sic. 
(Constant) -8.922 3.273 -2.726 . 007 PLS . 293 . 108 . 771 2.708 . 007 PLSS -. 003 . 001 -. 738 -2.603 . 010 AGE -. 894 . 164 -. 317 -5.453 . 000 LTA 2.089 . 415 . 288 5.036 . 000 PI -. 297 1.579 -. 011 -. 188 . 851 SI -. 192 . 854 -. 014 -. 225 . 822 
R 
. 233 
Adjusted R2 
. 216 
F 13.197*** 
" 1) ependant vanable: KUA (return on total assets). independent variables: PLS (the proportion of shares held by 
the biggest shareholder), PLSS (square of the proportion of shares held by the biggest shareholder. Control 
variables: LTA (logged total assets), AGE (age of the company), PI (primary sector), SI (secondary sector) 
a. Model, ROE -a+ P1PLS + ß2PLSS +. 8j, 4GE + fi4LTA + ß, SJ + ß6TI +E 
Note: A plot of the standardised residuals against standardised predicted values was inspected and no evidence of 
the heteroscedasticity or non-linearity was detected. 
McConnell, J. J. and Servaes, H. 1990. "Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value, " 
Journal of Financial Economics, 27,595-612; Morck, R., A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, op ctt fn. 38; and Thomsen. S. and T. Pedersen, op cit. fn. 825. 
975 To find the turning point in Figure 9.1, the estimated equation for model I was differentiated with respect to PLS and the derivative set equal to zero. 
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Figure 9.1 
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The largest shareholder's shareholding 
Previous studies argue that both ownership concentration and owner identities are 
embedded in the corporate ownership structure which must be taken into account 
when assessing the implication of corporate governance mechanisms for corporate 
performance. 876 Table 9.4 explores the effects of the identity of the largest 
shareholders on corporate performance. The findings show that the eftcct of 
ownership concentration on corporate performance is qualitatively unchanged by 
including the identity of the largest shareholder as a categorical variable. I lowever, 
Table 9.4 indicates that the coefficients of SOE, GA and COM are positive and 
significant at the 5% level and FAI is positive and significant at the 1% level. The 
results suggest that the companies tend to have higher ROA if the largest shareholder 
is a family or individual investor. In contrast, if the largest shareholder is a 
government agency, corporate performance is lower compared with the others. 
Overall, the results are consistent with all the hypothesized relationships //j,, through 
g76 See S. Thomsen and T. Pedersen, op cit fn. 825. 
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H1,. In addition, based on the results reported in both Tables 9.3 and 9.4, the findings 
show that the estimated coefficient for the control variable AGE is negative and 
statistically significant (p<0.01) and LTA is positive and statistically significant 
(p<0.01) in the regression model. However, the industrial sector variables are 
insignificant. 
Table 9.4 The effects of ownership identity on corporate performance* 
ROA' 
Model B Std. Error Beta t 
(Si 
. 
(Constant) -14.684 3.957 -3.711 . 000 
PLS . 263 . 108 . 
692 2.421 . 016 
PLSS -. 003 . 001 -. 
666 -2.352 . 019 
SOE 6.349 2.692 . 450 
2.358 . 019 
GA 5.973 2.770 . 303 2.157 . 032 
COM 6.225 2.735 . 350 2.276 . 024 
FAI 8.063 2.839 . 340 2.840 . 005 
AGE -. 859 . 166 -. 304 -5.166 . 000 
LTA 2.077 . 417 . 286 4.980 . 000 
PI -. 471 1.577 -. 018 -. 299 . 765 
SI -. 109 . 851 -. 008 -. 128 . 898 
. 257 
Adjusted RZ . 228 
F 8.873*** 
" Dependant variable: ROA (return on total assets). Independent variables: PLS (the proportion of shares held by 
the biggest shareholder), PLSS (square of the proportion of shares held by the biggest shareholder), SOE (identity 
of the largest shareholder is an SOE); GA (identity of the 
largest shareholder is a government agency); COM 
(identity of the largest shareholder is a non financial corporation); FAI (identity of the largest shareholder is a 
family or individual. Control variables: LTA (logged total assets), AGE (age of the company), Pl (primary sector), 
SI (secondary sector) 
a. Model, ROA=a + ß, PLS + ß1PLSS +ß3SOE +ß4GA +ft3COM +ß6FA1 + ß7AGE + ßvLTA + QS/ + ß, 0T1 +6 
Note: A plot of the standardised residuals against standardised predicted values was inspected and no evidence of 
the heteroscedasti city or non-linearity was detected. 
9.4.2 The Effects of Shareholder Activism oil Corporate Performance 
Table 9.5 considers the effects of shareholder activism on corporate performance. The 
regression model comprises three explanatory variables - VL (voting level at the 
AGM), LTR (logged turnout ratio) and SP (shareholder proposing resolutions at the 
AGM), all of which proxy shareholder activism. The regression results show that the 
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estimated coefficients for VL and LTR are both positive and statistically significant, 
whereas SP appears not to be related with ROA. Based on the findings reported in 
Table 9.5, there is strong support for H2,, and Heb, but H2c is rejected. In addition, the 
findings also show that the estimated coefficients for the control variable "AGE" is 
negative and statistically significant (p<0.01) and "LTA" is positive and statistically 
significant (p<0.01), and with no significant relation with industrial sectors in this 
regression model. 
Table 9.5 The effects of the shareholder activism on corporate performance* 
ROA' 
Model B Std. Error 
I 
Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -5.425 2.588 -2.096 . 037 
cri, . 084 . 030 . 177 2.829 . 005 LTR 1.391 . 319 . 235 4.364 . 000 
SP . 097 1.488 . 003 . 065 . 948 
AGE -. 819 . 166 -. 290 -4.920 . 000 LTA 1.951 . 406 . 269 4.803 . 000 Si -. 267 1.525 -. 010 -. 175 . 861 Ti -. 162 . 821 -. 012 -. 197 . 844 
. 284 
Adjusted R2 . 265 
F ', 14.705*** 
Dependant variable: ROA (Return on Total Assets). Independent variables: LVL (logged voting level at the 
AGM); LTR (logged turnout ratio at the AGM); SP (shareholder proposal submitted at the AGM). Control 
variables: LTA (logged total assets), AGE (age of the company), PI (primary sector), SI (secondary sector) 
a. Model, ROA =a + ßjL VL + ß2LTR + ß3SP + ß4AGE + ß. LTA + ß6, S1 +Q7TA +t 
Note: A plot of the standardised residuals against standardised predicted values was inspected and no evidence of 
the heteroscedasticity or non-linearity was detected. 
9.4.3 The Effects of the Characteristics of the Board of Directors on 
Corporate Performance 
Table 9.6 presents the estimated regression results of the relation between the board 
characteristics and corporate performance. The results show that only the presence of 
an audit committee (H3c) is positive and statistically significant at 10% level. The 
findings indicate that the coefficient for Chairperson and CEO duality (113d) is 
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negative, but not significant at conventional levels. There is no empirical evidence to 
support the relationship between ROA and board size (H3a), the proportion of 
independent directors on the board (H3b), executive compensation (HU) and the 
frequency of board meetings (H3f) in this regression model. However, the coefficient 
for the control variable AGE still remains negative and statistically significant 
(p<0.01) and "LTA" remains positive and statistically significant (p<0.01), but the 
industrial sectors remains insignificant. 
Table 9.6 the effects of the characteristics of board of directors on corporate performance* 
ROA' 
Model B Std. Error Beta 
I 
tI Sie. 
(Constant) -1.923 4.449 -. 432 . 666 
SBOD -. 040 . 170 -. 013 -. 234 . 815 PIND . 032 . 048 . 039 . 658 ä11 
AUC 1.701 . 883 . 112 1.926 . 055 
LEC . 578 . 388 . 085 1.488 . 138 CCD -1.873 1.229 -. 085 -1.524 . 129 FBM -. 424 . 375 -. 063 -1.132 . 259 AGE -. 896 . 162 -. 317 -5.528 . 000 
LTA 1.842 . 425 . 254 4.335 . 000 Si -. 388 1.576 -. 015 -. 246 . 806 
TI . 273 . 835 . 019 . 327 . 744 
R . 244 
Adjusted RZ . 214 
F 8.253*** 
" Dependent Variable: ROA (return on total assets). Independent variables: SBOD (size of board of directors) 
PIND (proportion of independent directors in the board); AUC (audit committee); EC (executive compensation). 
CCD (Chairperson and CEO duality); FBM (frequency of board meetings - coefficient estimated by instrumental 
variable method). Control variables: LTA (logged total assets), AGE (age of the company), PI (primary sector), SI 
(secondary sector). 
a. Model, ROA=a + ßISBOD + /J2PIND +ß3A UC +fi4'CD +fljLEC +ß6'BhfP + ßX1 GE + PL TA + Qs/ + AM 
+ 
Note: A plot of the standardised residuals against standardised predicted values was inspected and no evidence of 
the heteroscedasticity or non-linearity was detected. 
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9.4.4 The Effects of the Strategic Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Corporate Performance 
While all of the work discussed in the previous sections focuses on the impact of 
individual governance mechanisms on corporate performance, recent research by 
Coles et al and Sundaramurthy et al argue that the independence assumption may have 
some problems since firms are more likely to use governance packages to deal with 
agency issues and various corporate control mechanisms co-exist within the company, 
so that corporate governance mechanisms may substitute for or enhance each other. 77 
The study adopts this perspective and expands on this view by proposing a framework 
for examining how a company selects a package of governance mechanisms, and the 
impact of this selection on performance. Table 9.7 explores the regression results by 
combining all corporate governance mechanisms employed in this study. The findings 
show that the "inverse U-shaped" relationship between ownership concentration and 
corporate performance still exists with significance at the 10% level for PLS and the 
5% level for PLSS. The effect of the identity of the largest shareholder qualitatively 
also remains the same on ROA, but is less strong and less significant compared with 
the regression results shown in Table 9.4. Similarly, the voting level and logged 
turnout ratio at the AGM qualitatively remain positive and significant, but stem also 
less strong and less significant compared with the previous results showed in Table 
9.5. Nevertheless, although the estimated coefficient on the presence of an audit 
committee remains qualitatively unchanged, it is not significant at the conventional 
'"Coles, J. W., V. B. McWilliams and N. Sen, op cit. fn. 114; C. Sundaramurthy, J. M. Mahoney and I. T. Mahoney, 
Board Structure, 1997. Antitakeover Provisions, and Stockholder Wealth, Strategic Management Journal. Vol. 18: 3 
231-245. 
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level any more. The coefficient for the control variable AGE remains negative and 
statistically significant at 1% level and LTA continues positive and statistically 
significant at 1% level, but the industrial sector variables are still insignificant in this 
regression model. 
Table 9.7 The effects of the strategic corporate governance mechanisms on corporate 
., nrfnrmanrP* 
ROAR 
Model B Std. Error Beta 
(t I 
Sig. 
(Constant) -15.920 5.377 -2.961 . 003 
PLS . 192 . 
106 . 504 1.813 . 071 
PLSS -. 002 . 001 -. 572 -2.088 . 038 
SOE 5.324 2.666 . 377 1.997 . 047 
GA 4.845 2.740 . 246 1.769 . 078 
COM 4.994 2.703 . 281 1.847 . 066 
FAI 6.988 2.776 . 294 2.517 . 012 
VL . 096 . 039 . 202 2.452 . 015 
LTR 1.156 . 327 . 195 3.539 . 000 
SP . 340 1.508 . 012 . 225 . 822 
SBOD -. 033 . 167 -. 011 -. 198 . 843 
PIND . 046 . 046' . 057 1.001 . 318 
AUC 1.207 . 850 . 080 1.421 . 157 
LEC . 394 . 376 . 058 . 1.047 . 296 
CCD -1.695 1.187 -. 077 -1.428 . 155 
FBMP -. 226 . 370 -. 033 -. 610 . 542 
AGE -. 740 . 169 -. 262 4.383 . 000 
LTA 1.904 . 428 . 262 4.447 . 000 
SI -. 274 1.528 -. 010 -. 179 . 858 
Ti -. 196 . 837 -. 014 -234 . 815 
R . 340 
Adjusted RZ . 289 
F' 6.696* ** 
'Dependent Variable: return on total assets. Independent variables: PLS (the proportion of shares hold by the 
biggest shareholder), PLSS (squared the proportion of shares hold by the biggest shareholder), SOE (identity of the 
largest shareholder is an SOE); GA (identity of the largest shareholder is a government agency); COM (identity of 
the largest shareholder is a non financial corporation); FAI (identity of the largest shareholder is a family or 
individual; LVL (logged voting level at the AGM); LTR (logged turnout ratio at the AGM); SP (shareholder 
proposal submitted at the AGM); SBOD (size of board of directors) PIND (proportion of independent directors in 
the board); AUC (audit committee); EC (executive compensation), CCD (Chairperson and CEO duality); Ft3M 
(frequency of board meetings - coefficient estimated by instrumental variable method). Control variables: LTA 
(logged total assets), AGE (age of the company), PI (primary sector), SI (secondary sector). 
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a. Model, ROA=a + ß1PLS + ß2PLSS +ß3SOE +ß4GA +ßsCOM +ß6FAI +ß, LVL +ß8LTR +P SP + ßIO$BOD + 
ßuPIND, +ßI24 UC + ß13CCD + ß14LEC + ßJSFBMP +ßj AGE + ßnLTA + , 
81 SI + ß19T! +e 
Note: A plot of the standardised residuals against standardised predicted value was inspected and no evidence of 
the hetroscedasticity or non-linearity was defected. 
9.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter incorporates recent data on Chinese listed companies in a study of the 
impact of corporate governance on corporate performance. This study is distinctive in 
a number of ways. Conceptually, it provides an analysis of the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance, and it considers each 
mechanism including ownership structure, shareholder activism and board of directors 
separately. as well as jointly. In considering the effects of ownership structure on 
corporate performance, the findings confirm previous studies suggesting that the 
relationship between ownership concentration and economic performance is 
nonlinear, so that ownership concentration beyond a certain point leads to 
entrenchment and has adverse effects on performance. The findings imply that 
expropriation problems may be incurred if the largest shareholder holds more than 
48.83 per cent of company's shares in China. In addition, the findings also support the 
hypothesis that the identity of the largest shareholder is important as an influence on 
corporate performance. For example, government ownership is associated with lower 
performance of the company, whereas family and individual ownership is found to 
have a significantly positive effect on performance. This result is consistent with the 
literature (e. g. Thomsen and Pedersen) and suggests that the government is likely to 
pay more attention to political goals, such as low output prices, employment or other 
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external effects relative to profitability. 978 The implication is that there is a need for 
China to consider the innovation of the ownership structure in order to improve 
corporate performance. In principle there will be potential gains for all shareholders if 
the Chinese government decides to privatise, especially if a dominant ownership stake 
can be transferred to family and individual investors. 79 
We also find "a particularly strong effect of shareholder activism on corporate 
performance based on its estimated coefficients of the voting level and the turnout 
ratio at the AGM. The way voting at the AGM is carried out by shareholders in 
person, which is an important corporate governance mechanism, can further enhance 
corporate performance. However, the available evidence is not convincing that 
shareholder activism can perform a significant function in corporate governance in 
China because shareholder activism, heavily dependant on the monitoring role of the 
large shareholders, has limitations. Firstly, the low turnout ratio with high voting level 
indicates that the minority shareholders typically do not attend the AGM and the 
conflicts of interest between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders 
becomes the main agency problem which has led to the expropriation of minority 
shareholders in many Chinese listed companies. Secondly, there are a limited number 
of financial institutions or families and individual investors in the largest shareholder 
group. The government usually directly or indirectly owns substantial shareholdings 
"" Thomsen, S. and T. Pedersen, op cit. fn. 825. 
'"As the institutional shareholder system is underdeveloped in China, the results are based on limited identity 
categories. In other words, institutional shareholders were excluded from this study, and so cannot provide any information with regard to the effect of institutional shareholders on performance. 
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f 
and is often heavily involved in corporate decisions, so that the shareholder meeting 
system is less likely to evolve in a manner to protect minority shareholders, and more 
likely to promote the controlling shareholder's interests. Finally, it should also be 
pointed out that, as discussed in Chapter 5, the shareholder meetings are frequently 
convened in many listed companies, even though the costs are obviously sizable for 
minority shareholders. Under such a scenario, only the shareholders who hold 
substantial shareholdings have an incentive and capacity to attend all the meetings. 
This might result in the large shareholder extracting more private benefits and 
diverting corporate assets at some level of shareholdings. 
The board of directors seems to have a very limited effect on corporate performance 
in China. Board size, the proportion of independent directors, the separation of the 
chairman and CEO, executive compensation and the frequency of board meetings 
seem to have no significant effects on corporate performance. This finding is 
, consistent with some previous studies 
(such as Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991, Klein, 
1998 and Bhagat and Black, 2002). A number of possible explanations for'this finding 
may be proposed. Firstly, in this study, Table 9.1 reports that among the 267 Chinese 
companies in our sample, the proportion of directors who are independent averages 
just over one quarter. This figure is consistent ' with the CSRC report8S° which 
8S0 In August 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), authorised by the State Council, 
promulgated the "Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed 
Companies" (the Guidelines). The Guidelines require that by June 30th, 2002, at least two members of the board of directors should be independent directors; and by June 30th, 2003, at least one-third of the board should be 
independent directors. According to the CSRC report, a total of 1,244 companies out of 1,250 listed companies on 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges has established independent directors by the end of June 2003. 
Among 1244 listed companies, only 800 companies (accounting for 65%) have satisfied the requirement in respect 
of at least one-third of board members being independent, and 1023 companies (accounting for 82%) have one- quarter independent directors in the boardroom. See Lu et al. Corporale Governance Correspondence, vol.!, 2004, 
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indicates that the independent board system has not been well established in China by 
the date of this study. The primary intent of the independent board system is to 
encourage listed companies to establish and develop a modern enterprise system, 
regulate the business operations of listed companies, and to foster higher corporate 
productivity and economic performance. However, its implementation will take time. 
Secondly, although the study shows that the majority of companies separated the roles 
of the chairman and CEO in China, this does not mean that the chairman was an 
independent outside member of the board. Ho argues that in most cases the chairman 
of the board in China represents the controlling shareholders who are former general 
managers in the state-owned enterprise or party secretaries being dominant on the 
board. 881 Obviously, this form of leadership structure could make listed companies 
much like wholly-owned subsidiary companies of the controlling shareholders, so that 
board decisions would normally be in the interests of the controlling shareholders 
rather than in the interests of the company as a whole. In addition, it is evident that the 
titles of chairman and CEO can be very misleading in China because many chairmen 
of the board who work full-time for the companies are executives in all but namc 882 
This scenario suggests that the leadership structure of Chinese listed companies is not 
truly captured in customary definitions of the separation of the role of chairman and 
CEO. 
available at http: //www. iwep. org. cn/cccglpdf/tongxun 2003-S f [Accessed 28 September 2005J. 
881 110, S. M. 2003. Corporate Governance in China: Key Problems and Prospects, Centre jor ACcounfing 
Disclouse and Corporate Governance, School ofAccountancy, The Chinese University of I long Kong 982 Zhong, Juyin, op cit. fn. 491. 
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Finally, the data analysed in this study are limited to the 2002/2003 financial year. 
Further research which extends the period of the study may result in different 
conclusions. In addition, although the study finds evidence for a positive influence of 
the presence of an audit committee by assessing board characteristics only, this result 
is not confirmed when all corporate mechanisms are included in model 4. The 
evidence seems to suggest that the effectiveness of the board system is dependent 
upon the effectiveness of the integration of the overall system of corporate 
governance on economic performance. 83 
The control variables measured by LTA (logged total assets) and AGE (the age of the 
company) are strong and significant drivers of performance in all regression 
equations. These results show that, on the one hand, larger firms perform better on 
average in China. The reason may be that the large listed companies have the priority 
which they attach to shareholder value such as market environment, financial 
capacity, as well as business network relationships. On the other hand, given the 
negative and significant relationship in this study between AGE and corporate 
performance, the logical explanation would be that the older companies arc mainly 
formed by government agencies which represent a trade off between shareholder 
value and other goals, or to some extent, may be due to a lack of renovation of 
products and outp-dated management. The study does not find any impact of 
industrial sectors on corporate performance. However, further research by using the 
aas in unreported results, where estimates exclude SBOD, PIND, and FBM variables in the Model 4, the prcscncc 
of audit committee is positive and significant related to ROA (sib ". 085). 
324 
specified measurement of industry categories may potentially change the statistical 
significance of these findings. 
In conclusion, this study presents empirical evidence on the effects of ownership 
structure, shareholder activism and the characteristics of the board on corporate 
performance, both separately and as interactions. The results explored in this chapter 
indicate the need to take the interaction of corporate governance mechanisms into 
account when assessing their impact on corporate performance. In terms of further 
research, there is a need to apply a cross-country approach to examine the relative 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in relation ' to corporate 
performance in different countries. 
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CHAPTER 10 
ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 
10.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we have examined the evolution and development of the 
corporate governance systems in China and the UK and, where appropriate, we have 
used empirical evidence to assess the ongoing evolution of the governance structures 
of Chinese publicly listed companies with reference to the governance structures of 
UK companies. By means of a functional comparison of both countries' systems, 
many problems in current Chinese corporate governance practices have been 
identified, including the concentration of state ownership, the expropriation of 
minority shareholders by controlling shareholders, the relative ineffectiveness of the 
hybrid two-tier board system and the lack of independence of the supervisory board, 
as well as an inadequate (or incomplete) law in respect of directors' duties and 
enforcement. In addition, given the distinctive features of, the Chinese corporate 
governance system, we have estimated a regression model to investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance in China. The 
empirical evidence provides statistical insights on how the current corporate 
governance system affects the performance of the listed companies in China. The 
functional comparative analysis, supplemented by the regression analysis on the 
relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance in China, 
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provides empirical evidence confirming that the weakness of the Chinese corporate 
governance system is not simply a consequence of the concentrated ownership 
structure. The weakness is also in part due to the ineffectiveness of internal 
monitoring rules, inadequate or incomplete law and poor law enforcement. 
The numerous findings presented in this thesis give us very strong reasons to believe 
that although the Anglo-American corporate governance system has been largely 
adopted by China, the current Chinese corporate governance system has not benefited 
from the advantages generally associated with the Anglo-American model. The thesis 
focuses on the institutional differences in ownership structures, board structure and 
accountability, and the impact of legal rules and enforcement on the efficient 
operation of companies in China and the UK in order to identify some solutions to the 
problems of creating a strong corporate governance environment for the success of 
China's economic reform. In section 10.2, we present a summary of findings and 
discuss their implications. In section 10.3 we provide some suggestions for the 
Chinese government to improve the Chinese corporate governance system. In Section 
10.4, we outline the limitations of the research and offer some suggestions for future 
research. 
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10.2 Summary of Findings 
Ownership structure is one of the key determinants of corporate governance. The 
empirical evidence presented in Chapter 4 shows how Chinese publicly listed 
companies are structured, who controls Chinese listed companies, how they differ 
from companies in other jurisdictions and whether the conflict of interest between the 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, which is created by the existing 
ownership structure, represents an important problem in the Chinese corporate 
governance system. By investigation of three key aspects of ownership structure - the 
types of ownership, ownership concentration, and the identities of shareholders - the 
findings suggest that high ownership concentration and de facto state control of 
Chinese publicly listed companies have resulted in the potential expropriation of 
minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders in China. Ownership without 
owner and yigu duda (big brother ownership/directorship) which support `tunnelling' 
activities by controlling shareholders, government influence over management 
appointments and management political incentives - have seriously affected the 
operation and performance of listed companies, and these have led to some listed 
companies being temporarily suspended from listing. To, some extent, the results 
obtained here are consistent with the available evidence in most developing countries 
(including emerging and transition economies) with similar corporate governance 
problems. 884 
8" For example, Du and Dai investigate the effects of ownership structure in East Asian corporations showing that 
the controlling shareholder may excessively raise debt and increase the corporate leverage ratio which leads to intensive corporate value losses during a financial crisis. Julan Du and Yi Dai, 2005. Ultimate Corporate 
328 
In addition, the findings from our regression analysis. of the relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate performance in China in Chapter 9 of the thesis 
indicate that. the relationship between ownership concentration and economic 
performance exhibits an inverted U-shaped pattern. This result suggests that the ROA 
will increase with the largest shareholder's shareholding up to approximately 48.83% 
of company's shares and decrease afterwards. This result is consistent with related 
studies such as Morck et al, McConnell and Servae, and Thomsen and Pedersen 8ßs 
We also find that the identity of the largest shareholder is important as an influence on 
corporate performance. The regression results suggest that Chinese listed companies 
tend to have a higher ROA if the largest shareholder is a family or individual investor. 
In contrast, if the largest shareholder is a government agency, corporate performance 
is lower compared with other identities. The implications of these findings are two- 
fold. One the one hand, a concentrated ownership structure is not always the best 
approach to minimise agency costs. Firms with a controlling shareholder are more 
likely to experience expropriation of minority shareholders; On the other hand, 
ownership concentrated in the hands of private owners is likely to lead to bcttcr 
performance. Regarding this, we conclude that. privatisation - the transfer of 
ownership from state to the private sector - may stimulate a sufficient numbcr of 
private owners to use their resources efficiently, which, in turn, will hclp Chinese 
Ownership Structures and Capital Structures: Evidence from East Asian Economics, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, Vol. 13, pp60-71. Similarly, Lemmon and Lins also demonstrate that the expropriation of 
minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders and managers directly resulted in a low stock value in the 
Asian financial crisis period. See Lemmon, M and Lins, K. V. 2003, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance 
and Finn Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis, Journal of Finance, 58, pp1445.1468. 891 McConnell, J. J. and Servaes, 11.1990. "Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value, Journal of Financial Economics, 27,595-612; Morck, R., A. Shleifcr and R. W. Vishny, op cit fn. 38; and Thomsen. S. and T. Pedersen, op cit. fn. 825. 
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listed companies to improve their economic performance. However, it should be noted 
that privatisation itself is unlikely to resolve the problem of corporate governance and 
managerial motivation. Indeed, disappointment with the results of privatisation in 
Russia, voucher privatisation in the Czech Republic and infrastructure privatisation in 
many developing countries has lead to some new critiques of privatisation 886 Some 
argue that where markets are fully competitive, ownership does not have an impact on 
efficiency. 887 As far as the operation of privatised companies in transition countries is 
concerned, Lojpuer suggests that the main objective of privatisation in transition 
economies is not to eliminate state or social property but, primarily, to merge a new 
ownership structure with efficient management structures which should result in 
corresponding corporate success. 88 Thus, we stress that in addition to privatisation, 
mechanisms to ensure that shareholders possess sufficient power, initiative and 
capability to supervise and scrutinise management are also seen as necessary to the 
development of the Chinese corporate governance system. 
The general principles of shareholder rights are enshrined in company law in cvcry 
jurisdiction. However, how voting rights should be exercised in shareholder meetings 
depends largely on the jurisdiction of incorporation of the company. Shareholdcr 
voting and procedural rules are discussed by La Porta et al, who specify six key 
886 Mary M. Shirley and Patrick Walsh, "Public versus Private Ownership: The current State of the Debate", 
available at htpp: //econ. worldbank. org/files/1175 wps2420. pdf. 
$ay Borcherding, Thomas E.; Schneider, Friedrich and Pommerehne, Werner. "Comparing the Efficiency Private 
and Public Production", Zeitshrift fur Nationalokonomie, 1982 Supplement. Whitehead, C. "Introduction, Theory 
and Practice", in Whitehead, ed., Reshaping the Nationalised Industries. New Brunswick: Transaction [looks, 
1988. 
$99 Andelko Lojpuer, 2004, Corporate Governance in the Transition Process, South-East Europe Review, Vol. 3, 
pp. 107-118 
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shareholder rights in relation to shareholder meetings and voting issues: the right to 
mail their proxy vote to the firm; the right to participate in the general shareholders' 
meeting without having previously deposited their shares with the company; the rights 
to benefit from cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the 
board of directors; the rights to benefit from the existence of an oppressed minorities 
mechanism; the right to hold an extraordinary shareholders' meeting if it is called for 
by a minimum of no less than 10 per cent of share capital; and the existence of pre- 
emptive rights to new security issues that can only be waived by a shareholders' 
vote. 889 However, they failed to observe how these rights are operated in each 
country. The research into shareholder meetings and voting rights in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis covers a detailed comparative discussion of the legal and technical rules on 
shareholder meetings. By examining how the legal rules of shareholder mcctings are 
applied in relation to publicly listed companies in China, we find that although 
Chinese company law empowers shareholder meeting sovereignty, the shareholder 
meeting does not in practice play the role envisioned by the legal model. Too much 
power located in the shareholder meeting has resulted in a higher frequency or 
shareholder meetings in China, which obviously adds an administrative and economic 
burden on to companies and shareholders alike. In addition, we note that the 
introduction of the rule of cumulative voting to regulate controlling shareholders in 
exercising their voting rights for the appointment of directors and supervisors would 
be useful as a means of mitigating conflicts of interest. I lowcvcr, such a rule would be 
in see La Porta et al. 1998, op eit, fh. 6. 
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unlikely to produce the desired benefits of conflict monitoring because the controlling 
shareholders would still possess a powerful ability to influence corporate behaviour 
and decisions. In order to gain the desired result of effective monitoring by minority 
shareholders, it would be necessary to change the ownership structure and create a 
new breed of -private institutional owners, holding much larger stakes in their 
portfolios, which would then be dependent on the long-term performance of those 
companies. 
Moreover, the empirical evidence demonstrates that the shareholder meeting is 
ineffective as a corporate governance mechanism in China because of incomplete or 
inadequate procedural rules of voting which have resulted in poor attendance, a low 
voting ratio, and minority shareholders having very limited powcr and incentive to 
involve themselves in or challenge corporate decisions. This reflects the fact that 
although the existing corporate legal system in China provides certain mechanisms for 
enhancing effective conduct of the shareholder meetings and voting rights, minority 
shareholders still face significant practical difficulties in exercising voting rights, as 
well as economic disincentives to participate in shareholder meetings. In order to 
improve the passive role of minority shareholders and mitigate the conflicts of intcrcst 
between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, the ruics governing 
shareholder voting rights should be designed, on the one hand, to facilitate the 
exercise of voting rights by minority shareholders, and on the other hand, to impose 
necessary measures to prevent the controlling shareholders from abusing of their 
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voting rights. Indeed, our regression analysis supports the hypothesis that the turnout 
ratio and voting levels at the shareholder meetings have a particularly strong positive 
effect on corporate performance. One implication of this finding is that shareholders 
should be encouraged to exercise their voting rights either by participating, in person, 
in the shareholder meeting, or voting through proxy. In the light of considerable 
developments in electronic communication and the growing trend of individual 
shareholders, it will be desirable that Chinese listed companies should be able to vary 
the voting methods to facilitate the exercise of voting rights by shareholders. 
The role and structure of boards of directors have been studied by many researchers. 
The issues relating to the structure and role of the board of directors arc closely 
examined in Chapter 6 of the thesis. At present, China has borrowed both the two-tier 
board system and the independent director system from Western corporate 
governance practices. However, our empirical analysis provides cvidcncc that the 
hybrid system adopted by Chinese listed companies does not promote a strong and 
responsive board to ensure directors' accountability. For cxampic, cvidcncc has 
shown that the two-tier board system in the Chinese context is not cffcctivc as it is 
often unclear whose interest is being represented by the supervisory board. In many 
cases, the supervisory board which has acted as an honoured guest, a fricndly advisor, 
or a censored watchdog rather than an independent watchdog 840 has little influcncc 
on the decisions made by the board of directors and management. The cstablishmcnt 
I' Jason Zezhong Xiao, Jay Dahya and Zhijun Lin, 2004, A Ground Theory Exposition of the Role of the Supervisory Board in China. British Journal of Managcmcnt, Vo1.15, pr39-35. 
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of the independent director system is intended to prevent controlling shareholders 
from expropriation of minority shareholders and to monitor management 
integrity and 
performance. However, experience has shown that the 
independent director system 
has not been well-established in Chinese listed companies. 
Although a majority of 
companies have appointed independent directors, like many 
developing countries, the 
independent board and specialised committees are largely non-existence because most 
independent directors, who are not sufficiently independent, are often nominated by 
the controlling shareholders or by executives who are also representatives of the 
controlling shareholders rather than independent nomination committees. 
E9, In 
addition, the co-existence of independent directors and the supervisory board in 
China's corporate governance structure has created potential problems for effective 
monitoring because the monitoring functions overlap which not only increases the 
cost of corporate governance, but also leads to confusion between the roles and 
functions of the supervisory board and independent directors in practice. 
The ineffectiveness of the hybrid board system in Chinese listed companies is 
confirmed in our regression analysis where we examine various aspects of the 
relationship between the board of directors and corporate performance. We find that 
891 For example, Chen. Fan, and Wong present data on the boards of directors of 621 companies that went public 
from 1993 through 2000 in China. They report that almost 50 percent of the directors arc appointed by state 
controlling owners, and another 30 percent are affiliated with various layers of governmental agencies. l here are 
few professionals (lawyers, accountants, or finance experts) on Chinese boards and almost no rcprescntatives of 
minority shareholders. See Chen, D. II.. J. P. 11. Fan and TJ. Wong, 2002. Do Politicians Jeopardize Professionalism? 
Decentralization and the Structure of Chinese Corporate Boards, Working Paper, Shanghai University of Finance 
& Economics and llong Kong University of Science & Technology. In comparison, Goswami states: "perhaps the 
greatest drawback of corporate governance in India is the de facto lack of independent directors on the vast 
majority of boards". See Omkar Goswami, 2000. op cit. fn. l i g. Jamal Uddin Ahmad identifies the lack of 
independent of directors as one of the primary obstacles to good corporate governance in Bangladesh. See Jamal 
Uddin Ahmad, 2000, Corporate Governance for Transparency and Accountability. he Bangladesh Account, 
Vol. 29. No. 2. 
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the structure of the board of directors seems to have a very limited effect on corporate 
performance. This result suggests that although the board system reform implemented 
in China is based on the idea that shareholder welfare should be enhanced by 
independent directors who are capable of mitigating agency problems, improving 
corporate performance, in reality the independent directors are likely to remain mere 
formalities. Building on these findings, we argue that further reform of the board 
system is still critical to the evolution of corporate governance in China. 
Corporate governance is an institutional framework defined in large part by law. 
Some argue that all developing countries (including emerging and transition 
economies) need to incorporate substantial aspects of the Anglo-American model of 
corporate governance, in particular, the development of legal rights and the procedural 
mechanisms for their enforcement to support the functioning and devclopmcnt of 
corporate governance regimes as a whole 892 In Chapters 7 and 8, we examine how 
well the legal duties have been imposed on directors, and analysc the rolc of 
shareholders in enforcing directors' duties and the current development of company 
law in respect of shareholder legal actions, and assess the uncertainty and ambiguity 
surrounding the civil proceeding regimes in China compared with the UK. By 
comparison, we find that the rules governing directors' fiduciary duties and duty of 
care, skill and diligence are incomplete in China compared with the UK. Although 
"2 Dennis C Mueller, 2006, The Anglo-Saxon Approach to Corporate Govemancc and Its Applicability to 
Emerging Markets, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 14, pp207-219. Boris Z. Marinov, 1998, 
Company Law and Corporate Governance Renewal in Transition Economics: The Bulgarian Dilemma, European 
Journal of Law and Economics, 6: 231-261. Soederbcrg, S. 2003. The Promotion of'Anglo- American' Corporate Governance in the South: Who Benefits from the New International Standard? Third World Quarterly, 24, pp7.28. 
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China has transplanted certain common law rules into the Chinese corporate 
governance system, the validity, legality and enforceability of directors' duties has 
become more problematic in practice because the transplanted common law rules only 
exist in the CSRC's directive or corporate governance code. The directive and code of 
corporate governance is neither the formal law nor a judicial explanation promulgated 
by the Supreme People's Court, so they carry very weak legal authority in the 
litigation process. In addition, the enforcement of directors' duties and the rights and 
. remedies of shareholders 
raise not only substantive provisions in company law, but 
also inevitably involve procedural issues that would enable shareholders to bring and 
pursue a lawsuit. By looking at the CCL 1994, the thesis finds that the legal 
framework provided very limited procedural rules governing shareholder litigations, 
and the shareholder protection is rather weak compared with the UK. Although the 
recent development of Chinese company law and securities law gives various forms 
of protection to minority shareholders, evidence shows that minority sharcholdcrs' 
interests are not properly protected because of the absence of judicial indcpcndcnce 
and impartiality. 
The institutional mechanisms of corporate governance discussed in this thesis 
comprise a system which is critical to the enhancement of corporate performance in 
China. A number of studies look at the relationship between corporate performance 
and the combination of various instruments of corporate govcmancc suggesting that 
the interaction of corporate governance mechanisms is important in determining 
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corporate performance. 893 Consistent with these studies, our regression results also 
indicate there is a need to consider the interaction of the corporate governance 
mechanisms when assessing their impact on corporate performance. For example, in 
the combined model [model (4)], the effect of the identity of the largest shareholder 
qualitatively remains the same on ROA, but is less strong and less significant 
compared with the regression results shown in the model (1), where we tcst the 
relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance separately. 
Similarly, the relationship between the voting level and logged turnout ratio at the 
AGM qualitatively remains positive and significant, but also seems less strong and 
less significant compared with the results shown in model (2), where we tost the 
relationship between shareholder activism and corporate performance respectively. 
Moreover, although the estimated coefficient on the presence of an audit committee 
remains qualitatively unchanged, it is not significant at the conventional level in the 
combined model (4) compared with model (3), where we test the relationship between 
the board of directors and corporate performance respectively. The implication of 
these findings is that corporate governance mechanisms have been developed over 
time in a specific economic, legal and political environment within a country, and no 
single mechanism can provide a solution for the entire sct of corporate governance 
problems, but rather certain mechanisms are interdependent and sometimcs substitutes 
or complements. 
893 Coles et al, 2001, op cit. fn. 1 14, Sundaramunhy et at, 1997, op cit. fn. 877. 
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An open question in relation to the issues discussed in this thesis is: if China's current 
corporate governance system is inefficient, can China's governance systems be 
expected to converge to a new internal governance system, comprising the bcst 
practices in the UK? Comparative corporate governance debates on the issue of 
convergence have suggested that although there has been some convergence in states' 
governance systems, considerable differences remain. 
8 These differences, in turn, 
raise important questions about the reasons for their continued existence, about the 
comparative merits of alternative governance schemes and about the possibility of 
states improving their own governance schemes by borrowing the best practices from 
other states. From a comparative perspective, China is experiencing some form of 
convergence along the Anglo-American lines. However, the complex ownership 
structure and inadequate existing legal rules need to be recognised as the elements of 
6 path dependence' in shaping China's corporate governance system. With thcsc 
unique characteristics in mind, we now attempt to provide some constructive 
suggestions to the Chinese government to improve the Chinese corporate governance 
system. 
"' John C. Coffee, 1999, The Future as Iiistory: The Prospects of Global Convergence in Corporate Govcrnacnc 
and Its Implications. Northwestern University Law Review, 93 (3): 639-707. John C. Coffee, 2001.11he Rise of 
Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of O%ncrship and Control, Vol. 111, Yale 
Law Journal, 1. Christel Lane, 2003. Changes in Corporate Governance of German Corporations: Convergence to 
the Anglo-American Model? ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper 
No. 259, M. J. Rubach and T. C. Sebora, 1998. Comparative Corporate Governance: Competitive Implications of an Emerging Convergence, 33. Journal of World Business, 167. 
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10.3 Recommendations 
10.3.1 Reforming Ownership Structure 
The comparison of the corporate governance systems in China and the UK seems to 
suggest that the effectiveness of corporate control mechanisms differs as a result of 
differences in the corporate ownership structure and the identities of shareholders. 
The concentrated corporate ownership structure and the existence of state-owned 
shares and legal person shares have clearly reduced the effectiveness of the 
shareholding system as a vehicle of corporate control in China. The problems of the 
ownership structure have been recognized by the Chinese government and attention is 
being given to reducing the proportion of shares owned by the state. Indeed, in July 
2001, the Chinese government announced that the principle of the reduction of state 
shareholdings was commencing. However, in the following months, the share price in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange markets dropped by approximately 40%. In 
October 2001, China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) had to makc an 
announcement to stop the reduction of state stakes 895 
Although the reduction of the state's shareholdings should in theory makc intcmal 
monitoring and the market for corporate control more cffectivc, the reality shows that 
' By observation of the China's stock markets, Liu summarised that "during 2000-2004, as China's GDP grew by 
53%, the Shanghai and Shenzhen benchmark indexes fcll by more than one third each. A recent on-line survey on 
25,675 Chinese investors conducted by the internet portal sina. com showed that 94.281,1* of investors lost money in 
their stock investment, 67.34% of whom claimed to have lost more than half of their investment..., after four 
years' bear market, the market capitalization of tradable shares in China has dropped from close to 1.7 trillion )'ran 
to 0.7 trillion yuan (up to early May of 2005). Nearly one trillion Yuan worth of wealth disappeared in Just 4 can 
and the trend is still continuing. " See Qiao Liu, 2006, Corporate Governance in China, Current Practices. 
Economic Effects and Institutional Determinants, CESifo Economic Studies, 52 (2): 415-453. 
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it may give rise to sharp fluctuations in the market and may even cause a collapse of 
the Chinese security market. Bebchuk and Roe's path dependency theory suggests 
that the current ownership structure is influenced by the initial ownership structure, 
which implies that the corporate structure will vary among countries and continue to 
do so over time. 896 So, how can China improve the effectiveness of its corporate 
control mechanisms? The following are possible ways forward: 
(a) Privatization 
This approach is a transfer of the state-owned shares from the public sector to the 
private sector. The privatization process is extremely complex, time consuming and 
costly. It cannot change the ownership structure overnight. The reduction of the statt 
stakes has to be conducted in a steady and gradual way. As we have sccn, it cannot go 
beyond the market's capacity for acceptance, otherwise it may destroy the whole 
securities market. 
(b) Specialized ownership management 
This approach is to retain state ownership, but place state shares under the control of 
specialized ownership management institutions (e. g. fund management institutions 
which act on behalf of both individual investors and pension and insurancc companies, 
and which are accountable to their own Customcrs). 897 At the same time, efforts 
L. A. Bebchuk and M. J. Roe, op cit. fn. 154. 
These institutions which are different from the government established Investment Intermediaries which naffed by the government officers, are created initially by private funds with market-based incentives and fiduciary 
responsibilities. 
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should be made to develop corporate governance by institutional shareholder activism, 
and truly transform the corporate control mechanism of companies. In fact, China has 
allowed qualified foreign institutional investors to invest directly and trade Chinese 
publicly listed companies' securities. 898 he competition between domestic and 
foreign institutional investors on the management of state shares may help to improve 
corporate governance in China. 
I 
(c) Stock options approach 
Both international practice and China's practical situation have shown that the 
reduction of state shareholdings must take into account the process of pricing the state 
shares. A viable way is to price state shares on the basis of the movement of the value 
of state assets with a full consideration of market capacity and acceptance. Therefore, 
the state shareholdings could be transferred by means of stock options which give the 
recipients, especially institutional shareholders, the right to buy a sharc of stock at a 
pre-specified exercise price for a pre-specified term. This should reduce the instant 
pressure created by capital inadequacy or lower share prices. At the same time, as 
investors hold stock options with potential interests, they would have an incentive to 
monitor the management for better performance. 
I" see the QFII, art. 2, op cit. fn. 211. 
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10.3.2 Improvement of Law and Judicial Efficiency 
Whichever approach of reducing the state shareholdings is exercised in China, there 
are no guarantees that a restructuring of ownership will eventually increase the 
effectiveness of Chinese corporate governance, because a system without a strong 
legal enforcement system will never succeed. Therefore, China also needs to 
strengthen the legal enforcement system. There are three fundamental ways which 
will provide a sound institutional basis for the enforcement of prudential requirements 
on the management of companies and an appropriate procedural rule for shareholder 
litigation against the directors for breaching their duties. 
(a) Strengthening the judicial enforcement system 
Although directors' duties and shareholder protection rules are adopted in China, the 
courts and judges have not been empowered as effectively as judges in the `common 
law' countries. Government intervention significantly affects judicial independence 
and impartiality in the litigation process 899 In addition, the company law and other 
legislation afford protection to the minority by providing that they may, in certain 
circumstance, bring a personal, representative or derivative action to cnforcc a right or 
seek a redress. However, several hurdles currently stand in the way. For example, the 
Misrepresentation Regulation clearly stipulates that the courts will not have the power 
to adjudicate in false statement cases before an administrative sanction comes into 
effect. 900 So the result is that this requirement creates some complexity and 
I" See I iutchens, W., op cit. fn. 786. 
90° See the Misrepresentation Regulations, the SRC January 15,2002. 
342 
uncertainty for shareholders filing an action against wrongdoers. It also puts 
shareholders at a disadvantage in seeking economic remedies because administrative 
sanctions always impose economic penalties to the wrongdoing companies and their 
directors. The conflict between the administrative sanctions and shareholder remedies 
in a serious securities fraud case may significantly dilute the potential for shareholder 
compensation. Taking all these factors into consideration, the solution for China is to 
strengthen the judicial enforcement system by establishing a fair and independent 
judicial environment, which is a key component of reforming Chinese corporate 
governance. 
(b) Completing the shareholder remedies system 
As discussed earlier, China has adopted the principle of minority shareholder 
protection from the Anglo-American system. However, this does not mcan that a 
shareholder remedies system has been properly established in China. For example, the 
Misrepresentation Regulation stipulates that only cases involving misrepresentation 
issues (such as false record of major transactions, misleading statcmcnts, material 
omission and acting in an inappropriate manner in information disclosure) can be sued 
through shareholder litigation. Clearly, its scope is far too narrow in response to all 
kinds of securities fraud, such as insider dealing, market manipulation and other 
unfair prejudice to minority shareholders in China. With regard to derivative action, 
however, the minority shareholder must satisfy the prerequisites and the demanding 
requirements before they may commence action. This can lead to very protracted and 
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costly proceedings in practice. Therefore, Chinese policymakers should invoke a 
comparative approach in order to complete the existing law in shareholder remedies. 
(c) Improving the shareholder litigation services system 
Although in recent years the number of Chinese lawyers has grown dramatically and 
securities and corporate lawyers have become fashionable and popular, the number of 
securities and corporate lawyers is still inadequate. Most lawyers who practice in 
securities law and the corporate governance fields are located in provincial capitals. 
At the regional level, few lawyers have the knowledge and experience in corporate 
governance to deal with shareholder litigation against a corporation or to bring a 
derivative action against directors. Therefore, we can see that the solution for China 
does not only lie in enacting more laws, but also in stimulating an awareness of the 
benefits of good corporate governance, as well as improving both the quantity and 
quality of the corporate and securities lawyers engaged in shareholder litigation and 
other corporate governance-related legal service practices. 
10.3.3 Constructive Use of Shareholder Meetings, Resolutions and 
Shareholder Voting Rights 
The shareholder meeting is the pre-eminent occasion for shareholders to cxcrcisc their 
property rights within the company they have invested in. The legal status of the 
shareholder meeting and the procedural rules regulating the shareholder meeting are 
the important elements in a country's corporate governance system. In China, the 
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shareholder meeting is "the organ of power of the corporation", 901 encompassing the 
superior corporate control authority, which differs significantly from the UK 
corporate governance system where the boards of directors are expected, in their 
fiduciary capacity, to control or approve the corporate affairs. The rationale behind 
this institutional arrangement in China is that the shareholders are considered to be the 
ultimate source of authority. However, as shareholders are generally free to act in 
their own interests and have no legal duty to act in the best interests of their follow 
shareholders and the corporation, they are likely to exercise their power to pursue the 
maximisation of short-term gains rather than long-term shareholder value, or adopt an 
agenda that may favour themselves, to the detriment of others. 
In China, in companies with concentrated ownership, the attendance and voting level 
at the shareholder general meeting largely depend on the controlling shareholders 
rather than institutional shareholders, as in the UK. By observation of the data of 
shareholder meetings and voting on the resolutions of shareholders in both countries, 
it is apparent that the main potential conflicts of interest lie between the controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders in China, whereas in the UK the main 
conflicts of interest rest on the relationship between directors and shareholders. As a 
result, in China, evidence suggests that although legally the general meeting of 
shareholders is very powerful, in reality the meeting is often simply a rubber stamp 
for the wishes of the controlling shareholders. To solve this problem, we recommend 
90' See art. 37 of the CCL 2006. 
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that shareholder meetings should be designed to ensure that, on the one hand, 
shareholders have the flexibility to influence board decision making, while on the 
other hand, the controlling shareholders should act responsibly and exercise their 
ownership and voting rights for the benefit of the company and not for any self- 
interest. 
Comparing the two countries' systems, the procedural lacuna existing in Chinese 
company legislation with respect to the shareholder meeting is to afford the minority 
shareholders more opportunities to participate effectively and vote on resolutions at 
the shareholder meetings. In the UK, the Myners Report investigated the impediments 
of the UK voting system and developed a comprehensive programme of action aimed 
at removing impediments to the voting process in the UK 902 The report emphasised 
that various parties, including the beneficial owners of shares, companies, investment 
managers, custodians, proxy voting agencies and registrars, should participate in the 
voting process to ensure that it is being operated in an effective, efficient and 
transparent way. 903 The report argues that electronic voting remained the key to a 
more efficient voting system and called for beneficial owners, fund managers and 
custodians to play their part in embracing electronic voting so that votes are properly 
cast and counted 904 Among the recommendations presented in the Myners Report, the 
importance given to electronic voting is valuable for China too, because electronic 
902 See P. Myners, 2005. Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares, Report by Paul Myners to the 
Shareholder Voting Working Group, January, available at 
http: //wHw. manifest. co. uk/links search/votingUKshares pdf [Accessed 25 April 2006] 903 ibid 
94 ibid 
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voting provides an efficient means for shares to be voted in a direct, efficient and 
timely manner and this should help to overcome the problem of the conflicts of 
interest between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. In addition, 
the threshold for tabling shareholder resolutions (3% of the company's shares is the 
current criterion under the CCL 2006) still remains fairly stringent in China compared 
with the UK system. It may also be more appropriate to allow a certain number of 
shareholders, having an average shareholding at a certain market value, to table such 
resolutions and have them circulated at no cost to themselves 905 Furthermore, the rule 
of quorum and vote by show of hands should be incorporated into the voting rules of 
China's company legislation. This is a more fundamental way to improve the voting 
system in China as it would give minority shareholders a sense of participation in the 
shareholder meeting. 
10.3.4 Establishment of the New Board System 
China's board system was initially based on the German two-tier board structure. 
However, important differences between the German model and the Chinese model 
have resulted in ineffective and unsustainable practices in the Chinese corporate 
governance system. The German two-tier board structure crcatcs a management board 
that is responsible for managing the company and a supervisory board responsiblc for 
supervising the decisions of the management board. In contrast, China's two-tier 
board system does not provide the supervisory board with the legal power to influence 
"In the UK, 100 mcmbcrs having an average holding of LIDO market value may submit shartholJcr resolutions to the shareholder meeting at the expense of the company. See s. 376 the CA 1985 and cl. 290 (2) of the [fill 
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board of directors' decisions. In practice, the supervisory board is only symbolic and 
has no real function in promoting good corporate governance. The emergence of the 
independent director system in China represents an attempt to increase board 
independence and enhance board effectiveness, but evidence suggests that the 
independent director system has not been well established in Chinese listed 
companies, and the duplication of functions between the supervisory board and the 
independent directors creates further ambiguity in China's board system. Although 
the CCL 2006 has clarified and strengthened the role of the supervisory board, it is 
still doubtful that supervisory boards will play any substantive monitoring functions 
on behalf of all shareholders and other stakeholders, because they lack independence. 
Considering the many drawbacks of China's board system, we suggest that the law 
should integrate independent directors into the supervisory board and give the 
supervisory board wide powers over boards of directors, assuming that China 
continues to employ the two-tier board system. For example, the supervisory board 
should comprise independent directors, shareholder and employee representatives 
divided into proportion of one-third from each group. The combination of 
independent directors, shareholder representatives and employee representatives 
should be an important feature of the new Chinese corporate governance system 
which might be expected to solve the potential conflict between the controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders, as well as other stakeholders. In addition, the 
new supervisory board should set up subcommittees for remuneration, nomination 
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and audit, each with a majority of independent directors. The powers and functions of 
the supervisory board may extend to the appointment or dismissal of members of the 
board of directors and approval of the level of remuneration of directors. The new 
relationship between the supervisory board and the board of directors under the new 
model will be capable of avoiding the costly role confusion between independent 
directors and the supervisory board and enhancing the effectiveness of independent 
directors in disciplining executive directors. 
10.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
This thesis has concentrated on the roles of shareholders and directors, and has only 
made limited references to the corporate governance roles played by creditors and 
employees. Particularly with regard to employees, what role they play and how much 
influence they have on the governance of companies in China are interesting and 
important questions. Under China's two-tier board system, further research could 
examine whether the current structures of employee involvement assist good 
governance and whether employees actually feel inclined to participate in the 
governance of companies. In addition, the empirical data used in Chapter 9 were 
limited to the 2002/2003 financial year. Further research which extends the period of 
the study may reach different conclusions to those reported in our regression analysis. 
Finally, since the CCL 2006 has just come into effect, many new rules have not yet 
been implemented in Chinese publicly listed companies. Further research could focus 
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on the implementation of new regulations, including the effectiveness of the means of 
enforcement used in China. 
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APPENDIX 
Survey Samples 
China 
1 Anhui Huamao Textile Company 
2 Baida Group Company 
3 Bai in Copper City Commercial 
4 Baoshan Iron & Steel A 
5 Bei'in Gehua Catv Network 
6 Beijing Zhongke Sanhuan 
7 BJ Jin xi Tour 
8 Bohai Group Company 
9 Centennial Brilliance 
10 Century Zhongtian Invest 
11 Chengdu Qianfeng Electronics 
12 Chengdu Yangzhiguang 
13 China Jialing Industrial 
14 China Liaoning International 
15 China Railway Erju 
16 China Spacestat Technolo 'A 
17 China WLD TRD Centre 
18 Chinasoft Network Technology Company 
19 Chongqing Department Store 
20 Citic Guoan Information Ind 
21 Cntic Trading Co 
22 Dalian Daxian Company 
23 Dalian Feifei Aojia 
24 Dalian Shengya Ocean 
25 Dashang Group Company 
26 Dong Feng Automobile Company 
27 Don fen Motor Electronic Instrument A 
28 Dongguan Winnerwa Indl 
29 Fujian Lon kin Company 
30 Fujian Newland Computer 
31 Fujian Shishi Xinfa 
32 Fujian Start Computer GP 
33 Fujian Tianxiang Indust 
34 Guangdong Golden Dragon 
35 Guangdong Goworld Company 
36 Guangdong Kai in Company 
37 Guangdong Mingzhu Ball 
38 Guangzhou Nanhuaxi 
39 Guangzhou Pearl River 
40 Guilin Tourism Corp. - 
41 Guizhou Panjiang Coal 
42 Handan Iron And Steel Company 
43 Hefei Department Store Group 'A' 
44 Heilon 'ian Black 
45 Henan Lianhua 
46 Hen da Real Estate Company 
47 Hengyang Jinli Technology Company 
48 Hit Shouchuan Technolo Com an 
49 Huandon Medicine Company 
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50 Hubei Guangji Pharmaceutical 
51 Hubei Wuchangyu Company_ 
52 Hubei Yihua Chemical 
53 Inner Mongolia Prairie 
54 Irico Display Devices 
55 Jiangsu Hongdou Industry 
56 Jiangsu Huaxicun Company 
57 Jiangsu Jianghuai Engine 
58 Jiangsu Yueda 
59 Jilin Chemical Fibre 
60 Langchao Electronics Information 
61 Advanced Technology & Materials Company 
62 Anhui Ankai Automobile 
63 Anhui Fangxing Science 
64 Anhui Feicai Vehicle 
65 Anhui Golden Cattle 
66 Anhui Guofeng Plas 
67 Anhui Jianghuai 
68 Anhui Wenergy Company Limited 
69 Anhui Xinke New Material 
70 An an Iron &Steel Company 
71 Auhui Bbca Biochemical 
72 Baoding Swan 
73 Baoji Titanium Company 
74 Baotou Huazi Indl Company 
75 Baotou Tomorrow Technology ompany 
76 Beihai Gofar Marine 'A' 
77 Beihai Xinli Industrial 
78 Beijing Capital Tourism 
79 Beijing Centre ate Technology 
80 Beijing Shou an Company Limited 
81 Beijing Xidan MKT 
82 Beiya Industrial Limited 
83 Bit Technology Holding Company 
84 Blue Star New Chemical Materials 
85 Bri ht Oceans Int-Teleco 
86 Canal Scientific & Tech 
87 Changchun Department Store Company 
88 Changchun Eurasia Group 
89 Changchun Goldenstar 
90 Chengdu Brilliant Development 
91 Chengdu DR Peng Tech 'A' 
92 Chengdu Taikang Network Company 
93 Chengdu Yinhe Innovations 
94 Chen zhi 'A' 
95 Chifeng Fulong Company 
96 China Sichuan 
97 China Sports Group Industry 
98 Chongqing Brewery Company Limited 
99 Chongqing Holley Share 
100 Chongqing Ton 'un e 
101 Cosco Shipping Company 
102 Cosun 
103 Dalian Beeda Technology Group 
104 Dalian Merro Pharmaceutical Company 
105 Dalian Yichen Group 
106 Da in Huake Company Limited 
107 Don ton Cement Company 
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108 Emei Shan Tourism Company 
109 FAW Car Company Ltd 
110 Fiberhome Telecommunications Technology 
111 Foshan Plastics Group Company 
112 Fujian Cement 'A' 
113 Fujian Changyuan Investment Company 
114 Fujian Expressway Development 
115 Fujian Furi Electronics Company 
116 Fujian Qingshan Paper A 
117 Fujian Sanmu Group 
118 Fujian Shenlong Development Company 
119 Gansu Lan uan Scienct 
120 GD Midea Holding Company 
121 Gemdale 'A' 
122 Gezhouba Company 
123 Guangcai Construction Group 
124 Guangdong Golden Horse 
125 Guangdong Ron tai Industry 
126 Guangdong Shaoneng 
127 Guangdong Shengyi Technology 
128 Guangxi Guitang 
129 Guangzhou Friendship Company 
130 Guangzhou Hengyun 
131 Hafei Aviation Industry 
132 Hainan Expressway Company 
133 Hainan First Investment Merchant Company 
134 Hainan Pearl River Holdings 
135 Hainan Yedao Company 
136 Haitong Food Group 
137 Hangzhou Iron & Steel Company 
138 Harbin Air Conditioning 
139 Harbin Churin Group 
140 Harbin Swan Industry Company Ltd 
141 Hebei Jinniu Energy 
142 Heilongliang Beidahuang 
143 Henan Joline & Jo sun 
144 Henan Shen HUO Coal Industry 
145 Henan To fond Pharmaceutical 
146 Henan Yinge Industrial Investment 
147 Henan Yuguang Gold & Lead 
148 Hualian Supermarket 
149 Hubei Changyuan Electric 
150 Hubei Jingshan Light Industry 
151 Hubei Qianjiang Pharmaceutical 
152 Hubei Tlanyi Technologies Company 
153 Hudong Heavey Machinery 
154 Hunan Don tin 
155 Hunan Ansu Company 
156 Hunan Computer Company 
157 Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare 
158 Inner Mongolia Lantai 
159 Jiangnan Mould & Plastic 
160 Inner Mongolia Mengdian 
161 Inner Mongolia Xishui 
162 Inner Mongolian Baotou 
163 Jiangsu Fasten Company 
164 
- 
Jiangsu Hen rul Medcinie 
- 5T5 7 F Jiangsu Kanion Pharmaceuticals 
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166 Jiangsu Sainty Corp. 
167 Hunan Valin Steel Tube 
168 Jiaozuo Wan fan Aluminium 
169 Jilin Paper Manufacturing Company 
170 Jilin Power Company 
171 Jilin Yatai Group 
172 Jinzhou Petrochemicals Company 
173 Joincare Pharmaceutical Group 
174 Jonjee High & New Technology Company 
175 Kunming Pharmaceutical 
176 Kunming Yunnei Power Co 
177 Kweichow Moutai Company Limited 
178 Lanzhou Huanghe Enter rise 
179 Leshan Electric Power 
180 Liaoning Chen da Company 
181 Liaoning Guoneng Group 
182 Liaoning Times Garments 
183 Luzhoulaojiao Company 
184 Minclong Electric Group 
185 Mudanjian Hengfeng Pa pr 
186 Nanfang Motorcycle 
187 Nanjing Central Emporium 
188 Nanjing Xinjiekou 
189 Ningbo Bird Company Limited 
190 Ningbo Success Information Industry 
191 Ningxia Hengli Steel 
192 North China Pharmaceutical 'A' 
193 Phenix Optical Company 
194 Qinchuan MCH Development Co 
195 Qingdao Jiande Biologica 
196 Sanjiu Medicines Pharmaceutical Company 
197 Sdic Yuanyi Phosphorus 
198 Shandong Huatai Paper A 
199 Shandong Lukang 
200 Shandong Shanda Company 
201 Shanghai Aerospace Automobiles Electric 
202 Shanghai Automotive 
203 Shanghai Construction Company Limited 
204 Shanghai Electric Apparatus 
205 Shanghai Hainiao Enterprise 
206 Shanghai Industrial United Holdings Comp 
207 Shanghai Jiaoda Onlly Company Ltd 
208 Shanghai Port Container 
209 Shanghai RAW Water Supply Company 
210 Shanghai Shenda Textile & Garments 
211 Shanghai Shimao Company Limited 
212 Shanghai Ton 'i Science & Technology 
213 Shanghai Xingye Housing Company Limited 
214 Shanghai Xinmei Real 
215 Shanghai Yatong Company 
216 Shanxi Lanhua SCI-Tech 
217 Shanxi Xishan 
218 Shenergy Company 
219 Shenyang Dawn Garments Company 
220 Shenyang Environmental Protection E ui m 
221 Shenyang Jinshan 
222 Shenzhen Hua ian Indust 
223 Shenzhen SED Indust Company 
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224 Shenzhen Shemin Taifeng Group 
225 Shenzhen Tone Group Company 
226 Shenzhen Worldsun Enterprises 
227 Shenzhen Zhenye Properties Company Limit 
228 Shenzhen Zhongjin Linnan Nonf 
339 Sichuan Linfeng Holding 
230 Sichuan Heia Company 
231 Sichuan Hushan Electronic 
232 Sichuan Meiya Silk Company 
233 Sichuan Minjiang 
234 . Sichuan New Hope Agri 
235 Sichuan Quanxing Company Limited 
236 Sichuan Tian i SCI & Technology 
237 Sinopec Qilu Petrochemicals 
238 Sinopec Wuhan Petroleum Group Company 
239 SINOPEC WUHAN PHOENIX CO LTD 
240 Sinotrans Air Transportation Development 
241 Suntek Technology Company Limited 
242 Taiyuan Lion-Head Cement 
243 Tianjin Binhai Energy 
244 Tianjin Reality Development 
245 Tianjin Tasly Pharmaceutical Company 
246 Tibet Jinzhu 
237 United Travel Company 
248 Wuhan Linuo Industry 
249 Wuxi Commercial Mansion Corp. 
250 Xiamen Tungsten Company 
251 Man Minsheng Group Company_ 
252 Xian Typical Industries 
253 Xin"ian Tianfu Company Limited 
254 Xinjiang Tianshan Textiles A 
255 Xizang Rhodiola Pharmaceutical 
25 Yantai Xinchao Industry 
257 Yibin Wuliangye 
258 Yintai Holdings 'A' 
259 Youn or GRP Company 
260 Yunan Malong Chemical 
261 Zhangjiajie Tourism 
262 Zhejiang Zhenyuan Company 
263 Zhejiang China Textile 
264 Zhejiang Furun Company 
265 Zhejiang Orient Holdings Company 
266 Zhejiang Xinlian Company 
267 Zhongyan Textile'A' 
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United Kingdom 
1 4IMPRINT GROUP PLC 
2 A& J MUCKLOW GROUP PLC 
3 ABACUS GROUP PLC. 
4 ABBEYCREST PLC 
5 ABERDEEN ASIAN SMALLER COMPANIES INVESTMENT TRUST PLC 
6 AEGIS GROUP PLC 
7 AFA SYSTEMS PLC 
8 AGA FOODSERVICE GROUP PLC 
9 ALEXANDRA PLC 
10 ALTERIAN PLC 
11 ALUMASC GROUP PLC 
12 ALVIS PLC 
13 AMLIN PLC 
14 ASSOCIATED BRITISH PORTS HOLDINGS P. L. C. 
15 AURORA INVESTMENT TRUST PLC 
16 AUTOLOGIC HOLDINGS PLC 
17 AVON RUBBER P. L. C. 
18 BABCOCK INTERNATIONAL GROUP PLC 
19 BALFOUR BEATTY PLC 
20 BERTAM HOLDINGS PLC 
21 BIOFOCUS PLC 
22 BOND INTERNATIONAL SOFTWARE PLC 
23 BOOTS GROUP PLC 
24 BPB PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
25 BRAMMER PLC 
26 BRIT INSURANCE HOLDINGS PLC 
27 BRITANNIC SMALLER COMPANIES TRUST PLC 
28 CAFFYNS PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
29 CAIRN ENERGY PLC 
30 CAMBRIDGE ANTIBODY TECHNOLOGY GROUP PLC 
31 CANARY WHARF GROUP PLC 
32 CAPITAL RADIO PLC 
33 CARE UK PLC 
34 CARILLION PLC 
35 CASSIDY BROTHERS PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
36 CHAUCER HOLDINGS PLC 
37 CHIME COMMUNICATIONS PLC 
38 CHRYSALIS GROUP PLC. 
39 COE GROUP PLC 
40 COMPASS GROUP PLC 
41 COMPEL GROUP PLC 
42 COOKSON GROUP PLC 
43 COSTAIN GROUP PLC 
44 COUNTRYWIDE ASSURED GROUP PLC 
45 CRODA INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
46 DAWSON HOLDINGS PLC 
47 DE VERE GROUP PLC 
48 DERWENT VALLEY HOLDINGS PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY. 
49 DEWHURST PLC 
50 DIAGONAL PLC 
51 DIPLOMA PLC 
52 DIXONS GROUP PLC, 
53 DOMINO PRINTING SCIENCES PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
54 DTZ HOLDINGS PLC. 
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55 DUNEDIN ENTERPRISE INVESTMENT TRUST PLC 
56 EASYJET PLC 
57 EDINBURGH OIL & GAS PLC 
58 ELEMENTIS PLC 
59 EMI GROUP PLC 
60 ENNSTONE PLC 
61 ENODIS PLC 
62 EURODIS ELECTRON PLC 
63 EUROPEAN MOTOR HOLDINGS PLC 
64 EXPRO INTERNATIONAL GROUP, PLC 
65 FIRST CHOICE HOLIDAYS PLC 
66 FORTH PORTS PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
67 FOUNTAINS PLC 
68 FRAMLINGTON INNOVATIVE GROWTH TRUST PLC 
69 GAMINGKING PLC 
70 GEEST PLC 
71 GLOBAL NATURAL ENERGY PLC 
72 GLOTEL PLC 
73 GOVETT EUROPEAN ENHANCED INVESTMENT TRUST PLC 
74 GOWRINGS PLC 
75 GRANADA PLC 
76 GYRUS GROUP PLC 
77 HC SLINGSBY PLC 
78 HARVEY NASH GROUP PLC 
79 HAVELOCK EUROPA PLC 
80 HEADLAM GROUP PLC 
81 HELICAL BAR PLC 
82 HGCAPITAL TRUST PLC 
83 HIGHBURY HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS PLC 
84 HOLIDAYBREAK PLC. 
85 HONEYSUCKLE GROUP PLC 
86 HORNBY PLC 
87 HOWLE HOLDINGS PLC 
88 HUNTING PLC 
89 INCISIVE MEDIA PLC 
90 INTELEK PLC 
91 INTERCARE GROUP OLC 
92 INTERIOR SERVICES GROUP PLC 
93 INTERSERVE PLC 
94 INVESCO RECOVERY TRUST 2005 PLC 
95 INVESCO TECHMARK ENTERPRISE TRUST PLC 
96 ITNET PLC 
97 JD WETHERSPOON PLC 
98 J SAINSBURY PLC 
99 JOHN SWAN & SONS P. L. C. 
100 JOHNSON MATTHEY PLC 
101 JOHNSON SERVICE GROUP PLC 
102 JPMORGAN FLEMING EUROPEAN FLEDGELING INVESTMENT TRUST PLC 
103 KBC ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES PLC 
104 KELLER GROUP PLC 
105 KIDDE PLC 
106 KIER GROUP PLC 
107 LATCHWAYS PLC 
108 LEGGMASON INVESTORS INCOME & GROWTH TRUST PLC 
109 LIONTRUST ASSET MANAGEMENT PLC 
110 LONDON & ASSOCIATED PROPERTIES PLC 
111 LONMIN PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
112 LPA GROUP PLC 
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113 LUMINAR PLC 
114 MACFARLANE GROUP PLC 
115 MALLETT PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
116 MARTIN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS PLC 
117 MCBRIDE PLC 
118 MCINERNEY HOLDINGS PUBLIC LIMITED COMPAN Y 
119 MCLEOD RUSSEL HOLDINGS PLC 
120 MEARS GROUP PLC 
121 MERRYDOWN PLC 
122 METALRAX GROUP PLC 
123 MSB INTERNATIONAL PLO 
124 NICHOLS PLC 
125 NORTH ATLANTIC SMALLER COMPANIES INVESTMENT TRUST PLC 
126 NORTHGATE PLC 
127 OLD MUTUAL SOUTH AFRICA TRUST PLC 
128 OVERNET DATA PLC 
129 OXFORD INSTRUMENTS PLC 
130 PALADIN RESOURCES PLC 
131 PHS GROUP PLC 
132 PITTARDS PLC. 
133 PLANESTATION GROUP PLC 
134 PNC TELECOM PLC 
135 PORVAIR PLC 
136 PPL THERAPEUTICS PLC 
137 PREMIER FARNELL PLC 
138 PROVIDENT FINANCIAL PLC 
139 QUAYLE MUNRO HOLDINGS PLC 
140 RPS GROUP PLC 
141 REDBUS INTERHOUSE PLC 
142 REGENT INNS PLC 
143 RM PLC 
144 ROBERT WALTERS PLC 
145 ROYAL & SUN ALLIANCE INSURANCE GROUP PLC 
146 ROYAL DOULTON PLC 
147 RPC GROUP PLC 
148 SABMILLER PLC 
149 SAFEWAY PLC 
150 SCAPA GROUP PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
151 SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE PLC 
152 SEVERFIELD-ROWEN PLC 
153 SHANKS GROUP PLC 
154 SIMON GROUP PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
155 SOMERFIELD PLC 
156 SOUTHAMPTON LEISURE HOLDINGS PLC 
157 SOUTHERN VECTIS PLC 
158 SPIRENT PLC 
159 SPRING GROUP PLC 
160 SPRINGBOARD PLC 
161 STAGECOACH GROUP PLC 
162 STODDARD INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
163 STYLO PLC 
164 SVB HOLDINGS PLC 
165 SYLTONE PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
166 TBI PLC 
167 TDG PLC 
168 TESCO PLC 
169 THE CAPITA GROUP PLC 
170 THE CITY OF OXFORD GEARED INCOME TRUST PLC 
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171 THE DAVIS SERVICE GROUP PLC 
172 THE GAME GROUP PLC 
173 THE GO-AHEAD GROUP PLC 
174 THE MAIDEN GROUP PLC 
175 THE MTL INSTRUMENTS GROUP PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
176 THE ROXBORO GROUP PLC 
177 TIBBETT & BRITTEN GROUP PLC 
178 TRIFAST PLC 
179 TRIPLE PLATE JUNCTION PLC 
180 TT ELECTRONICS PLC 
181 UCM GROUP PLC 
182 ULTRAFRAME PLC 
183 VI GROUP PLC 
184 VOLEX GROUP P. L. C. 
185 VT GROUP PLC 
186 WEMBLEY PLC 
187 WESTBURY PLC 
188 WHITBREAD PLC 
189 WILMINGTON GROUP PLC 
190 WINCANTON PLC 
191 WOOLWORTHS GROUP PLC 
192 WORKSPACE GROUP PLC 
193 XAAR PLC 
194 XANSA PLC 
195 ZINCOX RESOURCES PLC 
196 ZOTEFOAMS PLC 
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